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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses how floods are managed in two European countries, 
focusing in particular on the role of risk instruments within emerging flood 
management regimes. Studying flood management is not only relevant 
because of a rise in frequency and severity of flood events in the 1990s and 
2000s, and the expectation of a further increase due to a changing climate. It 
is also a particularly suitable issue to enrich our understanding of how 
institutions shape risk-based governance.  
Examining how institutions shape risk-based governance challenges 
and refines existing contributions on the rise of risk-based governance. In the 
literature, this rise is associated with arguments of the functional rationality 
of risk-based governance, in response to the particular problem of flooding, 
and to the wider need to deal with challenges to states as effective and 
legitimate problem-solvers. These arguments suggest a universal appeal and 
adoption of risk-based governance.   
This assumption is challenged by undertaking a comparative analysis 
of the flood regimes of Germany and England in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Germany and England are compared because, actors in both countries have, 
following major flood events in the 1990s and 2000s, recognised the 
importance of risk instruments for their emerging, more anticipatory and 
adaptive approaches to flood management, and are seemingly subject to 
similar pressures on the state actors to become more effective and 
accountable. At the same time, they display substantive differences in their 
institutions.        
In a first, descriptive step, using the risk regulation regime approach 
(Hood et al 2004), it will be demonstrated that risk instruments differ along 
three dimensions in the two countries’ regimes. These dimensions concern 
varying types of information included in assessments (hazard versus risk), 
different treatment of the uncertainty implied in the concept of risk (safety 
 5 
versus uncertainty), and the particular positions of risk instruments within 
the regime, in particular their centrality throughout the regime.  
In a second, explanatory step, the variance between the two 
countries’ flood regimes will be explained with regard to the specific 
institutional context in the two countries. This context shapes the choices of 
actors involved in flood management make concerning the design and role 
of risk instruments. It will be shown how most notably state traditions and 
perceptions, state structure, and the prevalent style of administration shape 
the risk-based flood regimes in Britain and Germany. 
By putting risk-based governance into its institutional context, this 
thesis adds a note of caution to the debate of the rise of risk-based 
governance that points to the need to better understand the varied ways in 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION. EXPLORING THE DIVERSITY OF 
RISK-BASED FLOOD MANAGEMENT 
 
 
Figure 1: Tewkesbury Cathedral, England, Summer 2007 
 
In the summer of 2007 large parts of England were covered with water 
following unprecedented precipitation in the months of June and July. 
Thirteen people died in the floods. About 48,000 households were flooded 
and billions of pounds of damage was caused. Among the households 
damaged were those of Tewkesbury in West England as the picture above 
shows.  
As the only building spared from the water appears to be the 
cathedral the picture ironically underlines the traditional description of 
floods as ‘Acts of God’ – normally understood as events outside human 
control that cannot be reasonably foreseen or prevented and for which 
therefore no one can be held responsible. The miraculously spared cathedral 
notwithstanding, the description of floods as being unforeseeable, out-of-
control events is difficult to reconcile with the developments in modern 
flood management over the 20
th
 century. In fact, a look at England’s 
Environment Agency’s flood map (see figure 2) demonstrates that the divine 
intervention in favour of the Cathedral at least did not come as a surprise. 
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The Cathedral (at the tip of the red error) is only likely to be flooded in the 
event of an extreme flood event (the bright-blue colouring indicates a 
probability of once every 1,000 years); the July 2007 floods affecting 
Tewkesbury only had a statistical return period of about once every 200 
years.   
 
Figure 2: Tewkesbury Cathedral on the Environment Agency’s EFO flood map 
But modern science improves flood management in other ways, too: 
for instance, through flood forecasting systems (such as the one for the 
Rhine river that provides downstream communities with up to 48 hours of 
notice) or through constructing flood defences (the German population is 
protected by about 7,500 km of dykes and embankments) in order to confine 
floodwater to its ‘natural’ place and thereby prevent the inundation of 
homes. While such measures have clearly not always been sufficient to 
provide absolute protection the ability to foresee and manage floods and 
their consequences has risen significantly.  
This is a result of the increasing availability of advanced instruments 
for flood risk assessment and risk-based flood management. Generally such 
instruments undertake and manage flooding on the basis of calculations of 
the probability and consequences of harmful events. More precisely 
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instruments such as flood maps, catastrophe models, and probabilistic flood 
flow models describe the probability of the occurrence of certain water 
quantities and their consequences, for instance, in terms of the water’s 
distribution over land and its effects on values. Such calculations may enable 
actors involved in flood management to design infrastructure to protect 
people and values from future flood disasters, to move or keep them out of 
future harm’s way and to improve the ability to recover from disasters in the 
future. In general the rationale for using risk in flood management is to 
anticipate flooding and take preparatory and adaptive measures. Risk 
calculations may therefore form the basis for a broad range of risk-based 
flood management measures and the organisation of flood management 
regimes.   
As shown by the choice of examples above, Germany and England
1
 
are two countries in which actors make use of flood maps, forecasting and 
the preventive infrastructure of flooding to discharge of their flood 
management responsibilities. In other words, flood management in both 
countries seems to be strongly risk-based.  
The research presented here examines in detail the role of the 
concept and instruments of risk within the flood management regimes
2
 in 
Germany and England. Its central aim concerns the systematic analysis and 
explanation of varying roles of risk
3
 within flood management regimes 
                                                 
1
 This thesis focuses on the flood management regime of England. Since devolution in 1999, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland have increasingly differentiated regimes of their own. This 
concentration on England where the central government in Whitehall plays an increasingly 
important role for flood management, however, makes sense, as will be argued later 
(chapter 4) in the light of the institutionalist perspective chosen for this study. 
2
 The regime concept will be discussed more extensively in chapter 4 on the research 
design. At this stage it is sufficient to remark that – drawing on the concept of risk 
regulation regimes by Hood et al. 2004 – flood regimes are formal and informal 
mechanisms including the organisational architecture, sets of rules and ideas and practices 
that aim to reduce flood risks.  
3
 Risk is conventionally defined as a probability of adverse consequences. However, as this 
dissertation will show, risk can be conceptualised and used in different ways in flood 
management. Chapter 3 in particular will elaborate on the use of the concept of risk in 
governance while chapter 8 will highlight the diversity in the conceptualisation of risk in the 
flood management of Germany and England. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that the 
concept of risk is used to introduce a probabilistic and quantitative logic into governance 
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embedded in different institutional contexts. This study therefore constitutes 
an effort to learn more about different forms of risk-based governance
4
 and 
their compatibility with different institutional settings.  
The rest of the chapter briefly outlines some of the central arguments 
in the debate about risk-based governance, introduces the research questions, 
discusses the main themes of the study, and sketches out the reasons for 
comparing Germany and England before presenting the structure of the 
dissertation. 
1.1 CONVERGENCE OR DIVERSITY IN RISK-BASED FLOOD MANAGEMENT? 
Why focus on diversity in risk-based flood management, though? There are 
good reasons to assume the opposite, namely a convergence towards 
particular forms of risk-based flood management. Convergence towards risk-
based flood management can be argued to be functionally rational, as well as 
underpinned by various institutional mechanisms. Moreover, particular 
forms of risk-based governance are often said to be on the rise because they 
help enhance the problem-solving capacities of the Western liberal 
democratic state. These capacities in turn have been contested from different 
angles in policy and scholarly debates, most notable questioning the 
economics of state involvement and exploring the repercussions of 
heightened demands for accountability and scrutiny of state operations in 
risk governance.    
More specifically the concept and instruments of risk can, first, be 
argued to be functionally rational for the emerging flood management 
                                                                                                                             
(quantitatively assessing the probability of occurrence of a potentially harmful event) that 
might or might not be complemented with a monetary logic (calculating the probable 
economic damage). 
4
 Broadly speaking governance is about the exercise of control. Governance is normally 
juxtaposed to government and hierarchical state interventions as it includes a variety of 
hierarchical and non-hierarchical measures undertaken by state and non-state organisations 
(Mayntz 2001; Hood et al. 2004; Rhodes 1996; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). The concept 
of governance is primarily used in this study to highlight the openness of this analysis 
towards the contributions of non-state actors to exercising control, in particular the 
insurance industry. The specific term of risk-based governance will be elaborated in chapter 
3. In general risk-based governance means that governance interventions and resources are 
informed and shaped by calculations of risk. It is, however, important to note that this study 
shows that there is not a single form of risk-based governance. 
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regimes, which emphasise anticipatory and adaptive interventions over 
remedial measures. A second argument suggests that the widespread 
adoption of similar risk-based flood management approaches results from 
the transnational diffusion of particular risk-based flood management 
approaches through transnational expert co-operation and international flood 
policy integration, echoing neo-institutionalist arguments about isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). These arguments, reflecting a widely adopted 
paradigm shift in flood management and the particular transnational 
institutional mechanisms for flood policy diffusion, are specific to the issue 
area of flood management.  
Beyond these flood-specific arguments there are other arguments that 
present the concept and instruments of risk more generally as means to 
address a set of challenges to states as effective and legitimate problem-
solvers. In particular, these challenges concern: the economic performance 
of public spending and the adverse consequences of government regulation 
of a country’s economy and society; advocacy for the market as a superior 
regulatory and distributional mechanism to states; and the increased public 
scrutiny of state operations and resulting accountability pressures on state 
actors. The ‘economic effectiveness’ arguments are normally associated with 
neoliberal ideas ((Peck 2001; Peck and Tickell 2002; Castree 2008a; Castree 
2008b) while the ‘accountability’ arguments (Power 2004; Black 2005; 
Rothstein et al. 2006a) have emerged more recently in response to the rise of 
the debates and policy initiatives about ‘good governance’ (for instance, the 
2001 ‘European Governance’ White Paper by the European Commission 
(EC 2001)). These two (sets of) arguments are embedded in the observations 
that the economic and accountability pressures apply internationally to 
developed liberal democracies as a consequence of phenomena such as 
economic globalisation, the spread of new information and communication 
technologies and wider shifts in society towards ‘late modernity’ (Giddens 
1991). Given the assumed universality (in relation to developed liberal 
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democracies) of these pressures a convergence towards particular forms of 
risk-based governance can be expected. 
But how can such arguments about the convergence of risk-based 
flood management be squared with the stark contrasts found between 
emerging flood management regimes in Germany and England? For 
instance, why does England’s central government strongly rely on a risk-
based benefit-cost ratio to allocate its flood defence budget while Germany’s 
Federal government allocates most of its spending on flood management in 
accordance to the Königsberger Schlüssel (an allocation key proportional to 
the population numbers of the 16 Länder)? Why does Germany’s 
government very restrictively and almost exclusively regulate new property 
developments in areas that are inundated on average once every 100 years 
while England’s national policies cover areas exposed to flood events as 
rarely as once every 1,000 years with more flexible restrictions based on 
three different risk zones? Finally, why does the German state spend GBP 
4.1 billion (of the GBP 7.5 billion in total economic losses) for remedial 
actions in the aftermath of the Elbe 2002 floods while the economic losses of 
about GBP 2 billion from the 2007 floods in England were largely covered 
by the insurance industry (GBP 1.5 billion) – even though both countries’ 
governments officially subscribe to private flood insurance schemes?   
These questions point to a diversity in risk-based flood management 
that seems rather puzzling in view of the arguments in support of 
international convergence in flood management regimes.  
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THEMES 
Risk has arguably become increasingly central within flood management 
regimes across Europe. Probably the most visible expression of this rise is 
the agreement and adoption of the Floods Directive in 2007 (EC 2007) by 
the member states of the European Union in which flood risk assessment and 
risk management are identified as key prerequisites to preventing major 
flood disasters. Yet, as this dissertation shows, convergence arguments fail 
 24 
to account for the impact of the different institutional contexts on policy 
instrument choices by actors involved in flood management. More 
specifically, different forms of risk-based governance are more compatible 
with some institutional settings and the particular actor interests, 
constellations and interactions that follow from them than other institutional 
contexts.  
Drawing on a set of 48 semi-structured expert interviews, a review of 
scholarly literature on risk and governance and a close analysis of policy 
documents this study seeks to answer the following research questions:  
 First, what arguments can be made in support of the rise of and 
convergence towards a particular form of risk-based flood management? 
To what extent does the practice of flood management in Germany and 
England match the expected form of risk-based flood management?  
 Second, what different forms of (and to what different degrees) are risk 
instruments and conceptualisations adopted in and shaping the flood 
management regimes of Germany and England?  
 Third, which and how do different institutional variables shape this 
variance in the risk-based governance of flooding? Can the 
institutionally shaped regimes be understood as particular and consistent 
national ‘styles’ of risk-based governance? 
These questions revolve around five interrelated themes that resonate 
with the wider scholarly debates on risk in governance. The first theme is the 
convergence theme. This theme has been salient since the concept of risk 
was popularised in the social sciences through Ulrich Beck. Beck’s risk 
society (1992; 1999) is mostly associated with the emergence of potentially 
catastrophic risks that are linked to human activity and technology in 
‘advanced modernity’. In response to this transition to ‘advanced modernity’ 
and the rise of associated risks, science and technical risk analysis 
universally become increasingly essential for risk governance. This thesis 
focuses on the four different convergence arguments (that were introduced in 
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the previous section), reflecting the aim of adopting a more nuanced view of 
how science-based and technical risk analysis is actually used in flood 
management regimes. As this dissertation will show, the four arguments are 
relevant for a study of flood management regimes because of recent shifts in 
international flood policies, the economic costs and consequences of 
flooding and flood management, and the potential implications of disasters 
on the state’s legitimacy. However, they fail to explain how and why the 
emerging risk-based flood management regimes in Germany and England 
make use of the concept and instruments of risk in very different ways. 
The second theme is therefore concerned with the diversity in the use 
of risk in governance. Diversity in the choice of policy instruments from 
country to country is a familiar topic of research. For instance, scholars (for 
instance, Vogel 2003) have discussed the varying roles and interpretations of 
the precautionary principle in different countries. Another example is the 
variation in the definition of acceptable risk and the value of each life 
between and within countries (Viscusi 1993; Heimann 1997). Moreover, 
researchers have also taken note of the fact that risks (for instance, road 
worthiness of cars) are sometimes not at all regulated in one country 
(France) but subject to tight regulations in another (Germany) (Hood et al. 
2004). The discussion of diversity in flood regimes, first, focuses on 
‘qualitative’ differences in the use of risk in governance, namely different 
conceptualisations of flood risk. One question that will be identified as 
important in the context of flood management is whether calculations of the 
probable (material) damage matter for governance interventions or not 
(instead, the focus is simply on the probable inundation). This question 
therefore revolves around the differences between the concepts of risk and 
hazard. Another question that emerges in the context of flood management is 
whether risk is used to pursue safety or communicate uncertainty. This 
question is therefore concerned with the links between the concepts of risk, 
safety and uncertainty. Secondly, a more ‘quantitative’ aspect of this study 
asks about the centrality of risk as an organising principle for governance 
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interventions and organisation, and where it is marginalised by alternative 
rationalities, such as political proportionality. As the discussions in the 
following study demonstrate, these differences in the use of risk in 
governance challenge arguments that expect the rise of one particular form 
of risk-based governance. But in what patterns can this diversity be found in 
the two countries’ regimes? 
 The third theme revolves around national patterns in risk-based 
governance. This theme of national patterns echoes arguments found in 
scholarly literature closely related to risk-based governance. The politics of 
regulation literature, for instance, contrasts the informal style of regulation 
found in Europe with the formalised regulations of the United States (Vogel 
1986). National patterns have also been found for the so-called ‘civic 
epistemologies’ (through which the public assesses the robustness of techno-
scientific claims that inform collective decision-making), distinguishing 
Germany’s consensus-seeking (built through negotiations of institutional 
stakeholders) from Britain’s communitarian epistemologies (based on shared 
perceptions among those involved in the issue area’s specific policy 
community) (Jasanoff 2005). The discussion of national patterns in flood 
management regimes of Germany and England follows the previous theme 
of diversity. Are there unique national approaches as to how much safety the 
state provides in Germany and England? Can national patterns be discerned 
as to the extent that the uncertainty of protection is considered and 
communicated in the two countries? How important an organising principle 
is risk in the respective flood regimes, and are there distinctive alternative 
logics in each of the two countries that have marginalised risk in flood 
management? Are calculations of damage potential important in one but not 
the other country? As this study of flood management regimes in Germany 
and England will illustrate, it is possible to discern distinctive patterns of use 
(and marginalisation) of risk in the two countries. 
The fourth theme embeds these national patterns in their respective 
macro-institutional context. More specifically, such an institutionalist 
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perspective, widely used for cross-country comparisons of governance 
(among others, the aforementioned analyses of the politics of regulation and 
civic epistemologies use this perspective), takes into account structural, 
cultural, normative and procedural macro-institutional factors that shape 
ideas, interests and interactions of key actors when they decide upon the use 
of risk in governance. Three sets of macro-institutional variables emerge as 
particularly relevant throughout this study of the flood regimes, namely the 
fragmentation and coherence in government and public administration, along 
with the perceptions and norms that reflect and describe the state’s 
objectives, as well as particular styles of public administration. More 
specifically, how do Germany’s Federal structure and England’s centralised 
state shape risk-based flood management? How do (constitutional) norms 
about the well-being of citizens in Germany and England’s adoption of 
neoliberal convictions influence the shape of risk-based flood management?  
How compatible are Germany’s legalistic and England’s managerial style of 
public administration with risk-based flood management? As will be shown 
in the course of this dissertation, these variables are important determinants 
of the national patterns found in the flood regimes of Germany and England.  
The final theme is concerned with additional explanatory factors 
beyond the macro-institutionalist context. Looking beyond macro-
institutional context is necessary because of the contradictions found within 
the two regimes in spite of the effects of the prevalent macro-institutional 
factors. Why, for instance, are the boundaries of the German state’s 
provision of safety fuzzier than the probabilistically defined standards 
suggest? Why do partially inefficient private insurance markets underpin the 
economic efficiency logic of England’s public flood management regime? 
These contradictions point to a number of factors familiar to scholars of risk 
governance and policy change. One factor is the importance of post-disaster 
politics and pressures on the state. Scholars have discussed disasters as 
‘focusing events’ (Birkland 1998) and ‘catalysts’ for policy change (Johnson 
et al. 2005). Another factor is the legacy of historical institutional 
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settlements on current actions by regime actors, reflecting arguments of 
‘path dependency’ made by historical institutionalists (Pierson and Skocpol 
1999; Thelen 1999; Mahoney 2000).  
By discussing these themes this research seeks to contribute to two, 
heretofore largely separate, areas of research. First, this study contributes to 
the specific debate in geography and environmental studies about the 
management of flooding. It does so by undertaking a comparative analysis of 
two countries’ flood regimes and by focusing on the variations in particular 
concepts of governance and types of policy instruments in different contexts. 
This is particularly important as policy convergence around risk-based forms 
of flood management is not solely driven by expert collaboration and 
consensus but also by supranational regulations such as the EU Directive on 
the assessment and management of flood risks from 2007 (EC 2007). 
Understanding what forms risk-based regimes take in different countries is 
therefore relevant with respect to fulfilling international obligations and 
learning about the relative adaptive capacities and paths in different 
institutional settings to challenges such as flooding.  
Secondly, this research contributes to broader debates in political 
science and sociology about the rise of risk-based governance. By putting 
risk-based governance systematically into different institutional contexts, it 
enriches contributions that study the emergence of risk-based governance in 
a single country (e.g. Power 2004); those that take a macroscopic 
perspective, implying a universal trend towards a greater role of risk in 
governance (e.g. Beck 1999); and those that focus on developing theoretical 
arguments (e.g. Rothstein, Huber and Gaskell 2006a) on the rise of risk-
based governance without embedding these arguments systematically in a 
comparative empirical context.  
1.3 WHY FLOOD REGIMES OF GERMANY AND ENGLAND?  
This dissertation aims to enrich our understanding of the nature and drivers 
of diversity in risk-based governance and in so doing to challenge arguments 
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that assume the rise of similar forms of risk-based governance 
internationally in response to particular ‘universal’ pressures for 
convergence. To this end, the country cases selected for comparison should 
on the one hand be subject to the pressures for convergence (as well as be 
familiar and capable of adopting advanced instruments for risk assessment 
and risk-based management). On the other hand, they should also vary along 
the explanatory variable. In other words, reflecting this research’s 
institutionalist perspective, the actors in charge of flood management should 
be embedded in strongly varying institutional contexts.  
The country cases selected for comparison should on the one hand be 
subject to the pressures for convergence (as well as be familiar and capable 
of adopting advanced instruments for risk assessment and risk-based 
management). On the other hand, they should vary along the explanatory 
variable. In other words, reflecting this research’s institutionalist 
perspective, the actors in charge of flood management should be embedded 
in strongly varying institutional contexts.  
Germany and England meet these requirements: both have suffered 
recently from devastating flood events that triggered policy change (and 
made resources available to flood management) towards risk-based 
anticipation and adaptation; actors in both countries are involved in similar 
international expert and policy-making circles that promote risk-based flood 
management; both countries’ state actors have been subject to economic 
efficiency and accountability pressures. At the same time, however, scholars 
have described their institutions as fundamentally different, whether in terms 
of electoral systems (Lijphart 1984), state structure (Schmidt 2005), political 
economy (Hall and Soskice 2001) or administrative culture and structure 
(Knill 1999; Hood and Lodge 2004). This renders Germany and England 
interesting cases to study how institutions filter and shape the choices of risk 
instruments by actors in each of the two countries. 
The risk regulation regime approach (Hood et al. 2004) offers a 
useful analytical framework for a comparative study because it creates a 
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comprehensive and nuanced representation of the mechanisms of control 
through which actors manage flood risk. First of all, the regime approach 
operates at the meso-level, and establishes relatively clearly delineated 
analytical objects (the risk-based flood management regimes). This is a 
departure of macro-level accounts such as the one of a global risk society 
(Beck 1999) that potentially overlook important differences in the responses 
to risks. Secondly, the usefulness of the regime approach is a result of the 
disaggregation of risk regulation regimes into regime functions (and, in this 
dissertation, policy domains). This reveals inconsistencies and contradictions 
within the regimes that would go unnoticed if the analysis was focused on 
only one function (such as standard-setting) or one domain (for instance 
disaster financing). It allows for a refined detection of diversity in risk 
instruments, function-by-function and domain-by-domain. Finally, the 
regime approach is open to non-state and informal mechanisms for the 
exercise of control. This is particularly relevant for flood risk regulation 
where the private risk managers of the insurance industry play a crucial role 
and the co-ordination between an increasing range of actors relies on 
informal agreements and rules. This risk regulation regime approach 
therefore provides the analytical tools to comprehensively represent the 
diversity in risk-based flood management. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis’s structure can broadly be split into three parts. The first 
part is introductory and consists of chapters 1–4. Following this brief 
introductory chapter 1, chapter 2 describes the issue area of flooding and its 
management, as well as elaborating on the rationale for choosing it as an 
ideal area for undertaking a comparative study on risk-based governance. 
Most importantly, the chapter highlights the central role that risk instruments 
have been assigned to in emerging flood management regimes. Chapter 3 
provides a broad overview of the literature on the rise of risk in governance, 
noting how this literature has yet to develop a systematic comparative 
perspective. Moreover, the chapter sets out how such a comparative view 
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could benefit from institutionalist approaches. Chapter 4 introduces the 
research design. In particular it elaborates on the risk regulation regime 
approach that allows for a tailored testing of convergence arguments and 
systematic comparison of risk-based flood management and explains the 
selection of country cases.      
The second part comprises the three empirical chapters 5–7, each of 
which also challenges one line of argument in favour of international 
convergence in risk-based flood management. More specifically in chapter 5 
the regime domain of flood defence management offers a favourable testing 
ground for arguments that risk serves the ‘roll-back’ and economic 
evaluation of state operations. In chapter 6 the regime domain of land-use 
regulation is examined from a ‘regulatory state’ perspective since risk can 
help manage the trade-off between a precautionary stance on the regulation 
of areas of flood risk with interests in the economic utilisation of these areas. 
In chapter 7 the regime domain of disaster financing serves as a testing 
ground for arguments about insurance markets as a governance mechanism 
superior to the state.  
The third part is summative and contains chapters 8 and 9, which 
brings together the findings of the partial analyses of chapters 5–7. Chapter 8 
takes a holistic view on the flood regimes. The chapter first challenges 
functional and institutionalist arguments in support of the international 
convergence in risk-based flood management. Second, it consolidates the 
partial analyses of chapter 5-7 into a holistic description of the distinctively 
patterned national flood regimes and their institutional and other 
determinants. Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter, in which the implications 
of this study beyond the concrete case of flood management and for future 
research into risk-based governance are drawn.  
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CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING FLOODING AND RISK IN 
FLOOD MANAGEMENT 
Floods are major policy challenges. One reason is the fact that they wreak 
havoc on large stretches of land. The English floods in the summer of 2007 
mentioned in the first chapter affecting Tewkesbury (as well as a large 
number of other cities and villages in England) were only the most recent. 
They followed other major flood disasters in England – in particular the 
Easter 1998 and the autumn 2000 floods. And England was not alone in its 
suffering. An even more damaging catastrophe than England’s 2007 flood 
took place in central Europe in August 2002, with parts of Germany, 
Austria, Poland and the Czech Republic – as riparian countries to the Elbe 
river – being devastated.  
Another reason why flooding constitutes a particular policy challenge 
is the complexity of the emerging responses to flooding – mostly reflecting 
the growing recognition that flooding is not a purely nature-made disaster. 
Rather, the negative effects of interventions into the natural river channels 
and the economic utilisation of rivers and floodplains point to the human 
factor involved in turning floods from being part of the natural water cycle 
into disasters. The interventions of the emerging approaches to flood 
management target both natural and socio-economic processes, thus 
involving a wider range of actors and policy areas and thereby increasing the 
complexity of flood management.   
In this context of potential devastation and complex governance it is 
possible to observe that the concept and instruments of risk have become 
increasingly central within flood management regimes. But how can risk 
help in dealing with major policy challenges such as flooding and organising 
complex governance arrangements in response to flooding? Is there room for 
diversity in the emerging risk-based flood management? This chapter 
therefore explores why flood management is a suitable issue area to examine 
the issue of diversity in risk-based management. 
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The chapter starts with a discussion of the recent rise in the number 
of devastating flood events that catapulted flooding to the top of the political 
agenda in the early 2000s in particular. Second, it describes the emerging 
patterns in the policy responses to flooding in many European countries. 
Third, it takes a closer look at how these policy responses in particular and 
flood management in general include a special role for the concept and 
instruments of risk in flood management. The chapter concludes with a brief 
discussion on why flooding and the emerging risk-based flood management 
promises to offer interesting insights into diversity in risk-based governance. 
2.1 THE CHALLENGE OF FLOODING: MULTIPLE DISASTERS IN THE 1990S 
AND 2000S  
Flooding is, most simply put, about too much water in the wrong places. 
More formally, flooding can be defined as:  
“temporary covering of land by water as a result of surface waters 
escaping from the normal confines or as a result of heavy precipitation” 
(Kron 2003:2).  
The history of European societies is full of tragic flood disasters. To 
name a few early ones: a storm surge in East Anglia in 1099 caused an 
estimated 100,000 deaths. In 1530 flooding from rivers and the sea killed 
approximately 400,000 people in the Netherlands (Mitchell 2003). Disasters 
in these medieval times as Quarantelli (2001) argues were attributed to the 
supernatural and defined as ‘Acts of God’. This implied that while too much 
water clearly went to the wrong places there was little that could be done 
about it.   
This fatalistic attitude was – says Quarantelli – replaced by a 
perception of disasters as ‘Acts of Nature’, a shift in attitude that occurred 
with scientific progress and secularisation during Europe’s Enlightenment. 
This shift was associated with increasing human endeavours (driven by 
progress in science and technology) to control the natural process of 
flooding – primarily in order to utilise floodplains for economic purposes 
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such as agriculture and industrial development. Historical examples of 
control through engineering include the large-scale river straightening and 
training of Germany’s Odra between 1736 and 1788 and of the Rhine 
between 1817 and 1876. From being a problem beyond human control, 
flooding turned into an issue that was perceived as being largely under 
technological control.   
Floods – in particular river and other forms of inland flooding5 – 
gained salience as a policy challenge recently because the limitations of 
technological control became increasingly apparent in the last two decades. 
These limitations were seen in recent experiences with flood disasters in 
Europe: European societies have seen a steep rise in the frequency and 
damage resulting from flooding in the 1990s and 2000s. Barredo (2007) 
counted as many as 168 flood events for the EU-27 between 1990 and 2005 
compared to only 72 events between 1950 and 1989. Making a distinction 
between major floods
6
 from the total number of floods Barredo notes that 24 
out of a total of 47 major disasters since 1950 occurred in the 15 years 
between 1990 and 2005. Most of the major flood events that occurred 
between 1990 and 2005 were either river or flash floods whilst the most 
recent severe storm surges occurred in 1953 (East Coast flooding in Britain; 
Netherlands and Belgium) and 1962 (Germany, in particular Hamburg). 
Moreover these statistics hide important singular events and their 
characteristics. One example are the Rhine floods in 1993, during which the 
defences protecting Cologne’s old city centre failed, resulting in major 
damage to buildings and property in the city (as the image below illustrates).  
                                                 
5
 Flooding is normally classified into three different categories namely river floods, flash 
floods and storm surges (Perry 2000; Berz et al. 2001; Kron 2005). While river floods 
concern events that overwhelm the capacity of the river channel flash floods are local events 
that result from intense rainfall over a small area within a short period of time and storm 
surges/tidal flooding refer to events in which water from the sea is pushed onto dry land by 
storms or onshore winds. Inland flooding normally refers to all forms of flooding including 
flash floods with the exception of tidal/coastal flooding. Inland floods in particular riverine 
flooding are at the heart of this thesis’ attention because it is the type of flooding that has 
caused the greatest damage in recent years and is the field of management where the 
greatest changes took place.  
6
 ‘Major’ floods are defined as those where the number of casualties is greater than 70 
and/or the direct damage is larger than 0.005% of the EU GDP in the year of the disaster.   
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Figure 3: City centre of Cologne, winter 1993, Germany 
Important defences also threatened to fail in the event of the 1995 
Rhine floods and during the 1997 Odra floods which led in the former case 
to a mass evacuation of the population and livestock in the Netherlands and 
in the latter case to the deployment of the German army to stabilise the 
dykes with thousands of sandbags. These incidents underlined the 
precariousness of technological control over the forces of nature.  
In addition the statistics also hide the unprecedented scale of some of 
the recent disasters
7
. For instance floods in autumn 2000 affecting large 
areas of England and Wales caused immense economic damage, exceeding 
the threshold of GBP one billion for the first time for Britain. This sum 
however pales in comparison to the economic losses incurred in Germany 
during the August 2002 floods along the Elbe, which resulted in about EUR 
ten billion damages – or those of the summer 2007 floods in England and 
Wales with an estimated GBP two billion economic losses.   
There are multiple causes for this rise in the frequency and damage 
from the (mostly riverine) flood disasters in the 1990s and 2000s. River 
                                                 
7
 Further figures on economic damages of flood events can be found in chapter 7 on disaster 
financing. 
 36 
flooding is on the one hand part of the natural water cycle. It occurs if water 
resulting from for example precipitation or snowmelt exceeds the capacities 
of a specific water body such as a river channel. Some authors have 
therefore argued that flooding has and will become an ever greater threat to 
society as a result of changing precipitation patterns and snowmelt induced 
by global warming (Bronstert 2003; EC 2008). Others point to human 
activities such as the sealing of soil surfaces, the conversion of meadowland 
into arable land and the construction of dykes and roads. Such activities 
interfere with the natural water storage properties of vegetation, ground and 
soil, leading to a greater quantity of water that flows through river channels 
or accumulates in low-lying areas (LAWA 1995). On the other hand 
flooding only becomes a disaster if the water affects assets and processes 
valued by society. It has been argued that the rising economic damage 
caused by flooding is a result of factors such as an increase in affluence, a 
more flood-vulnerable evolution of economic structures and activities, 
changing land-use and urbanisation (Mitchell 2003).     
Regardless of the exact contribution of each of these factors to recent 
flood disasters, the greater frequency and damage from flooding (as well as 
the recognition that flooding is beyond (technological) control) has led to a 
review of approaches to flood management. In particular this concerns 
riverine floods in many individual European countries as well as at the pan-
European level. The emerging approaches will be discussed in the next 
section.  
2.2 CHANGES TO MANAGING FLOODING: FROM CONTROLLING TO 
ADAPTING TO FLOOD DISASTERS  
Given the devastation resulting from flooding there is a strong demand for 
its effective management. Flood management – for example through 
building local weirs and embankments – was historically organised locally 
by individual riparian property owners or local private collective actors such 
as England’s Internal Drainage Boards or the Deichverbände (dyke 
associations) along parts of the Rhine river. However as water bodies and 
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floodplains became economically more important and the potential damage 
from flooding more extensive the state assumed an ever-greater role in 
protecting the population from the consequences of flooding.  





 century respectively are historical examples for the major 
role the state assumed in flood management. The two examples also reflect 
the approach to flood management that prevailed in advanced industrialised 
European countries until the 1990s, namely a reliance on engineered 
interventions into natural processes. The image of the 7.5 km long Rhine 
dyke in Neuwied (constructed in the 1930s) that protects Neuwied  
(including the 500-metre flood wall pictured below) is instructive for 
understanding the ‘engineering’ approach to flood management. 
 
Figure 4: Neuwied flood defence system, Rhine river, Germany 
This emphasis on flood defences was on the one hand driven by 
economic motives  – for example making use for agricultural production of 
the fertile land of the floodplains (Johnson, Tunstall and Penning-Rowsell 
2005). On the other hand it was often based on a belief in the ability to 
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control flood events technologically (Scrase and Sheate 2005). However 
flood events such as the aforementioned floods along the Rhine river in the 
early 1990s served as a wake-up call to the agencies and actors involved in 
flood management. The events highlighted that the engineering approach – 
in addition to further disadvantages such as negative environmental 
consequences and major investment and maintenance costs – fails even to 
offer the desired safety especially against the background of further 
increases in flood risk associated with climate change.   
The lessons learned from these events led to the rise and adoption of 
a new approach to managing flooding – from a strong reliance on protective 
infrastructure such as dykes, walls, dams and embankments to a more 
adaptive and holistic bundle of measures. The former approach aimed at 
controlling and adjusting the natural process of flooding to the needs of 
human society and lost its persuasiveness in view of incidences of 
overtopping and failures of defences in recent flood events. The latter in a 
notable contrast pursued the goals of anticipating future flooding and 
adapting socio-economic processes to the natural cycle of water.  
One of the earliest examples of the emerging approach was the 
transnational Rhine Flood Action Plan (RFAP) (ICPR 1998) that was 
developed in the aftermath of the 1993 and 1995 floods. Rather than 
focusing on the construction of new defences for one of the already most 
heavily modified water bodies of Europe it explicitly aims at restoring the 
natural characteristics of the Rhine river catchment and reducing the damage 
potential through a broader bundle of adaptive measures. These include dyke 
realignment (in order to make more space for water) as well as land-use 
planning and flood forecasting and warning (in order to ensure that values 
are kept out of harm’s way). In parallel to the ICPR the LAWA 
(Länderarbeitsgruppe Wasser) (the water policy co-ordination body of the 
German states (the Länder) and the Federal government) developed 
influential flood management guidelines (LAWA 1995). The guidelines 
establish the principle that: 
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[we] need to – like with other environmental issues – understand that we 
cannot use natural resources against nature but only in agreement with 
nature. (...) If one wants to reduce damage from flooding rapidly and 
sustainably, there is a greater chance for success in influencing the 
different uses near the river than only by shaping the course of the flood 
(ibid:19).      
The guidelines therefore propose aspects of improving the natural water 
storage and precautionary land-use and construction regulation but also – in 
recognition of the possibility of floods that might overwhelm all flood 
management measures and damage existing assets – the use of commercial 
insurance as an individual private risk management strategy.  
Another notable change in approach is reflected in a lessons learned 
report from Britain’s Institute of Civil Engineers (ICE), an organisation 
traditionally involved in the implementation and design of the engineering-
dominated approach. In its report entitled ‘Learning to Live with Rivers’ 
(ICE 2001), the ICE stresses the need to adapt socio-economic processes to 
nature. The responsible UK government department Defra (Department for 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) followed suit by publishing a new 
strategy of flood management in 2005 named ‘Making Space for Water’ 
(DEFRA 2005). The new strategy includes provisions on the regulation of 
land-use, the use of natural water storage capacities through the (re)creation 
of wetlands and the improvement of flood warning and public awareness. As 
table 1 demonstrates, the policy initiatives for Germany’s Rhine river and 
beyond (as well as in England) were not the only ones internationally in 
which anticipation and adaptation were emphasised. 
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Country Year Selected initiatives/programmes/legislation 
France 1995 & 
2005 
 Prévision des crues ainsi qu'à la transmission 
de l'information sur les crues (Decree of 12 
January 2005 issued pursuant to Articles L. 
564-1, L. 564-2 and L. 564-3 of the 
Environmental Code): Monitoring and 
forecasting of floods and the communication of 
information on flooding to the public.  
 Plans de prévention des risques naturels 
prévisibles (Decree 95-1089, 1995 & 2005): 
Management plans for the prevention of 
predictable environmental risks. 
Switzerland 1993, 
1994 &  
1999   
 Bundesgesetz über den Wasserbau (Federal Act 
for Water Management 1993): Risk 
assessments and anticipatory flood 
management plans. 
 Verordnung für den Wasserbau (Federal 
Decree for Water Management 1994, 1999): 






 IRMA-Interreg Rhine-Meuse Programme 
(1997-2003), including Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands: 
Spatial planning projects for flood control. 
 ELLA-Elbe-Labe Preventive Flood 
Management Measures through Transnational 
Spatial Planning (2004-2006), including 




Country Year Selected initiatives/programmes/legislation 
Netherlands 2006  Ruimte voor de Rivier (Cabinet Decision 
2006): Room for rivers by providing additional 
natural retention space.  
Table 1: Selected policy initiatives of adaptive flood management in Europe 
Comment: My emphasis highlights anticipatory and adaptive emphasis in 
initiatives 
As the table demonstrates the shift towards a more holistic and 
adaptive approach to flood management is an international, transboundary 
phenomenon. At the same time this shift implies a greater complexity of 
flood management. On the one hand the new approaches include a wide 
range of policy domains – as it recognises that water cannot always be kept 
within its ‘natural’ confines. As a consequence policy domains such as land 
use and the financial recovery from economic losses from flooding have 
become important components of flood management in addition to the 
traditionally important realm of water engineering and flood defences. On 
the other hand as the new approaches aim is to adapt socio-economic 
processes to natural processes that are no longer confined to river channels 
through engineering solutions flood managers need to anticipate future flood 
events more extensively.  This can be done for example by assessing how, 
where and with what consequences the excessive water moves over land. It 
is in the context of organising the new approaches and anticipating future 
flooding that risk instruments emerge as increasingly important components 
of flood management. Risk instruments for flood management and their role 
in the emerging management approaches will be discussed in the following 
section. 
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2.3 RISK IN FLOOD MANAGEMENT  
2.3.1 The rise of risk in emerging approaches to flood management 
Risk is a central concept in many of the flood policy initiatives that have 
emerged in the 1990s and 2000s. This section aims at illustrating the wide 
use of and reference to risk in the recent policy initiatives.  
Most notably the European Union recently agreed on a Directive on 
the assessment and management of flood risks (EC 2007) in October 2007. 
The directive makes it obligatory for EU members to develop risk 
instruments. More specifically, member states are to produce flood risk 




The risk instruments at the heart of this European flood regulation 
echo previous initiatives in European countries. One prominent example is 
the widespread development of flood maps, a spatial representation of 
different levels of risk. More specifically flood maps normally outline areas 
that are inundated during flood events of different probabilities (e.g. events 
with a statistical return period of 1-in-100 years). In addition to this basic 
type of flood map, maps can also take into account specific properties of the 
inundation (for instance, certain depth or flow velocity) and the particular 
consequences (for example, economic damage).  
Even before the EU Directive made it obligatory for the member 
states to produce maps they had become a pervasive feature in the landscape 
of flood management in European countries. A stock-taking exercise by the 
transnational expert group EXCIMAP (European Exchange Circle on Flood 
Mapping) between 2006 and– 2007 illustrates the extent to which the 
instrument of flood maps has become available for flood management in 
Europe and beyond. The group’s 2007 report (EXCIMAP 2007) presents 
flood maps of different types by 16 EU member states, for five 
                                                 
8
 The individual deadlines are: (i) preliminary risk assessments by end-2011, (ii) flood maps 
by end-2013, and (iii) risk management plans by end-2015. 
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transboundary river basins and by insurers in five EU member states – as the 
following table 2 summarises. 
Type of map EXCIMAP’s report (2007) 
Flood maps of 
individual countries 
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Britain, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 








Maps by insurers CatNet, Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy 
Evacuation maps Germany (Hamburg), Netherlands 
Table 2: Examples of flood mapping in European countries 
 However flood maps are only one (arguably important) example of 
the evolution and spread of risk instruments concerning flooding. The same 
basic calculations of the probabilities of water quantities and their 
distribution over land are used – along with, most importantly, assessments 
of damaging impact on values – for the catastrophe models often required 
and produced by international reinsurers. These are used to anticipate the 
financial consequences of major flood events with their accumulated losses 
on a reinsurer’s solvency. Such models have been produced for different 
countries over the last decade with (for instance) a model by the reinsurer 
MunichRe available for Germany (simulating flood scenarios with different 
probabilities for eight different regions) being available since 2002 (Kron 
2005:67).  A similar model for inland flooding in England, Wales and 
Scotland is being offered by the commercial risk modeller RMS since 2001 
(Lowe et al. 2008:29). Another example is that of flood forecasting and alert 
systems such as the recently developed European Flood Alert System 
                                                 
9
 COMRISK = Common Strategies to reduce the risk of storm floods in coastal lowlands; 
ELLA = Elbe-Labe Preventive Flood Management measures by transnational spatial 
planning; FLAPP = Flood Awareness and Prevention Policy in border areas; SAFER = 
Strategies and actions for flood emergency risk management; TIMIS = Transnational 
Internet Map Information System. 
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(EFAS), which is used to issue warnings to potentially affected regions. 
These draw on statistical calculations of water quantities and river channel 
profiles to predict the future flow of water and its consequences.  
These national public and private mapping projects and other risk 
assessment efforts assume a central role in the emerging approaches to flood 
management as - to complement the earlier mention of the strong role for 
risk instruments in the recent EU Directive - the following references 
demonstrate. Germany’s LAWA the inter-Länder co-ordination body for 
water politics remarks in its revised guidelines from 2004 that:  
“any forward-looking flood management concept requires the production 
of flood maps” (LAWA 2004:14).    
Furthermore, the guidance notes that:  
“only knowledge about the threats makes a targeted precautionary flood 
management possible” (LAWA 2004:15).  
Another explicit endorsement can be found in the new flood management 
strategy of Britain’s Defra, which stresses the importance of maps and risk 
assessments more generally through its plans to: 
“develop the coverage and reliability of risk information and mapping. 
This improvement in the risk evidence base will drive our risk 
management activities”. (Defra 2005:19).  
This discussion of supranational and national policy initiatives – as 
well as the widespread use of the risk instrument of flood mapping – 
demonstrates that risk has become a key concept in the emerging approaches 
to flood management. But what exactly is meant by risk and risk instruments 
and in what ways can they contribute to flood management? 
2.3.2 Understanding the concept and instruments of risk in flood 
management 
In everyday language risk is about threats and dangers, about mishaps that 
may happen to someone – such as the inundation of one’s basement. As an 
instrument in flood management however, risk assumes a different meaning 
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– namely that of particular quantitative measurements. These measurements 
most importantly revolve around statistical calculations. More concretely the 
calculations estimate the probability with which a certain event occurs. The 
concept of risk therefore is conventionally defined as the product of the 
probability and the consequences of specific events or processes. Risk 
instruments in turn provide and/or are based on the calculus of probability 
and consequences of events or processes.  
In flood management actors take an interest in the probability with 
which certain water quantities occur. For instance a particular flood event is 
classified as a flood with a 1-in-100 years statistical return period or as a 
‘Jahrhunderthochwasser’ (centennial flood). In addition to this most 
fundamental risk calculation risk in flood management can combine the 
aforementioned probability of occurrence of certain water quantities with 
accounts of the consequences – that is the water’s distribution over land and 
its effects on values. These calculations are undertaken and/or displayed 
through particular risk instruments. For example flood maps in their most 
basic form display the distribution over land of water quantities that occur 
with particular probabilities. Catastrophe models allow for an estimation of 
insurance losses for a range of flood events with different probabilities.  
In this context it is useful to point to the different concepts of risk 
and hazard. Jones and Hood (1996) note that these concepts are in practice 
often mixed up. The authors clarify that the assessment of hazard (often 
undertaken by scientific and technical experts) normally is focused only on 
the causes of harm (i.e. excessive water quantities) and their management 
(i.e. managing water quantities through retention and channelling). In 
contrast risk assessment refers to a broader analytical task that also takes into 
account the economic and social consequences, and thus includes 
management measures that seek to reduce the exposure and the vulnerability 
of values to the damaging event. In the following discussions the concept of 
risk refers to both hazard and risk instruments. However as will be argued in 
particular in chapter 7 the distinction between hazard and risk marks an 
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important difference between the risk-based flood regimes of Germany and 
England.  
Risk instruments in flood management draw on a long tradition of 
scientific and technological discovery. The modern science of hydrology that 
explores the motion and distribution of water on Earth was founded in the 
late 17
th
 century when the French scientist Pierre Perrault discovered the 
rainfall–runoff relationship. Following these early steps the modelling of the 
relations between rainfall, runoff and hydraulic characteristics of a river 
channel made significant advances, from Thomas Mulvaney’s development 
of the ‘rational method’ in 1850 (describing rainfall, runoff and catchment 
size relations) and the Stanford Watershed Model from 1962 
(mathematically simulating river or stream flows) to recent flood flow 
models such as LISFLOOD-FP
10
 from 1999 (using topographical data on 
floodplains to predict water diffusion). These calculations of the hazard’s 
‘consequences’, that is the motion of water over land, were linked to 
statistical assessments of probabilities. 
The statistical understanding of extreme value distributions was 
improved following the work of Emil Gumbel (who came up with the so-
called Gumbel distribution) in the 1940s. These statistical functions were fed 
with the systematically gathered data on rainfall and river flow (e.g. 
Dresden’s Elbe gauge has recorded water levels since 1775) so that the 
statistical estimation of different flood scenarios became increasingly 
sophisticated. The advancement of technologies since the 1990s –, most 
notably the increased computing power, the laser scanning of terrain that 
allows the production of digital terrain models and initiatives to assess the 
value of land use
11
  –further boosted the analytical capacities of flood 
managers. Nowadays as Britain’s Institute of Civil Engineers boldly notes: 
                                                 
10
 LISFLOOD-FP was developed by the University of Bristol and the EU’s Joint research 
centres (EC-JRC). It is mostly used for larger river catchments such as the Danube. It also 
forms the underlying hydrological model for the EC-JRC’s European Flood Alert System. 
11
 One prominent example is the CORINE database on land cover initiated by the European 
Union in the mid-1980s. Based on satellite images different categories of land use are 
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 “there are methodologies available to engineers that can allow relatively 
accurate predictions of where flooding will occur and, given a particular 
magnitude of the flood, the extent of flooding, duration, rate of rise, flood 
depths, velocities, and damage can all be predicted” (2001:15).  
As the ICE’s statement suggests these calculations of risk provide 
different insights that benefit flood managers. For instance they allow for 
spatial differentiation between areas with different risk levels (as e.g. 
displayed on flood maps), the calculation of total and annual average 
economic losses from flooding (as e.g. undertaken through catastrophe 
models) and the evaluation of locations for flood management interventions 
in which they yield the greatest benefits (as e.g. undertaken through risk 
assessments that identify and quantify the probable damage for a particular 
area).  
These benefits mostly focus on an informational role for the concept 
and instruments of risk in flood management. However risk can have further 
applications in flood management. The following table distinguishing 
between three risk management functions as defined for Hood and 
colleagues’ risk regulation regimes (Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin 2004) 
illustrates additional functions of risk in flood management. 
Functions  Details Examples 
Detecting Assessments of probability and 
consequences 
Flood mapping across Europe  
Directing Risk-based definition of 
management goals  
Dutch safety standard of 
1/1,250 
Effecting Risk-based design and selection 
of implementation measures  
Financial risk transfer through 
flood insurance 
Table 3: Risk regulation regime functions in risk-based flood management 
On the one hand risk can help define goals and standards in flood 
management (the ‘directing’ function). One example is the setting of 
                                                                                                                             
identified among them agriculture, urban/residential and industrial/commercial/transport. 
These in turn can be linked to particular damage potential values. 
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minimal safety standards – in particular for flood defences. For instance the 
Dutch statutory standard for protection from riverine flooding is to ensure 
that water quantities that occur with a 1-in-1,250 years or higher probability 
do not cause harm. On the other hand risk can play an important role in 
designing and selecting measures to achieve the flood management goals 
(the ‘effecting’ function). One risk-based mechanism to manage and reduce 
economic losses from flooding is insurance. Insurance implies that an 
insurer indemnifies an individual that incurred economic losses from 
flooding in exchange for the regular payment of a premium. Risk is at the 
heart of this transaction because the premium reflects – at least in economic 
theory (Priest 1996) – the price for the amount of (financial) risk that is 
transferred from the client to the insurer.  
2.4 CONCLUSIONS: THE ISSUE AREA OF FLOOD MANAGEMENT AND RISK-
BASED GOVERNANCE 
Why does a study of flood management promise to yield relevant results for 
the discussion of diversity in risk-based governance? On the one hand risk 
can be expected to matter in flood management. As this chapter’s discussion 
showed flood managers are in general likely to make use of risk instruments 
for a number of reasons. First, this is because advanced risk assessment 
instruments have become available thanks to advances in computing 
technology, data collection and modelling methods. Second, it is because 
specialists in water management science and practice are familiar with 
probabilistic analyses reflecting the historical evolution in the sciences of 
hydrology and statistics. A third reason is that there has been a shift towards 
more adaptive and anticipatory approaches to flood management for which 
risk calculations are deemed essential as a basis for decision-making.  
On the other hand the cases of Germany’s and England’s flood 
regimes offer some substantial contrasts; – from who helps disaster victims 
to recover from flooding to the restrictiveness and scope of land-use 
regulation to how the state’s money is allocated to flood defence projects (as 
noted in chapter 1). Are these different ways of organising different policy 
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domains of flood regimes also linked to diversity in the use of the concept 
and instruments of risk? And how can this diversity be squared with the 
wider trends of convergence towards more anticipatory and adaptive flood 
management reflected in transnational (the river commissions) and 
supranational policy integration (the EU Flood Directive) as well as the 
international diffusion of particular policy templates (often carrying 
variations of the name ‘making space for water’)?   
Finally, flood management promises also a particularly rich harvest 
for a comparison. This is because of the manifold roles risk can assume in 
flood management regimes. Do risk assessments directly shape standard-
setting? Which conceptualisation of risk, hazard or risk, matters in standard-
setting and in the implementation of measures? Are resources for 
implementation allocated in accordance to different levels of risk?  This is 
also because the regimes stretch across several distinctive policy domains, 
ranging most prominently from the public investment into flood protection 
infrastructure through the regulation of land use to the financing of disaster 
damages. Similar questions as with the different regime functions need to be 
asked here as well. To what extent does risk matter in each domain? Which 
conceptualisation of risk matters? Are the same concepts used across all 







CHAPTER 3: ANALYSING RISK IN GOVERNANCE. FROM 
THEORY TO COMPARATIVE RESEARCH 
The proliferation of risk instruments and the use of statistical probabilities to 
describe policy challenges are not restricted to the field of flood 
management. Rather as O’Malley notes it seems:  
“no longer necessary to draw (...) attention to the fact that risk-based 
routines and practices of government pervade most areas of life” 
(2004:1). 
It is not only the practices of states and governments that are 
increasingly risk-based. In fact Power finds the origins for the ‘risk 
management of everything’ in the private sector especially in finance. He 
observes that:  
“risk management and risk ‘talk’ are all around us. The risk-based 
description of organisational life is conspicuous. Not only private sector 
companies, but hospitals, schools, universities and many other public 
organisations, including the very highest levels of central government, 
have all been invaded to varying degrees by ideas about risk and its 
management” (Power 2004:9). 
The proposed ubiquity of risk in government and other organisational 
life raises a number of questions that have been answered in the literature in 
different ways and it has inspired this comparative study of risk-based flood 
management. These questions concern the extent to which risk-based 
governance is a universal and uniform phenomenon and if not, what 
different forms of risk-based governance emerge, what drives and hinders its 
adoption, and – if different forms emerge – which variables shape them.  
The following sections discuss the scholarly literature concerned 
with risk in governance and identify the need for an in-depth comparative 
study of risk-based governance regimes. This is followed by a discussion of 
the neo-institutionalist perspective that is chosen as an explanatory approach 
for this comparative study. 
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3.1 UNDERSTANDING RISK IN GOVERNANCE 
Flood maps are one example for risk instruments. They rely among other 
inputs on mathematical advances such as Gumbel’s extreme value 
distribution and systematically gathered data – such as those collected from 
Dresden’s gauge since 1775. These underlying calculations highlight that the 
concept of risk refers to a particular measurement representing ‘a specific 
mode of treatment of certain events’ (Ewald 1991:199). More specifically 
once the concept of risk is being used a potential danger (i.e. something that 
is liable to cause harm) has been assessed in terms of the likelihood that 
these effects will occur and the weight of the harm. Risk therefore contains 
quantitative and statistical measurement. 
This measurement is undertaken by actors embedded in an uncertain 
world associated with numerous possibilities. In such a context of 
uncertainty possibilities of mischance are a necessary complement to any 
planned, future-oriented human action. As a result mechanisms to control 
such mischance have a rich history as their presence in the history of 
auguries, omens and prophecies shows. However mechanisms of control 
have changed throughout history with modern societies increasingly relying 
on advances in science, mathematics and systematic data-gathering to 
produce the probabilistic ‘measurements’ of future events associated with 
the concept of risk. These particular measures have evolved over centuries as 
scholars such as Ian Hacking and Peter Bernstein show. 
Hacking (1990; 1991) observes that in the 19
th
 century an ‘avalanche 
of numbers’ was systematically collected – as, among other initiatives, the 
first population census in Britain (1801) demonstrates. Based on these 
numbers and the development of statistical concepts such as the Law of 
Large Numbers
12
 and Gauss’ Normal Distribution,13 statistical regularities in 
the observations were revealed on the basis of which ‘statistical laws’ were 
                                                 
12
 This law denotes the mathematical fact that irregularities in mass phenomena would fade 
out if enough data were gathered. 
13
 The bell-shaped curve associated with the normal distribution shows the distribution of a 
variable (such as height of men) around the mean (average). 
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formulated. These laws ‘tamed’ the chance associated with an uncertain 
future. For instance it was suggested that there is a specific likelihood for all 
kinds of phenomena, from physical ones, such as the velocity of molecules 
(Maxwell Distribution of Molecular Velocities from 1859) to social ones, for 
instance suicide rates among divorcees (Willcox 1891).   
Bernstein (1996) takes the reader back even further on a long journey 
through the history, roots and applications of the concept of risk. He notes 
how the early development in the theory of probability (such as Blaise 
‘Pascal’s triangle’14 in the 17th century) was concerned with resolving 
mathematical (and gambling) puzzles. Like Hacking however, Bernstein also 
shows how probability calculations and statistics found increasing 
application in political and commercial practices from the 18
th
 century 
onwards with early life expectancy tables
15
 that provided new foundations to 
the government and insurance business of life annuities;
16
 the increasingly 
systematic information-gathering on maritime trade and shipping through the 
London-based insurance collective Lloyd’s to enable the underwriting of 
international commerce; and the use of statistics from the population census 
in Britain by the Victorian social reformers to remedy the ills of 
industrialisation.   
Bernstein and Hacking therefore not only demonstrate advances in 
probability and statistical sciences that allowed for attempts to devise future-
oriented statistical laws even for society and concerning social facts, but 
their arguments also link the use of risk to governance. Bernstein points to 
Victorian social reformers and commercial insurers and Hacking to the 
                                                 
14
 ‘Pascal’s Triangle’ displays the possible outcomes (e.g. head (H) or tail (T)) of certain 
processes (e.g. the tossing of one or more coins) and allows for the calculation of the 
probability of a particular outcome (e.g. the probability of a ‘head’ when tossing two coins 
is 75% due to the possible outcomes: HH, HT, TH, TT). 
15
 Life expectancy tables show for different ages what the probability is that a person of that 
age will die before his next birthday.  
16
 Life annuities is a financial product for which the issuer makes a series of future 
payments to a buyer in exchange for the immediate payment of a lump sum or a series of 
regular payments prior to the onset of aforementioned future payments. Being able to 
estimate the duration of future payments is crucial to define profitable levels of immediate 
payment.  
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emergence of a bureaucracy of statistics as collective actors that make use of 
risk and associated statistical instruments to address harms such as 
epidemics, losses in maritime trading, poverty in old age and more.   
At the same time Bernstein is highly critical of using statistics for 
governing socio-economic processes in particular. Probabilistic prediction 
produces a ‘prison’ based on the repetition of historical statistical patterns. 
Given this perception of statistical laws and statistics-based governance 
Bernstein endorses critical arguments on statistics brought forward by the 
two economists Frank Knight (1921) and John Maynard Keynes (1921). 
Knight  (based on observations of surprises in the world of business in spite 
of then widely shared assumptions of either perfect certainty or reliably 
established laws of probability) argues that as any given decision (in the 
business world and beyond) is unique, no meaningful probabilistic inference 
can be drawn concerning future conduct. Similarly Keynes attacked the idea 
of inference from past instances to the future. Both Keynes and Knight put 
the idea of uncertainty into the centre of economic processes. An uncertain 
future is different from a probabilistically assessed future because there is a 
fundamental lack of knowledge on future outcomes. Bernstein celebrates this 
uncertainty: 
“Rather than frightening us, Keynes’ words (‘we simply don’t know’) 
bring great news: we are not prisoners of an inevitable future. 
Uncertainty makes us free” (1996:229). 
Hacking also has rather critical views on using risk in governance. He 
describes the emergence of probability as an effective control instrument, in 
fact so effective that:  
“it is a glib but true generalisation that proletarian revolutions have never 
occurred in any state whose assurantial technology was working 
properly” (1991:184). 
The contributions of these two scholars raise important questions. As 
statistical laws – argued forcefully as early as in the 1920s by two influential 
economists – have attracted substantial criticism (in particular in the context 
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of predicting and governing socio-economic processes) why does Michael 
Power in 2004 observe the ‘risk management of everything’, and why does 
Pat O’Malley perceive in his book from the same year that risk-based routine 
and practices are pervasive for governing most areas of life (O'Malley 2004; 
Power 2004)? Were Keynes and Knight wrong with their critiques? Or is it 
important to consider other variables such as the objectives of the 
bureaucracy of statistics, as Hacking’s account implies?       
Recent discussions on risk in governance come in two broad 
categories namely governance-of-risk and governance-by-risk. In the 
governance-of-risk category the focus is on how changes in technology and 
culture have increased our anxiety about the potential dangers faced by 
society. The governance-of-risk is concerned with dealing with these 
potential dangers with the state and other actors acting as risk managers. 
While the anxieties are partly due to modern societies’ advanced capacity for 
risk assessment – and successful risk management in the past that has given 
rise to zero-risk expectations – the governance-of-risk does not necessarily 
assign a major role to risk instruments in general and particular forms of risk 
instruments in particular in governance.  
Such a central role for the concept and instruments of risk in 
governance is the focus of the governance-by-risk debate, however. In this 
context risk no longer is the object or target of governance but the risk 
concept (along with its calculus and instruments) are used to organise the 
governance of a particular process object or group – such as property 
development on floodplains or risk-taking of financial institutions – in 
particular, ‘risk-based’ manner. In Rothstein and colleagues’ words:  
 “risk-based regulation can be conceived as allocating resources in 
proportion to risks to society (such as health, safety or environmental 
risks), considering both the impacts themselves and the likelihood that 
they happen, in order to establish appropriate levels of control” 
(2006b:1057).  
 55 
While this definition as will be illustrated below already refers to one 
particular form of risk-based governance it is instructive to highlight that in 
addition to managing particular threats to society, risk governance can be 
about the organisation of governance. This debate therefore raises questions 
such as how and why the concept and instruments of risk have become 
central for organising governance.  
3.1.1 Governance of Risk 
The governance of risk through state and non-state actors is nothing new. 
Governments have always provided particular risk management services 
even though they may not have been labelled as risk management – such as 
securing internal peace and order and defence against foreign invasion (Lowi 
1990). Scholars have suggested that the role of governments in risk 
management has been growing in particular throughout the 20
th
 century – for 
example in the form of the welfare state that assumes risks such as poverty, 
old age and health (Friedman 1981). Similarly organisations such as 
insurance companies have, as seen in the reference to their services by 
Bernstein, been involved in activities of risk management for a long time. 
The growing role of risk in governance in the sense of ‘governance-
of-risk’ has been explained in different ways. One argument originates from 
Anthony Giddens (1991; 1999). He argues that as modernity weakens old 
hierarchical restraints (for example, towards the church), opens access to 
new sources of knowledge (for instance through mass education) and creates 
institutions such as the mass media, people in contemporary, late-modern 
societies focus much more than in the past on potential harm. This public 
attention forces the state to govern risks. While the potential for harm may 
not have changed the awareness and knowledge of risks among the 
population has increased, resulting in increased demands for the 
government’s risk management by increasingly confident, reflexive citizens.  
A related argument has been proposed by Beck (1992; 1999). 
However in addition to the more demanding citizens of late modernity, he 
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suggests that as a result of the scale of modern organisation and the nature of 
modern technologies new kinds of potentially catastrophic threats have 
emerged (such as nuclear power and associated radioactive accidents). This 
increases the demands for (and on) risk management.  
While Beck’s and Giddens’ arguments embed the increasing demand 
for the governance-of-risk in macro-level narratives about epochal shifts to 
late or reflexive modernity other scholars have taken a closer look as to the 
particular drivers of the governance-of-risk. One important argument is 
exploring public opinion as a driver. More specifically it is argued that in the 
aftermath of disasters or major accidents the public outrage or panic implies 
public pressure on the government that results in increased activities to 
govern risk (Burgess 2002; 2009). Slightly cynically Hood and colleagues 
(2004) call the post-disaster regulatory initiatives as the ‘tombstone’ 
patterns, with the regulations constituting ‘monuments of public emotions 
about past tragedies’ (ibid.:110). Finally, Lodge and Hood (2002) point out 
that even small events can have big consequences if particular circumstances 
(e.g. absence of rival stories, innocent victims) lead to a strong media 
response.  
Another argument for the governance of risk is pressure from interest 
groups. There are groups of (potential) victims of dangerous activities such 
as NIMBY
17
 organisations fighting the siting of waste incineration plants or 
those representing broader causes (such as environmental groups) that 
advocate for tighter regulation and the adoption of the precautionary 
principle in respect to various potential hazards. Moreover business interests 
– often assumed to be critical of regulation as organisations responsible for 
major hazards – also have reasons to be in favour of risk regulation (Stigler 
1984). Tight environmental standards for example can benefit technological 
leaders or larger companies at the expense of laggards and smaller 
companies that have to bear larger compliance costs. Finally, there is an 
                                                 
17
 ‘Not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) refers to local protests against decisions and activities 
that affect local values.  
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argument about bureaucracies in charge of managing particular risks that 
seek to expand and shape their bureaucratic empires and thus attempting to 
increase the salience of a particular risk (Niskanen 1971; Dunleavy 1991).  
As these different arguments demonstrate risk has become a central 
concern for advanced industrialised societies for which collective solutions 
either devised by state or non-state actors had to be developed. This concern 
is driven by the increasing sensitivity, information and expectations of the 
population concerning potential threats to its security in late modernity. The 
anxieties of the population are fed by disasters and amplified by public 
interest groups and mass media that pressurise and/or mobilise the 
government and other organisations to provide risk management services. In 
addition to public pressures on policy-makers economic and bureaucratic 
interest groups may exercise pressure on policy-makers to expand the 
governance-of-risk. 
The growing importance of the governance of risk may also point to 
an increased use of risk instruments and to a rise in governance-by-risk. As 
Beck puts it concerning the new types of modernity risks: ‘no amount of 
collective coughing, scratching and sighing helps. Only science does’ 
(1992b:212). However ultimately risk in this context primarily refers to the 
possibility of harm and the governance-of-risk is about any kind of 
intervention that addresses this threat.  
A rise in the governance-of-risk is thus not necessarily related to a 
rise in the governance-by-risk. This separation is reasonable because on the 
one hand there are alternative means to deal with such potential dangers. 
O’Malley (2004) points to for instance rule-of-thumb, informed guesses and 
more as mechanisms to handle uncertainty. Moreover rather than using risk 
to anticipate future harm governance interventions may be limited to 
remedial, post-disaster measures that do not necessarily rely on any forecasts 
or predictions. On the other hand there are strong reasons why quantitative 
risk instruments may in fact have a rather limited impact on the governance 
of risk. Most notably public pressure to regulate can actually result in 
 58 
governance that runs counter to probabilistic assessments as a result of 
biases in public risk perception (Kahnemann and Tversky 1973; Slovic 
2000) and the social amplification of risk (Pidgeon et al. 2003).  
 However if public pressure and risk perception as well as the 
problems of inference from the past to future behaviour (as argued by Knight 
and Keynes) highlight potential shortcomings and barriers to risk-based 
governance, then contributions emphasising the ‘attractions of risk-based 
regulation’ (Hutter 2005) and its pervasiveness seem puzzling. The puzzling 
popularity of governance-by-risk will be discussed in the next section. 
3.1.2 Governance by Risk  





 century in governance – as described by Hacking and Bernstein – 
illustrates the potential of risk instruments to inform governance. One 
example of the impact that Hacking mentions is the case of medical 
statistics, in particular the canonical list of causes of death established during 
the 19
th
 century. As Hacking remarks: 
“in most parts of the world, it has long been illegal to die of anything 
except causes on the official list – although the list is regularly revised. It 
is illegal, for example, to die of old age” (1991:183).  
Hacking associates the rise of statistics in governance with that of the 
industrial state. Statistical analysis offered particular benefits relevant to the 
industrialising state in terms of its legitimacy, solvency and in the exercise 
of control over the population. More specifically statistics helped with the 
provision of large-scale services (public health services for preventing 
epidemic diseases), the extraction of resources (soldiers for large armies for 
European wars; tax revenue) and capital formation through social insurance 
(life annuities). Statistics helped as well in ensuring control and order 
through the classification of population through which individuals define 
themselves and the actions that are open to them (as seen above, ‘dying of 
old age’ is not open to them).  
 59 
Risk calculus in governance may therefore have further functions 
than simply an improved public administration based on better predictions of 
an uncertain future. This as will be discussed below is also at the heart of the 
scholarly contributions to the rise of governance-by-risk.  
The popularity of risk-based governance 
Governance-by-risk seems rather popular in advanced, capitalist societies. 
For Britain’s former Prime Minister Tony Blair for instance, risk is to 
become ‘the governing concept’ (Blair 2005) in all changes of regulation in 
order to avoid stifling science, business and public service delivery through 
excessive measures for harm avoidance. The European Commission notes 
that:  
“risk governance–embracing risk identification, assessment, management 
and communication – has become a crucial (...) component of public 
policy” (EC 2002:23). 
For instance beyond the Flood Directive the EU’s risk-based 
approach to governance has been adopted for the management of food safety 
for which the Food Safety Regulation requires a three-stage approach of risk 
assessment/analysis, management and communication (EC 2002a:17). A 
recent report by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) (2009) analysed the progress made in six member 
states including Britain, Canada, the United States the Netherlands, Japan 
and Singapore concerning the all-hazard approaches to managing the risks 
facing their populations and territories. The report notes that all surveyed 
countries ‘have set course’ (ibid:38) to implement such approaches with 
better risk assessment capacities, improved co-ordination between 
government agencies and preventative mitigation policies. Finally, Rothstein 
and colleagues (2006b) note that New Zealand and Australia along with 
Britain and Canada have also been found to adopt risk-based approaches to 
regulation. 
 These accounts of risk-based governance highlight on the one hand 
that governance-by-risk is widely adopted internationally and across 
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different policy areas. On the other hand it can be observed that in addition 
to anticipating and managing specific threats, risk is to serve as a tool for 
improved co-ordination, prioritisation and effectiveness of governance. This 
is achieved through (risk-)proportionate allocation of resources and by 
ensuring the effectiveness and the efficiency of public interventions. 
Britain’s Environment Agency (EA) in a strategy document on 
environmental management for the ‘21st century’ (EA 2005)  highlights that 
such targeted and proportionate interventions maximise their benefits while 
reducing the regulatory burden on the targeted groups and processes. Similar 
arguments are made by the OECD where risk-based governance implies 
being capable of ‘targeting mitigation investments to their greatest benefits’ 
(2009:5). These additional benefits of the concept and instruments of risk in 
governance matter substantially for some of the theoretical arguments about 
the rise of risk-based governance. More specifically risk instruments can be 
used to improve collective problem-solving capacities since the state’s 
legitimacy and effectiveness as a problem-solver is being challenged in 
different ways by the proponents of the theoretical perspectives discussed 
below. 
Explaining the rise of governance-by-risk 
Like Hacking (industrial society) and Beck (risk society) recent 
contributions on the rise of risk-based governance embed this particular form 
of governance in a context with specific political and politico-economic 
characteristics in which the potential dangers are being managed. Two broad 
types of arguments can be discerned. The first type of argument challenges 
the state’s capabilities as an effective risk manager. Risk instruments offer 
means to address these challenges. The second type of argument highlights 
increased pressures of transparency and accountability that risk managers 
within governments face. Again risk instruments can be argued to help 




Challenging the state as an effective risk manager 
Two sets of arguments relate to the post-war state in crisis and discuss risk 
as a possible means to resolve the failures of the state as an effective risk 
manager, namely arguments from a neoliberalism perspective and those 
related to the regulatory state.  
The first set of arguments is associated with the rise and critique of 
neoliberal ideas. In general commentators on neoliberalism examine shifts in 
the relations between state, market and society in managing risks. 
Neoliberalism is generally associated with a rather negative perception of the 
state – mostly as economically wasteful and inefficient, stifling private 
(economic) initiative and undermining the assumption of responsibility for 
their actions by individuals. In contrast neoliberalism’s proponents 
emphasise the superiority of markets and the price mechanisms to allocate 
resources and regulate individual behaviour as well as seeking to promote 
the individual responsibility for managing risks. Neoliberal advocates thus 
promote the ‘roll-back’ and reconfiguration of the state. 
The beginnings of ‘neoliberalism’ as a political and ideological 
project are usually dated back to the mid-20
th
 century. Friedrich Hayek and 
Milton Friedman are credited as the intellectual forefathers of the neoliberal 
project in opposition to the prevailing economic policies and thoughts 
inspired by the writings of Keynes. Such Keynes-inspired economic policies 
emphasise the possibility (even necessity) of beneficial economic policy 
interventions by the state to prevent unemployment and recessions – for 
instance through setting-up an extensive welfare state, state-owned 
companies and macro-economic interventions such as deficit spending in a 
recession. These neoliberal ideas were spread through think tanks and 
converted into ‘neoliberal conviction politics’ (Peck and Tickell 2002:388) 
initially – most prominently under Ronald Reagan’s U.S. government and 
Britain’s Thatcher government that weakened the central institutions of the 
post-war Keynesian-welfarist settlements. This implied the dismantling of 
the welfare state, the deregulation and liberalisation of markets, a monetarist 
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macro-economic management and the privatisation of state-owned 
companies.  
At the same time as Peck and Tickell (2002) point out, this ‘roll-
back’ of the state culminated in economic and other crises in the early 1990s, 
especially in the Anglo-Saxon neoliberal heartland, which in turn led to a 
reconstitution of the neoliberal project as epitomised by the socially 
interventionist and ameliorative Third Way of the governments of Bill 
Clinton and Tony Blair since the 1990s. This suggested that ‘roll-out’ 
neoliberalism engages in regulatory institution-building addressing some of 
the shortcomings of the neoliberalisation of economic management as well 
as government interventions primarily concerning the disciplining of those 
marginalised or dispossessed by the neoliberalisation of the 1980s.  
While the U.S. and the U.K. are normally seen as early movers in 
adopting neoliberal ideas and implementing associated policies, critical 
commentators of neoliberalism have noted that associated ideas ‘seems to be 
everywhere’ (Peck and Tickell 2002:380). This is reflected in a large number 
of case studies of neoliberalisation of water and forest governance, macro-
economic management, welfare regimes, or international trade policies in 
different geographical regions and on various governance levels (Castree 
2008a; 2008b). 
There are three interrelated dimensions to neoliberalism that are 
relevant to explaining a rise in risk-based governance. First, the character of 
the state changes in a neoliberal political economy. Second, through its 
emphasis on markets risk management in neoliberalism increasingly relies 
on commercial insurance and individuals themselves. Third, the changes in 
statehood and the expansion of markets are aspects of a broader promotion 
of an economic rationality in decision-making across all policy sectors.  
The first dimension is concerned with the changing character of the 
state. The embeddedness of states within a globalised competitive 
environment transforms them into ‘competition states’ whose primary policy 
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goal is economic growth (Cerny 1990; 2008)
18
. Such competition states 
contrast remarkably with the type of a modern nation state associated with 
labels such as the welfare state. This welfarist type of nation state revolved 
around ‘public interest’ and ‘general welfare’ to be accomplished through 
‘decommodifying’ key areas of public policy: 
“in order to protect strategic industries or financial institutions, bail out 
consumers or investors, build infrastructure, counteract business cycles, 
and integrate workers into cooperating with the capitalist process through 
unionisation, corporatism, the welfare state, and the like” (Cerny 
2008:13). 
The competition state however, argues Cerny, is actually concerned 
with the ‘commodification’ of the state to promote domestic competitiveness 
and reduce the burden and costs of the state. Such a ‘commodification’ 
includes:  
“streamlining and marketizing state intervention in the economy and (...) 
reorganizing the state itself according to organizational practices and 
procedures drawn from private business” (ibid). 
Risk can be argued to play an instrumental role within ‘competition 
states’ and to promote practices of neoliberal governance. Risk instruments 
allow for more ‘targeted’ and ‘proportionate’ state interventions, thereby 
reducing the burden of overregulation and ensuring a more effective use of 
state resources (Hutter 2005; Rothstein, Irving, Walden et al. 2006b). From 
this perspective risk instruments rather than solely serving to manage the 
actual threat of harm to values ensure competitiveness of state and societies 
in a global marketplace. 
                                                 
18
 Cerny’s ‘competition state’ is not the only label assigned to the reconfigured state 
inspired by neoliberal ideas. Jessop (1993), for example, argues that the Keynesian welfare 
state is replaced by the Schumpeterian workfare state. The new form of state is said to 
“promote product, process, organizational, and market innovation and enhance the structural 
competitiveness of open economies mainly through supply-side intervention; and to 
subordinate social policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and structural 
competitiveness” (ibid:3). 
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A second dimension is the emphasis on markets in neoliberalism. In 
the specific field of risk management the crucial market is the insurance 
market. Ericson and Doyle note that:  
“the role of the state is changing rapidly, and with it the mechanisms of 
governance. (...) In this era of governance through liberal risk regimes, 
one would expect the private insurance industry to take up some ground 
left by the downsizing of the state” (2003:6).  
Insurance in a neoliberal context differs from the insurance 
mechanisms that have emerged throughout the 20
th
 century for the welfare 
state. In welfare states the paradigm was ‘more insurance for more people’ 
and insurance served as a means to distribute risks as widely as possible to 
manage them collectively (Ewald 2002). However this approach to insurance 
has been heavily criticised by neoliberal advocates because of the 
consequences it had on individual behaviour namely the problem of moral 
hazard (Baker and Simon 2002b; Heimer 2002). Moral hazard refers to the 
fact that once insured individuals behave in a more negligent and/or risk-
taking manner than if they were uninsured (Arrow 1971). From a neoliberal 
perspective the financial problems of the social insurance systems and the 
crisis of welfare states is a result of moral hazard and the perverse incentives 
created through social insurance. Allowing private insurers to differentiate 
between different clients in terms of premiums and other contract conditions 
enables them to set economic incentives for their insurance clients that 
encourage them to avoid risk-taking and even engage in risk mitigation 
(Priest 1996; Harrington 2000).   
Risk instruments – primarily those that help determining different 
levels of risk exposure – are central for insurance-based risk management as 
promoted by advocates of neoliberalism. In contrast to the insurance systems 
under the welfare state where the size of the risk pool and the idea of risk 
redistribution were crucial, ‘neoliberal’ insurance aims at differentiating the 
risk pool in accordance to different levels of risk. This differentiation is 
important for the profitability of the insurance industry (to be able to charge 
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competitive rates and avoid excessive exposure to ‘bad’ risks and associated 
financial losses), as well as to enable individuals to manage their risk 
effectively (by finding a balance between risk transfer to insurance and risk 
mitigation/avoidance). Through neoliberal insurance individuals are turned 
into ‘agents of prevention’ (Ericson, Doyle and Barry 2003) and made to 
‘embrace risks’ (Baker and Simon 2002a). 
The third dimension is including aspects of the emergence of 
‘competition states’ and insurance in ‘liberal risk regimes’ (Ericson, Doyle 
and Barry 2003) in the more comprehensive concept of an economic 
‘political rationality’ associated with neoliberal ‘governmentality’. Inspired 
by a Foucauldian perspective neoliberalism in this context means that an 
economic political rationality – for instance associated with cost-benefit 
assessments – is colonizing all realms of society as well as the assessments 
and conduct of individual and collective actors. Foucault speaks of ‘a kind of 
permanent economic tribunal’ (quoted in Lemke 2001:198) and that ‘it is the 
market form that serves as the organisational principle for the state and 
society’ (quoted in Lemke 2001:200). The ideas of a ‘tribunal’ (as an 
institution evaluating and judging on courses of action against particular 
criteria) and ‘organising principle’ (as a set of guidance that prescribes a 
particular order) reflect Foucault’s concepts of ‘governmentality’ and 
‘political rationality’ that link techniques of power to particular forms of 
knowledge. Risk instruments can underpin the economic political rationality 
by providing quantitative, comparable, often even monetary values of the 
adverse outcomes of different courses of action. For instance avoided risk is 
a term that can be used to account for benefits in cost-benefit assessments of 
certain risk management measures.   
In short risk instruments can be argued to fit well with shifts towards 
a competition state and neoliberalism. As many commentators on 
neoliberalism treat its emergence and dominance as an international 
phenomenon risk-based governance can be expected to be an equally 
international phenomenon. However it is important to note that the 
 66 
arguments about the universal emergence of neoliberal forms of governance 
have been contested.  
The most fundamental attack on neoliberalism has been the 
epistemological challenge of the analytical object of neoliberalism. The 
uniqueness, specificity and amorphousness of many case studies analysed 
under the common label of neoliberalism have led Barnett to claim that 
‘there is no such thing as neoliberalism’ (2005:9) as a coherent hegemonic 
project raising doubts about the usefulness of the ‘neoliberalisation’ query as 
an analytical starting point. Castree (2008a; 2008b) however suggests that 
research into the ‘neoliberalisation’ of institutional settings and policies 
should focus on identifying the substantive commonalities in causal 
processes but acknowledge that ‘neoliberalisation’ always takes place jointly 
with other contextual drivers. Substantive commonalities with respect to 
‘neoliberalisation’ may even sometimes be so limited that ‘neoliberalisation’ 
in a particular case only exists conceptually but not in actuality. Moreover 
Jessop points out that there are tendencies and countertendencies towards the 
‘neo-liberal’ reconfiguration of the state. It is therefore 
“imperative to study ‘actually existing neoliberalisms’ to understand how 
their dynamic and viability are shaped by specific path-dependent 
contexts, competing discourses, strategies and organizational paradigms, 
and the balance of forces associated with different projects” (2002:457). 
These critical perspectives suggest that neoliberalism and the 
associated reconfiguration of statehood, state-society relations and 
governmentality are taking place, but that they may differ in their nature. 
Following Jessop’s advice this study analyses the role of risk instruments in 
flood management in two concrete country cases – with sensitivity towards 
the differences in the cases’ degrees of ‘neoliberalisation’.  
The second set of arguments emerges in relation to the ‘rise of the 
regulatory state’ debate. The ‘regulatory state’ debate is not concerned about 
shifts in the relation between state, market and society but focuses on the 
weight of different types of tools with which governments pursue their goals. 
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More specifically Majone (Majone 1997) argued that there was a shift in the 
emphasis in state activities from redistribution and stabilisation to regulation. 
This is normally attributed to the fact that the Keynesian post-war state has 
been exhausted financially and its legitimacy has been in decline due to its 
poor economic performance in the 1970s and 1980s in the advanced 
industrialised countries of Europe. The ‘regulatory state’ offers a response: 
The costs of regulatory interventions are mostly borne by the regulated 
entity rather than the state, and the authorities of the regulatory state are 
specialised agencies that autonomously engage in expertise-based problem-
solving.  
From a European perspective this shift to formalised regulation has 
marked a change from policies of nationalisation and an informal application 
of laws that have been described as being more typical for the western 
European post-war states – in particular Britain (Vogel 1986; Levi-Faur and 
Gilad 2004). From a U.S. viewpoint however the legalistic application of 
formal rules is nothing new. Formal regulation enforced by independent 
regulators emerged in the Progressive Era of the 1930s – mostly focusing on 
the regulation of economic sectors (for example competition rules) – and 
was expanded strongly to include social regulation (for instance health and 
safety regulations) between the 1960s and 1980s.  
In contrast to the European perspectives the American literature does 
not see the regulatory state positively as a solution to the interventionist 
state’s failings but is more critical. For instance there have been arguments 
that the regulatory state and its agencies can be captured by organised 
interests (Bernstein 1955; Stigler 1984). It may also be ineffective in the 
pursuit of its objectives since it fails to implement the regulations, in 
particular the more recent social regulations (Stewart 1983; Stigler 1984). A 
closely related challenge to the implementation of such ‘failure’ arguments 
is that the regulatory state requires the investment of substantial resources 
(for instance for inspections) by the state and overburdens the regulatees 
(Hutter 2005). 
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One response to these failures was the rise of strong ‘deregulation 
rhetoric’ (Hutter 2005) in the 1980s and 1990s. Another one was the 
promotion of regulatory reforms in the 1990s that were partially overlapping 
with the aims of the deregulation rhetoric (Radaelli 2007). Most notably 
‘better regulation’ became the buzzword in the 1990s and early 2000s – with 
international agencies such as the European Commission (EC 2001; 
Mandelkern-Group 2001; EC 2002) and the OECD (OECD 1995) promoting 
it as part of a wider modernisation of the state. ‘Better regulation’ is 
basically about policies, tools and institutions that ensure that regulations 
generate overall economic and wider societal benefits rather than 
excessively burdening regulatees and that regulatory resources are deployed 
more effectively. This is to be achieved by making rules simpler, consistent, 
more transparent and accessible, more targeted and proportional, and with a 
clear accountability (OECD 1995; Mandelkern-Group 2001; BRTF 2005).  
Risk-based regulation is particularly relevant in the context of the 
‘better regulation’ debate. More specifically the use of the concept and 
instruments of risk in regulation implies a potentially more targeted and 
efficient (in terms of its regulatory resource use) regulation as well as greater 
transparency and accountability. This is because regulatory resources can be 
deployed to those regulatees that can potentially cause the greatest harm. At 
the same time those with a lower potential to cause harm are burdened less 
by regulatory interventions. Moreover as Black (2005) points out risk-based 
regulation makes explicit which risks the regulator deems acceptable and 
which not and thus does or does not allocate resources to.  
While ‘better regulation’ along with risk-based regulation (Rothstein, 
Irwin et al. 2006) has been described as an international phenomenon, 
commentators (Radaelli 2004) highlight that regulatory reforms differ in 
terms of contents and pace. It is therefore interesting to see whether and how 
‘better regulation’ rationales (avoiding overregulation, improving 
compliance, allocating regulatory resources more effectively) have led to the 
adoption of risk-based regulation in flood management regimes – and 
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whether this has been the case in the same way for different institutional 
contexts.  
Challenging the state as a legitimate risk manager  
Perspectives on neoliberalism and the shortcomings of the regulatory state 
focus on how the state fails to govern effectively. Concretely, regulatory and 
other resources are not allocated efficiently and state interventions 
overburden and set the wrong incentives (‘moral hazard’) for private actors. 
From a neoliberal perspective an inefficient state and a crowded-out private 
sector undermine the capacity of a society to compete (for international 
investments, talent and other desiderata) in a globalised economy. 
Another pressure on the state is an increased emphasis on holding the 
state accountable for its interventions.  Accountability can be defined as: 
“a liability to reveal, to explain, and to justify what one does; how one 
discharges responsibilities, financial or other, whose several origins may 
be political, constitutional, hierarchical or contractual” (Normanton 
1971:311). 
Accountability pressures beyond the traditional constitutional 
obligations of the government and bureaucrats to be accountable to 
Parliament, ministers and to courts have been argued to be rising in 
European countries. This is on the one hand a result of changes in society – 
including the availability and dissemination of information through various 
sources (NGOs, Internet) and mechanisms (freedom of information 
requirements, corporate reporting). Moreover governments themselves have 
subscribed to the principles of transparency and accountability through the 
international promotion of concepts such as ‘good governance’ (EC 2001) 
and requirements for greater transparency under,  for example, the Aarhus 
Convention on freedom of access to environmental information at European 
and international levels.  
On the other hand an argument can be made that the traditional 
control mechanisms (Parliament; courts) no longer suffice to hold modern 
governments accountable (Harden 1995; Graham 1997). As a matter of fact 
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Hood and colleagues are pointing to a ‘web of regulation’ around 
government agencies (Hood and Scott 2000) having empirically discovered 
for the UK a rise in ‘regulation inside government’ (Hood et al. 1998). Light, 
in a study on the U.S. Congress-installed Inspector-Generals that oversee 
federal departments, notes ‘an ever-increasing level of regulatory and 
reporting requirements on executive agencies and their employees’ (Light 
1993:17).  
The implications of these pressures are two-fold. First, governments 
are expected to report on their activities to various audiences from expert 
regulators to the public and Parliament, from ‘sleaze buster’ and ’quality 
police’ to ‘waste watchers’ (Hood et al. 1999b). Second, these growing 
reporting and transparency requirements imply an intensified blame game 
that is intricately linked to (failed) risk management (Hood 2002). Mirroring 
these implications there are two arguments in the literature that relate the rise 
of risk-based governance to these accountability pressures. The first 
argument highlights characteristics of risk instruments that make them 
suitable for accommodating the increasing demands for accountability. The 
second group of arguments focuses on those features of risk in governance 
that allow actors to cope with the repercussions of governance failure in a 
context of increased transparency and accountability (Rothstein, Huber and 
Gaskell 2006a). In general governance failures can be argued to be 
inevitable in view of the ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1957) in decision-
making. In the context of increased transparency and accountability the 
likelihood of being detected and held accountable increases for the involved 
actors. Rothstein and colleagues therefore point to the increasing 
‘institutional risk’ that actors responsible for risk management are exposed 
to. In this context institutional risks are:  
“risks to organisations (...) regulating and managing societal risks, and/or 
risks to the legitimacy of their associated rules and methods” (Rothstein, 
Huber and Gaskell 2006a:92). 
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In relation to the first argument risk instruments offer means to report 
performance and processes transparently and in a comparable way. This is 
because risk instruments quantify, standardise and – in some cases – 
monetise the potential harmful consequences (Ericson, Doyle and Barry 
2003; O'Malley 2004). This allows for the measurement of the status quo 
and its actual reduction through measures as well as the definition of the 
desired outcome in terms of risk reduction.  
Secondly, risk-based governance has been argued to enhance the 
capacity to manage ‘institutional risk’ and defend choices in an era of 
heightened accountability. A first set of ‘risk-as-defence’ arguments stresses 
the processes involved in risk-based governance and how they allow actors 
to defend and justify their choices. Scholars highlight the quantitative and 
scientific character that is associated with the use of risk instruments in 
governance. For instance Porter suggests that:  
“a decision made by the numbers (or explicit rules of some sort) has at 
least the appearance of being fair and impersonal. Scientific objectivity 
thus provides an answer to a moral demand for impartiality and fairness. 
Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide. 
Objectivity lends authority to official who have very little of their own” 
(1995:8). 
This echoes an argument – bearing in mind the technical character of 
risk in governance – that has been made by Rose and Miller (1990) from a 
Foucauldian perspective in which they identify as ‘technologies of 
government’ knowledge and expertise. Knowledge has a key role in making 
aspects of existence thinkable and calculable and subject to deliberate and 
planned technocratic governance. Expertise in turn assigns social authority 
to specific forms of knowledge and judgement thereby shoring up the 
legitimacy of certain institutions and policy choices. Miller and Rose explain 
this authority as follows: 
“the language of expertise plays a key role here, its norms and values 
seeming compelling because of their claims to a disinterested truth, and 
the promise they offer of achieving desired results” (1990:10). 
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Another scholar, Michael Power, links the ‘risk management of 
everything’ (Power 2004) to his earlier arguments about the rise of the so-
called ‘audit society’ (Power 1997). Auditing has spread beyond the private 
sector because its particular procedures offer legitimacy and blame 
deflection for organisations on the basis of ‘ritualised practices of 
verification’ (ibid.:14). Risk-based governance offers similar procedural 
reassurances as reflected in multi-step risk governance models – for example 
consisting of risk identification, assessment, management and 
communication (CEC 2002). Having risk-based management processes in 
place therefore accommodates widespread expectations that any potential 
dangers are manageable (regardless of whether this is true) and that an actor 
is responsible for their management, leading to what Power calls ‘organised 
uncertainty’ (2007).  
A second set of ‘risk-as-defence’ arguments presents governance-by-
risk as a means to defining risk management failure as a legitimate policy 
outcome, thereby defining the limits of governance. These arguments focus 
on the fact that risk is linked to uncertainty as a result of the ‘bounded 
rationality’ of decision-makers. If actors use risk instruments as an 
informational basis for governance, the fact that risk only provides the odds 
(not certainty) offers a justification should anything go wrong (Luhmann 
1993; Rothstein, Huber and Gaskell 2006a).  
Risk-based governance therefore also offers some compelling 
instruments to policy-makers and public risk managers to adapt to a political 
context characterised by increasing accountability and transparency. The 
drive for and adoption of more accountable and transparent governments 
appears to be a phenomenon affecting most advanced liberal democracies. 
This is illustrated by supranational policy initiatives of the European Union 
concerning ‘good governance’ and participation, commentary on an 
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emerging ‘global civil society’19 and enabling technological change such as 
access to the Internet with high household penetration rates
20
 seem to 
underpin. However scholars have been cautious not to make universal 
statements about accountability and transparency pressures. One instance is 
the reflection of Hood and Scott on increased internal accountability 
pressures:  
“We lack any systematic cross-national survey of regulation in 
government, although parts of the field (notably audits and ombudsmen) 
have been comparatively mapped to some extent. So we cannot say with 
confidence which states have been most and least exposed to ‘audit 
explosions’ and new ages of inspection. We do not know whether the 
pattern observed (...) for the US (...) and for the UK (...) is observable in 
other cases or how far it constitutes an exceptional Anglo-American 
pattern” (2000:18).   
Given these reservations it is of crucial importance to comparatively explore 
whether and how possibly varied accountability pressures have an important 
role to play in explaining the differences in risk-based governance in 
advanced, liberal democracies.   
To sum up the discussion of risk in governance the actors involved in 
the management of risk live in a very dynamic, complex environment. 
Depending on scholarly perspective actors are embedded in a late modern 
‘risk society’ facing confident, well-informed, risk-sensitive populations. 
They may also be situated in a neoliberal global economy in which they 
have to permanently view any governance activity against an economic, 
value-for-money yardstick. Finally actors may operate in a society that 
values and has the technological capacity to scrutinise any public 
intervention. These environments create strong incentives to adopt forms of 
risk-based governance. These drivers are not linked to (the rise of actual) 
                                                 
19
 The fact that there has been a Global Civil Society Yearbook (e.g. Anheier, Glasius et al. 
2001) since 2001 (statistically) mapping and commenting on the emerging civil society is 
indicative of its existence.  
20
 In 2009 the average figure for Internet access across the EU-27 is 65% with Greece (with 
38% )having the lowest and the Netherlands (with 90%) the highest proportion of the 
population being connected (Eurostat 2009).  
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risk itself but pursue other objectives such as competitiveness or legitimacy. 
The incentives at first glance appear to be present in all advanced, capitalist 
liberal democracies. However many scholarly contributions are careful to 
point out that their arguments only apply under certain conditions or point to 
a lack of and need for cross-national research.  
3.2 COMPARING RISK IN GOVERNANCE  
This dissertation examines diversity in risk-based governance. To this end it 
undertakes a cross-country comparative study into risk-based flood 
management regimes in England and Germany. Ragin notes that: 
“comparative researchers (...) study diversity. (...) [They] tend to look for 
differences among their cases. Comparative researchers examine patterns 
of similarities and differences across cases and try to come to terms with 
their diversity” (1994:137).  
This study of diversity is particularly relevant in a theoretical debate 
driven either by macro-level analysis of risk in governance (for instance 
Beck’s global risk society or the ubiquitous spread of neoliberal forms of 
governance) or arguments based on single country studies (for example 
Power’s ‘audit explosion’ and ‘risk management of everything’ draw mostly 
on UK examples; the ‘insurance as governance’ arguments by Ericson and 
colleagues focus primarily on Canada).  
The recent scholarly interest in explaining a recent rise of risk-based 
governance across policy domains and in many countries sometimes hides 
the fact that risk assessments had attracted scholarly and policy attention as 
an important scientific input to setting regulatory standards for health and 
environmental risks for decades. This has particularly been the case since the 
1980s as the U.S. National Research Council’s so-called ‘Red Book’ 
guidance and the UK Royal Society report on risk assessment from 1983 
show (NRC 1983; RS 1983). In this debate, risk assessments and regulations 
in different countries have actually been found often by commentators on the 
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politics of regulation to lead to different institutional and policy outcomes in 
different countries. 
This is on the one hand testified by concrete conflicts in international 
politics. One instance is the BSE/mad cow crisis, when British beef was 
permitted for sale in Britain but banned for export into other EU member 
states. Similarly different risk regulations in the EU and the United States on 
growth hormones (the so-called bovine somatotropin) used in the production 
of milk and beef has resulted in a trade conflict between the two countries – 
with the EU taking a more precautionary stance and therefore restricting 
imports on the respective products from the United States. On the other hand 
scholars have also identified some puzzling differences in risk regulation. 
Vogel has taken an interest in transatlantic differences in regulating risk 
(1986; 2003). He observes that the EU regulations are now ‘more risk averse 
or precautionary than in the US’ (2003:25). Comparing two North American 
countries Schrader-Frechette (1991) discovered a mirror image in 
regulations of the United States and Canada concerning cyclamate and 
saccharin – with Canada permitting the former and banning the latter and the 
United States regulating in exactly the opposite way. Jasanoff’s 
comprehensive study (2005) on different biotechnological innovations takes 
a broader interest than a focus on regulation and explores the varying roles 
and measures by governments, science and the public in response to the risks 
associated with biotechnology in the United States, Britain and Germany. In 
another comparative study she reveals the different regulatory treatment of 
carcinogens between Germany, Britain and the U.S. (Jasanoff 1986). For 
instance Germany’s ‘cancer’ policy explicitly regulates the workplace risks 
associated with carcinogens whereby the carcinogenic potential of 
substances can also be established through animal experimentation. Britain 
in contrast does not have separate regulations concerning carcinogens per se, 
but any such risks are subsumed under the regulations for toxic substances. 
British officials are also reluctant to recognise any substance as carcinogenic 
unless there is corroborating human epidemiological evidence. 
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In view of the lack of systematic, comparative work in the context of 
recent debates on the rise of risk-based governance as well as accounts of 
diversity in the role of science in regulation in the 1980s it is important to 
undertake a comprehensive comparative study into new forms of risk-based 
governance.  
3.3 A NEO-INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE ON RISK-BASED GOVERNANCE 
Beyond identifying diversity in the forms of risk-based governance this 
study aims at explaining the differences in governance themselves. The 
discussions on risk in governance provide some insights into possible drivers 
of risk-based governance. For instance risk in governance can be expected to 
be shaped by public opinion and pressure – whether driven by the greater 
reflexivity of the population (risk society, late modernity), the strong public 
response to major disasters (tombstones) or a more transparent risk 
management process (accountability). Another factor might be interest 
groups and their impact on policy-makers – inspired by the rise of public 
interest organisations (accountability), increasing economic interests in an 
expansion of markets and an efficient state (neoliberalism) and the 
emergence of an industry of risk professionals including insurers (the ‘risk 
management of everything’; neoliberalism). These discussions point to 
traditional political science variables representing public risk managers as 
being exposed to public opinion pressures and the lobbying of interest 
groups  – that is, the consequences of rational choices and preferences of 
individuals (in aggregate) and groups.  
3.3.1 The advantages of and dimensions of neo-institutionalist 
explanations 
This study however uses a different perspective, namely a neo-
institutionalist perspective. Neo-institutionalist perspectives, varied as they 
are (Hall and Taylor 1996),  in general challenge the idea that policy and 
organisational choices as well as social behaviour are solely the outcome of 
particular functional needs or individual and aggregated rational choice 
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(DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Institutionalists argue that such perspectives 
ignore that:  
“social, political and economic institutions have become larger, 
considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima facie more 
important to collective life” (March and Olsen 1984:734). 
This perspective therefore highlights the role of institutional variables that 
shape individual preferences and collective choices concerning policies and 
the organisation of governance in a way that leads to outcomes distinct from 
those caused by market and power structures, functional requirements and 
aggregated individual choices. 
Institutionalist accounts therefore offer an opportunity to challenge 
the accounts of the rise of risk-based governance as functional responses to 
more catastrophic risk, as reflecting the effects of market forces (and 
accommodating corporate interest groups) or as demands for greater 
transparency by public interest organisations and others. The complex 
landscape of social, political and economic institutions are expected to filter 
and shape the weights of these different needs and pressures in the 
consideration of responsible actors, the varied manner in which forms of risk 
governance accommodate these needs and to add further roles that risk 
instruments of different kinds may assume. An institutionalist account 
explaining the rise of the observed forms of risk-based governance from a 
comparative perspective challenges simple stories of ‘rationalising’ 
regulation and offers a richer account of actual risk governance. There are 
for instance institutionalist arguments concerned with the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’– implying constraints through cultural and normative 
frameworks – to explain the selectivity in policy choices (March and Olsen 
1984). Another argument points to the need of policy change to be 
compatible with core features of a state’s administration (Knill and 
Lenschow 1998). Others highlight the ‘path dependency’ that constrains 
decision-makers even if the outcome may be suboptimal from a functional 
viewpoint: for instance existing institutional arrangements imply high 
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switching costs to novel policies  (for example due to the high set-up and 
fixed costs) and create increasing returns  (for example due to learning and 
co-ordination effects) (Krasner 1989; North 1990; Pierson 2000).  
Institutionalist arguments also appear to be particularly interesting 
for comparative studies and the study of diversity. This is because broad 
similarity in public opinion and interest group responses would be expected 
under ‘rational choice’ assumptions given the similarity of challenges faced 
and of the emerging flood management programmes (e.g. anticipatory and 
adaptive, multi-domain management approaches). Moreover the actual 
effects of public opinion and various interest groups in governance can be 
argued to be filtered and shaped by institutions. The importance of such 
institutional filters was for instance highlighted by Lodge and Hood’s 
examination of dangerous dogs risk regulation (Lodge and Hood 2002). 
While the authors acknowledge that public opinion and media frenzies have 
‘forced’ the regulatory choices by policy-makers they also note that:  
“entrenched institutional obstacles shape the context of those choices by the interests 
and positions that are developed in advance of the crisis and being promoted before a 
crisis, and in the detailed way that regulatory tools and their application are 
developed during and after such events” (ibid:11). 
Similarly in another comparative publication in which Hood and 
colleagues compare nine risk regulation regimes in the UK they observe – 
after examining the explanatory powers of market failure public opinion and 
interest group approaches – that they need to take into account the ‘inner 
lives’ of regimes, i.e. the ‘politics of professional-technocratic interests in 
and around the state structures’ (2004:140). In fact they note that:  
“the more we disaggregate regime content, the more we have to refer to 
the ‘inner life’ of the regulatory policy community” (ibid). 
 Once the authors move into this realm variables such as for example 
a ‘common view’21 of technocrats on radon risks and the human rights ‘legal 
                                                 
21
 This seems close to the ‘shared understanding’ often referred to by neo-institutionalist 
scholars. See below. 
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framework’ conflicting with populist demands (for instance, for a public 
registry of paedophiles) emerge as constraints on policy choices that reveal 
the limitations of approaches that present policy choices solely as an 
aggregation and balance of individual and interest group preferences. 
The richness of neo-institutionalist explanations is partly a result of 
its openness to a wide range of constraining variables on choices of actors. 
Rather than focusing, like the early institutionalists, on formal state 
structures only, constraints reflecting specific more or less formalised norms 
and values, shared understandings and taken-for-granted beliefs are also 
being examined in more recent contributions to institutionalism (Hall and 
Taylor 1996; Scott 2008). Institutions therefore can be defined as:   
“comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and 
meaning to social life” (Scott 2008:48). 
Extending more traditional institutionalist analysis with ‘softer’ 
variables and effective factors at different levels is particularly suitable for 
the analysis of risk-based governance. The reasons for this lie in the 
particular nature of the concept of risk. The concepts of risk and risk 
management have strong cognitive and moral connotations. Ewald (1991) 
for example notes that:  
“nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But, on the other 
hand, anything can be a risk” (ibid:199). 
Forms of risk governance such as insurance are therefore examples 
of – in Ewald’s view – a ‘scheme of rationality’ and ‘a certain type of 
rationality’ (ibid.) through which issues are objectified, quantified and 
thereby made governable (Rose 2002; Ericson, Doyle and Barry 2003). The 
particular risk-based schemes of rationality – among other things stressing 
quantitative measurability of possible events – may fit more or less with how 
actors make sense of the world. Furthermore Ericson and Doyle (2003) 
highlight the moral aspects of risk and its management. Rather than being 
neutral and instrumental the discourse surrounding risk is about moral 
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responsibility, accountability, retribution and justice. Risk implies the 
definition of values – of what society or particular groups value as good and 
bad – since it is defined as the product of probability and adverse 
consequences for something valued by somebody. Is this risk-based morality 
reconcilable with other moral principles of conduct and decision-making 
adopted by responsible actors? 
Accordingly the analysis explores first, existing formal and informal 
rules that govern choices, practices and responsibilities that constitute the 
regulative dimension of institutional analysis. Actors within flood regimes 
are subject to hierarchical, legislative, constitutional and/or market-
regulating rules. This is however complemented by ‘softer’ variables – 
reflecting the moral and cognitive connotations of risk and its governance. 
The analysis therefore also looks into the normative dimension of 
institutions – that is the norms and values held by and shaping decision-
makers and principal actors. Norms imply prescription, evaluation and 
obligations whilst values define the desirable and preferred against which 
actions and processes are measured. In addition to this ‘normative’ 
dimension the following discussions take an interest in the so-called cultural-
cognitive dimensions of institutions – that is the ‘shared conceptions that 
constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning 
is made’ (Scott 2008:57). Table 4 sums up the dimensions of institutional 
variables. 
Dimension Types of variables 
Regulative Regulative rules (legislative, contractual and 
more) enforced through legal sanctions/coercion 
Normative Norms, creating social obligations and binding 
expectations 
Cultural-cognitive Shared understandings / taken-for-grantedness 
Table 4: Types of institutional variables 
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3.3.2 Comparative institutionalism, regulation and public policy-making  
The idea of using an institutionalist perspective to explain variation in risk-
based governance is not new. In fact the literature that has taken an interest 
in studying variety in the politics of regulation revolves around 
institutionalist explanatory variables.  
In an early wave of scholarship commentators focused on state 
structures as explanatory factors (Evans et al. 1985). Most notably scholars 
identify national regulatory styles. For instance a European ‘co-operative’ 
regulatory style is contrasted with the ‘confrontational’ style in the United 
States (Vogel 1983; Badaracco 1985). Such institutionalist perspectives 
highlight for example the separation of powers between the Congress and 
the executive branch as a reason for greater rivalry and adversarialism in the 
U.S., as well as low barriers to litigation and judicial review that result in an 
emphasis on transparent, science-based, quantitative regulation of 
environmental and health risks. This style contrasts with the European one 
where regulators make decisions based on qualitative assessments and expert 
judgements reinforced by a wide co-ordination, trust and consensus among 
decision-makers in a less adversarial and transparent public sphere. These 
perspectives explore structures and relations within the government and the 
state  – for example the relations between different parts of the state and 
political decision-makers and experts and how they shape the instrumental 
choices of regulators, administrators and policy-makers. 
More recent accounts move beyond such ‘harder’ and visible factors 
and explore cultural and normative variables. An early formulation of the 
importance of ‘culture’ in determining which risks to pay attention to and in 
what ways to manage them can be found in Douglas and Wildavsky (1982). 
The authors distinguish between four different types of worldviews 
(egalitarian, fatalist, liberal and hierarchist) that can prevail in societies. 
Originally cultural theory has often been applied to explain and predict 
varying risk perceptions in different cultural contexts (Drake and Wildavsky 
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1990; Sjoberg 1996). More recently scholars have also sought to apply 
cultural theory to explaining public policy responses (Lodge et al. 2008). 
The starting point is that each of these worldviews is connected to different 
understandings of the nature of the world, distinctly organised social 
relations and underlying cause-effect relations. This in turn leads to different 
problem definitions and policy solutions depending on which of the 
competing worldviews has come to dominate a particular regulatory regime. 
Variance in the choice of particular policy instruments can therefore be 
examined through the lens of different worldviews that dominate in 
regulatory regimes.  
Jasanoff (2005), in her comparison of regulatory and epistemological 
foundations of risk management concerning biotechnology in the United 
States, Germany and Britain, explores the concept of distinct political 
cultures as an explanatory variable. The political cultures shape policy 
choices and assign meaning, legitimacy and identities to types of expertise 
and actors. For instance the Anglo-Saxon countries’ pragmatism and 
utilitarianism contrasts with Germany’s deontological ethics, leading to 
different regulatory outcomes concerning the treatment of embryos or 
genetic engineering. Choosing the wider concept of ‘political cultures’ 
Jasanoff’s analysis takes into account a wider set of institutional variables 
than state structures alone.  
In short an institutionalist perspective on the rise of forms of risk-
based governance promises to challenge existing accounts of the rise of risk-
based governance and to replace them with richer explanations of the 
particular configuration of risk-based governance that results from the 
interplay of different types of institutional constraints and opportunities. 
Moreover an institutionalist perspective allows for a more comprehensive 
view on traditional political science explanations – such as public opinion 
and interest groups as variables that shape particular policy and 
organisational choices because the impact of such factors on governance can 
be argued to be filtered by the institutional context.  
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter provided a review of the scholarly literature on risk in 
governance. It has demonstrated that beyond their particular functional 
rationality within more anticipatory and adaptive flood management regimes 
(see chapter 2), there are a number of arguments that seek to explain the rise 
of risk-based governance.  
These arguments include indirect explanations – such as those that 
discuss the growing pressure to undertake governance of risk – for which 
risk instruments may be relevant. Other arguments directly address the rise 
of governance-by-risk as a response to pressures on the state and society to 
become more competitive, economically rational and market-oriented as 
well as pressures on the state to become more accountable. In this context 
the concept of risk and associated instruments matter for their quantitative, 
numerical and scientific qualities as well as their statistical-probabilistic and 
potentially monetary character. 
While the arguments about risk in governance shed light on 
important trends in risk governance and its context they often remain at a 
macroscopic level or fail to examine whether the same arguments apply to 
the same extent in different countries and policy domains. As some of the 
comparative literature focused on the politics of regulation and the role of 
science in regulation indicate however, risks can be governed in very 
different ways with the input of risk instruments being used to very different 
ends. It is to enrich existing accounts on the rise of risk-based governance 
and to expand on existing comparative work, that this study into the rise of 
risk-based flood management in different countries has been undertaken.  
This research takes a special interest in how institutional variables – 
from formal rules to shared understandings – shape the particular 
configurations of risk in governance in different countries. Are the emerging 
risk-based flood management regimes in place to better manage floods – in 
terms of reducing the risk in a more cost-effective and accountable manner? 
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Does this apply across countries and regimes? Which objective is prioritised, 
cost-effectiveness, accountability or safety? What are the reasons for these 
prioritisations and possible differences? Are there further considerations that 
shape the use of risk in governance? These are the questions for which 







CHAPTER 4: COMPARING RISK IN GOVERNANCE. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Comparing the management of flooding in different countries is a 
challenging task. Floods are managed through a complex array of 
interventions: from the clearing of debris near bridges, issuing regulations 
prohibiting the sealing of surfaces in front yards or encouraging particular 
forms of farming and co-ordinating between meteorological services and 
flood forecasters to offering insurance policies covering flood damage to 
home contents. Actors of private and public nature, from local to EU levels 
and in a large number of policy domains are involved in different aspects of 
flood damage prevention. At the same time focusing on risk-based 
governance also offers a challenge of notable complexity, with the different 
forms in which risk assessments can come and their manifold uses in flood 
management. These challenges imply a rich empirical case in the context of 
which the variety in risk-based governance in different institutional 
environments can be examined. At the same time they highlight the need for 
a comprehensive and concise comparative research design.  
To meet this need this chapter introduces the risk regulation regime 
framework developed by Hood and colleagues (2004). As the discussion in 
this chapter demonstrates the approach is comprehensive in its use and 
definition of the concept of regime; it is also concise thanks to the fact that 
the regimes can be disaggregated into functional and sectoral components. In 
addition to introducing the framework further sections explain the selection 
of the case and the methods and data used. 
 4.1 COMPARING RISK REGULATION REGIMES 
Using the risk regulation regime approach as a framework for comparison 
allows for a comprehensive and nuanced examination of the role of risk 
instruments in the varied endeavours of actors involved in flood 
management to prevent, control and reduce the harmful consequences of 
flooding. More specifically it is the concept of regimes that helps us to go 
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beyond a simple analysis of (for instance) command-and-control regulations 
(such as a ban on land use near the river bank) and to recognise the 
multitude of mechanisms through which control is organised and exercised 
and in which risk instruments can matter in manifold ways. In addition 
regimes can – following Hood and colleagues’ approach (2004) – be  
disaggregated into functional components, adding another filter through 
which the impact of risk on governance can be located more precisely. The 
following sections set out the comparative framework. 
4.1.1 Risk regulation regimes 
Regimes denote the ‘complex of institutional geography, rules, practice, and 
animating ideas’ (Hood, Rothstein et al. 2004:9) that are associated with the 
control of a particular adverse event and its consequences. The regime 
concept by Hood and colleagues is, in contrast with the more traditional 
political science focus on ‘government’ and formal processes, open towards 
informal control mechanisms and non-state agency. This appears important 
for the case of (risk-based) flood management in particular and risk 
governance in general. For instance non-state actors such as insurers can be 
important for managing the consequences of flooding as well as in relation 
to arguments about the emergence of neoliberal risk regimes. Informal 
mechanisms that contribute to and organise the control of flooding – such as 
ideas about the appropriate role of the state in flood management – can be 
important in order to inform the actors (for instance non-state actors and 
individuals in the case of a limited state involvement) of the existing risks 
and their responsibilities as well as for putting in place the appropriate set of 
(support) measures (e.g. subsidies for low income households to be able to 
buy insurance products).  
In addition to this comprehensiveness of the regime concept it is also 
analytically useful for drawing the boundaries of the research object, 
especially for a complex governance challenge such as flooding. A regime’s 
components are identifiable through their objective to control the particular 
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threat of future flooding. This focus on varied mechanisms of control allows 
for a study of the concrete impact of risk instruments on each of the 
components of a specific country’s risk regulation regime in contrast to 
grand narratives on risk governance such as Beck’s ‘risk society’. One 
example of overly generalising arguments of such grand narratives is Beck’s 
treatment of risk-based insurance. In it he assumes that insurance fails and 
consequently withdraws cover for the novel risks in a risk society because 
the complexity and scale of the novel risks render existing capacities for risk 
assessments and capital formation inadequate. However as Ericson and 
Doyle argue this is because:  
“Beck, as well as other participants in debates about risk society, makes 
his assertions about insurability without empirical evidence regarding 
how the insurance industry actually operates in conditions of 
uncertainty” (2004b:139).  
The use of the regime framework will provide a detailed overview of 
how and to what extent risk instruments are used for different aspects of 
managing flooding in different countries. The regime approach is further 
elaborated by Hood and his colleagues (2004) by identifying three different 
functional dimensions of regimes as will be discussed in the following 
section. 
4.1.2 Disaggregating risk regulation regimes: The functional dimensions 
Hood and colleagues (2004) disaggregate the regimes on the basis of 
categories of cybernetic control systems (Dunsire 1991). Three functions are 
identified namely directing, detecting and effecting.
22
 These components 
reflect traditional terms of political analysis such as policy 
formulation/adoption, problem identification/policy evaluation as well as 
                                                 
22
 In fact the authors (2004) use in their monograph the functions of information-gathering, 
standard-setting and behaviour-modification. In earlier papers (Hood, Rothstein et al. 1999; 
Hood and Rothstein 2001) directing, effecting and detecting are being used. This thesis uses 
the latter because the term ‘behaviour-modification’ implies mainly organisational and 
individual behaviour whilst ‘effecting’ is more easily being understood as a more 
comprehensive term open to include modification of natural processes. This latter aspect is 
of relevance in the management of environmental disasters such as flooding.   
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enforcement/implementation respectively. In line with cybernetics these 
three functions are necessary for a system to exercise control as the 
following discussion will show.  
‘Directing’ is about having a clear knowledge of the preferred state 
of the world one seeks to achieve. This implies the setting of goals, targets, 
guidelines and standards that provide direction to the agents within the 
regime. Such standards may include for example goals such as lowering the 
numbers of road accident victims or particular emissions standards for 
nitrates from agriculture to protect water bodies. This goal and standard-
setting has always received substantial attention in the debate of risk 
regulation because it raises controversial issues about the equality of safety 
standards for all and hence ultimately the value of life, as well as the level of 
tolerable risk and the distribution of risk (Heimann 1997). Whilst these 
discussions focus on the nature of the standards and goals involved, scholars 
have also directed their attention to the underlying processes of standard- 
and goal-setting. Dunsire (1990) for instance distinguishes between simple 
steering, homeostatic control and control through opposed maximisers 
(‘collibration’). Simple steering is based on targets set through 
administrative decisions directly based on available risk analysis. 
Homeostatic control introduces certain quantitative or qualitative levels of 
acceptable risk that are to be kept without regard for competing objectives or 
interests. In contrast ‘collibration’ generates regime standards through a 
deliberative process which allows the weighing of different criteria against 
one another (e.g. risk-benefit-comparisons, risk-risk-trade-offs). Studying 
variety in risk-based governance this research focuses on the extent to which 
and how standards and goals of safety and risk reduction are defined in 
probabilistic and risk terms in the two countries, what alternative 
considerations are reflected in the goals and – if the countries vary in extent 
and manner of risk-based directing – how this can be explained.   
‘Detecting’ refers to ways through which the system receives 
information about the state of the world. This means that information is 
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gathered to produce knowledge on the risk in question and to monitor the 
accomplishment of goals and compliance with standards. Examples include 
registering dangerous dogs and measuring the contamination of food with 
pesticides. Information about a particular threat can however come in 
different ways, exhibit varying quality and be collected by different actors. 
Potential dangers can be estimated through different means – from rule-of-
thumb assessments to sophisticated, statistical risk assessments (O'Malley 
2004). Moreover Hood and colleagues (2004) suggest that the (quality of) 
risk information can be contestable. These suggestions reflect the wider 
debates on the co-production of knowledge (Jasanoff 2004) and the 
indeterminate character and local nature of scientific knowledge generation 
(Wynne 1996), which casts doubt upon the quality of even supposedly 
objective and superior nature of scientific information. Apart from the nature 
of risk information, information-gathering can be undertaken by various 
actors – from the government agency to individual insurers to commercial 
risk modellers – using multiple sources of data. This regime dimension is in 
view of the informational character of risk instruments of central importance 
to forms of risk-based governance and the variation in the type of 
information gathered (e.g. information on spatial, environmental, monetary 
consequences) and the actors involved provide important insights into the 
extent of and the varied ways in which decision-making in flood 
management can be based on calculations of risk.  
‘Effecting’ addresses the discrepancy between the desired state of the 
world and the observed one. It refers to measures taken to achieve human 
behaviour modification and hazard impact mitigation that are needed to 
achieve the goals. Examples may include inspections of retailers concerning 
the compliance with certain pesticide standards or awareness-raising 
campaigns for road safety. Effectively accomplishing behaviour 
modification and hazard impact mitigation is problematic. In terms of 
behaviour modification it might be difficult to accomplish its objectives in 
view of counterproductive preferences and incentives of the regulating 
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bureaucrats and the regulatees. Even if bureaucrats are willing to accomplish 
behaviour modification this may in turn contradict the rationale of the 
overall risk control goals, as illustrated by concepts such as ‘goal 
displacement’ (in other words rules in place to achieve an end become an 
end in themselves) (Merton et al. 1952) or ‘tunnel vision’ (implying single-
minded and disproportionate regulation) (Breyer 1993). Whilst this 
discussion shows that behaviour modification may be problematic Hood and 
colleagues (2004) point to different approaches to achieve it. They 
distinguish between ‘compliance’ and ‘deterrence’ mechanisms. The former 
relies on diplomacy, persuasion or education; the latter stresses sanctions 
and expected costs of violation to change behaviour. In addition to 
controlling human behaviour the control of natural processes and their 
impact also emerges as a major challenge – as the previously mentioned 
experiences of the failure of technical control over floods in the 1990s and 
2000s illustrate. This study’s discussion on risk-based governance takes an 
interest in the various aspects of effecting – with risk instruments being 
expected to improve the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of risk 
management and offering non-state, ‘compliance-style’ effecting 
mechanisms. To what extent and how do risk calculations shape effecting’ 
efforts? 
The discussion of regime functions in relation to risk-based 
governance is summarised in the following table 5.  The first column sums 
up the purpose of the three regime functions. The second column rephrases 
in the form of questions earlier discussions on how the different dimensions 
might be looking like from a risk-based governance perspective. In a 
nutshell, the questions concern the extent to which and the way in which a 
quantitative, probabilistic and economic (risk-based) logic informs and is 
reflected in the decision-making and measures by flood regime actors in 
each of the three regime functions. 
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 Purpose Questions relevant to risk-based 
governance 
Directing Determining the preferred state of 
the world through setting certain 
goals and standards 
Are the standards/goals defined in 
terms of risk? If so how (e.g. 
including consequences or just 
probabilities)? What alternative 
logic/considerations to risk are 
reflected in goals? 
Detecting Assessing the current state of the 
world and monitoring progress 
towards goals/standards 
What kind of risk information is 
collected? Which actors are engaged 
in this?  
Effecting Undertaking measures that achieve 
the goals and standards 
To what extent is ‘effecting’ 
organised through risk (e.g. the 
greater the risk the more aggressive 
the interventions)? 
Table 5: Risk regulation regimes and regime functions 
This functional disaggregation allows for a more nuanced analysis of how 
risk instruments affect different stages/functions of the governance of risk. 
Disaggregating regimes in this way can reveal important control problems 
that would remain hidden in other perspectives. One illustration is the 
discrepancy in control between ‘effecting’ and ‘directing’: Particular 
regulations or safety guidance are not being applied because the target 
groups do not understand the regulations (e.g. Wynne 1989), or the regulator 
– whether deliberately or not – does not provide sufficient resources for the 
implementation (e.g. WHO 1990). 
However emerging approaches to flood management – with their 
diverse range of interventions – also need to be organised into different 
categories, namely by particular policy domains or sub-regimes, in order to 
gain a more concise understanding of how in different domain contexts 
actors adopt varied risk-based forms of governance. This disaggregation will 
be discussed in the following section.  
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4.1.3 Disaggregating flood management: Three policy domains 
The emerging approach to flood management has been shown to have 
moved away from an approach that primarily relied on flood defences and 
other engineered infrastructure (such as river straightening) to a more 
holistic approach. The holistic approach includes measures from policy 
domains such as environmental conservation, agriculture, spatial planning, 
construction, transport, water management and industrial development.  
This thesis focuses on three policy domains only – namely land-use 
planning, flood defence infrastructure and the financing of disaster damage. 
There are three reasons for this selection. First, each of the three regime 
domains allow for an examination of a particular convergence argument. 
More specifically all three domains can be linked to arguments about the 
effectiveness of the state as a risk manager. As argued in chapter 3 advocates 
of neoliberalism take issue with the state’s wasteful use of taxpayer money 
and promote market-based solutions for risk management. Moreover a 
critical view on the ‘regulatory state’ highlights the costs of regulation. The 
regime domain of flood defences implies significant public investment into 
safety infrastructure. Disaster financing may be provided by the commercial 
insurance industry. Finally land-use regulation may include the 
establishment of formal rules that restrict the use of land at risk from 
flooding that is often associated with significant economic benefits. In each 
of the three domains an argument in support of a particular form of risk-
based governance can be made and examined from a comparative 
perspective.  
Second, the regime domains are very distinctive in terms of 
government tools and actor constellation. Flood defences are as noted using 
the tool ‘treasure’ (basically the use of money) (Hood 1983) to achieve flood 
management objectives. The domain is usually dominated by water 
management authorities such as water authorities and environment agencies. 
Land-use regulation uses the tool of formal rules (or legal ‘authority’ in 
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Hood’s government toolkit (1983)) to pursue its flood management goals. 
The central actors are normally expected to be planning authorities and 
ministries. Disaster financing also makes use of financial resources and 
regulations but may work through economic incentives (and not – as in the 
case of governmental regulation – coercive powers) to achieve risk 
management objectives. The central actors primarily consist of insurance 
companies and finance ministries. 
Third, each of the regime domains plays a central role within flood 
management and the emerging risk regulation regimes. Flood defences are 
protecting significant existing values from flooding. Land-use regulation is 
an effective means to reducing the (growth of) damage potential. Disaster 
financing is crucial in dealing with the increasing losses from flooding. 
A more extensive description of these policy domains and how they 
have been organised specifically in Germany and England follows in chapter 
5 through 7 (with its domain-by-domain descriptions of the flood regimes). 
These domain-by-domain discussions will show that the composition and 
relations of actors as well as the goals of different actors is more complex 
than presented in this short discussion. 
Taking these two disaggregations together a comprehensive and 
differentiating analytical framework to analyse different countries’ flood 
regimes can be devised. This is illustrated in table 6.  
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Detecting    
Directing    
Effecting    
Table 6: The analytical framework: flood regimes disaggregated 
The next section elaborates which data has been collected to 
complete this table. 
4.2 CASE STUDY DESIGN, COUNTRY CASES AND QUALITATIVE METHODS 
The analytical framework (multi-dimensional regimes) highlights the 
complexity of the object of analysis while the research questions (in what 
ways does risk-based governance vary and how can this variance be 
explained?) point to the exploratory character of this study. This complexity 
and exploratory character leads to a case-oriented qualitative research 
project, more specifically, a two-country case comparison using qualitative 
methods to collect empirical data. The following sections explain these 
research design choices.     
4.2.1 Small-n case study design 
This study focuses on studying the complex flood regimes in two countries, 
each comprising three subregimes/policy domains each. Such small-n 
designs with two case studies allow for more intensive examinations of the 
factors that shape particular policy choices (Gerring 2004). This is 
particularly relevant for complex analytical objects such as emerging flood 
regimes and risk instruments of varying shapes and in different roles. Yin 
argues that a specific advantage is endowed upon the case study method 
when:  
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“a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked about a contemporary set of 
events, over which the investigator has little or no control” (1989:20).  
Moreover case studies are unique in terms of depth and richness of data. 
This allows for the discovery of causal mechanisms and complex variables. 
These aspects are particularly important to understanding how particular 
institutional constraints shape the choices of actors concerning the design, 
selection and application of policy instruments. Another reason for the 
limited number of cases is the time and resource constraints of a doctoral 
research project.  
4.2.2 Selecting country cases: Germany and England  
This research examines the cases of Germany and England. The actual 
choice of particular country cases reflects the need in comparative research 
designs to create a coherent set of cases, delineated from others by 
empirically and theoretically defined categories. As this research focuses on 
identifying variation in risk-based governance it is necessary to identify 
countries that are similar in respect to the presence of the assumed ‘drivers’ 
of risk-based governance, but offer variations with regards to aspects of risk-
based governance and institutional settings. This latter variation is to be used 
to identify causal conditions that can be linked to divergent outcomes in 
interpretable ways (Ragin 1994). While the actual variance in the risk-based 
governance of flooding is part of what this study is actually exploring, the 
countries are selected in a way that ensures that the prerequisites for risk-
based governance for flooding are being given. At the same time they should 
show a strong variation in their respective institutions in order to understand 
whether and how different institutions shape risk-based governance. 
In fact the cases show significant similarities in terms of policy 
challenge and responses in particular, but vary substantially in terms of 
institutional settings. The cases therefore allow for a most-similar cases 
design. As Peters notes: 
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“the most similar systems design has been argued to be the comparative 
design, given that it is the design that attempts to manipulate the 
independent variables through case selection and to control extraneous 
variance by the same means” (1998:40).  
Germany and England offer suitable cases for the analysis of 
institutional variables shaping risk-based governance. For both countries 
there are strong reasons (based on the convergence arguments introduced in 
chapter 3) to believe that risk-based flood management of a similar form is 
widely adopted. First, they are among the most severely affected countries in 
Europe throughout the 1990s and 2000s. These disasters have increased the 
pressures for reviewing the flood management approach and opened 
‘windows of opportunity’ (Kingdon 1984) for the introduction of a new 
approach to flood management.   
Second, making use of these opportunities policy-makers and flood 
managers in the two countries overhauled each country’s approach to flood 
management in the aftermath of flood events (in 1993 and 1995 in Germany 
and 1998 and 2000 in England). The new approach – as presented in chapter 
2 – is anticipatory and adaptive and assigns a special role to risk instruments 
and information. The endorsement of risk instruments by key actors in both 
countries is further underpinned by their involvement in and agreement to 
the risk-oriented EU Flood Directive. Moreover the importance of risk in 
governance more generally is also underlined by broader policy and 
institutional changes in the two countries. Both countries have developed 
centralised comprehensive explicitly risk-oriented tools and management 
institutions – such as the UK Cabinet Offices’ ‘National Risk Register’ 
(Cabinet-Office 2010) or Germany’s establishment of the Federal Institute of 
Risk Assessment (BfR; Bundesamt für Risikobewertung) and the Federal 
Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance
23
 (BBK; Bundesamt für 
Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe) in 2002 and 2004 respectively.     
                                                 
23
 The BBK calls risk assessment the ‘central basis’ for civil protection and ‘core 
component’ to its risk management (BBK 2010:3). 
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Third, the two countries – as advanced liberal democracies embedded 
in the global economy and members to the European Union – are also 
subject to pressure to ‘modernise’ their public sector and services as well as 
the relations between state, market and society. Both countries are deeply 
embedded in the competitive European and global economies. The 
importance of competitiveness considerations had become particularly 
prominent in Germany in the mid-1990s in debates about the 
‘Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland’ (investment/industrial location Germany) 
when environmental regulations were challenged on the grounds that they 
undermined Germany’s economic performance in comparison to competing 
nations (Weidner 1995). For Britain, Moran notes: 
“Mrs Thatcher’s and Mr Blair’s lectures to foreigners on the need to 
adapt to global markets reflected the belief that Britain (...) now had the 
providential mission of leading into the new world of globalization” 
(Moran 2003:160).   
In both cases the adaptation to a globalised competitive economy also 
implied a modernisation of regulations and state interventions in a manner 
that would allow countries to compete within the global economy – 
examples being the ‘light-touch’ regulation of financial markets in the UK 
and welfare reforms (the so-called ‘Hartz’ reforms) in Germany. In addition 
both countries have formally subscribed to private commercial insurance 
systems to provide compensation for flood damage in contrast to many other 
European countries (Prettenthaler and Vetters 2004). 
Moreover in both countries, mechanisms to increase pressure for 
greater accountability are in place with an active media landscape, a wide 
penetration of the Internet
24
 as well as strong and well-established social 
movements and civil society organisations.  Also both countries have 
endorsed the EU’s ‘good governance’ agenda, are signatories to the Aarhus 
                                                 
24
 The figures on the proportion of households with access to Internet for Germany and the 
UK are 79% and 77% respectively (Eurostat 2009). 
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convention on freedom of access to environmental information and have 
adopted Freedom of Information Acts (Britain in 2000, Germany in 2005).  
These aspects of the two country cases suggest that the emerging 
flood regimes can be expected to assign a substantial role for risk 
instruments. Moreover the close co-operation of experts and authorities 
across national boundaries – for instance for the preparation of the EU Flood 
Directive or in circles such as EXCIMAP  – points to expert information 
exchange and consensus that increases pressures for policy convergence 
implying the emergence of similar forms of risk-based governance.  
The presence of these drivers which make it worthwhile to study 
these cases to examine risk-based governance cannot be taken for granted. 
Other countries within the same spatial context (Europe) display lesser 
degrees of similarities in respect of these important dimensions. In Southern 
Europe flooding is much less of a current and prospective problem (EC 
2008). Eastern and central Europe experienced major flood events (in fact, 
Poland and the Czech Republic also suffered from the summer 2002 floods 
of Elbe and Danube). However they only entered the EU in 2004 and have a 
much shorter record of belonging to the group of liberal democratic 
capitalist countries as compared to Britain and Germany. Finally, western 
European neighbours such as France or the Netherlands rely on state-
organised disaster compensation schemes rather than subscribing to market 
solutions – an aspect relevant in the context of the ‘neoliberal’ driver of risk-
based governance. 
At the same time this study is interested in diversity. More 
specifically it explores how institutional variables shape the role of risk 
instruments in flood regimes. In this relation the two countries offer 
substantial variance. This variance is concerned with the structure of the 
polity: Britain is normally classified as a simple polity, a unitary, centralised 
state. While this has changed since the 1999 devolution the flood 
management of England is integrated into the centralised political system 
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normally described as being dominated by Westminster (the UK Parliament) 
and Whitehall (the UK executive). Germany on the contrary is defined as a 
compound polity, a fragmented, Federal state with a large number of 
institutional veto points (Katzenstein 1987; Schmidt 2005). Fundamental 
political processes are also organised distinctly in the two countries with 
Britain being classified as a majoritarian and Germany a consensual system 
(Lijphart 1984). Moreover a strong contrast between the two cases has also 
been found for the political economy. Here Britain has been classified as a 
liberal market economy (LME) and Germany’s political economy has been 
termed as Rhenish capitalism or a coordinated market economy (CME) 
(Albert 1983; Hall and Soskice 2001). The two types contrast in the role of 
states and markets, with competition and arm’s length relations between 
actors in the political economy prevailing in LME and non-market, strategic 
and co-ordinated relations being significant in CMEs. 
The distinct models and patterns describe generic differences in the 
institutional settings of Germany and England. Their impact and that of 
further institutional variables on risk-based governance is an empirical 
question that will be resolved in the course of this study.
25
 It is reasonable to 
expect that these variables matter. On the one hand many of them – 
including the number of veto points in Federal versus centralised polities and 
the concentration of executive power in majoritarian systems – have for 
instance been argued to shape other aspects of environmental policies in the 
two countries (Knill and Lenschow 1998). On the other hand they can be 
related to some of the suggested drivers of risk-based governance, for 
instance the complexity of agency in compound compared to simple polities 
is likely to affect accountability mechanisms and pressures. The weight of 
non-market actors and mechanisms in co-ordinated market economies 
                                                 
25
 An extensive discussion of relevant institutional factors will be undertaken in chapter 8. 
This discussion will also show how the generic descriptions of polities and political 
economies may only provide a starting point for an institutionalist analysis. Ideas like 
particular institutionally-determined ‘types of capitalism’ have been contested (for instance, 
Hancke 2009). 
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compared with liberal market economies may affect the effects of the 
pressures of neoliberalism on actors in the two countries.  
Germany and England – with their combination of similarities 
(policy challenge of flooding; policy shift; broad presence of drivers of risk-
based governance) and dissimilarities (institutional characteristic of political 
system and political economy) –therefore constitute cases suitable for a 
comparative examination that focuses on institutionalist explanations of 
diversity in risk-based flood management.  
While England is strictly speaking not a country and only one part of 
the United Kingdom, the devolution under New Labour in 1999 implied that 
flood management fell under the exclusive remit of the devolved territorial 
administrations of Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England. This 
study focuses on England because of the continuing strong institutional 
contrasts with Germany resulting from the fact that the same institutions in 
charge for Britain before 1999 remained responsible for England’s flood 
management.  Moreover the most devastating flood events in Britain –most 
notably the floods in 1998, 2000 and 2007– predominantly affected England. 
4.2.3 Qualitative methods: Interviews and document analysis 
The arguments and observations made in this thesis draw on data collected 
through qualitative methods. This is due to the need to understand the causal 
relations and mechanisms that shape the organisational and instrumental 
choices of decision-makers within flood regimes. Qualitative methods 
generate rich empirical data that reveal the underlying motivations, 
perceived constraints and attitudes of decision-makers.  
Two methods are selected, namely document analysis and semi-
structured elite interviews. The analysis of documents is in general perceived 
to be useful for providing an understanding of the context of the research 
topic (Weimer and Vining 2004). Reflecting this function documents 
provide insights into the nature and future prospects of flooding and flood 
risk, different types of costs/damage floods can cause, the interactions 
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between climate change, precipitation and flooding etc. Such reports are 
often authored by scientific institutions, independent public bodies or 
various societal interests. Examples for such reports include the Future 
Flooding report by the UK government’s Office for Science and Technology 
(Foresight and OST 2004) the LAWA paper on climate change and water 
management (LAWA 2007) and the commentary by the insurance industry 
on flood risk and climate change (ABI 2004a). 
Beyond providing background information documents can provide 
information on the organisation and the principles and performance of the 
governance process itself. In particular, the key documents, such as 
government strategy documents and legislation itself as well as agreements 
with binding character that introduce and reproduce the measures, 
regulations and responsibilities within the flood regime, were examined for 
the (linguistic) use of risk in governance documents and the reference to 
instruments and concepts that draw on quantitative and probabilistic 
calculations (e.g. the reference to benefit-cost ratio does not explicitly 
include the term of ‘risk’ but draws on calculations of avoided probable 
damage to define the benefits of a governance intervention). Examples for 
documents of particular relevance to this end are the Federal Flood Control 
Act (HWSG) in Germany (Gesetz zur Verbesserung des vorbeugenden 
Hochwasserschutz, i.e. the Act for the Improvement of Precautionary Flood 
Management) (Bundesregierung 2005b) the UK Environment Agency’s 
flood risk management strategy 2003-2008 (EA 2003) and the UK insurance 
industry’s statement of principles on flood insurance (ABI and Government 
2008). 
A third set of documents comments on, reviews and evaluates the 
risk management mechanisms, performance, objectives, legal norms and 
principles in place at different times, provide information about institutional 
configurations, binding and non-binding rules and practices and ideas. 
Among the authors of such documents are responsible government 
departments and agencies as well as other public bodies such as 
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parliamentary actors. Examples are the lessons learned reports in the wake of 
various disasters (Bye and Horner 1998; EA 2001; von Kirchbach 2002; 
DKKV 2003; EA 2007; Pitt 2008) but also guidelines for the interpretation 
of policy strategies by the responsible government department/agencies itself 
(DCLG 2007c; ARGEBAU 2008). In general the document analysis has 
been undertaken cautiously, showing awareness for distorting factors such as 
the document’s age, specific purpose, limited substance, as well as the 
authors’ biases and tendencies for blame shifting/avoidance. 
The mostly descriptive insights provided by documents are 
complemented by a series of semi-structured elite interviews undertaken 
between April 2008 and August 2009 in the two countries. Interviews 
disclose the motives and attitudes/personal realities of decision-makers, the 
risk interpretations that explain their actions and the constraints under which 
they operate. They are therefore crucial to understanding agency, choices 
within flood regimes and the impact of the institutional context on actors. In 
addition interviews can complement those ‘descriptive’ pieces of 
information on  (for example) the institutional architecture that the document 
analysis was not able to deliver. 
The approach to the selection of interviewees is driven by the 
analytical framework. First, interviews are guided by the regimes’ 
institutional infrastructure that in turn reflects the policy domain and 
functional dimensions of the concept of regimes. Therefore representatives 
of actors/institutions involved in the policy domains of flood defence, land-
use regulation and disaster financing with functional responsibilities for 
‘detecting’, ‘directing’ and ‘effecting’ were interviewed. Secondly, flood 
management is multi-scalar; floods are phenomena that affect some regions 
more than others and flood management takes place on European, national, 
regional and local levels. Interviews therefore included actors from different 
government levels. In addition a number of stakeholders such as insurers and 
public interest organisations were interviewed. 
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The following table 7 provides an overview of the interviews 
undertaken
26
 how they covered different policy domains as well as agency in 
and on different levels of governance.  
                                                 
26
 A list of interviews is provided in the Appendix. 
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 GERMANY BRITAIN Total 
POLICY DOMAINS  Number of interviews 
Flood defence and water 
management infrastructure  
15 10 25 
Land-use regulation  17 10 27 
Disaster financing  12 9 21 
Total number of 
interviews 










ACTOR TYPE Number of interviews 
Government / state 21 11 32 
Local 2 1 3 
Regional/Länder 10 2 12 
National  9 8 17 
Non-state  8 7 15 
Insurer 6 5 11 
Other stakeholders 2 2 4 
Total number of 
interviews 








EU  1 1 
Table 7: Interviews by category 
                                                 
27
 Many actors are involved in more than one of the policy domains. For instance 
interviewees from Germany’s LAWA developed guidance covering all aspects of flood 
management (LAWA 1995; 2004) while Defra officials engaged with the insurers but also 
worked on land-use control issues as well as flood defence management. This has led the 
double-counting because a single interview provided data for more than one policy domain.  
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The selection of regional and local sites is driven by this research’s 
interest in the ways in which the emerging flood regimes adopt risk 
instruments. The emergence and change within the flood regimes can be 
expected to be most pertinent in the most affected areas of Britain and 
Germany – in line with arguments about policy change that result from 
major disasters (Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Consequently 
this dissertation used data from England’s Thames and South Holland 
regions that were affected by major flood events since 1998. In Germany 
Saxony (affected by watershed event of 2002) and North Rhine-Westphalia 
(affected by initial trigger flood events of 1993 and 1995) were chosen as 
areas affected by major flood events.  
Moreover in North Rhine-Westphalia in particular the flood 
management of the Rhine – most notably the pioneering work by the 
International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) – is also a 
key site that provides insights into the emerging risk-based flood 
management because it pioneered and applied many aspects of the more 
anticipatory and adaptive approach to flood management. In fact instruments 
such as the flood risk map ‘Rhine-Atlas’ (by the ICPR) served as a model for 
other river catchments and Länder.
28
 While Saxony’s efforts at flood 
management were only really stepped up after the 2002 floods the floods 
were such a major disaster that policy-makers had a major opportunity to 
overhaul their approach, aided by substantial material and expert resources 
that were mobilised after the disaster. The influential role of Saxony’s flood 
management is noted by a flood expert in Saxony’s ministry of environment: 
“Sometimes, other states are a bit irritated because Saxony has 
progressed so quickly. In Germany, you always have this situation that 
one state looks what the other one has been doing. Our work is 
acknowledged by the relevant experts in different states. [All] this was 
                                                 
28
 For instance similar flood risk maps and stock-taking exercises were undertaken by river 
commissions at the Elbe (ICPE 2001; ELLA 2006). As an expert in Saxony’s Ministry of 
Environment points out, “the Rhine-Atlas was the template but ours is much further 
developed” (SMUL 2008, interview). 
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possible thanks to the resources that were made available to us but not to 
others. (...) Now the colleagues from North Rhine-Westphalia told me 
that they want to do it the same way as Saxony. (...) And as we have 
benefited from Germany’s solidarity, we return the favour. Therefore, we 
make all our know-how and expertise freely available to all those 
interested. So that, for example, we have provided Bavaria and Baden-
Wurttemberg with all the documents, from tender documents to maps” 
(SMUL 2008, interview). 
Studying NRW therefore offers an insight into how risk instruments 
have been designed and used in a case from the early phase of the policy 
shift towards a more anticipatory and adaptive regime in Germany that 
influenced subsequent activities in other Länder. Examining Saxony points 
to a context in which substantial resources were made available to overhaul 
flood management comprehensively and systematically and at a stage when 
the novel anticipatory and adaptive approach had become well-established 
(e.g. through LAWA guidelines from 1995, the Rhine Flood Action Plan 
from 1998 and revised Federal Water Management (1996) and Spatial 
Planning Acts (1998)). The flood management of Saxony became – thanks 
to the systematic and comprehensive work undertaken on a well-resourced 
basis – a point of orientation for other Länder. The data for the two Länder is 
combined with the empirical data from the  ‘framework’ providing Federal 
level influential intra-governmental co-ordination bodies such as the 
Working Group Water (LAWA) of Länder and Federal government and 
where feasible within the resource constraints of the present work from 
further Länder.
29
 This data therefore mostly provides an insight into how risk 
matters in flood management in Germany under conducive conditions (well-
resourced) with substantial impact on other Länder (the 
‘pioneering’/benchmark character) and where an inter-Länder and Federal 
consensus and convergence has emerged (nation-wide Federal Law; 
consensual guidelines by inter-Länder bodies such as LAWA). Bearing in 
                                                 
29
 References are for example being made to Sachsen-Anhalt, Rhineland-Palatine, 
Brandenburg and Bavaria. All of these Lander have experienced flooding in the 1990s and 
2000s. 
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mind the Federal fragmentation and geographical diversity of Germany this 
variety of data sources is to be seen as an attempt to providing a 
comprehensive picture of Germany’s flood regime. Even this attempt 
however allows identifying fundamental cross-country variance in the use of 
risk in governance that can be related to a range of contrasting institutional 
variables in the two countries.  
The table shows some interesting asymmetries that reveal insights 
into institutional settings in which flood management in the two countries 
takes place. First, the overall numbers of interviews is larger in Germany 
than in England. This is mostly a result of the Federal structure of Germany 
which allocates the responsibility for most aspects of flood management to 
the Länder/regional level. This also becomes obvious in the share of the 
Länder/regional category in the overall number of interviews with state 
actors (10/21, 48%) in contrast to England (2/11, 18%). Second, the share of 
the insurer category in the overall number of interviews is greater in England 
(5/18, 28%) than in Germany (6/29, 21%). This points to the different roles 
of state and market actors in the two countries’ flood regimes. The 
composition of interviews is naturally not an entirely reliable indicator of 
state structures and state-market relations, because they are often not only 
influenced by the information needs of the researcher but also by the 
constraints on access and resources that the researcher faces. However as the 
empirical and analytical discussions of the following chapters show, the 
asymmetries in the interview data significantly reflect the varied relevance 
of different actors and levels of governance in the flood regimes of England 
and Germany.  
Finally, the period of time that is under investigation in this study of 
the variations of risk-based flood management in Germany and Britain is 
defined by particular events, given the shift towards a more anticipatory and 
adaptive flood management as well as the advancement of risk instruments 
that were strongly driven by the impressions of major disasters. In Germany 
changes in flood management were initiated in the aftermath of the 1993 and 
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1995 Rhine floods. In England the most relevant flood events were the 
Easter 1998 and autumn 2000 floods. While there is no formal cut-off date 
for this investigation the process of major policy change came to a 
provisional end in Germany after the 2005 Federal Flood Control Act 
(Hochwasserschutzgesetz, FCA). For Britain the summer 2007 floods 
triggered another wave of policy change including the production of new 
types of flood maps specifically for surface water flooding, stronger 
provisions for the protection of critical infrastructure and improving the co-
operation between the MetOffice and the Environment Agency. While these 
are important changes the most significant shift and reorientation of flood 
management –including the production of central risk instruments such as 
the National Flood Risk Assessment (NaFRA) – took place or were initiated 
in the aftermath of the previously mentioned flood events. Consequently 
while references are being made to more recent developments in England the 
analysis will focus on the change between 1998 and 2007. The two cut-off 
dates at 2005 (Germany) and 2007 (England) are also chosen because more 
recent policy changes have been shaped by the EU Flood Directive. 
In short through extensive interviewing and the analysis of 
documents of actors based in and/or responsible for domains and areas that 
suffered large-scale flooding a substantive amount of data was collected and 
analysed to provide the rich empirical foundations required for the 
comparative small-n study of flood regimes in Germany and England. By 
using different types of methods the empirical evidence has been 
triangulated in addition to being (wherever possible) underpinned by 
relevant theoretical and analytical arguments.  
4.3 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presented the design of the comparative study into variations of 
risk-based flood management and the institutional variables that shape the 
emerging flood regimes. The short introductory chapter 1 presents some of 
the contrasts found in the organisation of and measures used in different 
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regime domains of the two countries’ flood regimes that point to a possible 
variance in the use of the concepts and instruments of risk in the two 
regimes. Chapter 2 – based on the issue of flooding has indicated that the 
emerging anticipatory and adaptive approaches to flood management not 
only assign a central role to risk instruments and information but are also 
characterised by substantial complexity – highlighted the benefits of 
selecting flood management as an issue area for a study of the diversity in 
risk-based governance. Chapter 3’s discussion of theoretical accounts of the 
rise of risk-based governance demonstrated that there is a lack of 
comparative analysis of diversity in risk-based governance. Comparative 
analysis with a view to identifying and explaining diversity therefore is 
explorative and requires an in-depth examination of why the involved actors 
take certain instrumental and organisational decisions.  
These two features – the complexity and the exploratory character – 
of the research determine the research design proposed in this chapter 4. The 
risk regulation regime framework is comprehensive in its openness to a wide 
range of control mechanisms, making it possible to capture the complexity 
of flood management. At the same time it draws boundaries around the 
objects of analysis (the flood regimes) and imposes order on regime 
activities though the two-dimensional disaggregation of the regimes. 
Through the ‘flood regime’ lens it is possible to produce a comprehensive 
and nuanced picture of the relevance of risk instruments in different aspects 
of flood management in the countries under investigation. This facilitates the 
exploration of the diverse forms of risk-based governance and prepares for a 
systematic examination of variables that shape this variance. 
The complexity of the domain under investigation and the study’s 
exploratory character also puts limitations on its scope. This is the reason for 
limiting the number of country cases to two, Germany and England. Both 
cases (as chapter 2 has already indicated) have seen the emergence of multi-
domain, anticipatory and adaptive approaches to flood management in which 
the role of risk instruments has been emphasised. At the same time Germany 
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and England display significant differences in institutional settings which 
render them suitable for exploring how variance in institutional constraints 
can contribute to differences in risk-based governance.  
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of how the decisions of 
actors are made concerning the use of risk instruments in flood management 
and its organisation it is essential to collect rich and qualitative data that 
reveal the motivations and the rationalisations behind certain instrumental 
and organisational choices of actors. To this end 47 semi-structured 
interviews were undertaken in the two countries (in addition to one in 
Brussels within the European Commission). The interview data were 
complemented and triangulated with an analysis of policy documents. 
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CHAPTER 5: FLOOD DEFENCES, THE NEOLIBERAL STATE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY PRESSURES 
The management of flood defences, from floodwalls to engineered retention 
basins to dykes, is most fundamentally about the use of government treasure 
to achieve particular flood management objectives within the flood regimes. 
The flood defence domain can therefore be explored as part of a wider 
discussion on the use of taxpayer money in pursuit of policy objectives.  
Between 1945 and the 1970s many governments of advanced 
Western European states made extensive use of the tool of treasure, creating 
a comprehensive welfare state and investing into the economy – for instance, 
through the ownership of companies such as utilities. A good indicator is 
public sector expenditure in relation to GDP: across the members of the 
OECD this ratio has increased for several decades until it peaked in 1993 at 
more than 40% of GDP (Joumard et al. 2003). This ‘more state’ trend, 
however, attracted increasing criticism since the late 1970s, driven by the 
economic recession in many advanced economies, increasing government 
debt and the rise of neoliberal ideas. Neoliberal ideas, as introduced in 
chapter 3, advocate for ‘less state’ or in a less radical version a ‘more 
economically efficient state’.  
Neoliberal advocates of ‘less state’ object that ‘too much state’ is 
costly since it implies substantial expenditure, crowds out efficient private 
investments and sends the wrong behavioural signals to individuals that are 
being protected from risks (e.g. social risks) through collective mechanisms 
(e.g. social insurance). As neoliberals argue, ‘less state’ or a more ‘cost-
efficient’ state means lower costs, a responsibilisation of individuals and 
more private investments. These arguments did not fall on deaf ears in the 
1980s, in particular with the elections of the Thatcher and Reagan 
governments in Britain and the United States. Both emphasised privatisation 
and deregulation as key part of their governments’ programmes. The 
rollback and reconfiguration of the state did not remain unchallenged, 
however. Neoliberal practices have also attracted substantial criticism, in 
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particular the withdrawal of state from providing social security to their 
populations (Peck 2001; Glyn 2006).  
Can this general story also be told about the state’s involvement in 
flood defences? Flood defences provided by the state mean that the state 
undertakes expensive investments to protect the population from risks to 
their lives, health and property. Have these costs come under scrutiny? Can a 
discernible trend towards withdrawal or – less radically towards greater 
economic efficiency in state operations be seen in the flood defence regimes 
of Germany and England?  
These questions are closely related to the availability and role of the 
concept and instruments of risk within flood regimes. This is because risk 
calculations have been argued to be instrumental for neoliberal challenges to 
the security state.
30
 In a nutshell, thanks to the quantification of probable 
damage via risk calculations, actors can allocate financial resources to areas 
where flood defences achieve greatest risk reduction. This in turn facilitates 
the state’s concentration on economically sensible protection, withdrawing 
from non-economical protection to leave it to what then become 
‘responsibilised’ individuals. This reconfigured security state can 
furthermore be linked to the discussion in chapter 7 about disaster financing 
based on insurance markets. The propagation of such market solutions in 
turn suggests another form of withdrawal of the state from its traditional role 
of safeguarding the fundamental financial security of its citizens and 
introducing private forms of risk regulation and management (based on price 
signals and private contracts).  
In addition to the broader questions about the roll-back and 
reconfiguration of the flood-defending state, the following discussions 
therefore also specifically examine whether the rise of risk instruments can 
be linked to their use to this effect. Also, should the ‘neoliberalisation’ in 
flood defence management not take place and drive the use of risk in 
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 See discussion of neoliberal conceptions of risk-based governance in chapter 2. 
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governance, what factors may explain the particular organisation of this 
regime domain? 
This chapter starts off with a discussion of the challenges to flood 
defence management, in particular from a neoliberal viewpoint, and 
examines how risk might assume an instrumental role in finding solutions to 
some of these challenges and accomplishing the expected rollback of the 
state. The following section analyses the organisation of the two countries’ 
flood defence domains. Next, the question of whether the use of risk can be 
linked to a neoliberal transformation of the state’s involvement in the flood 
defence domain will be explored, together with the reasons for and against. 
As an alternative role for risk in flood defence management, the issue of how 
risk is in both countries being used to organise and limit what actors can be 
held responsible for is discussed. 
5.1 FLOOD DEFENCE MANAGEMENT UNDER PRESSURE 
Floods are events that can harm the health and safety of the population. 
These undesirable consequences have for centuries led to efforts in societies 
to prevent them. One of the crucial means for reducing damage from 
flooding is the creation of good flood defences. Flood defences refer to 
engineered infrastructure that constrain the natural flow of water and 
includes constructions such as embankments, retention basins, dams and 
river channel expansions.  
Historically such interventions were undertaken locally by individual 
riparian owners and privately organised collectives, such as England’s 
Internal Drainage Boards or the Rhine River’s Deichverbände (dyke 
associations). However, with increasing economic activity and population 
density along the rivers and other areas at risk from flooding, states 
increasingly got involved in the provision of security for their populations. 
With their ability to mobilise significant financial and technical resources, 
this engagement has led to impressive examples of state-sponsored 
engineered control over the forces of nature. About 7,500 kilometres of 
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dykes and 500 dams in Germany (LAWA 1995) as well as 46,000 flood 
defence structures in England (NAO 2007) are testimony to this.  
The underlying notion of this technical approach is that water is seen 
as an enemy to the land-use needs and safety of society and is therefore to be 
controlled by engineered structures (Scrase and Sheate 2005). The strong 
faith in the control over nature through massive civil engineering was 
translated into an implicit promise of protection from flooding given by the 
state to its population. As Germany’s inter-state working group water 
(LAWA) noted: 
“(...) in European high-tech societies, [individuals] adopted the idea that 
all risks are under control. Accordingly, floods could no longer happen. It 
is expected from the state to accommodate the security requirements of 
the population and to manage threats from flooding” (LAWA 1995:1). 
This safety promise was not always given explicitly or absolutely. 
But its relevance was reflected in the limited or scant attention paid by flood 
managers to the accumulation of values behind flood defences
31
 or to public 
flood awareness, measures only required if the protection through defences 
is uncertain. 
Flood defences can certainly be seen as a great success story. In 2001 
Britain’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), then the 
responsible ministry for flood management, estimated that existing flood 
defences reduced the average annual cost of damage from flooding by over 
GBP two billion (NAO 2001). Moreover, the transnational International 
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) has found that the most 
effective means of reducing the most severe floods is through engineered 
retention basins right next to the main stream   as compared to catchment-
wide, natural retention measures that are particularly effective for 
local/regional and smaller events (ICPR 2005). 
Recent flood events across Europe, however, had challenged this 
promise of safety as was reflected in a marked shift, at least in the rhetoric of 
policy-makers, from ‘safety’ and ‘flood defence’ to ‘flood risk management’ 
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and the emphasis on promoting a ‘risk culture’ in flood management (MAFF 
1996; DKKV 2003; EA 2003). These challenges to the engineering 
paradigm in flood management are in many ways reminiscent of the 
challenges to other forms of security provision by the state.  
One of the key challenges is cost. The Environment Agency, for 
instance, spent almost three quarters of its flood management budget of GBP 
453 million for 2006/07 on the building of new and the replacement and 
maintenance of old flood defences (NAO 2007). In NRW the refurbishment 
of one kilometre of existing dyke would cost EUR 2 million (MUNLV 2008, 
interview). A LAWA expert therefore notes that the engineering-centric 
approach is:  
“basically over by now. This is at least partly due to the fact that such 
technical measures also have to be funded” (LAWA 2008a, interview).  
Likewise, England’s finance ministry HM Treasury, notes:  
“it is quite clear that flood programmes are limited by affordability, and 
not by projects for which there is a need” (HM Treasury 2009, 
interview). 
This cost awareness of some of the central actors within Germany 
and England’s flood regimes is accentuated by the failure of existing 
defences to protect the population fully from recent flooding events, as well 
as the fact that climate change is expected to increase the likelihood of 
extreme weather events (Bronstert 2003; LAWA 2004). Recent flood events 
have shown the limitations of flood defences, for example when the flood 
defences in Cologne were overtopped in 1993 or the Odra dyke partially 
failed in 1997. While predicting the impact of climate change at the regional 
and local levels is subject to considerable uncertainties, actors involved in 
flood management assume – based on their perception of increasingly 
frequent and severe events over the past two decades – that climate change 
will increase the risk of flooding and will require an increase in expenditure 
to manage this increased flood risk. In its Future Flooding report (2004), the 
Foresight authors predict for Britain that its annual expenditure on 
engineered measures in 2024 (for instance) would need to increase by a 
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factor between 1.4 and 2.2
32
  simply to manage the increased risk of future 
flooding.  
A second challenge comes from the adverse behavioural 
consequences of flood defences on flood management itself. As people feel 
safe behind protective infrastructure they have a limited awareness and 
preparedness for severe events that exceed the design standard, as well as 




Thirdly, a reliance on flood defences has also been criticised because 
of the adverse environmental consequences of engineered structures, for 
example on the biodiversity in wetlands. In response, flood managers have 
adopted additional goals and measures such as the creation of wetlands and 
washlands in England (DEFRA 2005) and Germany’s ‘renaturalising 
floodplains and watercourses’ (Bundesregierung 2005a).  
How does risk help in this context of financial constraints and 
declining confidence in flood defences? Risk calculations can help formally 
quantify in monetary terms, first, the probable damage expected in a certain 
area, and second, the effect of the interventions in terms of avoided probable 
damage. These figures can then be compared with the varying costs of 
alternative risk management options. Through formal quantification and 
monetarisation such calculations enable actors to evaluate and compare the 
benefit-cost ratio and value-for-money returns of state activities in different 
spatial, temporal and sectoral contexts  (for example the value of 
investments in different projects for the same flood management problem 
(project level) into defences at different rivers within a country 
(national/regional level) or investments into hospitals and schools compared 
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 The factor of 1.4 assumes the so-called Local Stewardship scenario of economic 
development and carbon emissions with associated flood protection needs defined as 25% 
lower than the current. The factor of 2.2 refers to the National Enterprise scenario for which 
a doubling of the protection level is assumed.  
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 This effect of flood defences will be discussed more extensively in chapter 5, which is on 
land-use regulation. Land-use regulation is one of the means to mitigate these behavioural 
effects. 
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with flood defences (sectoral comparison)).Risk instruments can therefore 
help in directing the state’s scarce resources to where they can achieve 
maximum impact in terms of reducing the consequences from flooding or 
achieving a set of desirable ends. If value-for-money is to be maximised in 
aggregate across all government operations, calculations undertaken on a 
national scale will ensure that the greatest possible number of interventions 
is evaluated and compared for measuring and achieving the greatest cost-
efficiency.  
From the aforementioned perspective of a shift from ‘more’ to ‘less’ 
state, these positive effects of risk on flood defence management can be 
interpreted in two ways. From the perspective of advocates of neoliberalism 
a more targeted use of resources implies an enhancement of flood 
management. Economically evaluated state operations achieve ‘more with 
less’, allowing for a smaller state to achieve the same risk management 
results. Moreover, economically rational state operations imply that 
protection is not distributed to the same levels across the country, 
’responsibilising’ parts of the population to prevent or manage flood risk and 
thereby avoiding the aforementioned adverse behavioural consequences of 
being protected. Such a neoliberal understanding of risk-based flood 
management is further reinforced by the proliferation of campaigns for 
greater public flood risk awareness,
34
 the promotion of more flood-resilient 
construction
35
 and private insurance solutions
36
  –all of which encourage 
individuals to take care of their own risks.  
From a more critical perspective it would be argued that risk-based 
flood defence management boils down to a much more limited role for the 
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 England’s Environment Agency launched an awareness campaign entitled ‘Flooding. You 
can’t prevent it. You can prepare for it’ in 1999. Germany’s Federal Environment Agency 
(UBA) published the brochure ‘What you need to know about precautionary flood 
management’ in 2006.  
35
 Germany’s Federal Ministry for Construction has published a ‘Hochwasserschutzfibel – 
Bauliche Schutz- und Vorsorgemassnahmen in hochwassergefährdeten Gebieten’ (BMVBS 
2006). England’s Department of local Government and Communities has published, 
Improving the Flood Performance of New Buildings – Flood Resilient Construction’ 
(DCLG 2007e) 
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 These will be discussed in chapter 7. 
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state in providing protection to its population, as state interventions are 
subject to an economic logic of scarce resources rather than a duty to protect. 
The concentration on those measures that make economic sense would result 
in the protection of assets of greater value (as a result of the better benefit-
cost ratio), thereby exposing the more vulnerable groups (with lower value 
assets) of society to greater risks.   
But are these expected positive or feared negative effects of the 
proposed neoliberalisation of flood regimes really shaping flood defence 
management in Germany and England? To what extent does the use of risk 
facilitate this neoliberalisation? To begin answering those questions the 
following two sections (4.2 and 4.3) examine the form and role of the 
concept and instruments of risk in the flood defence domains of Germany 
and England’s flood regimes.  
5.2 EXAMINING THE ROLE OF RISK IN GERMANY’S FLOOD DEFENCE 
MANAGEMENT 
The organisation of Germany’s flood defence domain involves a large 
number of actors. The most important ones are the 16 Länder governments 
that engage in risk assessments, standard-setting and the financing of flood 
defences. However, the Federal level (though less so than in the domains of 
land-use regulation and disaster financing
37
) also provides certain rules 
(primarily obliging the Länder to produce flood management plans through 
the HWSG). In addition, it offers financial resources through different 
financing vehicles and is responsible for navigation and shipping 
infrastructure on Federal waterways. These actors are complemented by the 
local water authorities that are responsible for smaller water bodies and the 
implementation of some of state-level flood defence programmes, 
transregional and transnational river commissions such as the ICPR as well 
as, especially in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), the privately organised 
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local Deichverbände (whose interventions are however, to a large extend 
funded by NRW’s Lander government). 
5.2.1 Detecting: Assessing existing protection and future risk levels 
Detecting in the flood defence domain is concerned with measuring and 
monitoring the existing protection levels achieved through flood defence 
systems, assessing the probability of different flood events in the future (i.e. 
how frequently the Elbe reaches the level of nine metres at the Dresden 
gauge), and estimating the damage costs such flood events would cause. 
Germany’s detecting includes stocktaking exercises of existing flood 
defences and their performance, probabilistic flood modelling as well as 
considerations of probable damages. What is notable about detecting in 
Germany’s flood defence management is that while more systematic 
instruments for risk assessment have been promoted, often after flood 
disasters and driven by experts of specialist public bodies (ICPR, LTV, 
DEZA), the detecting framework remains strongly fragmented. 
Calculations of risk are nothing new for actors within Germany’s 
flood defence domain. Early and extensive risk assessments were undertaken 
for the Rhine River. For instance an examination of defence performance 
and the probability of flood events was undertaken in the late 1970s for the 
Upper Rhine
38
 by the International Commission for Research on Floods of 
the River Rhine (Hochwasserstudien-Kommission für den Rhein) (HSK 
1978). Another set of risk assessments was conducted for NRW for its 
Generalpläne Hochwasser (General Flood Management Plans) in the late 
1980s (e.g. SAWAD 1990; e.g. SAWAB 1991). While these assessments 
provided some important, more formalised insights, mostly into the 
frequencies of certain water quantities along the Rhine river, they were 
neither systematically co-ordinated with other assessments along the Rhine 
catchment nor did they take into account damage potential. Focused solely 
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 The Upper Rhine is the Rhine stretch between Basel (CH) and Bingen (GER). The other 
parts are High Rhine (Basel), Middle Rhine (Bingen-Cologne), Low Rhine (Cologne-
Lobith), and the delta of the Rhine (Lobith). 
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on the probability of inundation they were, strictly speaking, flood hazard 
assessments rather than assessments of flood risk in the classical sense. 
This changed after the Rhine floods of 1993 and 1995. The floods 
left a sufficient impression on the environment ministers of the Rhine 
riparian countries to ask the International Commission for the Protection of 
the Rhine (ICPR) to develop the co-ordinated, catchment-wide Rhine Flood 
Action Plan (RFAP), a surge of activity that one of the involved experts 
within the ICPR attributed to a disaster-driven approach to flood 
management – in her words to ‘management by accident’ (ICPR 2008, 
interview). While the initiative started with politicians (through ministerial 
conferences of the Rhine riparian countries’ environment ministers in 
December 1994 and March 1995), the development of the plan and its 
components was left to the water management experts from the ICPR’s 
member states.  
The experts assigned a central role to flood assessments beginning 
with a so-called Bestandsaufnahme (stock-taking of protection level from 
existing flood management measures along the entire Rhine). This exercise 
was to provide the informational foundations for the definition of standards 
and goals within the ICPR’s Rhine Flood Action Plan (ICPR 1997a:10). The 
stocktaking exercise focused on documenting and comparing existing 
protection levels along the Rhine. The ICPR also produced the influential 
flood risk map ‘Rhine-Atlas’. The ‘Rhine-Atlas’   taking into account the 
effects of existing defences displays the inundation from water quantities 
with different probabilities (HQ10, HQ100 and HQextreme) as well as the 
damage potential for extreme flood events. While the ‘Rhine-Atlas’ fits with 
one of the four goals of the Rhine Flood Action Plan, namely to raise flood 
risk awareness, the experts also perceived it as a means of ‘political 
persuasion’ (ICPR 2008, interview) to raise the profile of flood issues among 
policy-makers at both local and national levels.   
Another pioneering initiative of risk assessments was undertaken in 
Saxony after the 2002 Elbe floods. Saxony as the most affected state 
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received substantial financial support from the Federal and other Länder 
governments, as well as significant intellectual support from international 
partners for overhauling its flood management. The most important source 
of expertise was Switzerland’s development co-operation and humanitarian 
aid agency (Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit-DEZA). As an 
expert from Saxony’s State Reservoir Authority (LTV) notes: 
“the Swiss arrived in Saxony just a few days after the event, with 
engineering know-how. We naturally accepted their help. Of course, we 
consequently integrated their flood philosophy into our approach, after an 
assessment, gradually and adapted to local circumstances. (...) The first 
thing the Swiss undertook with us was the event analysis. For them, it 
had the benefit that they were likely to draw lessons for their own flood 
management” (LTV 2008, interview).  
Saxony’s water management specialists developed comprehensive 
and integrated flood protection concepts (Hochwasserschutzkonzepte) for 
each catchment area. Each concept included an analysis of a major historical 
flood event, an assessment of the probability and intensity (water depth and 
velocity) of potential flood events, calculations of the damage potential, as 
well as an assessment of existing defences (Socher et al. 2006a). These 
individual catchment assessments were undertaken on the basis of the same 
methods developed and applied by the state-level agencies LTV (State 
Reservoir Authority) and LFUG (State Environment Agency), supported by 
their Swiss colleagues.   
As these initiatives in prominent flood management sites in Germany 
show, the assessment of existing defences and probable flooding has been 
stepped up in recent years, driven by post-disaster political pressures from 
the electorate to respond decisively and by the lobbying by the professional 
experts in water management authorities in Germany and beyond. In contrast 
to earlier risk assessments the instruments also include calculations of 
probable damages. Damage potential assessments were of much less interest 
to water authorities before the flood events of the 1990s and 2000s – not 
only because the assessment techniques were still underdeveloped
39
 but also 
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 Data on damage from flooding was only systematically collected by the LAWA since the 
late 1980s in the so-called HOWAS database.  
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because existing dykes, especially along the Rhine river, were assumed to 
provide sufficient protection
40
, making damage assessments redundant.  
These emerging risk assessment instruments can therefore potentially 
facilitate an economic evaluation of Germany’s flood defence management 
that would provide information on the potential benefits of flood defence 
measures (avoided probable damage) – as desired by the advocates of 
neoliberalism. However, the instruments themselves are heterogeneous and 
their application remains fragmented, rendering a trans-Länder economic 
comparison of different options for public infrastructure spending 
impossible. Saxony’s elaborate and consistent assessment methods are 
applied to assessing flood risk within Saxony only. For the ICPR’s 
initiatives, while the results of these assessments are presented as catchment-
wide information tools the calculations are based on data and variable 
methods used by each of the member states of the ICPR. For instance, the 
‘Rhine-Atlas’ draws on several digital terrain models based on varying 
methods applied to different stretches of the river
41
. These modelling 
inconsistencies make it difficult to compare levels of risk between the 
different parts of the Rhine catchment depicted in the Atlas. Moreover, the 
Atlas shows little local detail as its coarse spatial scale (1:100,000) was 
chosen ‘because we as the ICPR are not allowed to interfere with local 
affairs’ (ICPR 2008, interview).   
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 In fact, one expert from NRW’s environment ministry observed, that when local 
authorities and dyke associations were approached with new calculations of probable flood 
events before 1993, the local actors called him a ‘Fachidiot’ (one-track specialist) and 
‘Bürokrat’ (‘bureaucrat’) (MUNLV 2008, interview), dismissing the modelled water 
quantities and revised design standard for dykes as being implausible and unnecessary. 
Given this faith in the adequacy of flood defences along the Rhine the issue of damages did 
not seem very relevant. It also underpins the experts’ interest in macro-level damage 
potential assessment as a tool for ‘political persuasion’ and the importance of floods to step 
up political action on flooding.  
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 In terms of digital terrain models for instance, the following ones are in use for the Rhine-
Atlas modelling: in Switzerland, the so-called DHM25 Matrixmodel, in France the Base de 
donnees altimetrique (BD-ALTI), in Germany’s Baden-Wurttemberg the DHM-BW, in 
Hesse the DHM40, in Rhineland-Palatine DGM-RP, in Northrhine-Westphalia a terrain 
model taking from a research project on potential flood damage at the Rhine for which 
various DTMs were combined, and in the Netherlands the model from the research project 
Overstromingsrisico’s Buitendijkse Gebieden (ICPR 2001). 
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This fragmented nature of ‘detecting’ reflects the concentration of 
operational and political responsibility at Länder level in Germany’s flood 
regime. This allocation implies that the expertise required for risk 
assessments is mostly concentrated at the Länder level, along with locally 
specific knowledge held by regional and local environment agencies and 
authorities.  
But a more centralised risk assessment is also a result of the politics 
between different levels of government in Germany. Allowing for a more 
centralised risk assessment implies central government interference with 
Länder affairs, imposing implementation costs for risk assessments on – and 
more generally, reducing the political discretion at – the Länder level. If 
Länder use different methods to calculate HQ100 any standardised direction 
of risk assessments potentially imposes costs to overhaul risk assessments. 
The financial and administrative efforts of risk assessments become visible 
in the reluctance of the water authorities to update and revise their risk 
assessment at ‘normal’ times – that is, without the additional pressure 
triggered by a crisis event. An official of the Federal Ministry of 
Environment observes that:  
“assessments such as maps are only updated when the water authorities 
are forced to do it. The deficiencies only become apparent at the next 
flood event. If nothing happens, no adjustment takes place” (BMU 
2008a, interview).  
Apart from the costs of risk assessments these assessments serve as 
the basis for flood management in general. Länder are very cautious to 
safeguard their overall responsibilities in flood management. As another 
official from the ministry notes:  
“the interest of states to retain control over flood risk management is, on 
the one hand, for historical reasons. Every state has its own tradition, 
conception, and perceived challenges concerning flooding. Rhineland-
Palatine, for instance, was a great critic of the HWSG because it praised 
itself as being one of the most exposed and best organised flood 
managing states. [They argued:] ‘We just don’t want the Federal level to 
tell us about how to do it better’. (...) On the other hand, if we are talking 
about political responsibilities, we are talking about [the distribution of] 
political power. This is especially relevant in a field which is about costs, 
obligations, and restrictions... here, the Länder prefer to set their own 
rules” (BMU 2008b, interview). 
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These barriers point to the difficulty in producing transregionally 
consistent risk assessments and risk-based management plans in Germany, 
limiting the ability to evaluate different investment and management 
measures across the whole country. From the perspective of the advocates of 
neoliberalism this is, however, of great importance for comparing the value-
for-money of different uses of public investments at the national and sectoral 
levels. The discussion revealed that while risk assessments are strongly 
expert-driven, disaster politics (‘management by accident’) and institutional 
structures (decentralised allocation of responsibilities and resources as well 
as resulting interplay between different levels) shape the form risk 
assessments take – in a manner that impedes a nation-wide 
‘neoliberalisation’ of flood defence management in Germany. 
5.2.2 Directing: Standards of and responsibilities for protecting from 
flooding 
Directing in Germany’s flood defence management is mostly about defining 
the particular standards of safety that flood defences should be designed to 
meet. These standards of safety normally refer to specific hypothetical 
events that no longer cause harm thanks to the prescribed protection 
provided by flood defences. By defining such events directing also allocates 
responsibilities between state and society – that is, which events different 
state actors offer protection against and which events are deemed 
‘acceptable’ risks.    
In Germany’s flood defence domain the minimal risk-based safety 
standard is in general defined for flood defences as HQ100. That implies that 
properties normally are to be protected against an event that statistically 
occurs once or more in 100 years (even though  (see below) there is some 
variation in the standards). If an event occurs that is statistically less frequent 
– for example once in 150 years (HQ150) – individuals need to expect to be 
flooded. HQ100 therefore defines the responsibilities of Germany’s 
‘infrastructure’ state vis-à-vis its population in spite of the state’s fragmented 
allocation of flood management responsibilities. As the following chapter 6 
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will show, HQ100 is equally central to the land-use domain and therefore 
also defines the boundaries of Germany’s ‘regulatory’ state.     
The HQ100 standard has become a central reference point in 
Germany’s fragmented flood regime through its use at both Federal and 
Länder levels. The Federal Flood Control Act (HWSG) from 2005 explicitly 
identifies a HQ100 flood event as a key reference standard for the design of 
flood management plans (according to paragraph 31.d WHG). The Länder 
are therefore obliged to spell out measures for run-off management, flood 
protection infrastructure and safeguarding/expansion of retention space for 
the purpose of minimising threats resulting from flood events with a return 
period of 1-in-100 years. While safety is not promised (the statutory 
obligation is to ‘minimise’, not eliminate, the threat), a particular level of 
protection is aimed for across Germany. Accordingly, flood management 
plans on the Länder level are geared towards achieving the HQ100 standard 
through a set of measures including flood defences. In NRW for instance, 
HQ100 is the so-called Bemessungshochwasser (BHQ) (reference flood 
event) towards which the construction and maintenance of flood defences is 
oriented. Saxony’s flood protection concepts are also geared towards HQ100 
in most cases but not all. Saxony’s standard-setting offers a greater 
variability. HQ100 is the standard that applies for areas in which larger 
population groups need to be protected,  for example in urban areas. This 
standard is complemented by ’laxer’ safety standards that apply to other, less 
populated areas. Using qualitative descriptions of different land uses Saxony 
defines as safety level HQ25 for isolated developments and local 
infrastructure and HQ5 for farmland (Socher, Dornack and Defer 
2006a:305). 
The central HQ100 standard has a long tradition in Germany’s water 
management. One expert (Regional Water Authority Düsseldorf 2009, 
interview) suggested that the Prussian water authorities used the extreme 
flood from 1890 to determine the water quantities of the reference flood 
event for floodplains and defence construction and that this historical flood 
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event had roughly been equivalent to a HQ100 flood. Another expert 
(LANUV 2009, interview) noted that when systematic flood flow modelling 
began in the 1970s they used HQ100 as reference standard. This long-
established history of HQ100 also suggests that among flood managers, 
‘everyone has a rough idea of what it means’ (BMU 2008a, interview). 
Beyond its historical entrenchment some experts explain the choice of 
HQ100 with the rationale that individuals are statistically at worst likely to 
experience one major flood in their lifetime (ICPR 2008, interview; LAWA 
2008a, interview).  
A uniform minimal standard of protection – at least where larger 
groups of population would be affected by flooding – is however prone to 
political conflicts. It implies that safety for the population is provided to the 
population to an equal degree. This is problematic because it may imply for 
instance that (populated) areas with mostly agricultural production be 
protected to the same level as higher-value urban areas. In other words urban 
taxpayers subsidise the safety for rural areas in which relatively fewer 
taxpayers live and lower values are being protected. As a local flood 
manager of Saxony’s capital Dresden notes:  
“Dresden’s city centre, for instance, needs to be protected. But those that 
live in the countryside, can the state really protect them? Well, we can 
only offer some basic safety” (Local Environment Authority Dresden 
2008, interview). 
In Saxony, the difference in the consequences of flooding is reflected 
to some extent in the greater variability in standards that allows for lower 
protection for isolated developments and farmland. However, once larger 
groups of people are at risk (i.e. groups that do not live in isolated 
developments) HQ100 is to be applied.  
The flipside to these conflicts around the objective of 
undifferentiated protection is the fact that Germany’s flood managers 
perceive varying protection standards as highly problematic. An expert from 
the Federal Institute for Hydrology (bfg) wonders:  
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“OK, then there is the question how to explain it to the citizens why they 
get less protection than others. So here is the problem how can we defend 
such asymmetry politically?” (BFG 2009, interview).   
This ‘political’ concern also has a judicial side to it. Politically the 
concern for being protected adequately is often felt in particular by local 
politicians. For instance during a post-2002 conference of Saxony’s mayors 
the local politicians expressed their concern about the order of the 
implementation of repairing and investing in flood management 
infrastructure – that is they were interested in benefiting as quickly as 
possible from remedial action (SMUL 2008, interview). One reason for this 
local pressure for investment can be associated with the perceived risks of 
inadequately protecting the population. A Landes expert in NRW describes 
how  
“there is nothing more dangerous than a below-standard flood 
management measure which suggests safety that it cannot deliver. If the 
citizen notices a flood defence, it should protect him against an 
appropriate flood event” (LANUV 2009, interview).   
This ‘danger’ can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, the population 
may be less aware of the danger than necessary in view of an actual 
protection level below the expected HQ100 standard. This can potentially 
lead to greater damage as individuals do not take precautionary measures, 
such as using tiles rather than carpets in their basements. Secondly, the risk 
is ‘political’. If a house is protected by a below-HQ100 flood defence then 
the responsible actors – for example local authorities and dyke associations 
for smaller water bodies – will be blamed for the failure to protect against 
events with probability equal to or higher than HQ100.  
The ‘political’ concern is hardened by the options open to individuals 
to contest administrative actions such as the investment and construction of a 
flood defence system judicially through the public law court system 
(Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit). One illustrative case is the response of NRW 
flood managers to their obligation (through the Federal Flood Control Act) 
to produce a list of rivers for which flood management plans are required. 
Länder actors have some discretion in how to interpret the Federal obligation 
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because rivers can be excluded from the list on the basis of an expectation of 
‘not significant’ damage from flooding. However, NRW flood managers 
drew an extensive list of rivers slated for flood defence investment in an 
attempt to pre-empt legal challenges from those left out. An NRW expert 
points out: 
“so, we have got our list of rivers for which we devise a plan, formally 
only if we expect significant damage. But then there is a farmer who 
suffered from a flood the year before and cannot find the river on this 
list. He says: “But look, this river is dangerous, too. I had substantial 
damage”. And even where the citizens understand that not every single 
river can be controlled, still, there can be organisations that 
instrumentalise this legal clause. So this was our fear and that’s why we 
have a rather long list of rivers” (LANUV 2009, interview).   
This is not only a hypothetical risk to flood managers. Several decisions of 
administrative law courts in Bavaria point to the state’s obligation to provide 
a minimal level of protection against HQ100 floods to ensure the health and 
safety of the residential and working population (LAWA 2004). 
German flood managers face political and judicial constraints when 
setting standards for flood defences. The risk-based uniform standards of 
safety (normally at a HQ100 level) form the regulatory core of this domain 
in Germany that is shaped by a long history of expert use and accommodates 
the judicial and political requirements for state actors to provide equal safety 
to all groups in society. In contradiction to claims about the rolling back of 
the state as the driver for risk-based instruments meeting this risk-based 
safety standard is costly, and the economic performance per euro spent on 
flood management is not being explicitly taken into account in this type of 
standard-setting.  
But the HQ100 is not only about an equal safety ‘promise’. It also 
defines the boundaries of state responsibility. Events beyond HQ100 can be 
understood as residual risks for which the individual has to take precautions 
(e.g. through insurance (LAWA 2004)). While drawing a boundary between 
state and private responsibility in general fits well with the ideology of 
neoliberalism, the commitment (through the reference standard of HQ100) 
of the German state to provide safety to its population is substantial. The 
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relatively ambitious safety level (remember that HQ100 implies statistically 
that an individual with a normal life expectancy of around 80 years would 
need to be ‘unlucky’ to be affected by a flood even once in a lifetime), the 
fact that this safety level is applied relatively uniformly across Germany and 
the temporal stability of the protection level of HQ100 (see the 
aforementioned historical origins of the HQ100 reference standard) casts 
doubt on any arguments about the retreat of or a greater emphasis on 
economic efficiency by the state, at least when it comes to the function of 
‘directing’ in the flood defence domain. 
 Another function of the standard is to delineate the responsibilities 
of the Länder actors from those of local flood managers that might in view 
of local political, economic and/or hydrological circumstances deviate from 
the HQ100 protection level.  One example of this use of risk-based standards 
is flood management in Dresden, Saxony’s capital. The state of Saxony in 
general aims at providing HQ100 protection for urban areas and is 
responsible for main rivers (so-called Gewässer 1. Ordnung), such as the 
Dresden’s rivers Elbe and Weisseritz.  
However, the local government’s intentions differed. For the Elbe 
river it wanted to avoid unsightly flood walls and other engineered defences 
typically used to deliver HQ100 standards of protection. As one official 
explained, the city is a ‘very special place with a harmonious relationship 
between city and river space’ (Environment Authority Dresden 2008, 
interview). The city insisted that there was no space for high flood defence 
structures that obstructed access to the Elbe. However, for the Weisseritz 
river, a fast-flowing river causing many of Dresden’s 2002 flood’s fatalities, 
the city’s government sought HQ500 protection. The governments of 
Dresden and Saxony eventually resolved their differences through an 
agreement that Dresden’s flood defence would be managed by the local 
government rather than from the Land, shifting the political responsibility 
for lower protection levels along the Elbe and the financial responsibility for 
higher protection levels for the Weisseritz from the Land to the city 
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(Environmental Authority Dresden 2008, interview). Beyond limiting state 
responsibility for protecting the population to a particular standard, risk-
based standard-setting also serves important functions within Germany’s 
Federal state by delineating and clarifying responsibilities between different 
levels of government for flood defence management. Such a defining of 
responsibilities for protection contrasts with neoliberal expectations of 
reducing the responsibilities of the state for or making state operations more 
economically efficient in providing protection to the population.   
5.2.3 Effecting: Scale and allocation of investment into defences  
Effecting in the flood defence domain reflects the techno-centric nature of 
this domain. It uses hard infrastructure measures to influence the behaviour 
of natural processes that is the flow of water. The key question for effecting, 
especially as this discussion is about the government tool of treasure, 
therefore concerns how the financial capital required for these interventions 
is allocated.
42
 In fact, the effects of flood defences on human behaviour are 
normally described as negative because defences provide the protected 
population a (sometimes) false feeling of safety. Within flood regimes more 
generally, human behaviour is directly targeted through land-use regulations 
and economic incentives in disaster financing, which are the subjects for the 
next two chapters.  
In Germany’s flood defence domain two important factors shape the 
availability and allocation of money. First, money is made available to those 
projects that allow the state to protect the population to the level of HQ100. 
Secondly, the availability of the funding is mostly driven by the politics of 
                                                 
42
 The ‘treasure’ is not the only aspect that is relevant in effecting. The actual 
implementation of a HQ100 standard is also a considerable technical challenge, as are 
associated negotiations with the owners of the land on which a flood defence structure is to 
be installed. Resistance to flood defence structures sometimes also originates from local 
environment groups that complain about the adverse consequences of the chosen protective 
infrastructure project. One example is the planning of the technical retention basin near 
Meisdorf in the Selketal of Saxony-Anhalt that led to protests because 80,000 square metres 
of land in a natural reserve would be used (Mitteldeutsche Zeitung Quedlinburg, 1 Oct 
2007) However, as noted, this ‘neoliberalism’ discussion focuses on the use of public 
money. 
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disasters (that is money becomes available under the impression of a 
disaster) and the Federal state (i.e. amount and allocation of funds at macro-
level is shaped by negotiations between different levels of government). The 
considerations of the economic efficiency of flood defence operations 
central to neoliberal ideas of the economically efficient state are only of 
secondary importance and if at all, primarily on the level of individual 
projects.  
The importance of achieving certain levels of protection is reflected 
in the allocation practices at the Länder level. In NRW where the 
implementation of flood defence projects is mostly undertaken by local 
authorities and dyke associations, the local actors can claim 80% of 
expenditure for the flood management plan only under the condition that 
‘the measures actually protect to an HQ100 level’ (LANUV 2009, 
interview). Equally, Saxony’s resources are allocated to achieve particular 
safety standards, mostly HQ100.  
The comparative analysis of relative costs and benefits is only used 
at project-level to choose between different flood defence projects that are 
designed to achieve the HQ100 standard for a particular area. That means 
that the safety standard is taken for granted and benefit-cost considerations 
cannot take precedence. Precedence for benefit-cost-considerations could in 
principle imply that once a certain benefit-cost threshold has been met, a 
project can be implemented regardless of the protection level provided. In 
fact, the particular approach to the economic evaluation of projects, the cost 
comparative approach (Kostenvergleichsrechnung), underlines the secondary 
importance of economic efficiency considerations. A cost comparative 
approach assumes the benefits of an investment to be the same (e.g. the 
protection to the level of HQ100) and compares the costs of the different 
investments required to achieve these benefits. The importance of this 
approach is underpinned by the fact that LAWA (2005) has published non-
binding project appraisal guidance on cost-comparison approaches (rather 
than publishing guidance on cost-benefit analysis, as seen in England’s 
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Project Appraisal Guidance documents that will be discussed below). Cost 
comparison is for example practiced in Bavaria where the selection and 
comparison process starts with the HQ100 standard as reference value, 
followed by comparing the costs of individual project proposals to achieve 
this standard (LAWA 2008a, interview). In Saxony however, avoided 
damage is being considered in the comparison of projects. Saxony prioritises 
different measures on the basis of its sophisticated ‘SMS’ model that takes 
into account damage potential, cost-benefit ratio, vulnerability measures, as 
well as ecological and flood management benefits (Socher et al. 2006b). 
That notwithstanding, the actors use the model only to prioritise among a list 
of prospective measures that protect up to the predetermined safety 
standards.  
In short, achieving prescribed levels of protection outweighs 
considerations of economic efficiency in Germany. An interviewee from 
NRW’s Landes Environment Agency notes: 
“what has in my opinion never happened here is that a flood defence 
measure has not been approved because the costs for the measure were 
higher than the protected damage potential” (LANUV 2009, interview). 
The reason for the emphasis on safety rather than the economics of flood 
defence funding is political risk. In the words of a LAWA expert:  
“in my experience, it is almost impossible to try to refuse the funding of 
flood defences to the affected with reference to the benefit-cost analyses” 
(LAWA 2008, interview). 
These observations of flood managers suggest that public expectations are 
geared towards a certain level of protection by Germany’s state regardless of 
the particular costs this protection would entail.  
Economics is not only marginalised at the Länder and local levels by 
political concerns about the political damage that trading-off the safety of 
citizens (and potentially the assets of specific groups such as farmers) 
against flood protection costs may carry. The allocation of Federal funding is 
driven by the political dynamics between Länder and Federal level in the 
context of joint funding initiatives. One example is the so-called 
‘Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Agrarstruktur und Küstenschutz (GAK)’ (Joint Task 
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Rural Structure and Coastal Protection) whose portfolio includes flood 
management. Over the last ten years (2000-2009) the GAK distributed a 
total of almost EUR 1.8 billion for water management and rural 
infrastructure (wasserwirtschaftliche und kulturbauliche Massnahmen) 
among the Länder. The allocation of these funds between the Länder follows 
the so-called ‘Königsberger Schlüssel’, an allocation rule developed for 
Federal higher education spending proportional to Länder population 
numbers. Benz notes that such negotiations between different government 
levels within Germany imply distributive conflicts and that these in turn 
make it difficult to ‘concentrate resources on regions in need’ (Benz 
1999:56). Rather than allocating funding to where risk is largest, the 
allocation is driven by political negotiations and settlements between 
different levels of government. A politically acceptable distribution of 
resources and the financing burden outweighs considerations of risk for this 
type of funding.   
The approach to allocating money therefore follows the practices 
found in standard-setting in Germany; it emphasises safety rather than 
following the principles of economic efficiency, driven by an awareness of 
the political risks in failing to protect the population to a similar level. These 
political considerations are complemented by further considerations of a 
political (rather than a risk-based) proportionality in allocating funding that 
can be linked to the decentralised allocation of responsibilities in Germany’s 
flood regime. With such allocation principles in place it is no surprise that 
there are indications that funding for flood management is not in a linear 
decline (see table 8). At the same time, given the aforementioned costs of 
flood defences and the ambitious protection levels, it is interesting to explore 
whether the financial resources are made available in a sustainable pattern. 
Finding data on funding is complex in Germany’s flood regime. 
Even within a single Land, such as Saxony, flood managers draw on 
multiple funding schemes including in Saxony’s case the EU Solidarity 
fund, the Federal-Länder special fund (Sondervermögen Aufbauhilfe after 
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the 2002 Elbe flooding), the GAK and other programmes from various 
governance levels. In fact Saxony’s LTV has been acquiring funds from 16 
different sources since 2002 (LTV 2006). The following table focuses on 
three sources, namely the aforementioned Sondervermögen, the GAK 
funding mostly used for water management and the most regular budget item 
relevant to flood management in Saxony’s overall budget. 
In million EUR 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Landes funding 
for LTV 
13 14 13 13 10 10 20 20 29 
Sondervermögen N/A 49 193 394 167 176 75 78 57 
GAK funding 
Saxony 
1 39 30 22 32 24 29 24 28 
Table 8: Spending on environment and flooding, Saxony
43
      
One part of the image that emerges casts a doubt on whether the 
safety goals can be achieved over the longer term. The Sondervermögen
44
 is 
clearly disaster-driven with funding only available and stepped up after 2002 
peaking in 2004 and declining substantially thereafter. Even the share of 
Saxony’s GAK spent on water management rose extraordinarily after the 
flood in 2002. However, the amount of Saxony’s GAK overall share45 spent 
on flood management remained relatively stable ever since pointing to a 
more stable financing of flood management. This is confirmed by the Landes 
funding. The regular funding under Saxony’s budget has  after a slight 
                                                 
43
 This Sondervermögen row draws on data from the Annual Corporate Reports 
(Geschäftsberichte) of the LTV between 2003 and 2009. The other data is drawn from the 
budget in the documents Haushaltsplan 2001/2002 to 2009/2010, retrieved from the 
Saxonian Parliament website http://edas.landtag.sachsen.de/ on 18/01/11. The figures on the 
state funding of LTV concern the budget item 51 ‘Hoheitsaufgabe Hochwasser-
schutz/Stauanlagen’ (state task Flood Management/Dams) which is the most time-consistent 
budget category relevant to flood management.  The GAK funding for Saxony concerns the 
category of water management (wasserwirtschaftliche und kulturbauliche Massnahmen). 
The data is retrieved from the BMELV website http://berichte.bmelv-statistik.de/GAT-
9500000-2008.pdf on 25/1/11. 
44
 Further details on the Sondervermögen can be found in chapter 7. The Sondervermögen is 
a joint funding of Federal and Lander government of EUR 6.5 billion, and was made 
available for reconstructing flood management infrastructure and financing disaster damage. 
45
 Saxony’s share in the GAK remained at around 5% of the total GAK funds, in line with 
its share in the total population of Germany.  
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decline between 2002 and 2006 (reflecting the availability of alternative 
sources of income)  even been more than doubled between 2001 and 2009.  
That notwithstanding, concerns about the long-term availability of 
sufficient resources can be raised. Resources for the management of floods 
as relatively rare events are particularly vulnerable to cuts. A senior official 
in Saxony’s Environment Ministry recalls the situation before 2002: 
“Saxony’s engineered flood defences were not very well-maintained. 
Because over the entire duration of the GDR, except 1954, there were no 
floods. The institutional memory was no longer existent. This even led to 
the situation where my predecessor suggested to dissolve the [flood 
management] division. ‘Because flooding no longer exists!’” (SMUL 
2008, interview). 
Whether these financial pressures can be resisted thanks to the more 
systematic approach centring on the flood protection concepts will be 
interesting to watch. At the Rhine river, the planned measures of ICPR’s 
Flood Action Plan have been implemented to a large extent. As the ICPR’s 
representative observes: 
“And because at the early stages of the RFAP, the political pressure 
concerning flooding was still quite substantial, money was supplied. And 
for the future, well, it is always the case that the necessity and urgency of 
measures declines the longer the period without a flood was at a river. 
But for the Rhine, I assume that whatever was planned through the 
Action Plan will be implemented. This is all already in the pipeline. But 
we also know that through these measures alone, we won’t be able to 
achieve our goals” (ICPR 2008, interview).   
Germany’s flood regime reveals funding patterns that do not imply a 
substantial or linear financial trimming of the ‘security state’. The state does 
indeed assume financial responsibility for flood defences especially when 
driven by political pressures after a flood disaster. This latter aspect of the 
funding dynamics raises a different problem. An ambitious and uniform 
safety standard is being applied widely in ‘directing’, but the sustained 
funding required actually to meet and maintain that standard is often 
unavailable without the spur of major flood events (as Saxony before 2002 
and NRW before 1993 show). Faced with the problem of waning attention 
from elected officials several experts admitted that they sometimes welcome 
flood disasters – seeing them as a way to sustain the funding required to 
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fulfil their institutional obligations to effect the standards of flood defence 
they have been directed to deliver, where the obligations are not always 
accompanied by the resource allocations required to do so (e.g. LTV 2008, 
interview; ICPR 2008, interview).   
This discussion of the organisation of and use of risk in Germany’s 
flood defence domain has shown that even though suitable information tools 
are in place (albeit fragmented), they are not being used for rolling back the 
security state and introducing an economic efficiency orientation for flood 
defence management. Rather, an emphasis on equal safety for the population 
(reflecting an underlying fundamental objective of state-provided security 
and solidarity between different groups of society) prevails throughout the 
domain. Had economic efficiency logic prevailed as proposed by 
neoliberalism advocates, safety standards would have been systematically 
linked to the protection of monetary value alone and funding would have 
been allocated in accordance to the relatively greatest values protected by 
the money spent on flood defences. Introducing a differential treatment is 
perceived and experienced by the responsible German actors as politically 
and juridically risky. However, an approach stressing equal safety levels also 
carries substantial risks, financially (the costs of equal protection) and 
politically (failure to meet public expectations). In this context, the concept 
and instruments of risk emerge as means to define the boundaries of what 
governments at different levels can be held politically and financially 
accountable for. 
5.3 EXAMINING THE ROLE OF RISK IN ENGLAND’S FLOOD DEFENCE 
MANAGEMENT 
At a first glance the organisation of England’s flood defence domain appears 
to be almost as complex as Germany’s with a large number of actors and 
institutions arrayed across several levels and branches of the state and 
associated public bodies. Local authorities, internal drainage boards (IDBs), 
the Environment Agency (EA) and its Regional Flood Defence Committees 
(RFDC) all share responsibilities for the operational aspects of flood 
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management. However, apart from the fact that the overall policy 
responsibility is concentrated in one central government department (since 
2002 DEFRA, following on from MAFF), a gradual centralisation of 
operational responsibilities can be observed over the period since the 1970s. 
The landscape of operating authorities has shrunk in terms of numbers and 
fragmented responsibilities over the decades, with the IDBs and local 
authorities whose responsibilities were concerned with smaller, ‘ordinary’ 
water bodies and the 46 catchment boards originally instituted under the 
1930s Water Resources Act being consolidated into ten regional water 
authorities (following the 1973 Act) and finally a single body, the National 
Rivers Authority (NRA), in 1989.  
In 1996, the Environment Agency (EA) took on flood management 
in England and Wales. As a non-departmental public body the EA operates 
in line with the government’s national policies and strategy and delivers the 
targets set out by Defra (MAFF 1993b; DEFRA 2005). The EA and its remit 
initially continued to reflect the complex nature of Britain’s flood 
management by taking decisions through ten Regional and 17 Local Flood 
Defence Committees (RFDCs, LFDCs). However, in the aftermath of the 
Easter 1998 floods the LFDCS were abolished and other steps were 
undertaken to strengthen the central office of the EA.  Following the flood 
events in 1998 and 2000 the EA also saw its remit expanded to include 
critical ordinary watercourses, as well as being given a stronger general 
supervisory role over all types of flooding (DEFRA 2005).  
5.3.1 Detecting: Assessing existing defence structures and future risk 
England’s detecting has changed significantly in the aftermath of the ‘wake-
up calls’ of the Easter 1998 and autumn 2000 floods. A central government-
provided integrated risk assessment instrument can be found at the centre of 
the detecting function. The centralised instrument is a response to varying 
pressures on central government flood managers. These include criticisms of 
the variable quality of fragmented risk assessments prior to the 1998 floods, 
insurance industry pressures and the insurers’ own nation-wide risk 
 138 
assessment efforts, together with the functional need of a centralised 
evaluation tool for infrastructure investments.   
Before the Easter 1998 flood event information on the probability of 
flood events, the performance or even existence of flood defences and the 
damage potential was largely
46
collected regionally or locally where it was 
collected at all. As Bye and Horner note in their report on the ‘lessons 
learned’ in the aftermath of the Easter 1998 floods there were important gaps 
and inconsistencies in the production of the surveys of flood prone 
‘hotspots’ called for under Section 105 of the 1991 Water Act:  
“considerable work has been undertaken on these [Section 105] surveys, 
but with approaches and rates of progress differing between the regions, 
the exercise is far from complete nationally” (Bye and Horner 1998:40). 
Similarly, the Institute of Civil Engineers (ICE) reported that:  
“there is no agreed national standard with regard to [flood hazard] 
models, although some regions have adequate rainfall-runoff-models” 
(ICE 2001:49). 
Beyond the pressures on central government emanating from public 
critiques of the variable risk assessments provided in ‘lessons learned’ 
reports, the insurance industry was also calling for improved risk 
assessments (including for instance a centralised stock-taking of existing 
flood defences) among their list of demands on the government. As will be 
discussed in greater length in chapter 7, the insurance industry’s demands 
carry a special weight because they bear the entire financial risk of flooding 
as the exclusive provider of financing for flood damage in England.     
In response to these pressures a number of information-gathering 
efforts were launched after the 1998 and 2000 flood events. The Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) developed the so-called High-
Level Targets in 1999 to ensure the monitoring of policy delivery by the 
operating authorities. High-Level Target 4 obligated the Environment 
Agency to create a National Flood and Coastal Defence Database (NFCDD) 
                                                 
46
 The first rough attempt to do a nation-wide flood map actually dates back to the 1996 
Institute of Hydrology (IoH) map. However, the so-called IoH130 report was aimed at 
insurers, not flood managers, in IoH’s pursuit of commercial opportunities.  
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and the other operating authorities to provide data on defences to the 
Agency. Furthermore the EA, within its recent 2003 ‘Strategy for flood risk 
management’, commits to developing:  
“a modelling strategy to ensure consistency, coordination and multiple 
uses of model development and operation. Decision support will increase 
the effectiveness of our business decisions, both in terms of exploring 
flood risk management solutions and in balancing funding between our 
activities” (EA 2003:11) 
These centrally collected and generated assessments served as 
precursors and inputs to the annual ‘National Flood Risk Assessment’ 
(NaFRA) whose first version became available in 2004. NaFRA includes 
probabilistic analyses of flood risk that also account for the location, type, 
condition and performance of flood defences. Based on these assessments 
each territorial cell in NaFRA is assigned to one of three different risk 
categories that reflect different probabilities of inundation (HQ200 and less-
low; HQ75-200- moderate; more frequent than HQ75- high).
47
  
In addition MAFF initiated the collection of data on the damage 
potential of floods through the ‘National Appraisal of Assets at Risk’ 
(NAAR) (DEFRA 2001). In the years following the initial publication of 
NAAR the damage potential assessments were further refined and combined 
with probabilistic analyses in the integrated risk assessment instrument 
NaFRA, as described above.   
England’s risk calculations for domain of flood defence management 
are,  in contrast to Germany’s,  undertaken in a consistent manner across 
England. This in turn allows for a systematic comparison of the benefits – 
that is the avoided damage – of different investment options and the 
economic justification of expenditure on flood defences as desired by 
advocates of neoliberalism in pursuit of economically efficient state 
operations. The emphasis on economic efficiency and justification of 
investments was an important driver for the development of NaFRA. A 
                                                 
47
 The formulation of these risk categories, in particular the establishment of the HQ75 
threshold, was the outcome of negotiations between the government and the insurance 
industry. This will be discussed in greater length in chapter 6. 
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Defra senior official highlights the link between risk assessment and the 
economic evaluation of state operations:   
“because of the new risk information, we understood better what the risk 
actually is and what we need to invest collectively” (Defra 2008, 
interview). 
In other words NaFRA allows Defra and EA not just to define but also to 
justify externally in economic terms their claims for flood defence funding. 
Indeed, a member of one of the Regional Flood Defence Committees 
associates the development and use of NaFRA with changes in the funding 
of flood defences and an associated strengthening of scrutiny over the 
efficient use of financial resources.  
“This [switch to HM Treasury central funding] brought with it a new 
accountability on the part of the Agency to Ministers and to Parliament. 
(...) The development of tools like NaFRA (...) made such a centralised 
approach easier to manage” (RFDC 2009, interview). 
While the RFDC member’s comment points to the usefulness of 
NaFRA for better monitoring and control over spending, it also highlights its 
benefits for holding operating authorities accountable for their actions. 
Officials at the EA recognise that NaFRA, by introducing consistent 
assessments of risks and the effects of state operations, allows for a better 
management of institutional risks to the Agency. As an officer notes in the 
aftermath of the 1998 and 2000 floods:  
“you had the reputation of the whole Agency at stake. So you cannot 
really have flood defence management done inconsistently across the 
whole country” (EA 2008a, interview).  
Bye and Horner’s ‘lessons learned’ report (1998) evaluated the performance 
and response of the Environment Agency as a single organisation during the 
Easter 1998 floods and criticised the variable risk assessments undertaken by 
the regional and local offices and defence committees of the EA. This 
illustrates how differences in the quality of mapping from one region to the 
next can affect the reputation of an organisation. Introducing a nationally 
consistent assessment instrument that standardises risk assessments for the 
nation eliminates grounds for contesting risk assessments and the decisions 
they inform based on inconsistent methodological choices. Moreover, as the 
 141 
discussion of chapter 6 on the new Flood Map of the EA will demonstrate, 
nation-wide assessment instruments such as the Flood Map or NaFRA are 
also more easily defensible and auditable due to their standardised and 
proceduralised nature that shows that a certain standard of care was in 
general maintained (or not). The concerns about the defensibility of 
assessments and the reputation of the EA therefore reveal that the push for 
standardising risk assessments is not solely driven by a motivation to make 
state operations more efficient but also in response to the institutional risks 
faced by actors within England’s flood regime. 
5.3.2 Directing: Setting goals for protection and economic standards for 
state operations 
NaFRA is an integral part of the DEFRA ‘outcome measures’ (DEFRA 
2007) that form the regulatory core of England’s infrastructure regime. 
DEFRA’s ‘outcome measures’ depart from a simple setting of safety 
standards (as seen in Germany’s flood defence domain) in that they refer to 
particular targets concerning risk reduction and the aggregate cost-efficiency 
of state operations in the flood defence domain.   
The DEFRA outcome measures replaced the previous regulatory core 
set in the 1993 MAFF strategy. This MAFF strategy (1993b) included as a 
general objective of flood management:  
“to encourage the provision of adequate, technically, environmentally 
and economically sound and sustainable flood and coastal defence 
measures” (MAFF 1993b:4).  
These broad principles were reflected in concrete goal-setting, through 
indicative safety standards (for instance, HQ100 standard for densely 
populated, urban areas), funding priorities (e.g. flood warning systems 
taking priority over new rural defences), and project appraisal guidance as 
reference points for directing investment decisions.  
The core of this previous goal-setting was concerned with the 
‘economic soundness’ of flood defence measures. More specifically, any 
proposed defence scheme needed to at least have a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) 
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of unity (1:1). The other components of the concrete goal-setting comprised 
guidance rather than prescription: Indicative standards served as assessment 
aid concerning the adequacy of defences (MAFF 1993:28) and a secondary 
decision criterion (Parker 2000a:234) whilst the national funding priorities 
‘assist operating authorities in forward planning and establishing the relative 
importance of their schemes’ (MAFF 1993:5). 
In 2008,
48
 the ‘old’ regulatory core centred on a benefit-cost ratio of 
unity was replaced by nine
49
 outcome measures (OM). Two of these are 
particularly relevant for directing investment and management in the flood 
defence domain. First, OM-2 defines the objective of moving 145,000 
households to a lower NaFRA probability category between 2008 and 2011 
through investments into projects funded by the central government’s Flood 
Defence Grants in Aid (FDGiA); of these 45,000 households should be 
transformed from properties in the high probability category (HQ75) to those 
belonging to moderate or lower risk categories. While this OM implicitly 
takes into account a particular protection threshold (e.g. HQ75) it does not 
define it as a largely uniform minimal protection threshold to be achieved 
across the country. This implies that measures can be applied selectively 
(depending on their cost and effectiveness) to achieve the desired outcome, 
and no particular protection level is being ‘promised’ as a uniform standard 
to be met in all cases, as in Germany’s risk-based standard. 
Secondly, the benefit-cost ratio is also part of the outcome measures 
(OM). While the benefit-cost ratio test was applied before the introduction of 
the outcome measures to the individual project level, OM-1 introduces an 
aggregate, nation-wide benefit-cost-ratio for total flood defence spending of 
5:1. Individual projects continue having to achieve a BCR (now 
significantly) better than 1:1. The benefits in this calculation in turn are 
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 A first version of the outcome measures was made available for consultation in 2006. 
49
 The outcome measures beyond those discussed in this section contain objectives 
concerning the relation of flood with wildlife sites (OM-4) and UK biodiversity habitats 
(OM-5), flood warning (OM-6), contingency planning (OM-7), inappropriate land-use 
(OM-8), and the production of flood management plans (OM-9).  
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calculated on the basis of NaFRA in terms of damage avoided. OM-1 
therefore not only ensures that all individual projects have to be 
economically evaluated (1:1) but also that flood defence investments in 
aggregate pass a particular cost-efficiency threshold at a national level.  
This focus on avoided damage and reduced risk to properties as the 
criteria for directing flood defence investment creates winners and losers.  
Due to the weight given to damage potential in allocation decisions spending 
is focused on built-up urban areas.  Individuals and groups living in areas 
exposed to the same probability of inundation but with limited damage 
potential are forced to take responsibility for their own risk. This can happen 
since there is no key minimal level of state-provided protection which flood 
managers are to achieve.  
Rural interests are among the most prominent losers from the more 
focused and risk-based allocation system introduced under the new OMs. 
The Country Land and Business Association (CLA), for instance, recently 
criticised the strategy of risk-based ‘managed retreat’ for coastal defences on 
the basis that concentrating resources on towns where the monetary damage 
potential is highest neglects strategic interests such as food security, and is 
irreversible (CLA 2010). As the agency responsible for implementing this 
strategy the EA faces pressure from aggrieved rural communities and their 
political representatives that are denied funding for flood defence schemes 
(Lane et al. 2011).  The OM allocation mechanism provides a means of 
assuring due process in politically contentious spending decisions and 
fending off charges of political partisanship, bias or favouritism (Porter 
1995). Moreover, Johnson and colleagues (2003:122-123) argue that the 
impact of rural lobbies such as the National Farmers Union on the changes 
of flood management since the Easter 1998 floods have been limited. This is 
because decreasing concerns over food security and the declining role of 
farming in England’s economy have weakened the weight of agricultural 
interests in England’s flood defence domain. In fact, the government’s 
efficiency-oriented approach has found support among environmental 
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organisations (in particular the Wildlife Trusts, WWF-UK and English 
Nature) because it included a stronger emphasis on natural processes 
conducive to flood management (e.g. wetlands that retain water).   
At the same time, the ‘outcome measures’ offer an instrument for 
managing the potential blame England’s flood managers can attract if a 
flood occurs. Examples for the post-disaster public pressure on the EA are 
abundant: the Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment (the DETR 
opposite) noted in response to the publication of the Interim report by Bye 
and Horner that the EA showed an ‘inadequate and failed response on the 
part of the Agency’ (BBC News Online, 2 June 1998). In another example, 
residents of Worcester, a small city in western England flooded during the 
Easter 1998 floods, reported mismanagement of the EA in the operation of 
flood defences (BBC Online News, 14 April 1998). Finally, after the 
publication of the Bye and Horner report, all five Northamptonshire MPs 
demanded the resignation of Lord de Ramsay, then the chairman of the EA 
(BBC Online News, 2 Oct 1998). ‘Outcome measures’ can help responding 
to these pressures. This is because the ‘outcome measures’ demonstrate 
performance and effectiveness but do not promise protection to a specific 
level. This use is reflected in the comment by one senior policy officer of the 
Environment Agency:  
“Now [our approach] is about managing risk rather than offering safety. 
(...) It is not that we lower the number of properties that are at risk but 
rather that we manage more properties at risk. Because we are moving 
more to ‘we cannot stop flooding’”(EA 2009a, interview). 
‘Lowering the number of properties at risk’ implies that the 
government provides safety to these houses because fewer houses would be 
at risk from flooding. ‘Managing the risk’ on the contrary suggests that risk 
continues to be present, and can be associated with an implicit 
acknowledgement of the limitations of protection capacities (‘we cannot stop 
flooding’). It implies that that a number of management measures are 
undertaken that make it less likely (but does not rule out) that floods will 
cause as much damage. As such, this concept of risk offers a justification for 
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failures to protect (it was not economical to protect this site so the funding 
went to a site with greater potential damage) while providing evidence that 
the EA has discharged its flood management responsibilities competently 
(proven by the number of houses in a lower risk category or, in the words of 
the EA officer, ‘manage the risks to more properties’). This use of risk for 
blame avoidance has also been noticed by the national victims’ organisation, 
the National Flood Forum (NFF). In the words of an NFF representative:  
“this [shift to risk-based flood defence management] is a well-thought-
through idea because you can maintain a certain level of funding and 
strategic involvement but if something goes wrong, you can throw your 
hands into the air” (NFF 2009, interview). 
The ‘directing’ in England’s flood defence domain suggests that 
actors pursue the reduction of probable damage (properties at risk) in a cost-
efficient manner (positive benefit-cost ratio), and thereby it directly takes a 
form compatible with neoliberal expectations. This economic orientation, 
however, implies differential treatment of groups in the society, which is 
politically unpopular with those left with less protection. Mechanical, OM-
based rules for directing flood defence investment help to protect officials at 
the Environment Agency from charges of political bias or unfairness in its 
execution of the strategy chosen by elected ministers in the government of 
the day. At the same time, the tactic of defining risk reduction goals rather 
than safety standards is used as a means to control the extent to which flood 
managers can be blamed for failing to prevent damage, since such goals can 
be used to prove risk management performance without promising 
protection. Rather than simply serving as a means for ‘trimming the state’, 
risk-based directing also addresses the institutional risks associated with 
efficiency-oriented flood defence management.  
5.3.3 Effecting: Allocating public money for security       
As in the case of Germany the focus of this ‘effecting’ section will be on the 
funding of flood defences. The allocation of flood defence spending 
(historically at project level shaped strongly by cost-efficiency 
considerations) now includes a focus on performance and delivery in risk 
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reduction as well as cost-efficiency from a national perspective. This central 
government attention to performance and cost efficiency reflects the rise of 
central government funding for flood management.  
Since the 1930 Land Drainage Act the central government has 
provided capital grants to finance flood defence construction. The complex 
system combined the Treasury’s capital grants, local levies charged by local 
authorities and IDBs, and Revenue Support Grants from the Treasury to 
local authorities.  In the funding period 2004/2005 however, funding 
primarily originated from the budget of the central government department 
of Defra and was channelled through the EA. Between 1996/97 and 2003/04 
the annual average share of investment undertaken or at least controlled by 
local authorities stood at almost three-quarters of the total investment.
50
 
Between 2004/05 and the estimated figures for 2010/11 the local share has 
shrunk to less than 15% on average. The following figure 5 illustrates the 
evolution of funding more systematically, reflecting the switch from flood 
defence management drawing on resources largely controlled by local 
authorities to centrally funded spending, as well as highlighting the almost 
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 The shift in funding is not a purely scalar shift from local to central. It is also an inter-
departmental shift of responsibilities from Department of Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) to Defra. This is because while local council tax and other local 
resources contributed to the local authorities’ funding of flood defences, most of it 
originated from the funding through Revenue Support Grant (RSG) provided by DCLG. It 
still makes sense though to speak from a shift in control from local authorities to the central 
government’s EA and Defra because the RSG is part of the general transfer of resources 
from central to local government whose local use is not prescribed by the central 
government.  
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 The figures in table 4-2 are nominal values, i.e. the inflation rate has not been taken into 
account. If it is taken into account the factor by which the funding is stepped up shrinks 
from 1.93 to 1.62 in the decade between 1997/98 and 2007/2008. This shows that the 
overall real trend is an expansion of funding for flood defences.  
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Figure 5: Spending on flood management by government level, England
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Such a rise in central government and overall funding contradicts neoliberal 
expectations about a roll-back of the state. While the roll-back expectation 
does not appear to fit England’s flood defence domain a closer look at the 
allocation of the financial resources in flooding highlights the point that cost 
efficiency and economic performance are of great importance in England’s 
investments into flood defences.  
In fact, the increased provision of funding through the central 
government’s Defra and the EA implied that the prioritisation tools of the 
central government gained increasing weight in allocating investments. 
Historically, as noted earlier, centrally provided resources were allocated 
through benefit-cost calculations, following the Project Appraisal Guidance 
(MAFF 1993a; MAFF 2001). In this guidance actors were advised to 
compare the costs of construction and maintenance of individual protective 
infrastructure schemes with the flood damage to be avoided during the 
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 This figure draws on data from spending overviews found on the DEFRA website 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081027092120/http:/www.defra.gov.uk/envir
on/fcd/policy/funding.htm, accessed on 10/09/2010). 2005/2006 sees a major rise because 
the Environment Agency was required to spend historic balances held by the flood defence 
committees (NAO 2007). The decline in 2006/2007 can partly be explained by the need for 
DEFRA to cut their budget in order to ‘make up for losses from the failures in a new 
subsidy system for farmers’ (BBC Online, 02/08/2006, see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ politics/5238342.stm, accessed on 20/6/2011)   
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design life of the proposed scheme. Proposed schemes were selected if in 
accordance to the 1:1 benefit-cost-ratio (BCR) that formed the regulatory 
core of the flood defence domain.  
While individual projects were required to at least meet the unity 
BCR to be funded through central grants the allocation of the centrally 
provided and locally controlled funds was traditionally channelled through 
the decentralised Regional and Local Flood Defence Committees of the 
Environment Agency. The defence committees were composed of 
representatives of local governments representing local interests. The Royal 
Society for the Protection of the Birds (RSPB), for example, critically 
remarked that this implied a strong representation of local agricultural 
interests proposing major flood defence and land drainage schemes (RSPB 
1998:7). Similarly, following the flood events in 1998 and 2000 the 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Agriculture remarked in its influential 
report on the Easter 1998 floods: 
“it is all too apparent that much local level decision-making is driven by 
short-term economic circumstance and localised priorities, rather than the 
long-term sustainable approach the Government is seeking. (...) [T]his 
culture will only be overcome if the Ministry adopts a more dirigiste role 
in guiding the efforts of operating authorities (...). In our opinion MAFF, 
collaborating with the Environment Agency, must strive to implement its 
national strategy in a more dynamic and proactive way” (SCA 
1998:para.69-70). 
The switch to centralised Flood Defence Grants in Aid (FDGiA) 
shifted the centre of control over funding allocation. A member of one of the 
EA’s RFDCs notes that: 
“the decisions about how much money to spend in a given region used to 
be in the hands of local politicians [represented in the RFDCs]. (...) 
[However,] centralisation has undoubtedly taken place” (RFDC 2009, 
interview). 
With this switch in 2004/2005 the economic orientation of the 
allocation mechanism was further refined. The overall spending of the 
central government has to achieve an aggregate national-level efficiency 
threshold of 5:1 complementing the efficiency evaluation at the local level. 
A pure focus on the aggregate benefit-cost ratio of 5:1 allows for a very 
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limited engagement of the central state in flood defence funding because the 
operating authorities and central government funders potentially only have 
to fund projects that ensure aggregate and individual compliance with the 
BCR thresholds.  
Rather than focusing solely on the benefit-cost ratio and the value-
for-money of state operations, state operations are required to achieve the 
risk management performance targets laid out in Outcome Measure 2 and 
are therefore also evaluated and selected in view of their contribution to 
achieving these targets. In contrast to pure cost efficiency targets such risk 
management targets compel the operating authorities to undertake a certain 
level of flood defence investments.  
These cost-efficiency tests and evaluations in particular point to an 
orientation in the provision of flood defences that emphasises aggregate 
economic efficiency in the use of public resources, echoing the neoliberal 
desire to address economic inefficiencies of state operations. This orientation 
is even more conspicuous in policy documents and the perceptions of 
involved actors. Defra’s new strategy, for instance, states: 
“expenditure will be focused so as to achieve value for money and will be 
prioritised to deliver maximum benefits in line with this strategy” (Defra 
2005:15; my emphasis). 
Defra also signed a so-called Public Service Agreement on Value for 
Money defining efficiency and cost-saving targets (DEFRA 2009). In this 
2009 ‘delivery agreement’ Defra promises that: 
“the Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management programme will 
deliver savings through improving the maintenance work stream and 
through the use of a more risk-based approach to maintenance, improved 
productivity and reduced unit costs“ (ibid:4; my emphasis). 
Equally the ‘economics’ of public investment is also stressed in the 
latest Environment Agency strategy from 2003 (EA 2003):  
“We need a new approach to the way we manage our [defence] assets 
that considers the whole life cycle of the flood defence system (...) to 
secure the greatest return on investment” (EA 2003:12; my emphasis). 
This economic emphasis on value-for-money is recognised by the 
staff of operating authorities, including actors, such as the local authorities 
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and internal drainage boards (IDBs) that are involved in implementing flood 
defences at water bodies that are neither big nor critical enough to be 
assigned to the EA’s remit. For instance, a member of an Internal Drainage 
Board emphasises:  
“The biggest issue with flood management is economics. The UK has 
this idea that it only has so much money to spend on flooding. Therefore, 
there has to be prioritisation” (IDB 2009, interview; my emphasis).   
In combination with the shrinking share of locally controlled funding and the 
strengthening of the supervisory role of the EA in flood management in 
general since the Easter floods 1998, the economic orientation of England’s 
effecting is embraced across all operating authorities. What is puzzling, 
however, about ‘effecting’ in England is that in spite of the strong cost-
efficiency orientation the centralisation of funding had implications that are 
at odds with the more radical, neoliberal notion of ‘state roll-back’ (while 
still being reconcilable with the less radical ideas of a more economically 
efficient state). The centralisation of funding has in fact actually coincided 
with a continued rise of funding (see figure 4-2). In relation to central 
government funding it even implied a reversal of the decline in funding of 
the 1980s (Penning-Rowsell and Handmer 1988) and 1990s (from GBP 96.7 
million in 1996/97 down to GBP 66.5 million in 2000-01).   
This increase in spending is a result of different political pressures 
following the severe flood events in 1998 and 2000. The Select Committee 
of Agriculture (SCA) has in its influential report in the aftermath of the 
Easter 1998 floods noted that:  
“from the evidence we have received, it appears operating authorities are 
hard enough pressed as it is to maintain vital local flood and coastal 
defence programmes” (SCA 1998:para. 117). 
The SCA therefore favourably views the government’s ‘plans to 
increase spending’, and that the government ‘has no plans to cut global 
levels of flood and coastal erosion expenditure’ (ibid). This Parliamentary 
pressure can be understood as a response to the public pressure following the 
Easter floods in 1998. Intriguingly, political concerns about public anxiety 
about flooding also seem to influence the flood policy of the new UK 
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government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Even though the 
coalition government was elected on the basis of a election campaign that 
stressed austerity and substantial budget cuts across all government 
departments the Prime Minister David Cameron felt the need to conceal the 
budget cuts imposed on Defra’s flood defence spending by claiming that 




Moreover, another factor to consider is the more specific pressure by 
the insurance industry. Insurers, whose role will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 7, exercised pressure on the government by threatening to 
reconsider their then almost universal supply of affordable flood cover to 
households. In exchange for the commitment to provide flood cover the 
insurance industry asked for, among other demands, a substantial rise in 
central government funding for flood defences (Huber 2004). The 
effectiveness of this pressure is partly
54
 confirmed by an interviewed 
Treasury official: 
“We have an interest in maintaining the Standard of Principle [the 
agreement between the Association of British Insurers and the 
government, KK] because otherwise the expectations that the 
government steps in rears its ugly head, and we don’t want that because 
the costs would be significant. So we have an interest in doing some of 
the things the ABI was looking for” (HM Treasury 2009, interview).    
The discussion of the organisation and role of risk in England’s flood 
defence domain has shown that England’s risk assessment instrument, 
NaFRA, offers England’s flood managers the means to economically and 
comparatively evaluate flood defence measures. It has also shown that flood 
managers use NaFRA to define performance targets for cost-efficient risk 
reduction. While the economics of flood defence management is further 
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 David Cameron argues that the spending over the next four years will be similar (a 
modest 8% cut) to that over the past four years under New Labour. The problem is that 
flood defence spending had been rising significantly over the past four years so that if one 
compares the future spending under the new government with the 2010/2011 spending 
allocated under New Labour, the cut would be as high as 22%. See 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2010/nov/24/flood-defence-cuts-facts-spin, 
accessed on 24/06/2011. 
54
 The limitations to the insurers’ influence will be discussed in chapter 7. 
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reinforced through the definition of an aggregate BCR as an issue of central 
importance to England’s regime, this cost-efficiency focus is complemented 
by risk reduction targets. These targets along with the increase in funding 
contradict the simple, more radical ‘retreat of the state’ argument (while 
being compatible with neoliberal ideas of a more ‘economical’ state) and 
point to the political pressures on the government to protect the population. 
Risk instruments are in turn being used to manage these pressures by 
defining relatively flexible commitments to provide protection and 
demonstrate risk management performance. 
5.4 REVISITING ARGUMENTS ABOUT NEOLIBERALISM IN THE FLOOD 
DEFENCE DOMAIN  
This chapter reviews the domain of flood defence management in relation to 
neoliberal arguments around the ‘rollback’ and reconfiguration of the state 
and its use of the tool of the treasure. In order to address the problems 
associated with ‘more state’ – including costs, moral hazard and poor 
performance – neoliberalism’s advocates would primarily expect to see 
comprehensive economic evaluation of the costs and benefits of state 
operations (relying on national risk assessments to determine the benefits of 
different flood defence schemes) as well as a declining governmental budget 
for flood defence management.    
The flood defence domains in Germany and England cast doubts on 
neoliberal arguments about the significance of costs and economics as a 
primary driver of the choices by actors within the respective flood regimes. 
In neither case can a rollback of the state be observed even though the 
concept and instruments of risk are central components in the flood defence 
domains of Germany and England. Even introducing a stronger orientation 
towards economic efficiency faces specific barriers as the discussion of 
Germany shows.  
Taking a closer look at each of the two country’s cases, Germany’s 
case offers a particularly strong contrast with the expected neoliberal regime 
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because of its commitment to providing an ambitious, standardised minimal 
level of protection to its population. While the financial resources for its 
implementation are abundant mostly in the aftermath of flood events, there is 
little indication of a systematic rollback of the state in terms of its 
commitment or mobilisation of financial resources for the protection of its 
population. The concept and instruments of risk, rather than serving to trim 
the state and making it more cost-conscious and efficient, are used to 
standardise protection levels, mostly to HQ100, and to define responsibilities 
between the state and the population and different levels of the Federal state. 
State-level governments normally aim at protecting the population against 
events that statistically occur as frequently as once every 100 years, while 
less frequent events are either to be managed by private individuals or 
through additional local government spending. In some cases lower 
protection goals are possible if the flood management and funding 
responsibility is shifted to the local authority. In Germany the concept and 
instruments of risk therefore make explicit what state actors at different 
government levels can be held accountable for and thereby facilitate intra-
state co-ordination. 
England’s case resembles much more closely the expected neoliberal 
regime. The most visible deviation from the expected regime is the 
expansion of financial resources available for flood defences to the operating 
authorities. At the same time, the use of benefit-cost ratios at the project and 
national levels, as well as national performance targets based on the 
reduction of potential damage, fit well with neoliberal ideals of 
economically evaluated state operations. The centralised risk instrument 
NaFRA plays a crucial role in lending quantitative and formalised 
expression to this economic evaluation. 
However, there appears to be some other motivation than just cutting 
costs and making individuals responsible in England’s risk-based flood 
defence management. Such an explanation for the use of risk in this domain 
can also be reconciled with the actual expansion of the financial means for 
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flood defence management. The risk-based outcome measures promise that 
the state undertakes risk management (for which a consistently increasing 
amount of money has become available ever since the Easter floods 1998), 
but not that they provide a particular level of protection to the population. 
Both the increase in funding and the particular outcome measure can be used 
to manage institutional risks to flood managers in England  (that is, manage 
the blame that is allocated after a flood occurs).  
  Costs and cost-cutting therefore do not seem to be the only or main 
concern of flood managers in Germany and England. Flood managers in the 
two countries also share concerns about meeting public expectations for 
protection in their flood management and how different actors can be held 
accountable for this. However the responses to this concern differ. In 
Germany state-level governments focus on providing a relatively ambitious 
level of minimum protection equally across the entire population. Such an 
ambitious protection level cannot necessarily be achieved however. This is 
because abundant resources for flood management mostly become available 
in the aftermath of major flood events whereas the absence of flooding can 
dry out the supply of money for flood management as the spikes and one-off 
patterns in funding after flood events and the scarcer resources before recent 
flood events illustrate. In England the approach differs. Rather than 
accommodating public expectations through defining ambitious safety 
standards flood managers do not provide any explicit protection level for 
which they can be held responsible. They accommodate expectations 
concerning the state’s role in protection by demonstrating risk management 
performance. 
Both strategies are controversial because state actors make implicit 
decisions about how important either the protection of different assets is 
(Germany’s state-level actors define standardised safety objectives that 
imply protecting high economic value areas to the same extent as lower 
value areas) or the protection of different groups of the population is 
(England’s flood managers concentrate on protecting  higher-value areas).  
 155 
As this summary discussion shows, the analysis of flood defence 
domains and their use of risk instruments does not only spell doubt upon the 
validity of arguments about the roll-back and reconfiguration of the state 
using treasure-based interventions. It also shows how the use of risk serves 
different purposes in the two countries. How can the choice of these 
different strategies be understood? Why does one country consider the 
economics in flood defence management so strongly but not the other?   
5.5 EXPLAINING THE VARIATION IN RISK-BASED FLOOD DEFENCE 
MANAGEMENT 
The arguments of neoliberalism’s advocates about costs and moral hazards 
are not the dominant drivers of the organisation of the flood defence 
domains in the two countries and of the way in which key actors in the two 
countries’ regimes use the concept and instruments of risk. Barriers to 
neoliberalism and alternative drivers of risk-based flood defence 
management are, however, not the same in Germany and England and this 
requires further exploration. The following sections discuss two contrasts 
between Germany’s and England’s institutional contexts that help explain 
differences in the two countries’ divergent ways of organising their 
respective flood defence domains. The discussions will focus on the variance 
in the use of risk in the domains due to its assumed central role in the 
‘neoliberalisation’ of flood defence management. 
5.5.1 State structure: Fragmentation versus centralisation 
The first factor that shapes the two countries’ design and use of risk 
instruments is the state’s structure in each case. Variation in the state 
structures of Germany and England has affected risk assessment and shaped 
the particular use and role of risk in their respective flood defence domains.   
Germany’s flood defence domain mirrors the fragmented 
responsibilities in the German Federal state (Bundesstaat). In the German 
Bundesstaat the Länder governments normally have at least a significant role 
in implementing legislation (implying a functional fragmentation between 
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the implementing Länder and the legislating Federal level), if not even in 
legislating. In water management the responsibility for the operational and 
legislative aspects of flood management are mostly situated at the level of 
the 16 German Länder, continuing a long tradition of decentralised 
competencies in environmental and water management (Fassbender 2007; 
Lees 2007).  
This constitutionally, politically and historically entrenched 
fragmentation not only rules out centralised risk assessments (‘detecting’) 
that is instrumental for a systematic economic evaluation of state operations 
and much desired by many experts. An ICPR interviewee remarked that 
‘Federalism is rubbish for flood risk assessments’ (ICPR 2008, interview). 
While this comment may also be tainted by  the organisational interests of 
the ICPR (their Rhine-Atlas after all had to use a very coarse scale to avoid 
impinging on local responsibilities), insurers (see chapter 7) and some 
Länder experts (e.g. MUNLV 2008, LAWA 2008b, interviews) agreed that 
(especially in view of the transregional character of floods and their 
consequences) a less fragmented analysis could be beneficial for better co-
ordinated flood management and improved flood insurance products.  
The institutional fragmentation even marginalises the role of risk for 
some aspects of allocating funds (‘effecting’) for flood defence management 
due to the need for political compromises across different government 
levels. One illustrative outcome of a settlement between different levels of 
government is the use of the ‘Königsberger Schlüssel’ to allocate joint GAK 
funding. Another example is the Länder-Federal ‘Sondervermögen’ in the 
aftermath of the 2002 floods, where allocation of funding between different 
affected Länder and the respective proportions of the overall fund to be paid 
by Länder and Federal governments was the outcome of negotiations 
between the two levels.  
Finally, the Federal fragmentation also highlights the value of risk-
based safety standards as a means to achieve co-ordinated and equal 




 This is due to the abstraction from locally specific 
surroundings achieved by the use of the term HQ100.  
England’s flood defence domain has seen a significant concentration 
of responsibilities and resources at the central government’s EA. In contrast 
to Germany’s entrenched fragmentation such a centralisation does not face 
any significant institutional and political barriers within England’s unitary 
state organisation with a concentration of power at the centre of the 
government (Knill and Lenschow 1998; Knill 1999). This state structure 
therefore facilitated the centralisation not only of risk assessment  
(‘detecting’) but also of the funding available for flood defence operations 
(‘effecting’), both of which are important prerequisites for a cost-efficient 
implementation of flood defence operations.  
Moreover, consistent calculations of risk across England are also 
perceived as a prerequisite for making defensible England’s particular 
allocation of funding. This is, on the one hand, important because the 
funding does not aim for an equal protection level for the population. It is 
therefore no surprise that those disadvantaged by this allocation may 
challenge the underlying benefit and risk assessments. Standardising and 
centralising the process of risk assessment strengthens, following arguments 
by Porter (1995), the legitimacy of interventions on the basis of risk 
assessment. Porter also highlights that this improvement of legitimacy is 
particularly relevant for institutions with a weak legitimacy in contentious 
areas of intervention. Reflecting this need, the EA as a semi-autonomous 
organisation not directly legitimated by Parliament and increasingly 
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 Using alternative types of goals such as determining a maximum water volume per 
second flowing through a river channel might be useful locally, but of limited value as a 
reference point across states and Germany. Average water discharge measured in cubic 
metres per second at a particular gauge vary between and within different river catchments: 
The Rhine at Basel gauge stood at 1,060 m3/s while NRW’s Sieg (Menden gauge) only had 
52 m3/s. Average flood discharges along the Rhine also vary – e.g. at gauge Rheinfelden at 
the Upper Rhine the winter discharge stood at 2,220 m3/s  compared to Cologne’s 6,300 
m3/s. This variation illustrates that a standard based on discharge volume would make 
standardisation across river catchments and regions impossible.   
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endowed with strategic and operational responsibility for flood management 
seems to be particularly sensitive towards risks to its reputation. 
The defensibility is on the other hand important for blame deflection 
after a flood occurs. Again the EA has often been at the centre of attention 
for post-disaster blame assignment. For instance Johnson and colleagues 
(2003) observe after the Easter 1998 floods:  
“the failure of the Agency to warn people, accusations of 
mismanagement of the flood event, of poor maintenance and the 
condition of flood defence assets became key issues in the public debate 
in the media, among affected residents, and their action groups, and 
MPs“ (ibid:48). 
Risk management instruments in particular Defra’s risk management 
performance targets (the Outcome Measures) can be of great importance to 
fend off attempts to shift the blame upon the EA because they limit what EA 
can be held accountable for and provide a rationale for the EA’s flood 
management choices.  
5.5.2 Norms and perceptions of statehood: Safety versus efficiency 
The second factor concerns the norms and shared understanding of statehood 
underlying the attitudes of actors involved in flood and other risks’ 
management. Variation in the perceptions and normative definitions of 
statehood shape to what extent the economic rationale underlying a 
neoliberal approach to flood defence management is being adopted by actors 
within the flood defence domain.     
Germany’s emphasis on providing safety to the population can be 
linked to a wider characterisation of the state as protective that is reflected in 
legal, normative and cognitive foundations of the flood defence domain. 
This emphasis can be found in the basic legal principles that inform flood 
management. Effective flood management is presented as a ‘highest-order’ 
public good of ‘overriding significance’ (Berendes 2005:202; Fassbender 
2007:932) that is linked to the norm of the ‘Wohl der Allgemeinheit’,  that is 
the well-being of the population in general (LAWA 1995:2). More 
concretely water authorities are according to the HWSG’s §31a WHG 
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obliged to manage as far as possible water bodies so that water discharge 
does not cause damage (‘schadloser Wasserabfluss’) and damage from 
flooding is also prevented. These legal principles are also reflected and made 
concrete in the aforementioned decisions by administrative law courts 
concerning the protection of the health and safety of the population (LAWA 
2004). Legal and judicial manifestations of this image of a protective state 
also shape the attitudes and motivation of actors within Germany’s flood 
regime and overall political system. One example is the idea of 
Daseinsvorsorge through the state, i.e. ensuring the population’s safety from 
physical and financial harm. A senior official of Saxony’s Environment 
Ministry perceives:   
“a general duty for Daseinsvorsorge of state institutions vis-à-vis the 
population “(SMUL 2008, interview) 
Moreover a local water manager in Dresden contrasts this duty of the state 
with perceptions of the role of the individual:    
“In Germany, the instruments to ensure more individual responsibility 
[Eigenverantwortung] are not really given. Eigenverantwortung is only 
discussed once it is recognised that the state can no longer provide safety. 
That means that individual responsibility is only for residual risk, not for 
all the risk” (Environment Authority Dresden 2008, interview).  
Flood managers’ perceptions of the state’s responsibility for protecting the 
population echo core principles enshrined in Germany’s constitution, the 
Grundgesetz. One of the constitution’s basic principles is the so-called 
‘Sozialstaatsprinzip’ (welfare state principle; Art. 20 GG). This implies not 
only a duty for the state to protect against social risks but more generally to 
safeguard the individual from the mishaps of life in order to provide each 
citizen with the foundations for a dignified existence (Schmidt 2008). While 
these principles are relatively broad, all legislative and administrative actions 
are bound by them and their interpretation through the judicial system. Ideas 
about the state’s responsibility and capacity for the protection of the 
population have also been associated with the continuing influence of a 
Hegelian state philosophy on Germany’s political and administrative 
systems (Weidner 1995).In this the state is perceived as being responsible 
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for and capable of managing virtually all areas of society and situated above 
private interests and therefore impartial towards all groups in society. 
In view of this normative, legal and judicial environment actors 
choose HQ100 as key reference standard. This risk-based minimal standard 
firstly signals a significant degree of state protection, matching expectations 
vis-à-vis the self-portrayals of Germany’s ‘protective state’; and secondly it 
defines and operationalises impartiality by providing an abstract standard 
that can be applied regardless of the particular geography of a water body. 
Differentially treating different population groups based on damage potential 
is difficult to reconcile with the fact that state-provided safety is associated 
with the well-being of the population in general and abstract legal norms.  
In contrast actors in England’s flood regime stress the efficiency and 
value-for-money of state investments and operations. One of the roots of this 
economic orientation can be found in the evolution of flood management in 
England. England’s flood managers operate in a permissive policy 
environment, i.e. the state has no statutory duty to intervene in a particular 
policy area. This is a result of the historical origins of flood management. 
Land drainage, the main concern of flood management from the 1930s to the 
1970s, was one of the policy instruments at the disposal of MAFF ‘in 
pursuing its overarching goal of modernising and expanding food 
production’ (Scrase and Sheate 2005:131). These state interventions were 
justified in economic terms. More concretely water authorities have been 
using cost-benefit analysis to decide on allocating funds since the major East 
Coast flooding of 1953 (Waverley 1954). The long tradition of this method 
resulted in a taken-for-granted attitude of an economic evaluation of flood 
defence operations at project level within the operating authorities. In this 
context the EA’s Chief Economist observes:  
“there may be some ideas already embedded within the organisation that 
are so fundamental that they may be hard to identify or articulate as 
being anything other than common sense or natural” (quoted in Scrase 
and Sheate 2005:118). 
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This tradition predates the proposed rise of neoliberal ideas in the late 1970s 
and 1980s. It has thus already created a conducive institutional environment 
for the importance of economic efficiency in England’s flood defence 
domain and an economic evaluation of state operations reflected in the 
continued and expanded (to national level) presence of a BCR target.  
However, the novel regulatory core of the domain, Defra’s outcome 
measures also defines a particular performance goal concerning the 
reduction of flood risk to properties. The adoption of these national-level 
performance goals that define concrete outcomes (rather than just an 
economically efficient processes) can be understood as part of the rise of 
new approaches that inform government operations and procedures in 
England since the 1980s. In particular England’s public management has 
been associated with ‘new public management’ (NPM) (Hood 1991) and a 
performance target culture (Bevan and Hood 2006). NPM has many facets 
but it most fundamentally reoriented public management operations from a 
process to an outcome focus and adopted a private sector management 
inspired (language of) economic rationalism including promoting market 
mechanisms, outsourcing, human resource management, performance 
measurements and more. Scholars (Hood 1991; Hood 1995; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004; König 2006) have observed that the UK has been one of 
leading adopters of this new approach. The election of Blair’s New Labour 
in 1997 reinforced the outcome orientation of government – introducing 
quantitative performance targets for example through the introduction of 
PSAs (Public Service Agreements) across all government departments from 
1998 on for state operations and public services (Bevan and Hood 2006; 
Hood 2007).  
More specifically the systematic and centralised nation-wide 
application of risk-based performance targets involves other actors within 
England’s government, in particular Britain’s economic and finance 
ministry, HM Treasury. The Treasury is of central importance in Britain’s 
executive for managing public financial resources, shaping ‘good practice in 
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the control of public resources’ and ensuring ministerial ‘accountability to 
Parliament’ (Chapman 1997:164-165). Lee and Woodward remark that 
under New Labour it was: 
“decided to engineer an implementation process that would give the 
Treasury control not only over resources and inputs to policy, in terms of 
policy design and formulation, but also outputs, in terms of very detailed 
performance criteria and outcomes for service delivery” (Lee and 
Woodward 2002:51). 
Departments such as DEFRA engage in a bidding competition with 
other departments over scarce resources. This implies the need to persuade 
the Treasury of the relative necessity and benefits of the measures and 
therefore to adopt arguments that are close to the objectives and professional 
culture of the Treasury.  
The Treasury’s general mission is to ensure sound public finances 
and to promote economic growth. For the Treasury this economic orientation 
directly points to a risk-based approach to steering and controlling public 
spending ever since the influential Hampton report from 2005 emphasised 
risk as an ‘essential means of directing regulatory resources where they can 
have the maximum impact on outcomes’ (Hampton 2005:4). A Defra official 
notes that a risk-based approach is indeed used to make the case for flood 
defence spending:   
“So when we go to the Treasury for the Spending Review, we can justify 
more easily why we need the money” (Defra 2008, interview). 
A Treasury official involved with the DEFRA portfolio confirms the 
Treasury’s endorsement of a risk-based approach for evaluating financing 
needs in flood management and beyond: 
“Across the government, we use a risk-based approach to regulation and 
especially with regard to investment, it is a very sensible way of doing 
things. It is good to see if you have deadweight in your programme and 
you spent money where it does not have to be spent.  (...) If you have a 
set of goals and you have your performance matrix, and at the same time 
a limited amount of money, then a risk-based approach makes a lot of 
sense. To maximise those outcomes!” (HM Treasury 2009, interview). 
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5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter started off with neoliberal arguments that pick up on the 
substantial expenditure required for flood defence construction and 
maintenance as well as the moral hazard associated with the collectively 
financed protection of individuals. Similar to discussions in social and 
welfare policy neoliberalism advocates demand ‘less state’ (or ‘less 
inefficient states’) in order to bring down costs and make individuals 
responsible. Following the debate in chapter 3 on the rise of risk-based 
governance it can be argued that the concept and instruments of risk can 
serve these neoliberal objectives by allowing the economic evaluation of 
state operations through the consistent quantitative calculation of avoided 
damage (which is equal to the benefits of the state’s risk management 
operations).  
The discussion of the cases of Germany and England raises doubts as 
to whether the proliferation of risk instruments and an increased reference to 
the concept of risk are part of a rollback or reconfiguration of the state, in 
particular as regards to its use of the government tool treasure. These doubts 
emerge because firstly, the budget for flood defences fails to confirm the 
expected decline for either of the two cases. Secondly, risk instruments in 
neoliberal settings are to be used to restrict state operations to those with the 
best value-for-tax-money. However for one of the cases, Germany, risk-
based calculations of benefits (along with costs) of state operations play only 
a secondary role in goal-setting and investment into flood defence 
management. For the other case, England, the development and use of risk 
instruments can indeed be linked to close attention to costs and benefits of 
flood defence spending. However, England’s operating authorities are also 
sensitive to institutional risks through the public response to failures to 
protect and to complaints about unfairness in differential protection – and 
make use of risk instruments to manage these challenges to the authorities’ 
reputation and legitimacy.   
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Which factors are responsible for these deviations from neoliberal 
flood defence management in the two countries? In Germany, the key barrier 
to a neoliberalisation is the widely shared characterisation of the state as 
being responsible for protecting its population from harm. These foundations 
of the German state directly contradict the more limited description of the 
state’s responsibilities from a neoliberal viewpoint. In addition, Germany’s 
emphasis of equal protection reflects the norm of solidarity.
56
 Public money 
is used to protect individuals (as long as they live in settlements) to a similar, 
minimal level, even though not all people and values might be protected due 
to lack of financial resources and political attention. Beyond these ideational 
and normative foundations of the state, the dynamics within Germany’s 
fragmented Federal state interfere with risk-based neoliberalisation: political 
settlements between different levels of government disregard different risk 
levels and the Länder’s resources and attempts to safeguard autonomy and 
control over risk assessment and management vis-à-vis the Federal 
government prevented a consistent and centralised calculation of risk. In 
short, Germany’s case points to normative (protective state, solidarity) and 
structural (fragmented state) barriers to rolling back and reconfiguring the 
state. These barriers at the same time shape the particular use of risk in 
Germany’s flood defence domain. Risk is used to define and delineate 
Germany’s protective ‘security state’ by defining the statistical events for 
which (different parts of) the state can be held accountable in terms of the 
provision of protection and determine an ambitious protection standard 
sufficiently abstract and well-established to inform flood defence 
management across a fragmented Federal State. 
England’s case reinforces arguments about the aforementioned 
barriers by showing how the opposite features to Germany’s case work in 
favour of neoliberalisation: England’s state structure ensures a power and 
resource concentration at central government level, allowing for consistent 
                                                 
56
 This norm of solidarity will be even more visible in the discussion of Germany’s disaster 
financing where significant private donations and public disaster aid became available after 
more recent flood events at the Elbe (2002) and Odra (1997). 
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and centralised risk assessments that are important for a systematic, nation-
wide economic evaluation of state operations. Norms of individual 
responsibility (which will be discussed more extensively in chapter 7 on 
insurance), the rise of public sector management approaches leaning on 
efficiency-oriented private sector models and a long tradition of benefit-cost 
calculus in water engineering create a conducive ideational context for 
regime domain oriented towards economic efficiency.  
At the same time however, structural factors as well as the selective 
state involvement in the management of flood risks exacerbate institutional 
risks to key actors – in particular the EA – within the flood defence domain. 
A selective rather than comprehensive state involvement carries the risk of 
policy failure (that a flood occurs and causes damage) and complaints about 
unfair treatment (since residents of areas with lower damage potential are 
less protected). The need to manage these institutional risks explain – along 
with the pressure of the insurers
57
 – why the funding for flood defences has 
been on the rise as well as some of the particular features of risk assessment 
(consistency) and management instruments (no commitment to a particular 
minimal safety level but measurable risk management targets). These 
institutional risks are exacerbated by the fact that responsibility for the flood 
defence domain has become increasingly concentrated on the EA, rendering 
the semi-autonomous agency EA the first addressee of complaints and blame 
games.  
Dismantling or introducing an economic rationality into the ‘security 
state’ is therefore not as straightforward as neoliberalism’s advocates may 
expect in view of the high (and expected to rise) costs of flood defences and 
strong indications that human behaviour has contributed to the increased 
damage from flood events. The ‘security state’ can be as institutionally 
entrenched as in Germany, resulting in a very different pattern of use of risk 
in the flood defence domain. Or the institutional risk, partly associated with 
                                                 
57
 The reasons why the insurance industry is a particularly important interest group will be 
elaborated in Chapter 7.  
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a neoliberal, economic orientation of England’s flood defence management, 
compels actors to use risk for defensive purposes as seen in England. 
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CHAPTER 6: LAND USE, BETTER REGULATION AND ISSUES OF 
CONTROL 
The management of land use is concerned with the use of the government 
tool of regulation. Regulations are mostly sets of formal rules that – based on 
the legal authority of the state – establish restrictions on certain types of 
individual and organisational behaviour. Within any flood regime such 
regulations may include interventions from an outright ban on the use of 
land at flood risk to restrictions on particular land uses to requirements to 
render uses better adapted to flooding. 
In contrast to the ‘treasure’ tool, regulation is widely seen as 
becoming an ever more important tool in the government’s tool box. As 
noted in chapter 3, the ‘regulatory state’ in Europe (e.g. Majone 1994) 
replaces the financially and politically exhausted post-war state that was 
characterised by substantial financial interventions into the economy 
(Keynesian ‘deficit spending’) and state ownership at the company level. 
While the ‘regulatory state’ is sometimes seen as a solution to the costs and 
failures of the post-war state, another viewpoint on the rise of regulation is 
more critical, in particular due to enforcement failures and the costs of an 
ever-growing number of regulations (‘regulatory creep’) to the economy 
(e.g. Stewart 1983). The critics of regulation do not exclusively insist on 
‘less regulation’ but on different types of regulation – more specifically 
‘better regulation’ or ‘smart regulation’ (Gunningham et al. 1998; EC 2001; 
Mandelkern-Group 2001; Baldwin 2005; BRTF 2005).  
Using the concept and instruments of risk is one option among others 
(including Regulatory Impact Assessments) to accomplish better regulation. 
Restrictiveness of rules and their enforcement can be varied in accordance 
with levels of risk in risk-based regulation, implying a better targeting of 
regulation that increases the effectiveness of the state’s limited enforcement 
resources and avoids excessive burdening of regulatees (Hutter 2005; 
Rothstein, Irving, Walden et al. 2006b). Risk-based approaches have for 
instance been used in contaminated land clean-ups in the US and UK, 
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resulting in different degrees of detail of risk assessments (Rothstein et al 
2006). Such approaches have also been used by the UK’s Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) through its ARROW tool – identifying, among other issues, 
the risks particular financial institutions constitute to achieving FSA 
objectives in the process of tailoring, monitoring and regulating these 
institutions in accordance to risk levels (Black 2005). 
Are these concerns about regulation relevant for the discussion of 
flood regimes – in particular the regime domain land-use regulation? Given 
the economic trade-offs involved in regulating the use of floodplains and 
other areas exposed to flooding (between permitting development so as to 
encourage economic growth and restricting land use that would increase the 
consequences or frequency of flooding), questions of better targeting 
regulations to avoid overburdening private property developers and 
regulators are potentially of great importance. Has this regulatory domain 
come under scrutiny? Is there a discernible trend towards ‘better regulation’?  
The proliferation of risk instruments in the land-use and planning 
domain can be interpreted as one indication of an interest in ‘better 
regulation’. Planning authorities and regulatory initiatives from the planning 
domain have, for instance, been driving the development of flood risk maps 
that outline different flood zones in Germany and England. They have done 
this mostly by requiring the responsible authorities to provide flood maps 
and define particular flood zones for regulation (e.g. Germany’s ‘inundation 
areas’ and England’s three flood zones) (DETR 2001; LAWA 2004). But are 
instruments and the concept of ‘risk’ really used to improve regulation – for 
example by allowing an improved targeting and regulatory differentiation on 
the basis of risk instruments? If not what factors may explain the particular 
risk-based organisation of the regime domain of land-use regulation in 
Germany and England respectively? 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the manifestations of 
regulatory failures and the particular challenges in the land-use domain. It 
explores how the concept and instruments of risk could potentially be used 
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to improve the performance of land-use regulators. The following section 
analyses the organisation of the land-use domain in the two countries and the 
role of risk therein. Next it will be explored and explained whether and why 
the use of risk could be linked to the needs to ‘better’ the regulatory state. 
The issue of how the use of risk is in fact driven by concerns about varying 
institutional risks and shaped by the particular institutional context in the 
two countries will be discussed as an alternative motivation for the use of 
risk in this domain.      
6.1 LAND USE UNDER PRESSURE 
The basic logic underlying land-use regulation is simple. In the words of the 
influential guidance of Germany’s Interstate Working Group Water 
(LAWA) group:  
“if land at risk of flooding is not being used, there will be no or limited 
damage.” (LAWA 2004:13). 
As seen in the previous chapter flood defences fail to provide absolute 
protection. Regulation appears as an effective alternative means to reduce 
damage from flooding since it offers a means to control the accumulation of 
values on land at risk from flooding that would otherwise require protection. 
It also prevents land uses in one place (i.e. draining wetlands and retention 
zones) that might increase the frequency of flooding in others. It is therefore 
not surprising that LAWA assigns a ‘special importance to precautionary 
spatial planning’ (ibid). Similarly England’s Environment Agency (EA) 
notes that: 
“regulating and influencing development [is] essential in the battle 
against increasing flood risk” (EA 2003:8).   
The increased attention paid to land-use regulation in both countries 
reflects insights that encroachment of floodplains has contributed 
significantly to the damage resulting from recent flood events. In England 
for instance the autumn 2000 floods damaged about 10,000 properties; the 
flooding in summer 2007 damaged approximately 55,000 properties (EA 
2001; Pitt 2008). Germany’s Elbe 2002 floods damaged about 25,000 
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households in addition to the historic centres of Dresden and smaller 
Saxonian cities as well as transport infrastructure and industrial sites in 
Saxony (MunichRe 2003). Barredo points to the growing number of years in 
which floods caused very high damage in the 1990s and 2000s:   
“The causes of the increasing flood disaster damage in the last few years 
would have to be sought mainly in the socio-economic and territorial 
domain (e.g. land use, new developments) [rather than changes in the 
climatic system]” (2007:144). 
The encroachment of areas at flood risk is partly driven by the 
particular benefits associated with the use of areas at risk:  for example 
fertile agricultural land, access to fresh water and transport, and the amenity 
of living near a river or coastline. It is partly a result of social change and the 
associated need for more space for housing. Moreover – as noted in the 
previous chapter – the accumulation of values in floodplains also resulted 
from the traditional approach to flood management, i.e. the protection of 
values through structural flood defences. Parker (1995)  drawing on earlier 
research on the so-called ‘levee effect’ from U.S. scholars (White 1945; 
White et al. 1958)  describes the renamed ‘escalator effect’ where:  
“progressively higher levels of structural defences [that] are constructed 
to protect against increasing flood damage potential, which is mainly 
caused by post-defence development of floodplains” (Parker 1995:343). 
In other words, flood defences on the one hand convey a sense of safety 
which prevents current and prospective property owners from taking 
flooding into consideration (thus leaving them unprepared for larger flood 
events and ill-adapted even for smaller ones).  On the other hand especially 
where investment into flood defences is linked to damage potential (e.g. 
through cost–benefit assessments) the ‘escalating’ dynamics between flood 
defences and development may increase the potential damages from 
flooding as flood defences may fail or be overtopped.  
Two challenges for actors in charge of land-use regulation can 
therefore be identified in the land-use domain. The first challenge is to 
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ensure that regulation is in place to control the accumulation of values on 
land at risk. Once regulation controls the accumulation of values in areas at 
flood risk, flood defences, at least for new developments, will in principle 
become redundant. This points to the shift from a state that provides security 
through flood defences to a ‘regulatory state’ that enables and steers rather 
than delivering services directly – echoing the ‘rise of the regulatory state’ 
(instead of an infrastructure-owning state) argument. 
The second challenge is the design of land-use regulation in view of 
the benefits of land use to society. These benefits are reflected in multiple 
goals that actors in charge of general land-use regulation pursue. England 
and Germany’s planning systems have endorsed ‘sustainable development’ 
of land as the core principle of their planning (DCLG 2007b; ARGEBAU 
2008). Germany’s planners are required to ensure a ‘balanced land use’ 
(ausgewogene Gesamtnutzung) that reflects a ‘reasoned co-ordination of 
different types of land use’ (ELLA 2006:40-41) – taking into account 
different spatial functions (such as nature, landscape and climate) and spatial 
uses (such as development, recreation and farming). In England the 
competing objectives and the need for co-ordination are presented through 
the existence of 25 guidance notes that contain national planning policy 
objectives (the so-called Planning Policy Guidance notes or statements, 
PPG/PPS) – including ones specifically outlining guidance to ensure that the 
planning system is sensitive to the government’s strategic goals for housing 
(Planning Policy Guidance PPG-3), transport (PPG-13), renewable energy 
(PPG-22), as well as flooding (PPS-25) and coastal planning (PPG-20). 
These guidance notes are necessary to ensure that regulations concerning 
flooding do not come at the expense of other goals. Pottier and colleagues, 
for instance, point to the potential costs of regulating:  
“A strictly economic argument is that flood risk management should aim 
to maximise the performance of the whole catchment and not to 
minimise flood losses. This may, in some cases, be best achieved by 
developing floodplains, since improved efficiency of catchment use can 
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outweigh both increasing average annual flood losses and higher flood 
alleviation costs” (2005:3). 
From an economic perspective, a strongly precautionary approach to 
regulating floodplain use would therefore potentially imply welfare or utility 
losses (due to unexploited land). Such losses could, however, be mitigated 
by a more targeted approach to regulation that balanced the risks and 
benefits of different land uses.  
How do the concepts and instruments of risk help in meeting the 
needs of precaution and balancing these needs with those of utility? In the 
land-use domain calculations of risk have mostly been used to produce flood 
maps. As noted in chapter 2, flood maps (at least) display the distributions of 
water over land for flood events of varying probabilities and thereby provide 
insights into how likely it is that a particular piece of land will be inundated.  
From the perspective(s) of the ‘regulatory state’, risk can therefore be 
instrumental to defining the nature and scope of land use regulation and 
make it better. By identifying the areas that are at risk, risk instruments 
potentially define the spatial boundaries of the regulatory state. With 
regulations in place the construction of flood defences in principle becomes, 
at least in relation to those areas that have not yet been fully developed, 
redundant. By determining zones that flood with different frequencies and/or 
consequences the restrictiveness and extensiveness of regulations can be 
tailored  – for example by only allowing flood-adapted buildings in areas 
with a high likelihood of being flooded and lighter regulations for areas 
where fewer floods can be expected. This risk-based regulation would 
therefore allow some economic exploitation of areas at risk, thereby 
avoiding a precautionary overregulation of the economy.  
But are the emerging regulatory approaches in Germany and England 
formed by concerns about pre-empting the need for costly and ineffective 
infrastructure measures and by fears about the regulatory stifling of 
economic activities on floodplains? To what extent is it possible to speak of 
risk-based regulation within flood regimes? The following two sections (5.2 
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and 5.3) explore the forms and the concepts that instruments of risk 
encapsulate and the roles they play in the land-use domain of Germany and 
England’s flood regimes. 
6.2 EXAMINING RISK IN GERMANY’S LAND-USE REGULATION 
The regulation of land use is managed through Germany’s general planning 
system. Individual planning decisions, i.e. whether to allow the construction 
of a particular building, the Baugenehmigungen, and local plans, i.e. which 
areas to open for development, the Bauleitpläne, are taken by local planning 
authorities that hold the general competency over planning decisions, the 
Planungshoheit.  
However, local planners are bound by Federal and Länder planning 
legislation – such as the Federal Spatial Planning Act (Raumordnungsgesetz, 
ROG) – and are required to align their decisions with the codified objectives 
and binding plans defined with increasing details from mostly Landes (for 
example the Landesraumentwicklungsplan Sachsen) to regional levels (for 
instance the Gebietsentwicklungsplan or Regionalplan Düsseldorf). 
Moreover, local planners face further constraints in their Planungshoheit 
where planning issues are relevant for managing floods. Central norms and 
instruments relevant for these special planning issues have been introduced 
through revisions of the Water Management Act (WHG)
58
 in the context of 
the Flood Control Act (HWSG)
59
 from 2005 as well as recent Länder water 
acts, rather than in general planning legislation such as the ROG. In the case 
of the HWSG, the responsible Ministries of Environment (BMU) and Spatial 
Planning and Construction (BMVBS) decided that:  
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 The original version of the WHG from 1957 required Lander to identify ‘inundation 
areas’ only if it deemed them necessary for regulating run-off (no reference to reducing 
flooding). The revision of the WHG of 1996 emphasised that regulation of run-off should 
not imply faster and higher floods (e.g. a consequence of narrower river channels due to 
defences) but that the regulation of ‘inundation areas’ should contribute to preventing and 
reducing flooding.  
59
 The HWSG is a so-called ‘Artikel-Gesetz’. This implies that relevant norms and rules 
from different Acts are pulled together under the header of HWSG. Table 9 provides an 
overview of the elements. It is important to note that the component Acts of the HWSG 
existed earlier, but that in the course of producing the HWSG they were revised.  
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“specialist requirements for development [on floodplains] are to be 
regulated within specialist legislation” (Berendes 2005:Fn 20). 
The revised WHG in the HWSG contains the regulatory core of the 
land-use management domain of Germany’s flood regime with directly 
binding effects on all levels of the planning system. Table 9 provides a brief 
overview of the particular nature and contents of the HWSG, highlighting 








 General principles of flood management, in 
particular safeguarding areas at risk from flooding 
and relevant for the management of flooding, as 
well as a general obligation for precautionary and 
damage-reducing behaviour (§31a) 
 Flood management in 
‘Überschwemmungsgebieten‘ (USGs- inundation 
areas) (§31b): 
 Definition and legal publication of 
‘inundation area’  
 Specific regulations, including no oil 
heating and rules of farming 
 Specific regulations concerning 
development/construction, i.e. the ban on 
development planning (unless 9 
conditions are met) 
 Flood management in the 
überschwemmungsgefährdeten Gebieten‘ (flood-
prone areas) (§31c): 
 Definition and cartographic publication 
of areas 
 General rule to prevent/reduce significant 
damage to public good 
 Production of flood management plans (§ 31d) 
 Cooperating along catchments (§ 32) 
Baugesetzbuch (BauGB) – 
Construction Code 
 Integration of USGs and flood-prone areas in 
local development plans (Bauleitpläne) (§§ 5, 9) 




Components (continued) Content 
Raumordnungsgesetz (ROG) – 
Spatial Planning Act 
 Spatial aspects of flood management to be 
safeguarded through goals and principles of 
spatial planning (§7) 
Bundeswasserstrassengesetz 
(WaStrG) – Federal Waterways 
Act 
 Waterway training/construction/maintenance must 
not have adverse consequences on flood management 
(§§8, 12)   
 Federal navigational forecasting to be co-ordinated 
with Länder-level flood forecasting on waterways 
(§35) 
Gesetz über den Deutschen 
Wetterdient (DWD-G) – Act 
concerning German 
Meteorological Office (DWD) 
 Weather forecasting explicitly to be used for 
purposes of precautionary flood management (§4)  
Table 9: Germany’s Flood Control Act and its components  
Note: Bold print for norms in relation to planning 
The discussion of Germany’s land-use domain in the following 
sections therefore focuses on the regulations found in the specialist flood 
management domain. As the following discussions will show, the WHG’s 
‘inundation areas’ constitute the central spatial category in Germany’s land-
use domain. In general planning the ROG has (since 1998) explicitly defined 
‘precautionary flood management’ as a task for the general spatial planning 
system. This is achieved through Landes legislation (MKRO 2000) and 
draws on a range of specific planning tools to preserve and recover retention 
areas and protect those areas at flood risk. However these regulations 
primarily assume a serving role in the land-use domain of Germany’s flood 
regimes to the regulations and legal categories developed by the ‘specialist 
planners’ of water authorities (in particular the USGs) (MWME 2008, 
interview).   
6.2.1 Detecting: Advances in flood mapping  
In general, detecting in the land-use domain is mostly concerned with the 
assessment of spatial aspects of flooding – namely the distribution of water 
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quantities inundating land outside the river channel with varying statistical 
frequencies. An additional concern for ‘detecting’ might be the vulnerability 
of those values exposed to the hazard of flooding.  
As in Germany’s flood defence domain, detecting for land-use 
regulation is largely in the hands of Länder authorities – mostly the Länder’s 
environment agencies. What is notable however is that there is a specific, 
narrow convergence in flood mapping – namely around the mapping of 
HQ100 flood zones – and that the protection afforded by flood defences are 
taken into account when defining the boundaries of those flood zones. 
Moreover, there is no systematic consideration of the vulnerability of 
different values in the detecting. These aspects are notable because first, they 
contrast with England’s approach, and, second, they give a first illustration 
of the narrow and complementary nature of Germany’s regulatory state.    
The first systematic attempts at flood mapping date back to the first 
decade of the 20
th
 century, when Prussian water authorities produced a set of 
maps identifying inundation areas for the Rhine based on a historical flood 
event from 1890. However these maps referred to a single historical event 
only, and were not updated to take into account the engineered changes to 
the Rhine river channel of the 20
th
 century. After the floods in 1993 and 
1995 however, flood mapping took off – with a pioneering role for the 
aforementioned Rhine-Atlas. The Rhine-Atlas identifies three flood zones 
with different probabilities, namely with HQ10 and HQ100 as well as one 
zone that would be affected by an extreme event (generally based on a 
historical flood event individually chosen by the ICPR’s member states and 
Länder).  
The pioneering work for the ‘Rhine-Atlas’ also shaped subsequent 
mapping across Germany’s Länder. The Land with perhaps the most 
advanced flood mapping programme is Saxony. Constructed in the aftermath 
of the Elbe floods of 2002, Saxonian maps identify five different zones for 
flood events with different probabilities (HQ20, 50, 100, 200/300 and 
extreme); they also consider additional factors in the categorisation of flood 
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zones (velocity and depth of inundation). Other Länder with advanced 
mapping programmes (in particular Saxony-Anhalt, Baden-Wurttemberg, 
Rhineland-Palatine) make similar differentiations, sometimes taking further 
factors such as depth and velocity into account, and sometimes determining 
the probability of inundation only (LAWA 2006:16). This results in a varied 
landscape of risk maps across Germany.  
By establishing a statutory duty for flood mapping the Flood Control 
Act (HWSG) from 2005 consolidated and harmonised flood mapping across 
Germany, making advances in the production of flood maps less dependent 
on ‘management by accident’ and expert-led initiatives (see previous 
Chapter 5 on the origins of the Rhine-Atlas and Saxony’s 
Hochwasserschutzkonzepte). The HWSG defines a minimal, uniform and 
binding standard for flood mapping. It compels the Länder to identify, 
formally determine (‘förmlich festsetzen’) and publicise ‘inundation areas’ 
(‘Überschwemmungsgebiete’, USGs) with HQ100 boundaries until May 
2012.
60
 In addition to HQ100 as a reference point the maps draw boundaries 
taking into account the effects of flood defences on the distribution of water 
over land. In fact the legal definition of USGs first refers to areas between 
the river channel and the flood defences as ‘inundation areas’; this is 
followed by the probabilistic definition to capture areas not protected to the 
HQ100 standard. As will be discussed below, this aspect of taking into 
account flood defences in flood mapping reveals a distinct contrast with 
England’s case, and is important to understand the role of regulation in 
Germany’s flood regime. 
Given the association of USGs with tight regulations on land use (see 
next section on ‘directing’), the process of mapping USGs can be 
contentious and subject to challenges from aggrieved interest groups. An 
expert from a state-level Environment Agency notes that:  
                                                 
60
 Even if the process of formal determination has not been concluded, Lander are obliged to 
‘provisionally secure’ (vorläufig sichern) and apply the regulations to inundation areas 
(WHG §31b, 3 and 4). 
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“some of the people living in or near of a potential USG just submit an 
objection and ask things like ‘why have you only been using 1-
dimensional models to calculate this as you could potentially also do 2-
dimensional calculations?’ So in these cases, you need to have a 
justification why you chose the simpler method. I mean the reasons are 
often convincing enough but still, you better be prepared” (LANUV 
2009, interview).      
Such challenges may result in a judicial review of the intervention through 
the public law courts (Verwaltungsgerichte). Experts are therefore under 
pressure to take legal reasoning and reviews into account when determining 
USGs. Concretely this means that USGs are identified in accordance with a 
widely accepted technical norm (allgemein anerkannte Regel der Technik). 
Such norms require that a chosen method and process has been recognised as 
accurate in theory, is widely used in practice by experts, and its practice has 
demonstrated its adequacy.  
Beyond the HQ100 ‘inundation areas’ (USGs) the HWSG does little 
to harmonise flood mapping across Germany even though the Act also 
obliges Länder to map (though not formally determine) ‘flood-prone areas’ 
(‘überschwemmungsgefährdete Gebiete’). This type of area is, however, not 
precisely specified in probabilistic terms within the Federal Act. Rather the 
‘flood-prone zones’ are loosely defined as areas in which inundation results 
in adverse effects on the public good (Beeinträchtigung des Wohls der 
Allgemeinheit) and that are not part of the USGs. This definition of ‘flood-
prone’ areas explicitly includes those inundated when defences fail or are 
overtopped.  
According to the HWSG this definition of ‘flood-prone areas’ 
requires elaboration through the Länder governments. The practice in the 
Länder, however, shows the limited significance assigned to this mapping 
zone: North Rhine-Westphalia’s Landes Water Act (Landeswassergesetz, 
LWG) simply adopts the (non-)definition from the WHG (see LWG §114a). 
In Saxony, ‘flood-prone areas’ have yet to be integrated into the Saxonian 
Water Act at all (Sächsisches Wassergesetz, SächsWG). Another example is 
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Sachsen-Anhalt, also strongly affected by the Elbe 2002 floods, whose water 
act (Wassergesetz für Sachsen-Anhalt, WG LSA §98b) proposes as a 
reference flood the highest recorded flood event as long as it is less likely 
than HQ100. Risk assessments in relation to flood-prone areas therefore 
remain underspecified both at the Federal and state level. ‘Flood-prone 
areas’ are therefore a spatial category with limited relevance for flood 
mapping and thus (as we will see in the next section on directing), also for 
land use regulation. The reasons for this will be elaborated in the following 
sections because it is the formalised, regulatory category of ‘flood-prone’ 
area that is perceived as difficult to convert into concrete administrative 
practice.  
The ‘detecting’ discussion raises some interesting questions about the 
particular form and role of regulatory statehood in Germany’s land-use 
domain. Most importantly the flood maps that are relevant as informational 
foundations for regulation point to a narrow and binary nature of the 
regulatory state. While the flood maps display a set of flood zone boundaries 
(such as the five boundaries of Saxony’s flood maps, HQ20, 50, 100, 
200/300, and extreme), the key difference is between ‘inundation areas’ of 
HQ100 and those areas beyond the HQ100. As the discussions on directing 
and effecting will show, only ’inundation areas’ really matter for behaviour 
regulation.  
This ‘detecting’ casts doubts upon the adoption of ’better regulation’ 
in Germany’s land-use domain as well as more generally on the role of 
regulation within Germany’s flood regime. For the former the use of several 
flood zones to achieve more targeted regulation would have been expected. 
For the latter it can be asked to what extent flood zoning and associated 
regulations help in dealing with the key challenge to flood management – 
namely the increasing damage potential as a result of economic and social 
activities in areas at risk. The problems of a lack of flood awareness and the 
‘escalator effect’, key contributors to rising damage potential, are only 
addressed in a limited manner – namely for ‘inundation areas’ unprotected 
 181 
by defences. Behind flood defences flood zones have limited regulatory 
implications. This weakens the potential contributions of flood maps and 
land-use regulations to improve flood awareness and to control the escalator 
effect because it suggests that there are not only risky areas but also safe 
ones behind defences. 
Finally another notable aspect of Germany’s regulatory state is that 
reviews by public law courts shape the actors’ assessment of risk in the land-
use domain highlighting the fact that, as already visible in the discussion of 
the regime domain of flood defences, the judicial system is important for 
actors within Germany’s flood regime. 
6.2.2 Directing: Defining restrictions on land use 
Directing in the land-use domain is primarily about defining restrictions on 
the use of land at risk from flooding in order to halt the growth of (or even 
reduce) the potential damage from flood events. To this end ‘directing’ 
means defining the boundaries of flood zones (see ‘detecting’ section) and 
determining which rules are applied to land uses in these flood zones. In 
Germany the key regulatory concept in the land-use domain is the 
‘inundation area’, which is subject to stringent rules on land use (a de facto 
ban on further developments). Beyond USGs however, Germany’s 
regulatory state loses its teeth. This reiterates and elaborates on aspects of 
the ‘detecting’ discussion which pointed to a limited regulatory state within 
the boundaries of HQ100.  
The ‘inundation area’ and associated regulations were the central part 
of the general overhaul of Germany’s flood regime in the aftermath of the 
Elbe 2002 floods – especially in the form of the HWSG from 2005. Federal 
restrictions are tight for USGs. Particularly, local planners cannot formally 
generate any new development plans for an ‘inundation area’ unless they 
meet nine stringent conditions cumulatively (most notably the lack of 
alternative space, close proximity to existing developed areas, avoidance of 
damage for HQ100 events and of danger to human lives, and having no 
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adverse consequence for the run-off of water and existing protection 
level/flood management measures). Individual development proposals 
within ‘inundation areas’ (complying with development plans devised before 
the new regulations took effect) need approval by water authorities (§31b.4 
WHG). The water authority determines whether a development to be 
constructed in a flood-resilient way adversely affects water retention, run-
off, and flood management measures – and if it does, whether the adverse 
effects are appropriately mitigated, for example by adding water retention 
space elsewhere.   
While the previous Federal water management law an earlier version 
of the WHG from 1996, had already introduced the legal category of 
‘inundation areas’ also, the legal category in the revised WHG from 2005 
differ in several aspects. First, they define uniformly and clearly the concept 
of ‘inundation area’ through its quantification as HQ100. Second, they are 
linked to a concrete set of restrictive regulations and criteria for exemptions. 
Third, the new regulations are immediately effective. In contrast earlier 
versions (1957, 1996) of the WHG required the Länder legislators and 
governments to determine the regulation of land use and identification of 
‘inundation areas’, but without a concrete deadline or probabilistic 
specification of ‘inundation areas’. Federal lawmakers perceived this 
procedural and conceptual tightening as important because the regulatory 
failure in land-use control was seen as a failure of the Länder to make use of 
existing Federal framework legislation. As Germany’s Expert Advisory 
Council for the Environment (Rat der Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen, 
RSU) remarked in 2000:  
“the problems of flood management can rather be found in the fact that 
the Länder do not make use of and animate the framework [for regulating 
and managing flooding] that the revised Federal WHG [from 1996] 
provides them with” (RSU 2000, quoted in Fassbender 2007:927).  
With more detailed prescriptions, clear deadlines for introducing the 
new legislation at Länder level, and unified legal concepts, the Federal level 
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hoped to impose ‘a uniform standard across the whole country for land-use 
restrictions’ (LANUV 2009, interview). This standard-setting was to 
eliminate ‘loopholes’ for the implementing Länder rather than because it was 
perceived as necessary from a flood-management expert’s perspective 
(Berendes 2005). Berendes notes, however, that one loophole remained – 
namely that ‘inundation areas’ only have to be declared if ‘not insignificant 
damage’ (nicht nur geringfügiger Schaden) is expected. This loophole was 
narrowed down by the obligation to inform the public about the process of 
determining inundation areas. This in turn, as an expert of NRW’s 
Environment Agency observed, mobilised environmental NGOs that put 
pressure on the state actors to restrict land use – mostly in order to preserve 
the greatest possible area of floodplains for natural water retention (LANUV 
2009, interview).  
Not just the Länder level felt constrained in their planning discretion 
by such detailed and prescriptive regulations at the Federal level. Local 
councils – organised through the so-called Städte- and Kreistage – sought to 
prevent restrictive and binding regulations (BMU 2008, interview). Similarly 
economic interest groups also had issues with the restrictive regulations. The 
DIHK (the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry) however, was 
opposed to the ban on developments in inundation areas (DIHK 2002). Other 
groups had more specific issues with the draft proposal of the BMU. The 
DBV (Germany’s farmer interest group) challenged the restrictive 
regulations of farming practices (prohibition of crop farming 
(Ackerbauverbot) in inundation areas) (DBV 2004). The BDI (the German 
Industry Association) focused on preventing too-strict regulation for the 
storage of water-polluting substances in inundation areas (see BUND 2005). 
Officials of the involved Federal ministries (BMU 2008; BMVBS 2008, 
interviews), however, point out that in the course of the Federal law-making 
process such groups failed to make a deep impression on the legislative 
process in the land-use domain. Tight restrictions on land use within HQ100 
were nevertheless adopted (with the exception of the farming lobby that 
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managed to significantly water down the restriction on farming), and the 
stricter vision on land use regulation by the BMU (in particular the ban on 
development plans for inundation areas) prevailed throughout most of the 
legislative process (Berendes 2005).  
An official of the BMU argues that the HWSG had strong support 
from the then Chancellor Schröder, and was seen as a key legislative 
initiative by the Federal Minister of the Environment Jürgen Trittin, thus 
contributing to the political momentum created by the devastating 2002 
floods (BMU 2008, interview). In addition to the strong support of key 
actors within the Federal government Länder and local councils also 
recognised how unpopular it was to oppose tighter regulation of land use in 
the aftermath of the Elbe 2002 floods. An official of Saxony’s Environment 
Ministry remarked for instance that no Saxonian politician at the local or 
state level could afford to water down the regulations to safeguard the 
population in the aftermath of the 2002 Elbe when the process of 
determining USGs was initiated in Saxony (SMUL 2008, interview). 
Public flood managers involved in land-use regulation had another 
reason to choose clearly and consistently delineated HQ100 USGs. Such 
clear and consistent definitions of legal categories are an important 
prerequisite for being able to impose substantial restrictions on the 
development of these areas. Such restrictions – interfering with socio-
economic processes and individual property rights – are subject to judicial 
review through Germany’s public law court system. A water expert from 
NRW’s Environment Agency remarks that:  
“USGs as formally-codified legal concepts need to be black and white. 
(...) In the interactions between legal staff [Juristen] and flood specialists 
[Hochwasserexperten] [within the public administration], the Juristen do 
not step back from such simplistic binary conceptualisations” (LANUV 
2009, interview). 
This black-and-white approach is problematic from the viewpoint of the 
water expert because of the uncertainty involved in calculating an inundation 
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area. As the same expert suggests in relation to defining inundation areas: 
‘for a HQ100, you can always add or subtract 10%’ (ibid). HQ100 (being a 
long-established concept in water management and closely linked to safety 
levels provided by flood defences) offers a sufficiently clear technical and 
legal basis for tight restrictions that would also withstand judicial challenges 
(see note in ‘detecting’ section on ‘allgemein anerkannte Regeln der 
Technik’).   
In contrast to the more restrictive and thus politically controversial 
legal category of ‘inundation areas’ the second spatial category of the 
HWSG, the ‘flood-prone areas’, remain unspecified in terms of boundaries 
and restrictions – thus enfolding limited regulatory effects (also see the next 
section on ‘effecting’). According to the HWSG ‘flood-prone areas’ need to 
be mapped and appropriate precautionary measures are to be undertaken if 
flooding is expected to cause significant adverse effects on the well-being of 
the general public. This vague standard leaves Länder and local authorities 
with substantial latitude to decide whether or not to designate an area as 
‘flood-prone’ and what (if any) measures they might pursue as a result of 
that designation. Regulations at the Länder level are similarly unspecific. For 
instance NRW’s Water Act proposes that the responsible water authority 
may undertake ‘measures to prevent or reduce adverse consequences to the 
public good’ (LWG §114a). In Sachsen-Anhalt the Water Act requires water 
authorities to make a note of the flood risk when permitting developments 
and land use in such areas (WG LSA §98a) while Saxony has (as noted 
earlier) yet to transpose the concept into legislation. One reason for the 
planners’ hesitation to regulate ‘flood-prone areas’, as the discussion in 
effecting (i.e. implementing the Länder obligation to map and regulate such 
areas) will show in greater detail, is that it carries legal risks for the 
regulators, as infringements of property rights in protected areas behind 
dykes and are likely to be challenged in court.   
 Part of this section’s discussion echoes aspects found for ‘detecting’. 
In Germany’s land-use domain the concept of risk plays an important role in 
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defining the (relatively narrow) boundaries of the ‘regulatory state’ across 
Germany. Regulatory activity is focused around the HQ100 zone for which 
concrete, nationally consistent and restrictive regulations exist. The 
restrictions imposed on these areas have also been contested by interest 
groups, but key restrictions have remained in the HWSG – reflecting the 
political momentum for tighter regulations in the aftermath of the 2002 Elbe 
floods. Areas beyond the USGs did not attract much political attention. This 
is mostly because regulations of flood-prone areas are very generic and 
vague. 
Moreover the regulated USG normally ends where flood defences 
begin (if appropriately designed defences exist). This suggests that 
regulation is only needed in areas not protected by the flood defences – 
highlighting the faith in technical control and underpinning the safety 
promises in Germany’s flood regime noted in Chapter 5. The discussion in 
‘directing’ also highlights the importance of courts and judicial review 
within the land-use domain. Actors in Germany’s land-use domain are also 
aware of the need to justify restrictions on land use in the context of judicial 
reviews underlining the important role for public law courts 
(Verwaltungsgerichte) in Germany’s regulatory state.   
6.2.3 Effecting: Enforcing restrictions on land use   
In general effecting in the land-use regulation domain is about shaping the 
behaviour of individuals and their aspirations to use land at risk from 
flooding for economic purposes and individual welfare. The effecting 
discussion is, however, mostly concerned with the enforcement practices 
within the planning domain – in particular at the local planning level. In 
Germany’s land-use domain the post-2002 revisions of regulations – in 
particular the HWSG and subsequent adjustments of Länder legislation – 
resulted in a bifurcated pattern of enforcement and human behaviour 
modification. In ‘inundation areas’ rule enforcement is effective.  In contrast 
land use in vaguely defined ‘flood-prone areas’ is subject to vague 
regulation, and so shows few signs of modification.  
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This focus on the local authorities and their enforcement of rules has 
also been discussed in Germany in the aftermath of recent flood disasters, in 
particular the Elbe 2002 floods. Lessons learned reports, such as the one by 
the DKKV (2003), report a number of examples that demonstrate a lack of 
awareness of flood issues and the pursuit of other objectives in urban 
planning prior to the 2002 floods. For instance Dresden’s local councillor 
responsible for urban planning had been in negotiations with developers 
before August 2002 to declare a Baugebiet (area dedicated to development) 
on one of the historical, drained Elbe creeks: a high-risk area that was 
unsurprisingly completely inundated during the 2002 floods (ibid:43). 
Echoing this a local planner from Saxony suggests that: 
“in the old Bauleitplanung [local planning] from the 1990s, there is little 
about flood management. It was just not that important before 2002” 
(Planning Authority Dresden 2009, interview). 
A Landes level planner from NRW points to the dynamics of the ‘escalator 
effect’: 
“There were indeed Bauleitpläne [local plans] that were happily planning for 
construction on floodplains. They just assumed that once these areas have been 
developed, we’d just build some new defences” (MWME 2009, interview). 
This neglect of flood management in local planning contrasts with 
the potentially positive contribution more restrictive local planning practices 
could make to flood management. Through their Bauleitpläne and 
Baugenehmigungen local planners have a ‘comprehensive toolkit to ensure 
effective flood management’ (ELLA 2006:64) at their hands.   
With the overhaul of Federal and Länder level regulations in the 
aftermath of the Elbe 2002 floods the neglect of flood risk has become more 
difficult – albeit only in USGs. In fact while systematic data on the 
effectiveness of the regulations of ‘inundation areas’ and ‘flood-prone areas’ 
across Germany is(in contrast to England) not available, interview data  
combined with reviews on the Rhine Flood Action Plan implementation  
provide a strong indication of a two-tiered implementation pattern.  
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USGs and their tight regulation are widely seen as effective means to 
restrict development and safeguard water retention space between river 
channels and defence line. As one regional spatial planner explains: 
“the only thing that we can actually imagine and see in practice are ports 
and shipyards. The catalogue [of conditions] is very restrictive and rules 
out any Bauleitpläne in USGs” (Regional Water Authority Düsseldorf 
2009, interview). 
This is also confirmed by evaluations of the implementation of the Rhine 
Flood Action Plan, including measures of land-use regulation, flood 
defences and flood warnings. As the ICPR notes in its progress report from 
2005: 
“within non-protected areas, the [Action Plan] target for the reduction of 
damage potential [from 10% until 2005, 25% by 2020] is being achieved 
through keeping space undeveloped, improved defences, and improved 
information of the population. The reduction within these areas stood on 
average at 20-30% [by 2005]” (ICPR 2005:6). 
 On the other hand (in contrast to the effective regulation within 
USGs) the aforementioned ICPR report suggests that efforts to reduce 
damage potential in areas behind the defences were much less effective:  
“There was a limited reduction of damage potential behind flood 
defences. The target of 10% by 2005 will only have been accomplished 
because planning and flood awareness measures have been combined 
with flood management measures to reduce the probability of flood 
events [such as improved water retention and defences]” (ICPR 2005:6). 
Mirroring this a Landes planner from NRW admits that: 
“this residual risk, of extreme events and dyke failure, we have been 
displaying in our regional plans. We ask subordinate authorities to take 
flooding into account in these areas but I have to admit that it is not very 
effective” (MWME 2009, interview). 
Previous planning practices that failed to take into account flood risk 
can be associated with the pursuit of alternative spatial planning objectives – 
in particular economic development – in addition to the lack of risk 
 189 
awareness in the absence of adequate risk assessments and regulation. The 
conflict between economic interests (and interest groups) and safety 
concerns is mitigated through the particular organisation of responsibilities 
in Germany. While the local planners directly face economic interests their 
ability to accommodate these interests through favourable planning decisions 
is restricted, thanks to the tightened regulations on Länder level and through 
the HWSG. A local planner of Dresden remarks:  
“as local planners, we are really cornered. The investors at some point 
ask us ‘where if at all can we build?’. So there are often tensions... which 
we cannot resolve because of the regulations” (Local Planner Dresden 
2009, interview). 
Discretion for local planning decisions is also narrowed by state-
level and regional regulations and plans. A Landes planner points to a 
‘hierarchical chain of plans [through] which we control the lower planning 
levels’ (MWME 2009, interview). The producers of these plans at ‘higher’ 
(most importantly regional) planning levels are not directly exposed to such 
pressures to permit development. A regional planner in Düsseldorf notes: 
“In terms of economic interests, we don’t really see or hear about them. 
We are mainly dealing with the local governments. They may report to 
us that the investor s X and Y may have approached them. And it is 
ultimately the local government that has to respond to the investor. Does 
the local government want to change its plans to accommodate the 
investor? The local government then passes on the request to us and we 
check: USGs yes or no? And that’s it for us! For us, the issue of flooding 
and flood management is easy to handle” (Regional Planning Authority 
Düsseldorf 2009, interview).  
In fact the regional planners point out that their distance to the local conflicts 
of interests and the subsequent ability to make legalistic decisions is 
welcomed by the local level: 
“Sometimes the local governments tell us that we don’t want this either 
but it would help our negotiations at the local level if the regional 
government had ruled out a proposal” (ibid). 
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The local level therefore not only perceives the restrictions on their planning 
discretion as a problem but also as a means to deal with pressures by the 
local business community.   
Moreover regional and local planners also strongly rely on the inputs 
and approvals from regional and local water authorities. In controversial 
development decisions the ultimate decision as to whether a development 
proposal is situated within the boundaries of the USGs or acceptable in spite 
of being situated within it is taken by the water authorities. From a regional 
planners’ perspective: 
“Well, we would get the [more controversial] proposals at some point, 
and we would tell the local government that we cannot make a decision 
but that we need an expert assessment. And the local planners in turn 
would ask at the local environment authorities. I am happy as soon as I 
see that the calculations show it is flood-free but I would probably ask 
the experts for flooding in our house” (ibid).  
Given this central role of the specialist administration in planning decisions 
it becomes understandable why flood managers are attentive to the judicial 
review and thus ensure the procedural suitability of their assessments and 
operations.       
Beyond the USGs restrictions on development are limited. As noted 
the legal concept of flood-prone areas is vague and underdeveloped, and 
consequently so are the regulations associated with them. A local planner 
from Dresden notes, in explaining the delay in Saxony’s legislating and 
implementing of the legal category of ‘flood-prone areas’: 
“so while we make progress on understanding flooding, we have to make 
sure that this progress is somehow reflected in administrative planning 
practice. (...) If I withdraw a right [to develop] from someone, it becomes 
an enteignungsgleicher Eingriff (intervention similar to expropriation). I 
deprive the citizen of value – I mean he could build on the property or 
sell it. That is not easy to deal with legally” (Local Planner Dresden 
2009, interview). 
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The problem with ‘flood-prone areas’ is that they are not only legally 
vaguely defined but that their definition refers to areas behind defences, i.e. 
protected areas. Depriving citizens of certain property rights when their or 
other citizens’ safety is not substantially threatened (due to the protection 
through flood defences) may be interpreted by the courts as a 
disproportionate intervention into individual property rights. These rights are 
constitutionally protected (Article 14, paragraph 1). Any infringement of 
these rights needs to be justified as serving the public good (Wohl der 
Allgemeinheit) and requires laws that describe the type and degree of 
compensation to be paid to the addressee of the intervention (Article 14, 
paragraph 3). With compensation payments looming the local planner from 
Dresden remarks that there have been ‘too few court decisions’ (Local 
Planner Dresden 2009, interview) across Germany to allow predictions about 
how courts will evaluate restrictions on development within these areas. This 
uncertainty suggests a reason for the absence of ‘flood-prone areas’ in 
Saxony’s Water Act. 
An interesting two-tiered pattern therefore also emerges for effecting 
in Germany’s land-use domain, mirroring the findings on the patterns of 
regulation for the function of ‘directing’. Within the narrow confines of the 
‘inundation areas’ the restrictive regulation is effectively enforced – largely 
unaffected by local conflicts of interests as a result of the limited discretion 
of local planners where planning issues concern areas at flood risk (planning 
hierarchy; strong role of water authorities in planning for areas at flood risk). 
Outside these confines there are few rules to be enforced, and attempts to 
impose restrictions on the use of land carry the risk of being judicially 
reviewed.  
The implications of these patterns for the arguments about risk-based 
‘better regulation’ will be discussed more extensively after the following 
discussion of England’s case. What is notable however, is that Germany’s 
land-use domain – with its binary regulations and enforcement practices – 
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bears little resemblance with the more flexible, variable risk-based land-use 
regulation expected from a ‘better regulation’ perspective.  
6.3 EXAMINING RISK IN ENGLAND’S LAND-USE REGULATION 
England’s general planning regime was established through the Town and 
Country Planning Act (TCPA) from 1947, which aimed at controlling 
urbanisation of the countryside (Rydin 2003). The TCPA charges local 
planning authorities with two main functions: first to produce local 
development plans and frameworks
61
 and, second, to grant licences to 
applicants seeking permission for developments not ordinarily permitted 
under the TCPA. Planning decisions about this second development control 
function are to be made in light of the development policy framework set out 
in local plans, wider regional spatial strategies
62
 prepared by regional 
planning bodies and national policy guidance issued by the central 
government department DCLG (and its predecessors).  
Early national planning policy guidance in the form of circulars (e.g. 
Circular 31/47 from 1947) advised local planners to liaise with drainage 
authorities to avoid any adverse impacts of developments on drainage/flood 
management facilities and functions. In the early 1990s following the 
increasing criticisms of the traditional defence-drainage approach (Scrase 
and Sheate 20005) land-use managers emphasised flood risk as a material 
consideration for planning through a new circular, Nr 30/92 from 1992. The 
1992 circular was followed by a rapid expansion in national planning 
policies and guidance in the aftermath of the 1998 and 2000 floods and in 
the wider context of New Labour’s programme of planning policy reform 
(Clifford 2008). These new national planning policies – principally Planning 
Policy Guidance note 25 on Flooding (PPG25) introduced in 2001 and its 
successor the Planning Policy Statement from 2007 – contain the regulatory 
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 With the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act from 2004, a transition from local 
development plans to local development frameworks was initiated.  
62
 As in the case of local development plans, structure plans by regional planners were 
replaced by regional Spatial Strategies (RSS) that were introduced in 2004. Local plans 
have to be in ‘general conformity’ with RSS. 
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core of the current planning domain within England’s flood regime that 
shapes individual planning decisions and development plans at the local 
level, and will be discussed in the following sections. In contrast to Germany 
specialist regulations in the water and flood management legislation 
primarily concern the relations between the Environment Agency and 
planners. For instance the Environment Agency serves as consultee to the 
local planners for flood-related development issues and is obliged to report 
to DEFRA (Outcome Measure 8) on how many planning decisions are taken 
by local planners against the Environment Agency’s objections.   
6.3.1 Detecting: Flood mapping and enforcement monitoring  
The discussion of England’s detecting centres around the increasingly 
systematic and consistent production of flood maps that cover a much larger 
area with their flood zoning than Germany’s legally required flood mapping 
while ignoring the effects of flood defences. However a second type of 
information has been collected since 1999, namely systematic information 
on the implementation of national policies through local planners. Such 
systematic monitoring of the performance of land-use regulation is not in 
place in Germany. 
Early systematic attempts to map flood hazards in England were 
initiated under the Water Act from 1973. Under Section 24(5) this Act 
obliged the ten regional water authorities of the time to produce extensive 
surveys of areas with flood and drainage problems. However these maps had 
a limited impact on the planning system. Penning-Rowsell and colleagues 
(1986) argue that the surveys were riddled with inconsistencies in terms of 
methods, scope and quality and could therefore not be instrumental as a 
basis for systematic land-use planning and flood defence decisions. 
Moreover Bowers (1983) interprets the surveying of that time as a means to 
justify further drainage for agricultural production rather than as a decision 
aid to enable planners to identify (and thereby control) developments 
potentially at risk from flooding. 
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The ‘surveying’ was put more explicitly into a planning context in 
the early 1990s. Circular 30/92 refers to the so-called Section 105 surveys 
that should be taken into account in the planners’ structure and local plans. 
Under Section 105 the Water Resources Act from 1991 placed a duty on the 
Environment Agency (EA) and its predecessor (the National Rivers Agency 
(NRA)) to undertake surveys in order to define floodplains defined as 
HQ100 areas.  
However the progress in mapping was deemed insufficient in the 
aftermath of the Easter 1998 floods. Many areas that were previously 
thought to be at low risk were inundated. Peter Bye and Michael Horner note 
in their influential ‘Lessons learned’ report that the mapping process was:  
“far from complete nationally [and that] the defined extents [of 
floodplains] [were] often no more than crude estimates” (1998:41).    
Thus immediately after the Easter 1998 the EA sought to produce a 
nation-wide map, the Indicative Flood Map (IFM). The IFM was a first 
attempt, consisting of a patchwork of the best available (mostly locally 
generated) flood maps, and became available in 2001. In 2004 the EA 
replaced the IFM with a new nation-wide Extreme Flood Outline (EFO) 
Map that serves as the basis for land-use decision-making. In contrast to the 
IFM and the earlier mapping the new EFO map relied on applying a 
consistent modelling, data and analytical framework
63
 (Porter 2010). The 
EFO Map – reflecting the particular requirements of planning policies under 
PPG25 – introduces three main flood zones, namely a low probability (Zone 
1, <HQ1,000), a moderate probability (Zone 2, HQ100 to HQ1,000) and a 
high probability zone (Zone 3a+b
64
 with >HQ100).In contrast to Germany’s 
maps the definition of these flood zones in the EA’s EFO map does not take 
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 More precisely, the consultants tasked by the EA to produce the map made use of the 
same hydraulic model (J-Flow), digital terrain model (IF-SAR, interferometric synthetic 
aperture radar) and probability model (FEH, Flood Estimation Handbook). 
64
 The ‘high probability’ zone 3 (>1-in-100 years frequency) is differentiated into ‘a’ and 
‘b’. The zone 3‘b’ denotes the functional floodplain, defined qualitatively as those areas 
used for water storage and flow in the event of a flood but for whose identification a 
probability of HQ20 or greater is to be used as a quantitative reference point. 
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into account the protective effects of existing flood defences in tracing its 
flood zones – though it does show which areas benefit from flood defences.   
In addition to providing the IFM and then the EFO Map the EA also 
advises local planners on development control and on their decisions on 
individual applications from prospective developers for development 
projects. In fact the Environment Agency has, under the Town and Country 
Planning General Development Procedure Order No 2375 from 2006, been 
made a statutory consultee on development plans and planning applications 
within flood risk areas.
65
 This EA advice to planners carries even more 
weight since the Flooding Direction from 2006 also compels local planners 
to notify the regional Government Offices of any planning decisions 
concerning so-called ‘major’66 development proposals taken against the 
advice of the Environment Agency.  
Finally in addition to central government maps and advice local 
planners are also required by PPS25 to commission their own risk 
assessments, SFRAs, which should follow nationally consistent modelling 
guidelines set out by the EA. SFRAs take as a starting point the EFO Map 
and its different flood zones, but go beyond it in their spatial resolution and 
more detailed consideration of issues not considered in the EFO Map, such 
as different sources of flooding; the velocity and depth of flood waters; the 
potential effects of climate change on flooding; and only where the so-called 
Sequential Test is not sufficient to allocate planning permissions
67
 the 
location, conditions and effects of flood defences.  
A number of interesting changes to England’s risk assessments in the 
aftermath of the 1998 and 2000 floods can therefore be observed. Risk 
assessments are increasingly consistent. The EA acts as the central risk 
                                                 
65
 This means for all development proposals for zones 2 and 3, as well as those to be located 
in an area of zone 1 where a critical drainage problem exists. Beyond these probabilistically-
defined responsibilities the EA also is to be consulted if the development is larger than one 
hectare. 
66
 Major means ≥10 dwellings or 0.5 hectare for residential developments. 
67
 This is only applicable to highly vulnerable developments in zone 2, medium 
vulnerability buildings in zone 3a and essential infrastructure buildings in zone 3a+b. In 
these instances the Exception Test is to be applied. For further details, see table 6.1. 
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information provider; this includes producing guidance on how other actors 
are to undertake risk assessments. Moreover the EA (in its IFM and EFO 
maps) chooses to disregard the effects of its flood defences when delineating 
areas at risk of flooding. These shifts can best be understood by considering 
the particular challenges faced by the involved actors in the English land-use 
regulation domain.  
 As in Germany flood maps delineating areas at risk are contested 
because they imply restrictions on alternative uses (mostly the economic 
exploitation) of land. One example of this contestation is the response to the 
IFM. This patchwork map was replaced within a few years of being 
introduced with great fanfare by the Agency, partly because its variable 
quality and inconsistencies were criticised by local planners (Porter 2010). 
Variability and inconsistencies were perceived as problematic because they 
opened planning decisions to challenges from developers that questioned the 
accuracy of the level of flood risk found in the map for certain areas of 
interest for development. A local planner of South Holland Council notes: 
for rejecting a development proposal, we have to be confident in the data 
we use. The IFM still raised a large number of questions” (Local Planner 
South Holland 2009, interview).  
Confidence in the data also matters to the Environment Agency 
itself. In an internal report (EA 2004a) on flood mapping the EA stresses the 
importance of consistency in the detecting function. For its flood maps the 
EA ruled out the use of historic data ‘where we cannot be confident that the 
outline had been recorded accurately’, or ‘flood outlines that are not 
supported by numerical analysis or historic evidence’. Such locally derived 
information is ‘not appropriate’ because data have to be ‘defensible and 
auditable’ and issues such as ‘our reputation, political issues, litigation etc.’ 
need to be considered. Both EA and local planners are therefore concerned 
about challenges to the informational foundations of land-use regulations 
and emphasise consistent, formalised risk assessments as the basis for their 
regulatory interventions. This emphasis echoes Ted Porter’s arguments 
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about the perceived ‘objectivity’ of formalised, numerical evidence 
considered expedient for justifying bureaucratic interventions (Porter 1995).  
While local planners perceive a need for defensible development 
decisions they have also been found to disregard the objections of the 
Environment Agency concerning planning proposals for areas at flood risk 
(see sections on ‘directing’ and ‘effecting’). For the EA the planners’ 
disregard of flood management considerations is problematic because it 
results in developments that increase the damage potential from flooding. 
This not only undermines the objectives of flood management but also 
entails institutional risks to the EA. The EA is likely to attract some of the 
blame after a flood because of its role as the key central government body 
for flood management. A local planner for instance observes that:  
“the Environment Agency is becoming more concerned [about 
development and flooding]... and there is an element of blame there... 
and to be fair, they are the ones of the frontline so if flooding occurs, 
they are the ones the people turn to” (Local Planner South Holland 2009, 
interview).      
Strengthening the role of the Environment Agency’s risk advice 
therefore serves as a means to improve control over local planners. In the 
words of an EA official: 
“if the Agency wants to have an influential role in land use planning 
debate, it needs to give its information to planners” (Environment 
Agency 2008b, interview). 
The proliferation of risk assessments has indeed changed the terms of debate 
between local planners and the EA. A local planner remarks: 
“Now we local planners are in a much better position to talk to the EA. 
They say what they think, we say what we think is right. (...) It used to be 
a battle between us and them. They told us what to do, that we had been 
naughty and what was good for us. (...) But it is now a scientific debate, 
not one about we are right, and you are wrong” (Local Planner South 
Holland 2009, interview).      
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While this suggests a perceived empowerment of the local planning 
authority scientific expert knowledge on flood risk is really concentrated in 
the EA. This expert knowledge can in turn be argued to confer, following 
Foucauldian arguments made by Rose and Miller (1990),  a ‘social 
authority’ to the EA that can be used to align interests between autonomous 
actors. The discussion in the following sections on ‘directing’ casts further 
doubt on the empowerment of local actors through centrally-generated and 
shaped knowledge. 
While it may not be empowering the ‘indirect’ control through risk 
assessment and expertise is not without challenges. One example that 
illustrates the limits of indirect control is the continued disagreement with 
EA’s advice (see figure 6.4 in ‘effecting’). Another example of ‘resistance’ 
against the centralisation of risk assessments is found in the successful 
lobbying against undertaking regional risk assessments as a basis for 
Regional Spatial Strategies (RSS) as introduced under PPS 11. Rather than 
risk assessments, RSS are based on Regional Risk Appraisals.  
“We were worried about the regional flood risk assessment. (...) An 
appraisal is a broader view of what’s happening across the region. The 
fear that I and other planning officers have is that if you [based on the 
more precise risk assessment] start to apply the sequential approach at a 
regional level, then you’d say South Holland and Boston are the highest 
risk areas so we should not develop there at all... Lincoln and other areas 
are on higher ground. We will build there instead” (Local Planner South 
Holland 2009, interview).      
The EA therefore uses risk information to reduce the number of 
planning decisions that potentially increase the damage potential – thereby 
limiting the institutional risks associated with the failure to prevent damage 
from flooding. The latter concern of EA can also be argued as being 
reflected in the treatment of flood defences on the EA’s Flood Map. 
Drawing a line between regulated ‘dangerous’ areas and unregulated ‘safe’ 
areas – as seen in Germany with its HQ100 standards and acknowledgement 
of the effects of flood defences – reinforces public expectations of state-
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provided safety. The EA’s flood maps (publicly available on the EA 
website) however, ignore the effects of flood defences when determining the 
flood zones. As an EA expert involved in preparing land-use regulations 
notes: 
“we try to emphasise that risk is a continuum, and that there is no such 
thing as a safe place” (Environment Agency 2008c, interview).   
This emphasis on the absence of safety underlines the message that the 
public should not expect to be fully protected through government 
interventions.  
This management of public expectation has become increasingly 
important for actors within the land-use domain as devastating floods have 
increased public and political interest in flood management decisions 
resulting in post-disaster inquiries (e.g. Bye and Horner 1998; Pitt 2008) and 
Parliamentary processes (e.g. SCA 1998; EFRA 2008)). These concerns 
about Parliamentary and public scrutiny of planning and flood management 
decisions are further reinforced by the Parliamentary monitoring of flood-
related decisions in the form of High-Level Target 5 and Outcome Measure 
8. --These monitoring tools oblige the EA to gather information on 
development control and flood risk – including information on planning 
applications for flood risk areas, compliance with EA advice on planning 
decisions, and the reasons for local disregard of EA advice – and to report on 
these issues annually to DEFRA and the Parliament (MAFF 1999). This 
information-gathering is an outcome of the Parliamentary debate after the 
Easter 1998 floods in which the SCA (1998) noted that the Parliament and 
central government departments have a very limited knowledge about the 
degree to which national policies were implemented at the local level. The 
data on non-compliance with EA advice increases pressure on local planners 
to take such advice into account. As a local planner notes: 
“the Agency reports on how local planners take into consideration the 
Agency’s advice. We got caught one year. Well not ‘caught’ but we were 
on the top of the list for acting contrary to Agency advice. (...) It turned 
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out that most of [the cases] were rather trivial. Like house extensions for 
which somebody failed to produce a flood risk assessment. But we 
stopped it anyway afterwards – and I think last year, we haven’t had any 
against the Agency advice” (Local Planner South Holland 2009, 
interview).  
At the same time the EA also reports on the reasons why local planners 
disregard EA advice  (for example scrutinising its own supply of timely and 
suitable advice).  
The discussion of detecting in England’s land-use domain provides 
important insights into the form that England’s regulatory state in flood 
management has assumed. The boundaries of this state are more extensive 
than those of the German state, covering an area that is defined in risk terms 
as HQ1000. Several probabilistically-defined flood zones are identified as 
required by the PPG and PPS25 – the main regulatory instruments of the 
land-use domain. Finally by ignoring the effects of flood defences the EA’s 
Flood Map contributes to addressing the problems of poor flood awareness 
(by communicating the uncertainty of physical protection) and asset 
accumulation in defended areas (by paving the way for regulating land-use 
even behind defences).     
6.3.2 Directing: Defining restrictions on land use 
England’s directing changed significantly in the aftermath of the Easter 1998 
and autumn 2000 floods. Most notably central government guidance to local 
planners has become much more detailed and is systematically based on 
several risk and vulnerability categories. This is largely a response to the 
perception by the central government that local planning decisions prior to 
the floods failed to take into sufficient account of flooding, and that risk-
based regulatory instruments offer suitable tools to ensure that local planning 
decisions are aligned with the government’s wider policy strategy on flood 
risk and with the interest of the EA (as its delivery agent) in reducing 
damage from flooding.   
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Prior to the Easter floods there was little regulation forcing planners 
to consider flooding as a material consideration in their decision-making. In 
1992 planning Circular 30 introduced the general idea that flood risk should 
be taken into account when generating local development plans and deciding 
on particular planning proposals. However there was little guidance as to 
what exactly it meant to take flooding into account. Discretion reigned. The 
1998 Easter and even more so the autumn 2000 floods however, catapulted 
the issue of development control and flooding to the forefront of the flood 
management debate. More specifically it was found by the EA that: 
‘in the Easter event we have numerous examples of developments, 
whether structured buildings or caravan parks, which were allowed 
against the advice of the Agency and its predecessors’(SCA 1998b, 
Question 5). 
Bye and Horner’s futile search for more recent evidence of this disregard of 
EA advice casts some doubt on this assertion, even though the authors found 
indications of failures of development control for the 1980s (Bye and Horner 
1998). 
Those doubts notwithstanding, the public discussion resulted in a call 
for stronger guidance from the EA to direct the decision-making of local 
planners along with calls for tighter monitoring of the implementation of 
national policies by local planners under HLT5 (SCA 1998). As a 
consequence a review of the Circular 30/1992 was instigated, resulting in 
Planning Policy Guidance note number 25 (PPG25). The EA hoped that by 
replacing a circular with a planning policy guidance
68
 note, flooding would 
be taken more seriously in local planning decisions (DETR/DCLG 2009, 
interview). It is, however, important to note that both types of national 
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 The differences between Circulars and Planning Policy Guidance are not in their 
substance but in their perception by the actors involved. According to one of PPG25’s 
authors (DETR/DCLG 2009, interview), the EA insisted on using a PPG because they 
perceived it as a more effective means to raise the profile of flood risk among planners than 
Circulars. Formally both types of documents are used to explain statutory provisions and 
guide local planning.  
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policies can only contain non-binding guidance and recommendations to 
local planners rather than assuming a compulsory character.  
While a draft version of PPG25 was available as early as spring 
2000, PPG25 was quickly revisited after the autumn 2000 floods so that 
when PPG25 was eventually published in 2001 the guidance was much 
stronger. The final PPG25 converted the idea of Circular 30/92 to take 
flooding into account into a systematic, risk-based regulatory core in 2001’s 
PPG25. PPG 25’s regulatory core consists mostly of the Sequential Test.69 
This Test advises local planners how to, when allocating sites in 
development plans and deciding on individual proposals, give priority in 
descending order to flood zones as laid out in PPG25 (and identified on the 
EA’s Flood Map) – namely from low risk (zone 1) to moderate (zone 2) to 
high risk (zone 3). Given the ‘steering away’ from high-risk areas and the 
disregard of the effects of flood defences, this risk-based regulatory core 
points to a precautionary stance towards development in areas at flood risk. 
Indeed in something of a departure from the UK’s usual stance (O'Riordan 
and Cameron 1994), PPG25 explicitly invoked the precautionary principle to 
justify its approach to regulating development at risk of flooding (see 
Foreword of PPG25).   
The shift towards a more precautionary stance was not only disaster-
driven but also resulted from the interventions of different interest groups. 
Given the potential benefits of the economic development of flood risk areas 
one set of actors opposed to a tightening of land-use regulation were 
developers. Unsurprisingly developers as represented by the House Builders 
Federation (HBF) criticised the shift towards a more precautionary approach 
to developing on flood plains. The HBF argued in their contribution to the 
consultation for the post-1998 report of the Select Committee of Agriculture 
(SCA 1998) that the principle of ‘safe development’ (i.e. development is 
                                                 
69
 The Sequential Approach, i.e. the planning principle that identifies, allocates and 
develops certain types or locations of land before others is a common tool within England’s 
planning regime, for instance, also being used in other PPGs (e.g. PPG 3 on Housing). 
 203 
permitted in flood risk areas if it takes place behind flood defences) should 
be maintained and that the implicit ‘presumption against development in 
floodplains’ as a result of the precautionary stance is a ‘very negative 
approach’ (HBF 1998:2). However the developers’ opposition to the 
introduction of a more precautionary stance in development control stood 
against strong support for such a shift by a wide range of other organisations 
– ranging from environmental groups to the insurance industry (Johnson et 
al. 2003). One of the authors of PPG25 remarked that: 
“the responses [to the consultation] were that the developers said that this 
is too ‘green’, the ‘greens’ said it gives far too much latitude to the 
developers. Which wasn’t surprising. And as both sides were not quite 
satisfied, we felt we got it about right” (DCLG/DETR 2008, interview). 
 PPG25 also introduced the idea of taking into consideration the 
vulnerability to flooding of different land uses when deciding whether to 
permit their location in a particular flood zone. The PPS25 from 2007 
elaborates on the notion of vulnerability through a five-category 
vulnerability classification from essential infrastructure (such as utilities) to 
water-compatible infrastructure (such as flood control infrastructure). 
Moreover PPS25 also introduced the Exception Test. Based on this test 
planners can consider allowing development in higher probability zones 
involving relatively more vulnerable assets under certain circumstances. 
Exceptions can be made where a development provides wider sustainability 
benefits that outweigh flood risk, is safe and does not increase flood risk 
elsewhere while being situated on previously developed land. The Exception 
Test therefore allows for greater flexibility in planning decisions. The 
following table 10 provides an overview over the risk-based factors to be 













































No No No Yes 
Table 10: Flood risk zones and vulnerability classifications, PPS25 
The Sequential Test along with guidance for risk assessments and 
other tools such as the Exception Test was further elaborated under PPS25, 
especially through its Practice Guide (DCLG 2007d; DCLG 2007c). The 
Practice Guide is a step-by-step guide with best practice examples from the 
different types of risk assessments underlying planning practice (e.g. the 
Flood Map and the SFRA) giving the application of sequential and exception 
tests to various risk management options (e.g. making developments in 
higher risk zones more resilient).  
 To summarise, national planning policies underwent a step-change 
towards a more precautionary approach to planning in flood risk areas in 
recent years – driven by the political and public discussion in the aftermath 
of the 1998 and 2000 floods and supported by a wide range of interest 
groups. This greater emphasis on precaution is reflected in the systematic 
identification of areas at flood risk and guidance to local planners to steer 
away development from the relatively higher risk areas. At the same time the 
guidance promotes a particular flexible, risk-based treatment of proposals 
through the planning authorities. This implies risk-based targeting of 
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regulations and seems to fit with ideas of ‘better regulation’ (even though it 
also implies ‘more regulation’).   
To understand the introduction of this sort of risk-based guidance and 
tools such as the Sequential Test, it is important to take a closer look at the 
internal dynamics within the planning system. As the discussion of detecting 
highlighted, risk instruments can also be interpreted as means to ensure that 
local planners take planning decisions in line with the EA’s advice. This 
particular function of risk instruments is acknowledged by the involved 
actors. One of DCLG’s authors of PPS25 for instance points to the benefits 
of the new guidance in shaping local decision-making. He notes that:  
“what the Sequential Test does is to offer a way of structuring the 
thinking of local planners” (DCLG/DETR 2009a, interview).  
Moreover, the same official notes: 
“there was a need to formalise the approach. You have to understand that 
local authorities like tools! Give them a tool and they use it. And there 
are loads of tools in PPS 25: There is the Flood Map and the Flood Risk 
Assessment which is the assessment tool, then there is the Sequential 
Test and Exception Test” (ibid).  
This subtle directing of local planning is partly welcomed, and partly viewed 
critically by the local planners. Thus local planners find:  
‘the Sequential Test [...] quite useful. We have these risk zones on our 
maps and can apply them’ (Local Planner South Holland 2009, 
interview).  
At the same time the instrumentalisation of these tools to exercise influence 
is recognised by local planners as the following comment concerning the 
PPS25’s practice guide for risk-based decision-making in land use shows:  
“The PPS Practice Guide is a bit of a double-edged sword (...) because it 
is also being used by the EA. In some ways, the EA staff is more familiar 
with the guide than local planning officers. They tend to quote 
paragraphs to tell you: You can’t do that. So the guide is helpful but also 
irritating” (Local Planner South Holland 2009, interview). 
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These indirect mechanisms of control are complemented by further indirect 
mechanisms such as the publication of HLT5 monitoring results as well as 
direct mechanisms, such as the increased weight of the Secretary of State in 
reviewing and if necessary overturning local planning decisions (through the 
Flooding Direction).  
The discussion of ‘directing’ in England’s land-use domain reveals 
important characteristics of England’s regulatory state. In addition to their 
extensive territorial coverage (HQ1,000) regulations vary in accordance to 
different risk levels. For instance particularly vulnerable uses of land (such 
as caravan sites) are not permitted within certain high-risk flood zones. At 
the same time essential infrastructure and moderately vulnerable (after 
passing the Exception Test) as well as less vulnerable land uses are 
permissible even in high-risk flood zone 3. This illustrates the flexibility and 
fine differentiation in England’s approach to land-use regulation. From a 
regulatory state perspective this may be interpreted as providing means to 
move away from simple binary differentiations (of safe/unsafe and tight 
restrictions/unregulated) to a wider, more variable web of regulations that 
allows targeted interventions for the pursuit of both goals of precaution and 
utility maximisation in flood risk areas.   
6.3.3 Effecting: Enforcing restrictions on land use   
Even though a planning regime had been in place since 1947 and an 
increasing concern about development in flood risk areas has been expressed 
in policy guidance since the early 1990s, this has not prevented the 
encroachment of areas at risk from flooding. On the contrary more than five 
million homes are still at risk from flooding (EA 2009), and a recent green 
paper on ‘Housing’ (DCLG 2007a) set the target of an additional 2.5 million 
houses by 2016. Reflecting on even more ambitious housing targets set 
earlier the National Audit Office (NAO) notes in its 2001 report on flood 
defences that:  
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“the nature of this country’s geography and its housing needs are such 
that there is significant pressure to build in ‘flood plains’ which by their 
nature are more prone to flooding than other areas” (NAO 2001:15). 
With the introduction of the Flood Map, Sequential Test and other 
risk instruments the EA tried to ensure that the planning system takes 
flooding more seriously. Figures collected under HLT5 (EA 2004b; 2006; 
2008) indeed show positive effects. One indicator of how the planning 
system has become more responsive to concerns about flooding is the 
declining number of planning proposals in flood risk areas. Figure 6 shows 
that the number of those proposals submitted to the Agency that required 
detailed consideration of flood risk has been declining since the introduction 
of PPG25. In view of the rising profile of the Agency as a consultee this 
suggests that developers and LPAs are showing greater awareness and 
consideration of flood risk as better risk information has become available.    
 
Figure 6: Planning applications, flood risk and responses by the Environment Agency 
Note: Number of planning consultations on which the EA responded on all issues (blue) and 
number of EA consultations which required detailed considerations on flood risk grounds 
(red)  
Source: EA 2004, 2006, 2008 
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The increased consideration of flood issues by local planners is not 
only reflected in individual planning decisions but also in their forward 
planning in the form of local development plans. For instance all newly 
devised local development plans from the local planning authorities 
contained explicit flood risk policies since 2004/2005.  
While this evolution appears to indicate that flooding is being taken 
seriously at the planning stage by planners, recent reports by the Agency (EA 
2008) note the ‘disappointing’ incorporation of some of the risk-based 
elements of national policy guidance into local planning documents. For 
instance in 2006/2007 (five years after PPG25 took effect) only five (8%) out 
of 62 local development plans in that year make an explicit reference to the 
sequential test. The following year the share rose slightly to 14 (18%) out of 
77 plans.  
Even more importantly further data on individual planning decisions, 
i.e. the concrete implementation of planning policies, illustrates the extent to 
which considerations of flood risk are being taken into account by local 
planners. The following figure 8 shows the share of planning applications for 






Figure 7: Local planning approval against recommendation by the Environment 
Agency 
Development proposals where EA objections were made and sustained on flood risk 
grounds (blue) and proposals approved by LPAs contrary to EA advice (red) 
Source: EA 2004, 2006, 2008 
Like the previous graph Figure 7 shows that the LPAs’ 
considerations of flood issues (as conveyed through the acceptance of EA’s 
advice on planning proposals) has improved substantially since 2000/2001. 
In the first two years of HLT reporting local planners approved almost every 
four out of 10 planning applications against EA advice. After 2002/2003 
approvals against EA advice declined substantially – even though they never 
disappeared completely and remained at 10% of proposals that were 
objected to.  
One of the reasons why approvals in the early years of monitoring 
were sustained in spite of EA objections was institutional frictions between 
the Agency and local planners. As one local planner points out: 
“it was more about the fact that it was a new policy and the conflict 
between the Agency and the local authorities. It was perceived as a fight 
between us and them. (...) The Agency thought they were the only ones 
that knew what flood risk meant. And that therefore, they should decide 
how to deal with it – and the authorities should follow whatever they 
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suggest. However, this is not a way of dealing with local authorities” 
(Local Planner South Holland 2009, interview). 
However the decline in the share of approvals against objections is 
being explained by a mutual learning process and improved relations 
between the two sides: 
“On the one side, you had the Agency that acknowledged that there are 
other people that have something to say on flooding and planning issues. 
On the other side, there are local authorities that learned that there is 
something [climate change] going on that we have to take into account” 
(ibid.) 
Even though this quote implies that institutional frictions have 
declined other data collected suggests otherwise. For the year of 2007/2008 
LPAs explain approval against advice in 15% of the cases with reference to 
‘doubts as to the veracity and reasonableness of the advice’ (EA 2008). And 
indeed a local planner from a low-lying area remarks: 
“flood risk assessments de facto sterilise whole areas. The Environment 
Agency would probably be very happy if we just said: ‘Oh, there is flood 
risk so we don’t build anything here’. But we are not going to do this. 
We need a more realistic approach. Sometimes we think the Agency 
advice is just silly” (Local Planner South Holland 2009, interview). 
While institutional frictions explain some of the continuing approvals 
against EA advice there are also more administrative factors – for example 
belated responses by the EA on planning proposals to local planners (EA 
2008).  
Conflicts between the central government’s flood managers from the 
EA and the local planners reflect the stakes involved in land-use regulation. 
While local planning takes an interest in retaining control over planning 
processes – partly in order to be able to potentially benefit from local, 
economic development (but also to achieve housing targets set by the central 
government) – the EA shows particular sensitivity towards the institutional 
risks of inadequate planning and therefore seeks to increase central planning 
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control. In this conflict risk instruments have become a key instrument of the 
EA to improve control. 
6.4 REVISITING ARGUMENTS ABOUT RISK-BASED ‘BETTER REGULATION’ IN 
THE LAND-USE DOMAIN 
This chapter reviews the regime domain of land-use regulation in relation to 
arguments about the function of risk in regulatory states. Risk can serve as 
an instrument to sharpen and refine regulatory interventions into the use of 
land in a manner that reduces potential damage from flooding while also 
permitting the economic use of land at risk. In order to address problems 
associated with regulation in general (mostly overly precautious and 
legalistic regulation, as well as the costs of regulation) and land-use 
regulation in particular (asset accumulation in areas at flood risk in particular 
behind flood defences), advocates for better regulation would expect the 
concept and instruments of risk to be used in a specific manner. First, risk 
can be used to identify which areas are at a risk significant enough to make 
interventions necessary so that asset accumulation is subject to regulation 
and flood awareness is promoted in such areas. Second, the regulation would 
be variable – taking into account different levels of risk and vulnerability so 
that overly precautious regulation of potentially economically beneficial land 
use is avoided. This requires a risk-based regulation of land use that 
establishes and takes into account differences in risk and vulnerability as 
well as the uncertainty of safety in areas at flood risk.  
Land-use regulation in Germany and England’s flood regimes raises 
questions about whether the pursuit of ‘better regulation’ – and the particular 
use of the concept and instruments of risk to this end – is really driving the 
organisation and operation of this regime domain. In fact in neither case is 
the risk-based organisation of the regime domain shaped by a ‘better 
regulation’ agenda.  
Taking a closer look at each of the two country’s cases Germany 
offers a case study in how risk-based regulation does not necessarily imply a 
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better regulatory state. Germany’s ‘regulatory state’ makes only limited use 
of the available multi-zone flood maps, concentrating mostly on identifying 
HQ100 ‘inundation areas’. Moreover the effects of flood defences are fully 
reflected in German mapping and land-use regulation. This implies that the 
problem of asset accumulation in areas behind flood defences is not 
addressed, as the promotion of flood awareness and the regulation of 
developments in these areas are limited. Rather than highlighting the 
uncertainty of safety, risk instruments, by identifying inundation areas and 
integrating the effects of flood defences into flood zoning, have been used to 
distinguish between safe and unsafe, protected and unprotected areas. 
Finally the regulatory state debate also assumes that an autonomous agency 
staffed with specialists in their regulatory domain become central actors 
within a policy domain. However key actors involved in Germany’s 
regulatory state do not include a particular autonomous expert agency. 
Rather, in addition to legislators and the implementing authorities, public 
law courts matter as potential reviewers of state interventions. 
England’s ‘regulatory state’ in the land-use domain resembles much 
more closely the ideal of a state whose interventions are targeted and 
increasingly informed by the expert assessments of an autonomous state 
agency. The coverage of England’s regulatory state is extensive in terms of 
areas subject to regulation – namely all those areas inundated by events as 
rare as once in a thousand years (HQ1,000). Within this extensive area 
regulation varies with risk level and vulnerability of the development 
allowing for a variable and targeted regulation of land use. Moreover the 
effects of flood defences are ignored when defining flood zones, 
communicating the uncertainty of the safety provision through flood 
defences and ensuring regulation of land use even behind defences. Finally 
the semi-autonomous EA has become increasingly important for regulating 
land use by providing expert risk assessments and advising local planners on 
individual planning decisions.   
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However the use of the concept and instruments of risk is not 
exclusively driven by the pursuit of ‘better regulation’ in England but also 
by concerns about control and institutional risk. The EA in particular 
mobilises risk assessment and management instruments to exercise better 
control over local planning decisions, making sure that they take into 
account the issue of flooding and thereby reducing the damage potential of 
future flood events. The use of risk instruments therefore limits the 
institutional risks associated with post-disaster public blame allocation to the 
EA, because the damage from flooding is lowered through flood-aware 
planning practices and the fact that the EA has procedures in place that 
inform local planners about flood risk. Moreover risk calculations are also 
welcomed by local planners as a means to ‘rationalise’ their interactions in 
particular with developers (justifying restrictions on developments and thus 
mitigating the institutional risk of challenges to their planning decisions).   
‘Better regulation’ is not the main motivation behind adopting a risk-
based land-use regulation. Rather actors at the central government level in 
both countries seek to improve control over decision-making by local actors 
in the regime domain to ensure that flood damage potential is not rising. 
Actors are in general seeking to intervene into the processes of land use in a 
manner that does not carry the risk of challenges to decisions and 
organisations involved in the land-use domain. However the control and 
defence strategies in Germany and England differ. In Germany control relies 
on a more detailed set of legal regulations, the HWSG. However tight 
regulations only apply to a limited area and rely on a well-established single 
risk category that can be defended in public law courts. In England actors 
rely on more indirect mechanisms of control including monitoring and 
reporting on enforcement, centralised risk mapping and detailed a ‘practice 
guide’ elaborating the implementation of risk-based national policies.    
In short the cases of Germany and England cast doubts upon 
arguments that actors in charge of land-use regulation adopt risk-based 
regulation in order to achieve ‘better regulation’. They also show how the 
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use of risk in land-use regulation serves different purposes and that they play 
out in different ways in Germany and England. But how can the differences 
be explained? 
6.5 EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN RISK-BASED LAND-USE REGULATION 
The following sections discuss major contrasts between Germany’s and 
England’s institutional contexts that help explain differences in the two 
countries’ divergent ways of organising its land-use domains. The 
discussions will focus on the variance in the use of risk in the domains due 
to its assumed central role in the emerging risk-based land-use regulation 
domains. 
5.5.1 State structure: Federalism versus ‘dual polity’   
Germany’s Federal government focuses on addressing the regulatory deficit 
at Länder level whilst England’s EA concentrates its control activities on 
local planners. This variation points to the importance of the structure of the 
state, which distributes responsibilities and shapes interactions between its 
different levels.   
In Chapter 5 Germany’s Federal state structure was identified as an 
important factor that shaped the fragmentation of risk assessment and thus 
created a barrier to ‘neoliberalisation’ in the flood defence domain. In the 
land use domain the Länder’ responsibility for flood and land management 
has been suggested as resulting in regulatory deficits in terms of 
development control for flood risk areas. In response the Federal level used 
its legislative responsibilities to constrain the discretion of Länder legislators 
and subordinate enforcement authorities.  
However the extent to which the Federal level can impose its 
regulations onto the states is limited. The Federal government has to 
consider Länder interests because of the joint decision-making in legislation 
(giving the Länder a de facto veto right) as well as its reliance for 
enforcement on Länder and subordinate administrations. Increased Federal 
activism since the 1960s has been noted more generally for the field of 
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environmental policy (Weidner 1995; Lees 2007) and has often been part of 
an ongoing power struggle within Germany’s Federal state with its 
interlocking responsibilities between states and Federal level (Scharpf 1988; 
Benz 1999; Scharpf 2005). These interlocking relations in Germany’s 
Federal state therefore limit the scope and form that the ‘regulatory state’ 
takes across the whole Bundesstaat.  
More concretely the increased legislative activity by the Federal 
government was far from uncontested in the field of flood management, with 
Länder considering challenging the relatively detailed prescriptions for land 
use in USGs in front of the Constitutional Court. The Länder refrained from 
this step in view of the public salience of flood management after the 2002 
floods, which created a political context in which it was unpopular to 
challenge measures that improved flood management (Berendes 2005; 
Fassbender 2007). While the Länder did not try to completely block the 
HWSG the fact that they could potentially block legislation ensured that 
Federal activism would be limited. One instance already referred to in 
chapter 4 is the failure of the Federal legislator to introduce a HQ200 
reference standard for the production of flood management plans. These 
political constraints can be argued to have limited the scope to which the 
Federal level could impose regulations on Länder, thus offering one 
explanation for the relatively narrow HQ100 boundaries of the regulatory 
state by the Federal level. Moreover the risk-based standard of HQ100 is 
also sufficiently abstract to be applicable across the variable geography of 
river catchments and adjacent land in Germany.  
However the dynamics between the Federal and Länder levels are not 
enough to explain the choice of a narrow definition of the regulatory state. 
Even the Länder have not taken any steps (with few exceptions
70
) to expand 
the ‘regulatory state’ beyond HQ100. This spatial self-restraint of 
Germany’s regulators can be understood in the context of Germany’s 
                                                 
70
 Saxony for instance has introduced the concept of ‘flood emergence areas’ 
(Hochwasserentstehugsgebiete) in which they regulate land use in order to maximise 
maximum natural water retention (e.g. restrictions on sealing the surfaces). 
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‘protective state’ norms as discussed in Chapter 5, according to which the 
state ensures that the population is safe from flood events occurring more 
frequently than once in a hundred years. This not only means that defences 
are built to this standard but also that areas to be inundated by HQ100 floods 
are being kept free from development. Keeping the HQ100 areas free from 
development can serve as a complementary mechanism to flood defences for 
Germany’s state to ensure that the population is safe up to the HQ100 
standard. It can also be argued to be complementary because Germany’s 
actors acknowledge the effects of state-provided safety through defences by 
adopting the HQ100 as the boundaries of their restrictive regulatory state 
and by taking for granted the effectiveness of flood defences. Finally, as the 
earlier discussion of Germany’s risk-based land-use regulation shows, 
regulators have also been constrained by the possible interventions of 
administrative courts. This factor will be discussed more extensively below.   
In England responsibilities are conventionally assumed to be organised 
in a centralised manner as reflected in its flood regime through the dominant 
position of the EA. However in the land-use regulation domain the idea of a 
unitary state has to be treated with caution. In fact Jones called Britain more 
generally a ‘unitary, highly decentralised’ country well before the devolution 
under New Labour (Jones 1990). This characterisation refers to the relations 
between central government and local authorities. Knill and Lenschow 
(1998) note that:  
“there is no hierarchical control or inspection of local authorities’ day-to-
day activities by central government, implying high variation of local 
authority performance throughout the country” (1998:4). 
The complete absence of control postulated by Knill and Lenschow is 
too strong an assumption. Ever since the 1980s (with Margaret Thatcher in 
power) the central government has tightened control over local authorities 
through a proliferation of national planning policies – a trend intensified 
under the planning reforms inaugurated by New Labour (Clifford 2008). 
That notwithstanding, local authorities are not embedded in a hierarchically 
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structured public administration. Combined with the fact that local councils 
are directly elected this implies a substantial autonomy for local actors. This 
applies in particular for local planning authorities. Pottier and colleagues 
suggest that planning belongs to the ‘acknowledged and undisputed fields of 
local self-determination’ (Pottier, Penning-Rowsell, Tunstall et al. 2005:9). 
As one local planner stresses: 
“we are the elected organisations charged with looking after and 
regulating our areas” (Local Planner South Holland 2009, interview).  
This fragmentation implies that flood management through land-use 
regulation is dependent on the interventions of local planners and is beyond 
the direct control of the Environment Agency. The absence of a direct means 
of control partly explains the use by the EA of risk information and risk-
based proceduralisation as an indirect means of governance (Miller and Rose 
1990; Power 2003). This indirect means of control also makes central 
interference with local affairs within such a relatively large territory 
(HQ1,000) politically more acceptable to the local level. 
6.5.2 State structure: Rational bureaucracy versus regulatory agencies 
The second set of factors that shapes the choices of actors and the varying 
forms of regulatory state in the two countries’ flood regimes again relates to 
the structure of the state of the two countries. However rather than focusing 
on different levels of government this section explores the internal 
organisation of the executive.  
In Germany the internal organisation of the public administration is 
hierarchical and law-based. While the latter aspect will be discussed in the 
next section on operating principles, the former one points to a coherence in 
the state organisation in contrast to the fragmented image of the Federal 
state. Kuhlmann (2010) notes that Germany’s administration can be seen as 
part of the classical continental model of bureaucracy. More specifically the 
bureaucracy is:  
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“largely moulded by the ideal-type Weberian model of classic 
bureaucratic organisation characterised by steep internal hierarchies, 
highly specialised institutional structures, and marginal scope for 
corresponding responsibilities” (ibid.:1119). 
Planners at the local level in Germany are integrated into this 
‘rational bureaucracy’ and are constrained in their decision-making by 
relatively detailed plans provided by regional planners that concretely 
delineate areas with restrictions as well as the evaluation of planning 
decisions by specialised water authorities. This embeddedness explains the 
local planners’ sense of being ‘cornered’ when making planning decisions 
for ‘inundation areas’ (Local planner Dresden 2009, interview) and the 
confidence of Länder-level administrators that the restrictive regulations 
within USGs will be applied at local implementation levels (MWME 2009; 
SMUL 2008, interviews). 
The contrast to England’s regional planning in particular is 
remarkable: England’s equivalent to regional plans, the Regional Spatial 
Strategies, give significant discretion to local planners. In the words of a 
planning officer: 
“an RSS is not precise in terms of location. It is only precise in terms of 
numbers. What the regional plan would say for South Holland, would be 
the number of houses to be built over the next years. (...) This has to be 
seen in the context of the responsibility for local affairs by local 
authorities” (Local Planner South Holland 2009, interview). 
Similarly the central government’s planning ministry emphasises that:  
“planning is not dictated from above. We from DETR never tried to take 
away the power from local planning authorities [LPAs]. (...) We accept 
that local interests may under some circumstances override [national 
interests]. But if LPAs do so, it had to be justified. That they looked at 
the national policies, and considered them” (DETR/DCLG 2009b, 
interview). 
This reference to the need for justification underlines the indirect means of 
control applied by central government actors vis-a-vis local planners in the 
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absence of a more direct hierarchical control as found in Germany’s 
Weberian bureaucracy.  
The need for some indirect means of control is further reinforced by 
the particular status of the EA as a semi-autonomous public body. In the 
Parliamentary discussions about a stronger role (in particular a veto right 
over planning decisions) for the EA vis-a-vis local planners in the aftermath 
of the Easter 1998 floods, an official of the EA noted: 
“you trespass on an interesting area politically, which is quite difficult, a 
non departmental public body having the right of veto over elected 
councils over where development should happen.  It is a difficult 
one” (SCA 1998: Question 81). 
The creation of semi-autonomous public bodies and regulators has been part 
of a wider institutional development that was initiated under Margaret 
Thatcher’s Next Step programme in the early-1990s (Knill 1999). While 
such regulators and agencies have also proliferated in recent years in 
Germany (e.g. the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) – 
regulating domains such as electricity, telecommunication, gas, postal 
services and railways (founded in 2005) – flood management and land-use 
regulation is primarily managed through a hierarchically-organised 
executive with Landes environment agencies often serving in a purely 
scientific advisory and information-providing function.  
This institutional status of the EA is also interesting from a 
regulatory state perspective. First, one prominent feature of the ‘regulatory 
state’ is the existence of independent regulators outside the departmental 
hierarchy in which expertise can be concentrated and the state commits with 
credibility and time-consistency to particular policies (Majone 1994). This is 
associated with a greater problem-solving capacity and can be argued to 
imply the rise of technical instruments such as risk maps.  
Secondly however, the earlier discussions of England’s land-use 
regulation suggest that risk instruments serve control purposes. This need for 
control in turn arises due to the expected blame following major flood 
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disasters. The concern of the EA to be exposed to blame is a result of its 
peculiar position as a semi-autonomous agency with wide-ranging 
responsibilities in flood management. In fact scholars discuss the 
establishment of autonomous agencies as a blame-shifting strategy by 
policy-makers (Hood 2002). In Germany responsibilities for land-use 
regulation are much more diffuse across organisations and territory (local 
and regional planning and water authorities), implying a more difficult and 
localised assignment of blame.
71
 DEFRA as a government department 
overseeing flood management policies puts a greater emphasis on 
accountability in the ‘Making Space for Water’ strategy and thereby 
acknowledges the importance of blame attribution. In its ‘Making Space for 
Water’ strategy:  
“There will be transparent and measurable targets and performance 
indicators, in terms of managing risks to people, property and the 
environment, to ensure that those responsible for delivering the strategy 
can be held account for“ (DEFRA 2005:15). 
These targets are in turn directly linked to the EA. In the words of a 
DEFRA official: 
“we have been transferring a lot of responsibility from the department to 
the Environment Agency. (...) And we set High-Level Targets and 
Outcome Measures that relate to the programmes of the Agency” 
(DEFRA 2008, interview).    
In view of this exposure to institutional risk the EA’s endorsement of 
risk instruments to expand and improve control over local planning decisions 
(as well as to communicate that there is no safety from flooding) becomes 
much more understandable.    
                                                 
71
 The infamous case of Röderau-Süd near Dresden illustrates the complexity of the 
institutional arrangements. The local authority of Röderau obtained permission to develop 
Röderau-Süd by the regional planners in Dresden in 1992 during the post-unification 
construction boom in Eastern Germany. The development was permitted even against the 
advice of local environment authorities (Local Environment Agency Radebeul) because 
Saxony’s Environment Ministry simply declared the area to be off-floodplain. Intriguingly 
while a court case (due to danger to life) could have been made against the involved 
authorities the property owners were simply bought off after the 2002 floods with the 
promise of a state-funded resettlement (Spiegel, 04.08.2003).  
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6.5.3 Styles of administration: Legalism versus managerial 
administration 
Another factor that has significantly been shaping the choices of actors 
within Germany’s land-use domain has been the prospect of a judicial 
review of restrictions on land use. The importance of this review reflects 
Germany’s constitutional principle of the Rechtsstaat (Article 19.4 of the 
Basic Law). The Rechtsstaat means most notably that any public 
administrative intervention and operation needs to be based on a legislative 
rule and is subject to judicial review through the public administrative 
(Verwaltungsgerichte) and ultimately the constitutional court systems 
(Verfassungsgerichte).  
Commentators on Germany’s environmental policy have pointed to 
the formalism and juridification of its policies and have as well observed that 
Germany is the European leader in statutory, codified environmental 
regulation and has achieved a large density of environmental legal 
regulations (Weale 1992; RSU 1994; Weidner 1995). This codification of 
Germany’s policies and administrative measures dates back to pre- and 
semi-democratic times underlining the historical entrenchment of legal rule-
based state action (Schmidt 2008). Knill (1999) concludes that the 
comprehensive body of public administrative law provides a ‘rigid 
backbone’ of constraint for state authorities, with binding legislation 
prescribing most aspects of the decisions and measures by public authorities.  
One of the key rationales for the legalism underpinning 
administrative operations in Germany is that of protecting citizens from 
disproportionate state interventions and restrictions. Any intervention that 
implies (potentially disproportionate) restrictions on the freedom of citizens 
therefore is to be based on legislation and can be challenged in 
administrative courts. In order to avoid the annulment of the measures or 
compensation payments to the affected citizens, interventions therefore need 
to be based on clear and stable legal categories and take into account the 
state-provided safety. This is reflected in the bifurcation in the 
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restrictiveness of regulations between the clearly defined and unprotected 
‘inundation areas’ and vaguely defined and often protected ‘flood-prone 
areas’ as well as the planners’ hesitation to integrate the latter areas into 
administrative practice for fear of legal challenges.   
Such an extensive body of public law upon which public 
interventions can be based and reviewed is absent in England. The PPG and 
PPS25  are not formally binding legislation but offer non-binding guidance 
to local planners. That notwithstanding local planners should take these 
national policies into account when making development plans and taking 
individual decisions. Violations of such policies can lead to an appeals 
process that is for the vast majority of cases handled through the Planning 
Inspectorate (PINS). If PINS cannot resolve the issue the Secretary of State 
from the planning ministry DCLG is called upon to decide. A final appeal 
against the Secretary’s decision can be brought to the High Court of Justice 
that offers the ultimate venue to appeal planning decisions. The appeals are 
decided by individual inspectors trying to balance the opposing interests and 
policies relevant to an individual case. As one inspector notes, in 
highlighting the variability and flexibility of England’s review process: 
“we inspectors evaluate the discretion that local planners exercise. 
Different people, planners, inspectors, evaluate different things 
differently. PPGs do not provide a ranking order among themselves. [In 
most cases,] a lot of different national policies are relevant. And for some 
policies, proposals comply, for other cases partially comply and for some 
others, they were against the policies. So what each individual inspector 
does, with his own experiences in mind, is to decide which policies and 
which degree of compliance is really important” (PINS 2009, interview).     
The review process organised through PINS examining non-binding 
guidance therefore appears to be much less of a concern in terms of 
institutional risks for the actors in England’s planning system than the more 
formalised judicial review through Germany’s administrative courts. 
Individual appeals may be lost to developers but no abstract, widely applied 
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legal categories – such as ‘flood-prone areas’ and associated regulations – 
are being reviewed. 
The discussion of institutional factors shaping the ‘regulatory states’ 
in the land-use domains of Germany and England’s flood regimes sheds 
light on the different ways in which regulatory states can be organised, how 
risk is used to organise relations between central/Federal state actors and 
lower level governments and serves the purposes of central state control, and 
also how the use of risk is constrained and driven by aspects of state 
structure and operating procedures.  
The regulatory state in Germany seems to be neither rising nor in any 
way ‘better regulated’. Rather it is spatially limited to the threshold of state-
provided safety – that is it reinforces the image of the state as protecting the 
population against flood events with a greater probability than HQ100. 
Preventing development between river channels and HQ100 boundaries 
(often coinciding with HQ100 flood defences) through tight regulation does 
not necessarily replace but rather complements the infrastructure state in the 
pursuit of providing security to the population. Germany’s complementary 
‘regulatory state’ does not make systematic use of the risk instruments’ 
potential to better target regulations in order to better the ‘regulatory state’. 
This is not only a consequence of the implicit HQ100 safety promise but 
also owes to the weight of potential legal challenges of restrictions in 
Germany’s Rechtsstaat that constitutes the institutional risk of annulment 
and compensation payments for the regulators. 
The regulatory state in England looks much more as might be 
expected from the literature. An increasingly important actor is an 
autonomous regulatory agency. Regulatory interventions ‘smartly’ take into 
account different levels of risk. Moreover the effects of flood defences 
associated with the interventionist state are ignored in key risk assessments. 
However while the literature assumes improved problem-solving and a 
lower regulatory burden on users of flood risk areas thanks to risk-based 
targeting and expert-driven regulation the concepts and instruments of risk 
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are also used as indirect means of control over autonomous local planners 
that is used mostly by the EA to communicate the uncertainty of protection 
and avoid blame.  
6.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter started off with ‘better regulation’ arguments about the use of 
risk in the land-use regulation domain. These arguments’ main concerns are 
that regulations fail to achieve their particular purposes, mostly due to 
excessive restrictiveness. Within flood regimes land-use regulation needs to 
strike a balance between preventing asset accumulation in areas at flood risk 
and not stifling the economic utility of floodplains. To achieve these goals 
proponents of ‘better regulation’ may point to the benefits of risk-based 
regulation. The concept and instruments of risk help in identifying the 
boundaries of the areas that should be subject to regulations and allow for 
differential treatment within these areas depending on varying levels of risk 
and vulnerability.  
The discussions of Germany and England raise questions about the 
validity of arguments that propose that the use of concepts and instruments 
of risk in regulation is mostly motivated by a ‘better regulation’ agenda. 
These questions emerge because first, Germany’s risk-based regulation is de 
facto concentrated on a single flood zone, within which regulation is 
extremely tight and beyond which regulations do little to control the 
accumulation of assets. This binary form of regulation is very different from 
the risk-based regulation envisaged by ‘better regulation’ advocates. In 
contrast England’s risk-based regulation closely resembles the regulatory 
state shaped by ‘better regulation’ ideas of varied and targeted interventions. 
Second, however, in both cases the use of risk in the land-use domain is 
shaped by concerns of involved actors about their capability of regulating 
land use in flood risk areas. In Germany’s case there is a concern on the one 
hand, about the judicial review of planning decisions among actors  (for 
example on Landes and local levels) within the planning system that convert 
legal concepts such as flood-prone areas into administrative interventions. 
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On the other hand, there is also a concern about the deficit of legal 
regulations on Länder level among Federal lawmakers. England’s central 
government flood managers use risk to exercise control over autonomous 
local planners whose prior planning decisions can (partly) be blamed for the 
asset accumulation in areas at flood risk. Local planners in turn use risk 
instruments to justify their planning decisions vis-a-vis developers. 
Which factors are responsible for these deviations from ‘better 
regulation’ goals for land-use regulation? Germany’s case shows that certain 
features of its institutional configuration interfere with risk-based ‘better 
regulation’. Germany’s protective state fits well with the idea of ruling out 
developments in unsafe, i.e. unprotected areas because such a stringent 
regulation makes sure that the state keeps its safety promise (by preventing 
settlement in HQ100 areas rather than protecting up to HQ100). At the same 
time the protective state struggles to acknowledge the uncertainty in the 
safety provided by the state. The German Rechtsstaat makes regulation of 
land use beyond HQ100 difficult because it requires that interventions into 
individual (property) rights are justified – for example by arguing that they 
are necessary for the safety of an individual. In the Rechtsstaat interventions 
also need to be based on clear, legal categories such as HQ100 as the 
historically grown safety standard for flood defences. In short cognitive, 
normative and procedural barriers to the use of the concept and instruments 
of risk to achieve ‘better regulation’ with more variable risk-based 
interventions that ‘smartly’ address the problems of asset allocation in areas 
at flood risk can be found for Germany’s case. Risk (most notably the term 
of HQ100) is used to define the boundaries of the ‘regulatory state’ in this 
domain in a manner that reflects the power and interests of actors at Federal 
and state levels within the context of Germany’s Bundesstaat (Federal state). 
At the same time it remains compatible with the idea of a state that protects 
its population against most disasters and the procedural and normative 
requirements of Germany’s Rechtsstaat.   
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England’s case underpins the arguments about the barriers to better 
regulation made for the German case. In the absence of the legalistic 
requirements of the Rechtsstaat and its protection promise risk instruments 
reflect the uncertainty of safety, and interventions vary along risk and 
vulnerability levels. However the motivation behind the adoption of such 
risk-based regulation is not to strike an optimal balance between precaution 
and the economic utilisation of flood risk areas. Rather the key user of the 
concept and instruments of risk (the Environment Agency) uses risk as an 
indirect means to exercise control over autonomous local planners in order 
to reduce potential damage from flood events (the more damage the greater 
the blame to be allocated after the disaster) and to (help local planners) fend 
off potential challenges of developers when their proposals are rejected.   
The ‘better regulation’ agenda can be argued to have a strong appeal 
to actors within the land-use regulation domain of flood regimes. This is 
because the involved actors need to balance the objectives of precaution and 
economic utilisation – and risk-based regulation can help avoid too tight or 
too loose restrictions for areas at different degrees of risk. However in 
Germany’s case the institutional foundations of the state compel actors to 
regulate extremely tightly (in inundation areas) and extremely loosely 
(beyond HQ100). England’s case, on the other hand, shows how risk-based 
regulation may help actors in a particular institutional context to reduce their 
own institutional risk. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISASTER FINANCING, INSURANCE AND MARKET 
FAILURES 
Disaster financing is about both ‘treasure’ and ‘regulation’ but does not 
discuss them exclusively as government tools. Rather, insurance emerges as 
an alternative private mechanism available for providing compensation and 
regulation. 
More specifically, disaster financing can be organised privately or 
publicly (even though there are also some hybrid models, in particular for 
disaster insurance). Organised privately, damages from flooding are 
remedied individually or through private third parties, in particular the 
insurance industry. If financed publicly, the state steps in and makes 
compensation available to the victims of flood disasters. This chapter takes a 
special interest in collective disaster financing mechanisms, reflecting the 
insight that the damage caused by natural disasters often exceeds the 
capacities of individual households and small businesses. While desirable in 
view of the scale of damage, transferring the responsibility for disaster 
financing from individuals to collective actors is also problematic. Relieved 
of financial risks, individuals may disregard or even exacerbate their 
exposure to flooding, a phenomenon normally linked to the concept of moral 
hazard.   
Private insurance has been propagated by a number of commentators 
(Harrington 2000; Priest 1996) as the most effective collective mechanism 
for assuming individual risks and reducing overall financial risks.  This 
resonates with neoliberal arguments, since these are not only about a retreat 
and reconfiguration of the state but also the superiority of market and private 
corporate mechanisms for managing risks. Over the last two decades, these 
ideas have also been put into practice. States have deregulated financial 
institutions and markets, and have promoted individual responsibility for 
risks faced by individuals (Rose 1996). In terms of risk management, the 
advocates of market mechanisms have criticised public insurance 
mechanisms (such as social insurance) that have been challenged as 
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fostering a ‘culture of dependency’ and leading to the erosion of individual 
responsibility (Aharoni 1981). Private insurance, in contrast, makes use of 
the price mechanism and contract terms to signal the level of risk exposure 
to individuals, thereby turning individuals into ‘agents of prevention’ rather 
than ‘immoral’ risk-takers (Ericson, Doyle and Barry 2003). At the same 
time, the dismantling of public insurance has attracted criticism. For 
example, it has been interpreted as a scheme by the more affluent that would 
get better contractual conditions and services on the private market. Their 
withdrawal from the public insurance pool would undermine the viability of 
public insurance scheme (Rosanvallon 2000; Garland 2003).  
Commercial flood insurance is available in Germany and England 
and has been acknowledged to be essential for private flood risk 
management by key state actors within the two countries’ flood regimes 
(LAWA 2004; ABI and Government 2008). More generally, insurance 
markets have been deregulated across Europe (when the Third Non-Life 
Insurance Directive (EC 1992) became effective in 1994). At the same time, 
public social insurance systems (for instance, Germany’s Hartz IV reforms 
under the Schröder government or the rise of means-tested welfare benefits 
in England under Thatcher’s government) have been trimmed in many 
European countries. Is there a discernible trend towards market-based 
disaster financing in Germany’s and England’s flood regimes? Do the 
market-based mechanisms accomplish the tasks of disaster financing, that is 
the pooling and reducing of financial risks?    
 These questions are closely related to the availability and role of the 
concept and instruments of risk within flood regimes. This is because risk 
calculations are essential for private insurers to manage financial risks. In a 
nutshell, insurers rely on assessments of probable annual and total losses to 
build sufficient capital reserves and of individual risks to price risk transfer 
in a manner that creates incentives for the insurers’ (prospective) clients to 
reduce damage potential. This ensures an efficient pay-out of compensation 
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and an overall reduction of damage potential. Are risk instruments 
developed and used for these purposes in the two countries’ flood regimes?     
The chapter begins with a discussion of the particular challenges 
different forms of disaster financing face, and how risk instruments are 
deemed essential to overcome barriers to organising this domain efficiently. 
The next section analyses how disaster financing is organised in the two 
countries. This is followed by an analysis of why insurance markets fail both 
to compensate and regulate in these two countries. 
7.1 THE NEED FOR AND CHALLENGES OF DISASTER FINANCING  
 Recent flood events in Germany and Britain have led to record economic 
losses from flooding, easily exceeding one billion EUR and GBP 
respectively
72
. These aggregate damage figures actually conceal the tragedy 
of flooding for affected individuals and businesses. An expert from the 
major British insurer Aviva estimates that the average flood claim would be 
between GBP 10,000 (~EUR 15,400
73
) and GBP 15,000 (~EUR 23,200) 
(Stevenson 2003). Pohlhausen (1999) assumes average damages of DEM 
10,000 (~EUR 5,100) to 30,000 (~EUR 15,300) for German households. 
These are large sums of money for individual households and small 
businesses to absorb, and they reveal that substantial financial resources 
must be mobilised to remedy the adverse impact of flood disasters – along 
with measures that help reduce flood damage. 
The previous chapters 5 and 6 have highlighted how measures in the 
flood defence domain (aiming at preventing damages) and land-use control 
(using regulatory interventions to reduce accumulation of values in areas at 
risk) do not always achieve their flood management objectives. Interventions 
in these domains therefore need to be complemented and can even be 
partially replaced by measures of disaster financing. In terms of damage 
prevention, disaster financing can ameliorate the adverse consequences of 
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 An overview over damages caused by flooding in Germany and England follows in 
section 7.2 and 7.3.   
73
 Calculated on the basis of historical exchange rates. 
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flood damage on the material well-being of individuals through financial 
compensation financed collectively through taxpayers or insurance 
collectives. In terms of regulating ‘risky’ value accumulation, actors 
providing compensation can make this post-disaster financial support 
conditional upon compliance with certain regulations, including the payment 
of varying insurance premium rates (attaching a certain cost to particular 
activities, such as locating a house on the riverside) or particular building 
measures (e.g. elevating the ground floor or banning oil tanks in basements).  
Most simply put, there are two general challenges to organising 
collective disaster financing. The first challenge is that as much as individual 
financial capacities can be overwhelmed by the scale of natural disasters, 
collective mechanisms can also struggle to cope with large-scale 
compensation demands. One example for such difficulties has been the 
insolvency of nine insurance companies in the United States after hurricane 
Andrew in 1992 (Kunreuther 1996). Another involves the budgetary and 
economic consequences of state-provided compensation, as argued by 
Schwarze and Wagner (2004) for the case of the substantial state support 
paid out in the aftermath of the Elbe 2002 floods.  
The second challenge concerns the risk-taking behaviour of 
individuals and organisations. More specifically, the problem of moral 
hazard emerges once the consequences of one’s actions are borne by another 
party. Concretely, moral hazard has often been used to describe the fact that 
once insured, individuals behave more negligently and/or are more risk-
taking than if they were uninsured (Arrow 1971). This points to a potential 
trade-off between the ‘social’ objectives of disaster financing (helping 
overwhelmed individuals) and the ‘regulatory’ goals (discouraging risk-
taking behaviour by restricting access to financial compensation). This kind 
of ‘moral hazard’ is not only an issue for individual insurance clients but 
also for organisations. One example is insurers themselves, for example 
when they are bailed out after a major disaster such as 9/11 (Ericson and 
Doyle 2004b). Even the government may act immorally if another party 
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shoulders the financial risks associated with a particular course of action 
(Huber 2004).    
How does risk help in coping with these challenges? The concept and 
instruments of risk offer solutions that ensure that adequate financial means 
are in place, and that moral hazards are being managed. In the domain of 
disaster financing, actors not only take an interest in risk instruments that 
show the distribution over land of different water quantities but in particular 
in the material effects of the water on buildings and infrastructure. To this 
end, probabilistic modelling of flood events, focusing on probability of 
occurrence, can be combined with records of economic losses associated 
with different water quantities (e.g. claims data from insurers) to calculate 
damage potential curves
74
 that can be overlaid on maps of current land uses 
and actuarial exposure to estimate expected annual losses for different land 
uses. On this basis, actors providing disaster financing can anticipate the 
claims for compensation that they can expect annually and in a worst case 
scenario. This allows them to build adequate financial reserves, avoiding the 
opportunity costs associated with building too large reserves and the 
transaction costs that go with mobilising resources for rapid recovery at 
short notice in case of insufficient reserves. Risk instruments are therefore 
necessary for an efficient organisation of risk spreading across space and 
time. 
The actors can also estimate differences in the probabilities with 
which different areas and values are affected. This makes it possible for 
them to design access to compensation in a way that reflects different levels 
of risk and is conditional upon specific risk-related behaviour. Through 
variable pricing and conditionality, activities – such as constructing a house 
in an area at great risk from flooding – that potentially result in major 
damage are to be avoided, and those that have limited potential for damage 
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 Such calculations use depth-damage function. These functions express a mathematical 
relationship between the flood water depth and the amount of damage that can be attributed 
to that water.  
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should be encouraged. Risk calculations are therefore instrumental for 
controlling moral hazard and regulating human behaviour. 
This way of using risk instruments is often argued to be found in 
disaster financing systems based on private insurance markets and industry 
(Ewald 1991). Insurance-based systems are credited for their efficient and 
reliable delivery of compensation, based on the terms and conditions of 
insurance contracts. Insurers are argued to benefit from substantial loss 
assessment, claims management and risk assessment expertise (SwissRe 
2002; Jongejan 2007).  
Moreover, it is argued that insurers make contributions to reducing 
damage potential (Priest 1996). They do so, first, on the basis of their ability 
to aggregate different ‘risks’ (i.e. clients) which enable them – on the basis 
of the Law of Large Numbers – to improve predictive accuracy. Second, 
insurance-based compensation is based on the mechanism that insurers 
collect regular premiums from a large number of clients before an event so 
that insurers can compensate affected individuals after an event. Before 
assuming the financial risk of future flood events on behalf of their clients, 
insurers therefore normally define the (contractual) conditions under which 
this risk transfer takes place, segregating the aggregated risks again into 
subpools with different risk levels. With the aid of risk-assessment 
instruments, insurers can require different groups of prospective clients to 
pay risk-adequate prices for their risk transfer and to undertake risk-
mitigating measures.  
An important alternative to insurance-based financing, namely public 
disaster relief and compensation in the aftermath of an event
75
 is often 
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 The mechanisms discussed are, on the one hand, inspired by the mechanisms in use in 
Germany and England. On the other hand, another mechanism that could be in place is the 
use of ex-ante national disaster funds. However, this is not considered because it is likely to 
be much less common. Reserving public money for rare events such as flooding (remember 
the flood-free phase between 1950 and 1993 and the safety standards in Germany) is 
politically problematic. Another option would be disaster financing through the use of the 
judicial system (through Tort law). However, this requires a clear allocation of 
responsibility and blame. This is difficult in flood management because of the causal 
complexity of flood events and the formally limited (or shared with the public) 
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presented as the inferior approach to disaster financing (Priest 1996; 
Harrington 2000). In the case of ex-post public disaster aid, scholars have 
raised questions in respect of the ability of governmental disaster financing 
to provide means for recovery efficiently and incentives for risk mitigation. 
On the one hand, the capacity of government aid to assist recovery has been 
questioned because pay-outs in the aftermath of a disaster are uncertain and 
unpredictable in terms of their amount, timing and distribution and rely often 
upon unwritten moral rights and political expediency as well as 
inexperienced staff for loss adjustment and claims management (SwissRe 
2002; Schwarze and Wagner 2006). On the other hand, government aid is 
distributed on the basis of post-disaster needs and damages and in the name 
of solidarity in an emergency (Klimaszewski-Blettner and Richter 2007). 
The flipside of this orientation is that behaviour before the disaster – for 
example where and how a building is constructed – is not taken into account 
when compensation is paid out. Rather than setting economic incentives that 
sanction certain types of risky behaviour, ex-post government aid shields 
individuals and organisations from the adverse financial consequences of 
activities that increase their damage potential (Schwarze and Wagner 2004). 
State compensation is subject to the democratic principles of inclusiveness 
and political opportunism that make it difficult to manage moral hazard 
(Priest 1996). 
Given the suggested superiority of market-based financing 
mechanisms in achieving social and regulatory objectives, its endorsement in 
Germany and England’s flood regimes should elicit little surprise. In 
Germany, the state-Federal working group on water issues, LAWA (1995), 
highlights the important role of flood insurance as part of a precautionary 
approach to reduce the impact of flood disasters: 
                                                                                                                             
responsibility of governmental actors (see the ‘contingent’ role of England’s state and the 
responsibilities of the individual to take precautions in Germany’s WHG §31a). Finally, it is 
crucial to note that the aforementioned mechanisms aim to provide collective solutions to 
disaster financing because this thesis studies the governance of flood risk. However, 
financial risks are – to varying degrees – retained by the individuals. 
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“Without the protection of elemental insurance which also covers flood 
risk, all investments in structural flood protection and the promotion of 
individual precaution remain incoherent” (ibid:18). 
From the German insurers’ perspective, insuring flooding opens new 
opportunities on a potentially profitable market. An expert from the reinsurer 
Deutsche Rück notes: 
“our objective as an industry is to expand the market penetration for our 
Elemental Damage Optional Insurance product” (Deutsche Rück 2008, 
Interview). 
Defra, Britain’s Environment Ministry, has jointly with the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) – issued a statement that:  
“both want that flood insurance remains as affordable and widely 
available as possible  so that consumers and small businesses continue to 
be able to protect themselves from the financial cost of flooding” (ABI 
and Government 2008).  
This endorsement of insurance-based disaster financing can be found 
not only in policy documents but also in corporate practice. Commercial 
insurers in both countries typically offer flood cover as part of bundled 
packages. In England, flood cover is a part of the standard all-risk building 
and home content insurance policies whilst Germany’s Elemental Damage 
Insurance (Elementarschaden-Zusatzversicherung) – covering flooding, 
earthquake, snow storms, and volcano eruptions – can be added as an option 
to property and home contents packages.  
While there are arguments for the superiority of insurance solutions 
in risk management, the establishment of disaster insurance markets is not a 
common phenomenon. In many cases the state assumes an important role as 
regulator or reinsurer of the disaster insurance markets. One example of a 
market with regulatory interference is the property insurance market in 
hurricane-prone Florida. Here, the state – in addition to providing residual 
insurance cover to those not served by private insurers (Klein 2008) – 
regulates premium setting, which in turn affects the supply of private 
insurance because the regulated rates are often perceived as non-adequate for 
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higher risk levels. In France and Spain, governments act as reinsurer of last 
resort through the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance and Consorcio de 
Compensacion de Seguros respectively. Similar financial and regulatory 
interventions can be found in many European countries (see Prettenthaler 
and Vetters 2004 for an overview of flood risk insurance). In Germany and 
England, however, the governments do not formally interfere with the 
insurance markets.  
The state interventions in other European countries have to be seen in 
the context of the discussion of insurance market failures. Scholars highlight 
barriers to establishing a working disaster risk insurance market and point to 
the possibility of market failures (Kunreuther 1996; Froot 1999; Moss 1999). 
Whether these accounts are relevant for the cases of Germany and England 
where commercial flood insurance markets are largely unregulated will be 
discussed after exploring the extent to which markets have indeed assumed a 
central role in the disaster financing domains of the two countries. If not, 
how and why does the role of commercial insurers vary, in particular with 
regard to their use of risk instruments and their interactions with the 
government as a potential alternative provider of disaster financing?  
7.2 EXAMINING RISK IN GERMANY’S DISASTER FINANCING 
Market-based solutions to disaster financing through private insurance on a 
national scale are a comparatively recent innovation in Germany’s flood 
regime. The aforementioned Elemental Damage option has been introduced 
into the market as recently as in the early 1990s. Prior to this, flood cover 
was part of a mandatory home insurance offered only in the state of Baden-
Wurttemberg by two regional insurers that held the monopoly over specific 
areas of that Land.
76
 In the other Länder in western Germany, private 
                                                 
76
 Germany’s insurance system used to be (before the EU deregulation in 1994) organised in 
two tiers, commercial and monopoly insurers. For centuries (e.g. the Hamburger Feuerkasse 
since 1676), the insurance of buildings was organised as regional monopolies and 
compulsory insurances. However, while most monopoly insurers offered natural disaster 
policies, these only covered hail and storms. The exception were the Badische 
Gebäudeversicherung and the Wurttembergische Gebäudeversicherung whose natural 
disaster policies included flooding, avalanches, snow, and earthquake. 
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insurers did not offer any coverage for flood damage. Under the GDR, 
households in Eastern Germany were insured through a state-owned, 
national non-life insurer.  
These insurance arrangements, however, changed in the early 1990s. 
Many of the policies of the GDR’s non-life insurer were taken on by 
Western German private insurers. In 1991, Germany’s insurance regulator, 
at that time the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen (BAV), 
allowed private insurers to offer products that covered elemental damages. 
However, market access was initially restricted by regulations to those areas 
in which no regional monopoly insurers offered coverage (i.e. outside 
Baden-Wurttemberg). This practice was changed when the aforementioned 
Third Non-Life Insurance Directive became effective on 1 July 1994 
requiring the deregulation of the monopolistically organised regional 
markets.  
In parallel with these wider changes to the insurance market, the 
government has also become increasingly involved in disaster financing, 
most notably in the aftermath of the 1997 Odra flood and the Elbe 2002 
floods. The following sections demonstrate the role of risk instruments 
within this public–private organisation of disaster financing. 
7.2.1 Detecting: Assessing varying exposures to flood risk  
‘Detecting’ in the domain of disaster financing is important for predicting 
potential aggregate and individual compensation needs so as to assess 
exposure, build adequate reserves, charge appropriate premiums and thereby 
encourage individuals to mitigate flood risk. Actors in this domain therefore 
are interested in flood mapping and zoning, damage potential assessments, 
and aggregate loss calculations for events with varying probabilities. What is 
notable about Germany’s detecting is that even though both the insurance 
industry and government are involved in disaster financing, it is only the 
insurance industry that collectively and substantially invests in risk mapping 
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and modelling for the purposes of disaster financing rather than the 
government.    
Early assessment explicitly related to the needs of disaster financing 
was undertaken only by Germany’s insurance industry, not by state actors. 
These early assessments used for elemental damage underwriting relied on 
qualitative-descriptive tools, such as home-owner questionnaires in which 
the history of flooding and its material consequences for a particular 
building was enquired about (Falkenhagen 2005). The data obtained through 
these methods was, however, poor as questionnaires were often not filled in 
completely and the local and historical knowledge was not always available 
to the owner. Moreover, flood risk assessments available to the insurers from 
governmental actors were deemed inadequate for insurance purposes, 
primarily due to their fragmentation along administrative boundaries that 
would undermine consistency in exposure and premium calculation (GDV 
2008c, interview). As an expert from Germany’s association of insurers 
(Gesamtverband der deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft, GdV)  notes:  
“we as the insurance industry told the LAWA a hundred times to 
improve their data provision and gathering” (GDV 2008a, interview). 
In the aftermath of the 1997 Odra flooding and its substantive 
economic damage, the insurance industry jointly undertook a nation-wide 
flood risk assessment project, resulting in the instrument ‘Zoning System for 
Flooding and Extreme Rainfall’ (ZÜRS), which first became available in 
2001. The development of ZÜRS was undertaken as a joint project, led by 
the GDV because ’it would be too expensive for an individual company to 
do this by itself’ (Deutsche Rück 2008, interview). As this activity suggests, 
the GDV is more than simply a trade association concerned with political 
lobbying or representing the interests of the industry vis-a-vis the 
government, consumers, and other interest groups. It collects and analyses 
damage data from its members, and generates best practice and standards for 
its members. As such an association, it is allowed by competition authorities 
to produce technical instruments such as risk assessment tools as long as 
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they are ‘competition-neutral’ (that is, the instruments do not favour 
particular groups of companies by selectively providing such instruments).  
ZÜRS basically is a flood hazard map. It allows insurers to locate the 
properties of their (prospective) clients in different flood zones, 
differentiated by the probabilistically-defined boundaries of HQ10, HQ50 
and HQ200. With the support of this new industry-wide assessment tool, 
industry representatives estimate that approximately 80% of areas could in 
principle be insured against flooding (Hauner 2004:61; Schwarze and 
Wagner 2004). ZÜRS has assumed a central role in assessing flood risk for 
Germany’s insurance industry:  
“ZÜRS is the standard for the German insurance industry – and there is 
nothing beyond that. There is also no interest by individual insurers to do 
something different because they all back this product financially and 
technically” (Deutsche Rück 2008, interview). 
Combined with the specific insured values of individual properties and home 
contents, ZÜRS’ probability zones help insurers to price insurance cover 
adequately in view of varying risk levels.   
The pattern of insurance-led, collective risk assessments is not 
restricted to the development of flood maps. It also includes the so-called 
‘HQkumul’ project, which was completed jointly by seven reinsurers and the 
GdV in 2008 and delivered a probabilistic flood model covering the entire 
country and providing information also about the cumulative exposure of 
insurers and reinsurers to losses from flooding. In contrast to ZÜRS (which 
informs insurers about probability of inundation), HQkumul – as produced 
by the GDV for primary insurers – combines probabilities with the GDV 
member data on damage to produce damage functions for the different 
insurance segments affected by flood events (e.g. building insurance). With 
such ‘detecting’ capacity in place, insurers are in principle able to assume 
the ‘compensatory’ and ‘regulatory’ function attributed to insurance-based 
disaster financing. 
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Compared to the private insurance industry state actors have 
undertaken limited activities to assess the financial risks they face from 
flooding. Apart from making the data produced for their own purposes  (that 
is to determine floodplains and the safety levels for flood defences) freely 
available to the insurance industry because ‘only if the insurers know the 
risk, can they insure it’ (SMUL 2008, interview), state actors have done little 
to consider the financial risks they face. They do not make use of available 
risk instruments (e.g. the Rhine Atlas with its damage potential assessment) 
even though public disaster relief and compensation has played a significant 
role in some recent flood events, most notably the 2002 flood event at the 
Elbe. In the aftermath of these 2002 floods, the Federal government – jointly 
with the Federal states – set up the so-called Aufbauhilfefond (reconstruction 
aid fund), a special fund by Federal government and states (Bundesregierung 
2003). The information requirements for the financing of the damage of 
2002 were limited. Affected individuals – with the aid of engineering 
companies – made claims about damage that were used as the informational 
basis for the compensation, taking into account compensation already 
provided by insurers.  
The pattern in ‘detecting’ reinforces the aforementioned arguments 
about public and private solutions to disaster financing. Private insurers, 
through their heavy investment in risk assessments, gather the information 
required to build adequate reserves and control moral hazard. Public disaster 
financing, however, faces compensatory demands and regulatory needs in a 
state of limited informational preparedness. The pattern therefore underlines 
arguments about the superiority of private solutions to disaster financing 
while the increased engagement of the insurance industry in ‘detecting’ 
supports arguments about shifts to private governance. Does this superiority 
mean that most of the disaster financing in Germany is organised through the 
commercial insurance mechanism?  
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7.2.2 Directing: Standards of insurability and financial risk distribution 
Disaster financing in general pursues the objective of aiding economic 
recovery from flooding without increasing (or even better while decreasing) 
its damage potential. Directing is about defining responsibilities for the 
financial risk from flooding between state, insurance market and individual, 
whether by setting standards for ‘insurability’ or descriptors of events that 
trigger public disaster aid. The most notable aspect of ‘directing’ in 
Germany’s disaster financing domain is the absence of any formal regulation 
and standards that define who bears what financial risks.  
This absence of regulation applies, on the one hand, to disaster 
financing through the commercial insurance market. Rather than being 
regulated in terms of pricing and the provision of flood insurance by the 
state or through mechanisms of self-regulation, underwriting decisions about 
availability, pricing and conditions of flood insurance in Germany are 
shaped by market signals and commercial factors, such as individual 
insurers’ portfolios, capital reserves, access to reinsurance, and competitive 
position. Even though co-ordination in ‘detecting’ through the industry body 
GDV occurs, there is no co-ordinated approach to underwriting and 
insurability. While the joint risk assessment tool ZÜRS informs underwriting 
of flood insurance in Germany as a uniform, industry-wide technical 
instrument, it does not, however, exclusively determine it or provide the 
basis for binding standards. Indeed it does not even provide non-binding 
guidance concerning insurability and pricing insurance products. As survey 
data collected by Thieken and colleagues after 2002 suggest, ZÜRS is being 
used in combination with each insurance company’s data on insured values 
and further input to determine availability and pricing of insurance products 
(Thieken et al. 2006).  
On the other hand, particular rules and standards are also absent in 
the determination of public disaster aid and compensation. There is no 
concrete legal obligation for the Federal government or Länder governments 
 241 
to provide disaster compensation. Constitutionally, it is the Länder that hold 
the primary responsibility for flood management and disaster management 
(‘Katastrophenschutz’) in Germany’s Federal state. Consequently, they are 
also the first ones to become involved in disaster financing. However, once 
the disaster assumes ‘supra-regional’ (überregionale) dimensions, the 
Länder can ask the Federal government for support. The issue with this 
threshold rule is, as an official of the Federal Ministry of Finances notes, 
that:  
“the definition of ‘supra-regional’ is not codified but based on 
experiences” (BMF 2008, interview).  
Consequently, allocation of responsibility and access to public 
disaster financing are influenced by political considerations and determined 
through negotiation rather than probabilistically-defined rules or thresholds 
for intervention. This can be illustrated by the state compensation that was 
paid out in the aftermath of the 1997 and 2002 floods. The Federal 
government got involved in the Odra 1997 floods through a transfer of €250 
million to remedy the damage and reinstate defence infrastructure. The 
Federal Chancellor at that time, Helmut Kohl, visited a disaster-struck area 
and promised that everything would be rebuilt in the way it was. It was a 
purely ‘political decision that surprised all experts’ (LfUG 2008, interview). 
As an expert from Saxony’s Environment Agency notes, the prime minister 
of Brandenburg at that time:  
“Matthias Platzeck, told Kohl that as he promised reinstatement, he will 
also need to pay for it” (LfUG 2008, interview). 
This is not the only example of politically negotiated disaster financing in 
Germany. A similarly ‘political’ decision was made by Kohl’s successor, 
Gerhard Schröder, in the aftermath of the Elbe 2002 floods, to mobilise €3.5 
billion from the Federal level and €3 billion from the Länder governments 
through an Act jointly decided by the Upper Chamber (the Bundesrat with 
Länder government’s representatives) and Lower Chamber (the Bundestag 
with directly elected MPs).  
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In the absence of any explicit statutory duty to provide public 
disaster financing, policy-makers have substantial discretion in case of an 
emergency. Decisions concerning disaster financing are determined by 
political variables, such as an imminent election. Unlike commercial 
decisions of insurers, these political calculations about the provision of 
public disaster financing are not informed by ZÜRS and calculations of 
expected annual losses or other formal assessments of risk. In fact, an 
attempt to introduce a mandatory insurance scheme with rules and 
responsibilities for private and public shares in disaster financing, informed 
by a risk assessment of the probable maximum losses for the elemental 
damages, failed in 2004. In the aftermath of the 2002 flood event, the 
Federal Ministries of Justice and Finances, as well as the Conference of the 
Finance Ministers of the Federal States (Finanzministerkonferenz, FMK) 
approached the GDV to develop a proposal for a mandatory private 
insurance scheme – an initiative driven by the experience of the costly, 
large-scale financial aid in the aftermath of the 2002 Elbe floods. Under the 
proposed scheme, homeowners would have been required to purchase 
insurance whilst insurers would have been obliged to offer insurance 
products on a risk-oriented basis (i.e. with premiums that reflect different 
levels of risk). The scheme would also have implied that the government 
stepped in as an insurer of last resort. Based on the GDV’s risk assessment 
of probable maximum losses for elemental damage, the public reinsurance 
would have had to cover losses exceeding EUR 8 billion up to the probable 
maximum loss of EUR 30 billion, with the first EUR 8 billion covered by 
the private insurance market (Hauner 2004). 
However, the negotiations within the responsible working group of 
Federal and state level governments were discontinued in 2004 from the side 
of the Länder’s finance ministers. They were concerned that the proposed 
scheme was an undesirable formalised commitment to potential financial risk 
(the liability for the potential EUR 22 billion exceeding the threshold of EUR 
8 billion) in contrast to the currently unregulated engagement in disaster 
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financing without any formal commitment and would have faced the problem 
of how to allocate the financial burden between the Federal and state levels 
(Riedel and Hofmann 2004). Apart from the financial risk and the problem of 
negotiating the allocation of financial risks between the different levels of 
government, Schwarze and Wagner (2006) point to political benefits of 
distributing compensation after disasters that makes politicians reluctant to 
reduce their discretion in disaster financing. Finally, policy-makers were 
concerned about whether a mandatory scheme would be reconcilable with 
the constitutionally protected contractual freedom.    
In short, the absence of regulation is reconcilable with the idea of a 
market-based disaster financing. Disaster financing is also provided by the 
German state. State-provided disaster financing without risk-based regulation 
makes financing contingent upon political factors. As the next section will 
show, this political contingency potentially undermines the regulatory and 
compensatory functions of disaster financing. 
7.2.3 Effecting: Compensation and behavioural change 
‘Effecting’ in disaster financing has two aspects. First, it is about the 
distribution and delivery of compensation payments after an event. Second, 
the economic incentives of the prospect of post-disaster financial 
compensation can be employed to shape human behaviour in a way that 
reduces the potential for economic losses from flooding.  
In terms of compensation payments after flood events, Germany’s 
‘effecting’ underpins arguments about the superiority of private insurance 
mechanisms. Although systematic data is rare, the victims of flooding seem 
to be satisfied with the loss compensation services of insurers. As a survey 
undertaken by Thieken and colleagues (2006) suggests, 75% of the insured 
interviewees (n=424 insured households in the Elbe catchment area of 
Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt) were very satisfied with the flood loss 
compensation. While 67.5% of insured households received compensation of 
at least 50% for their losses, full loss compensation was paid out in the case 
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of 25.9% of the insured households. The mean loss compensation of the 
insured households amounted to EUR 23,749. These figures underpin 
arguments about the efficiency of loss compensations by insurers. 
The government’s contribution to improving financial resilience can 
be described as potentially restricted. Thieken’s previously mentioned 
survey (2006) also collected data from uninsured households after the Elbe 
2002 flooding. He collected data from uninsured households that relied on 
government aid. Here, only 32.1% of households (n=389 uninsured 
households) received compensation covering more than 50% of the flood 
damage and only 10.3% got fully compensated. Moreover, only (albeit a still 
impressive) 60% of households were very satisfied with the flood loss 




While these figures more concretely show the shortcomings of public 
disaster financing, the following table 11 illustrates which collective disaster 
financing mechanisms contributed what share of the total flood damage 
compensation.   
Event Total economic 
damage 
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 Note that the mean total flood damage for the categories of insured and uninsured 
households only varied by EUR 936 so that differences in the total damage does not account 
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[DEM 9.5 million 
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Table 11: Disaster financing of selected flood events in Germany 
All data in original values 
* MunichRe, GeoRiskResearch, NatCatService; ** Federal Ministry of Finance 2008 – 
interview; *** Environment Agency Brandenburg 2009, interview; **** Government of 
Saxony (Sachsen 2005)  
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The table underlines the relatively limited role of insurers in 
financing damages, with a two-fifths share in compensation at the 1995 
Rhine floods being the largest proportion of total economic damages carried 
by the insurance industry. It also shows the variable engagement of 
government, with massive outlays for the 1997 Odra and the 2002 Elbe 
floods but a limited role in the 1993 and 1995 Rhine floods. The reasons for 
this variability can be argued to be political, with imminent elections and the 
popularity of solidarity (as reflected in the large private donations) with the 
new Eastern German states being important factors driving political 
decision-makers.  
The availability of public and private disaster financing also has 
significant implications for the second function of this regime domain, 
namely discouraging ‘immoral’ behaviour and encouraging behaviour that 
reduces the damage potential of flooding.  The performance of insurers in 
terms of regulating behaviour is not particularly impressive. The insurance-
based mode of disaster financing makes a limited contribution to regulating 
behavioural and socio-economic processes. Its contribution is based on the 
differentiation of premium levels based on the ZÜRS zoning system. Most 
notably, the widely applied exclusion of zone 4 (GK4) from cover is a clear 
price signal to prospective clients. However, beyond this exclusion of very 
frequently flooded properties (HQ10), the effectiveness of price signals has 
been questioned. An expert of the insurance industry notes that the:  
“average property premium for supplementary stands at about €100 per 
annum. Such a low level of premium rates results in incentive problems 
as rewards and premium reductions for risk mitigation of, say, €10 are 
not really an incentive” (Deutsche Rück 2008, interview).  
An alternative mechanism for structuring insurance contracts is the 
introduction of a deductible or excess. A deductible means that a certain 
amount of the damage has to be borne by the insured before the insurance 
company steps in to cover the excess costs. By requiring those insured to 
bear some of the initial costs of flood damage, a deductible provides an 
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incentive for the insured to take precautionary measures. However, as a 
survey among German insurers (n=25) undertaken by Thieken and her 
colleagues (2006) shows, Germany’s insurers use the deductible in a 
relatively static way and fix it at about 10% of the insured value – regardless 
of locations of the properties in zones with different risk levels. The same 
survey also presents data that reflect the limited availability of financial 
rewards (14% of the sample) insurer-provided information (25-35% of the 
sample) to their clients about private risk mitigation measures (such as flood-
proofing technologies like flood gates or flood-resilient methods like tiled 
floods or elevated electrical points that reduce damage). 
For both functions of disaster financing, the financial/social and 
regulatory, it is very important to bear in mind the limited size of the flood 
insurance market in Germany. Elemental damage supplements for property 
insurance stood at 5% of Germany’s building stock while home content 
policies covering 10% of the building stock included the supplement (Hauner 
2004; Schwarze and Wagner 2004). In view of the small scale of flood 
insurance in Germany, the effects of insurance-based economic incentives 
are necessarily limited (Schwarze and Wagner 2004), as is their total 
contribution to improving the financial resilience of potential victims (see 
Table 7.1 above). The reasons for the small scale of insurance-based 
financing will be discussed more extensively in section 7.4. 
In terms of regulating behaviour, state compensation is provided 
regardless of risk levels after the damage has occurred. Reflecting these 
limitations, Germany’s most prominent case of public disaster financing, the 
2002 floods, reinforces this impression as the government made a promise 
that:  
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 Press conference in Magdeburg, Germany, 26
th
 August 2002. 
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The discussion of Germany’s disaster financing domain illustrates 
that the supposedly superior market-based disaster financing is not an 
inevitable choice for disaster financing. Germany’s flood insurance market is 
of a relatively limited size. This also explains the marginal role of risk 
instruments in this domain. More specifically, where compensation is 
organised through insurers, formalised, industry-wide risk assessment 
instruments play an important role in determining insurability and premium 
rates. Beyond the realm of insurance-based disaster financing, concepts and 
instruments of risk are not being used. This raises questions as to the 
substance of political interest in insurance-based solutions and the barriers to 
establishing insurance markets.  
7.3 EXAMINING RISK IN ENGLAND’S DISASTER FINANCING 
The origins of England’s current, insurance-based approach to disaster 
financing can be traced back to the early 1960s. Flood cover for home 
contents can even be dated back to as early as the 1920s. However, as Arnell 
and colleagues (1984) note in their review of the evolution of flood 
insurance in England, underwriting in this early phase of flood insurance 
was not a business line that was promoted actively. In fact, clients asking for 
cover were treated with suspicion. In the aftermath of the 1952 flood event 
affecting Lynnemouth, English insurers generously provided compensation, 
mostly as a public relations exercise, although they were not contractually 
obliged to do so. After the 1953 East Coast flood, however, which caused 
significantly more damage, insurers were not as generous as to pay 
compensation beyond their contractual obligation. The resulting public 
outcry led to calls in Parliament for the establishment of a government fund 
to finance disasters. This was – according to Arnell and colleagues (ibid.) – 
rejected by the government that argued that it would impinge on the viability 
of the insurance market and that it was fundamentally the responsibility of 
individuals to protect themselves against natural hazards.   
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Following another flood in 1960, the demand for a national disaster 
fund resurfaced as insurance compensation was perceived as too limited. 
The plan of setting up this fund, however, was averted by an informal 
gentlemen’s agreement between the British Insurers Association (BIA, now 
Association of British Insurers (ABI)) and the government. Through this 
agreement, the insurance industry committed to offer flood cover for an 
affordable, standard rate. ‘Only in exceptional circumstances where 
continual, regular flooding was unavoidable’ (Salthouse 2002:71) would 
insurers consider withholding cover or apply especially loaded terms to 
reflect the higher risk of flooding. In return, the government was obliged to 
provide ‘sufficient’ flood protection – though the terms of sufficiency 
remained unspecified (Huber 2004).  
Further calls for state-provided national funds in the aftermath of 
subsequent flood events (1968, 1970) were rejected with reference to the 
wide availability of private flood insurance. Insurers, however, were 
criticised for not promoting the product sufficiently and for offering opt-
outs, and agreed in response with the Building Society Association that flood 
cover should be required for loans and mortgages. During the 1970s, flood 
cover was included into their standard all-Risk household content and 
property insurance policies (Arnell, Clark and Gurnell 1984).  
This arrangement continued to operate throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. The floods of Easter 1998 and Autumn 2000 however, led the 
industry to reconsider the arrangement. The reconsideration resulted in a 
moratorium of two years during which insurers expected the government to 
overhaul its system of flood management while leaving flood cover 
unchanged but subject to review. This had become necessary in view of 
increasing losses and the prospect of future climate change, as well as the 
government’s inadequate investment into the maintenance of existing 
defences and regulation of land-use. In the words of a press release by the 
ABI, 
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“insurance against flooding is provided in virtually all homeowners’ 
insurance policies. The UK is one of only a handful countries throughout 
the world where this is the case. However, climate change, ageing flood 
defences, and some property developments are increasing the risks and 
costs of flooding. The Government needs to take action to ensure that 
flood cover can remain generally available” (Press release ABI 2002, 
quoted in Huber 2004:11). 
In response to these industry concerns and subsequent lobbying, the 
informal gentlemen’s agreement from 1961 was replaced by the publication, 
in late 2002,of the so-called Statement of Principles (ABI 2002). In it, the 
ABI lays out its commitment to continue providing insurance and the 
conditions for the insurability of flooding, including quantitative, risk-based 
thresholds (the HQ75 standard) and qualitative demands concerning the 
government’s flood management measures. The following sections discuss 
the emerging arrangements for England’s disaster financing in greater detail.  
7.3.1 Detecting: Assessing varying exposures to flood risk  
Britain’s insurers began to show a systematic interest in risk assessments for 
flooding after suffering large losses from the Easter flooding in 1998 and the 
following floods in 2000. For instance, the market leader Aviva (then called 
Norwich Union) recognised that:  
“following the flooding in the UK in the Autumn of 2000 which cost 
Norwich Union within the UK over £200m, our understanding and 
ability to assess accurately the risk of flooding was not sufficient” (Αviva 
2009b, interview). 
Prior to these flood events:  
“most insurers (...) within the UK generally did not consider the flood 
risk as a peril which warranted a great deal of attention. (...) Underwriters 
could simply assess what was a sufficient premium level for normal 
weather losses and then adjust based on any large catastrophic provision 
level. (...) Consequently, the degree of sophistication in assessment and 
rating used to be far more limited” (Aviva 2009b, interview). 
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The inadequacy of the insurers’ own assessment capacities was 
complemented by unsuitable publicly available risk data at that time. As an 
expert from Aviva points out: 
“in fact, it [the Indicative Flood Maps from the Environment Agency] 
was not created for insurance purposes but primarily for local planning 
and to get a general overview over flood risk in the UK” (Aviva 2008a, 
interview). 
In response to this perceived inadequate risk assessment, Aviva 
launched its own flood mapping project in 2002, an initiative that was soon 
followed up by other companies (Crighton 2002). Aviva’s maps distinguish 
seven probability bands (Aviva 2008a, interview). This was much more 
comprehensive and nuanced than the data provided by the Environment 
Agency at that time (namely the aforementioned patchwork Indicative Flood 
Map (see chapter 5) defining a HQ100 flood zone).  
By 2004, however, the overhauling of public flood maps of the 
Environment Agency was complemented by the government’s National 
Flood Risk Assessment (NaFRA). While also being used for other purposes, 
as seen in chapter 4, the Environment Agency (EA) provides the National 
Flood Risk Assessment (NaFRA) to the insurance industry subject only to 
the payment of a licence fee. NaFRA reflects in important ways the special 
needs of the insurance industry. First, NaFRA’s risk categories use HQ75, 
set out in the ABI’s Statement of Principles as the threshold for ‘insurability’ 
(see next section), to distinguish between high (more frequent or HQ75) and 
moderate risk – in contrast to the Agency’s Flood Map which uses the more 
conventional HQ100 threshold. Second, NaFRA includes data on the 
performance and status of flood defences, reflecting the insurers’ demands 
for such data. The reflection of insurers’ preference in NaFRA is partly a 
result of the negotiations that took place after the 2000 floods between the 
government and the ABI about the gentlemen’s agreement. As a 
representative of ABI noted:  
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“apart from money, what mattered from the very beginning of the post-
1998 negotiations were data. (...). The principle was always that ‘without 
adequate data, flood insurance cannot be offered’” (ABI 2008, 
interview).  
The government in turn developed NaFRA, as it was interested in complying 
with some of the demands of the insurers in order to ensure continued flood 
cover through private insurance (see the discussion in chapter 5). 
In short, while government agencies provide data as well as some 
basic risk assessment tools such as NaFRA, the major private insurers 
individually produce their own maps. Insurers also resort to private rather 
than public risk instruments when it comes to probabilistic flood models by 
risk modelling consultancies such as Risk Management Solutions or 
EQECAT. These models normally require the input of an insurer’s portfolio, 
and produce loss exceedance curves that allow individual insurers to 
anticipate capital and reinsurance needs. From the viewpoint of Britain’s 
insurers, the presence of multiple models is perceived favourably. As a 
report by a UK insurance expert group on flooding elaborates:  
“reinsurers and insurers are likely to take the view that use and/or 
development of a ’better’ solution than their competitors can be 
advantageous to their business. (...)The use of a single solution may in 
fact be disadvantageous, since the presence of varying results from the 
different models can lead to a greater variety of insurance pricing in the 
market” (Lowe, Barnett, Black et al. 2008:52) 
It is therefore no surprise that commercially produced risk assessments 
become increasingly relevant to England’s insurance industry. The authors 
of the GIRO working group paper report an increasing interest among 
reinsurers and insurers in probabilistic risk modelling, in particular in the 
aftermath of the summer 2007 floods (Lowe, Barnett, Black et al. 2008:30). 
In contrast to Germany’s shared, ‘competition-neutral’ risk assessments, 
England’s insurers perceive risk assessment as part of the competitive 
process.  
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7.3.2 Directing: Standards of insurability and financial risk distribution 
England’s insurance market provides most of the compensation to affected 
households and commercial entities. Does that mean that the market largely 
determines the prices for risk transfer in England, as seen in the case of the 
insurance-based component of Germany’s disaster financing? Surprisingly, 
for England’s market, specific standards and rules concerning disaster 
financing have been set through the so-called Statement of Principles in 
2002, which took effect as of 1 January 2003 (ABI 2002).  
The SOP, issued by ABI on behalf of its members, defines a 
threshold at which insurance continues to be available in England. If a 
property is protected up to HQ75 flood events, the owner is guaranteed that 
insurance will be available for it. This original version of the SOP was 
revised regularly after negotiations and reviews of ABI and the government. 
The HQ75 standard remained in place but the scope of its application 
became increasingly restricted. In 2004, ABI offered guidance for new 
developments and stipulated that:  
“minimum level of flood protection which would enable insurers to make 
cover available for new residential properties is at least HQ200 up to the 
year 2050” (ABI 2004d:4). 
The HQ75 standard therefore no longer applied to new 
developments. This tightening of access to insurance for owners and 
companies embarking in new developments was further reinforced in the 
latest, 2008 revision of the SOP, which excludes all new properties built 
after 1
st
 January 2009 from the insurers’ commitment to provide coverage 
(ABI and Government 2008).
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 While this controls for a further growth of financial risks for insurers, figures on the 
housing stock and its change over time shows that commitment to insure existing houses 
protected against upto HQ75 floods is still substantial. The 2010 total housing stock 
(provisional estimate) for England is 22,564,000. Ten years earlier, there were 1.6 million 
houses less (annual growth rate of <1%). See live tables on housing stock, table 104, 
retrieved from 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatistics
by/ stockincludingvacants/livetables/ on 26/10/2010. 
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The steady tightening of the threshold for insurability suggests that 
individuals retain some of the risks and/or need to seek alternative risk 
transfer mechanisms (e.g. pressurising the government for relief). However, 
while insurers are no longer bound by an informal agreement concerning 
new developments, the SOP leaves it to the individual insurer to provide 
insurance. The discussion on ‘effecting’ will show how the insurers continue 
to offer affordable insurance even in high-risk areas (>HQ75). 
 However, this insurability threshold is not the only rule that 
determines risk transfers from individual house owners and commercial 
entities to insurers. The SOP spells out additional, mostly qualitative 
conditions that concern the activities by the government and individuals to 
mitigate and manage risks. In its earliest version, for instance, the SOP 
outlined a long laundry list of industry demands for the government, 
including a significant increase in flood defence investments; the 
implementation of the Planning Policy Guidance 25 (including compliance 
reporting); improved flood defence planning in accordance to Defra’s 
defence funding review; better flood warning and emergency planning; and 
measures concerning sewerage flooding (ABI 2003). In the latest 2008 
revision of the SOP, the conditions concerning government action have 
shifted towards better flood information, the implementation of a long-term 
strategy for flood management, promotion of flood awareness and access to 
insurance, and the prevention of inappropriate developments in flood risk 
areas (ABI and Government 2008). In addition to ‘regulating’ government 
activities through setting regulatory, financial and informational ‘thresholds’ 
concerning government activities, the insurers also suggest to individual 
household owners in order to ensure continued access to insurance cover and 
should embark on a ‘better use of new solutions to make properties 
insurable’ (ABI Press release 2002, quoted in Huber 2004:16). 
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7.3.3 Effecting: Compensation and behavioural change 
In England’s market-based system, private insurance companies have the 
primary responsibility for meeting loss adjustment claims. But after a major 
flood disaster this can be a major challenge. The summer 2007 flood event, 
for example, led to 180,000 claims, the equivalent of four normal years’ 
claims made in the space of just a few short weeks (Pitt 2008). A survey 
undertaken on behalf of the Pitt review team among insured households 
affected by the floods (n=582) shows that 72% of surveyed households were 
satisfied with how their claims were handled while a minority of 22% were 
dissatisfied with how long the house repairs took and the poor insurance 
information and advice they obtained.  Of all claims, 90% were concluded 
nine months after their submission. Overall, the review considers: 
“the insurance industry to have generally responded well to the summer 
2007 floods, having been presented with one of the biggest ever 
challenges” (ibid:xxi) 
The importance of the insurance industry in improving the financial 
resilience of individuals is also reflected in the proportion of total economic 
damage covered by the insurance industry after the series of recent major 
floods in England. The following table 12 provides an overview.  
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Table 12: Disaster financing of selected flood events in England 
All data in original values 
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 Since its inception in 1983, the Bellwin scheme is concerned with emergency financial 
assistance from central to local government in Britain. Assistance can be claimed if 
immediate action to safeguard life and property are to be undertaken in the area under the 
control of a particular local government.  
 257 
* MunichRe, GeoRiskResearch, NatCatService; ** Association of British Insurers (2007); *** 
JSCCB 2003, Annex A; **** Parry 2009   
 
As table 7.2 illustrates, the industry’s contributions range between 
three-fifths and three-quarters of the total economic losses whilst 
government contributions, as far as data are available, are very limited 
(about 3% of the total economic damage in 2007). Losses are often mostly in 
the form of immediate emergency help to the local authorities (the Bellwin 
scheme). A significant proportion of the losses has also been borne by the 
victims, as a result of underinsurance and no insurance (Pitt 2008).  
While England’s insurers substantially contribute to the financial 
resilience of individuals, their regulatory effectiveness is limited. In 
principle, as England’s disaster financing is predominantly insurance-based, 
insurers have substantial scope to incentivise risk mitigation among clients. 
However, a recent report (Lowe, Barnett, Black et al. 2008) by the GIRO 
(General Insurance Research Organising Committee) working group on 
flooding surveyed the availability and pricing of flood cover by 24 insurers 
in February 2008. One of the most notable results of this survey is that even 
within NaFRA’s ‘significant’ HQ75 risk category, 19 out of 24 insurers 
provide a quotation for cover in spite of the high risk and the withdrawal of 
the commitment to ensure under the new renewed SOP. The differences for 
mean prices between properties located ‘off floodplain’ and within HQ75 
risk areas is just GBP 52 per annum; the mean premium rate for significant 
risk is GBP 320. If an insurance prospect aims at the cheapest available 
premiums, the price difference between HQ75 risk areas and off-floodplain 
location shrinks to only £6; the HQ75 risk areas’ premium rate stood at a 
low GBP 170 per annum. There is therefore little financial disincentive to 
settle in areas at high flood risk. The report also refers to the instrument of 
deductibles.  As in Germany, rather than considering the location in different 
flood zones, these are usually related to the sum insured and to previous 
claims history.  
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While the insurers' attempts to adapt individual behaviour through 
variation in availability, price and structure of flood cover seem restricted, 
the previous section noted that the insurers also set standards vis-a-vis the 
government and its behaviour through their Statements of Principle (SOPs). 
As a result of these responses of the insurance industry to the 1998 and 2000 
events, financial risk appeared on the government’s horizon again. As an 
officer of HM Treasury notes: 
“we have an interest in the SOP being maintained because otherwise the 
expectations that the government steps in rears its head and we don’t 
want that because the costs would be significant” (HM Treasury 2009, 
interview).  
It can be argued that at least partly in response to the insurers’ demand, flood 
defence investment was raised, NaFRA was produced and took a particular 
shape and planning regulations were tightened even though the government 
never met the requirements of the insurers completely (ABI 2002; Huber 
2004; ABI 2005a).  
A Treasury official’s comments, however, point to a much greater 
degree of autonomy for the government than could have been expected in 
view of arguments that emphasise that interest groups with major stakes in a 
regulation are able to exercise strong influence over the regulator (Wilson 
1980).  
 “Some of them [the demands of the ABI] Defra can do as long as it is 
within their budget. But the ABI’s demands were double of what Defra 
spends now—and this is already 1/5 of their budget. So such demand 
would mean for Defra to stop doing other things or reprioritise. So we 
have to be involved in that [the SOP negotiations]” (HM Treasury 2009, 
interview).  
As finance and economics ministries are concerned with the budget, the 
Treasury’s involvement has stiffened the resolve against ABI’s lobbying. 
The limited impact of the insurers’ lobbying is also reflected in ABI’s for 
higher precautionary standards in other domains and functional areas of 
flood regimes during the SOP negotiations. In the domain of land-use 
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regulation, the initial version of PPG25 that was in consultation just before 
the 2000 floods occurred contained two alternative approaches to managing 
developments in flood risk areas. One of the approaches, proposed by the 
insurance industry, emphasised the need to construct defences in accordance 
with the exposure and vulnerability of particular areas, thus emphasising the 
idea of providing (though risk-adequate) safety. This approach, however, 
was abandoned in favour of the risk zones approach that aims at moving 
developments out of harm’s way and highlights the uncertainty of protection 
through flood defences (DETR/DCLG 2009, interview). There have also 
been limits to industry influence on reforms to the detecting system. While 
NaFRA is being made available to the insurers (in exchange for a fee) in 
response to ABI’s demands for better risk assessments, the insurers continue 
to complain about the ‘inadequacy’ of public risk assessments for insurance 
purposes, and so continue to feel the need to develop their own risk 
assessment tools (Aviva 2009a, interview).  
The discussion of the organisation of disaster financing in England is 
puzzling. While the private insurance industry is indeed performing the 
disaster financing, some aspects of the domain do not match the expectations 
of a market-based financing approach. In fact, these aspects raise questions 
as to the alleged benefits of choosing markets over government. First, 
commercial insurers make limited use of risk instruments for reducing 
damage potential through behavioural change (the ‘regulatory’ function of 
disaster financing). At the same time, they continue to bear most of financial 
risk (the ‘social’ function). Insurers therefore seem to be doing little to 
reduce their financial risk through market-based contractual means and by 
implication, the overall damage potential. However, by renegotiating the 
informal regulatory core of the disaster financing domain (the 1961 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’) in the early 2000s, insurers at least gradually 
reduced their commitment to provide flood cover in the 2000s (by defining a 
risk-based insurability threshold) while trying to pressurise the government 
into taking measures to reduce the damage potential. This raises a number of 
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questions concerning the degree to which disaster financing is really market-
based in England, and about the legacy of the gentlemen’s agreement from 
the 1960s.  
7.4 EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN RISK-BASED DISASTER FINANCING 
The organisation of disaster financing in Germany and England provides 
interesting insights from a perspective that proposes the superiority of 
market-based mechanisms. Markets in both countries fail in providing both 
regulatory and social functions that they are expected to perform in a 
superior manner. However, markets fail to provide efficient outcomes in 
different ways in the two countries. In Germany, the market failure results 
from limited market size. As a consequence, financial risks from flooding 
are also handled by non-specialised actors such as the government, and the 
price mechanism does not apply for the risk transfer from individual to the 
state. In England, insurers are the main agent for disaster financing. 
However, the price mechanism fails to work effectively because of the 
legacy of informal (self-) regulation of the industry.  Both failures have 
particular implications for the assumed benefits of the superior market 
mechanism. As depressed demand (discussed below) in Germany and 
regulation in England limit the effective use of market prices as the 
allocation mechanism, individuals (and others, as will be shown below) are 
prone to take more risks than they would have otherwise (moral hazard). 
Financial compensation is contingent upon political factors in Germany and 
the question emerges as to whether the ‘social’ function provided by 
England’s insurance industry may become increasingly unsustainable in 
view of rising damages.  
The following sections focus on understanding why insurance 
markets fail to function and expand and how this affects the role of risk in 
disaster financing. The variations in the two countries point to two aspects in 
the disaster financing domain that shed light on the deviation from superior 
market mechanisms. In the first section, arguments about market failures are 
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explored, mostly focusing on the behaviour of private market participants. 
However, this discussion of why markets work or do not work in different 
ways in Germany and England already highlights the importance of state–
market relations in shaping markets and private behaviour. A second section 
therefore focuses on state–market relations in the two countries.  
7.4.1 Market failure: Demand, supply, evolution and institutions of 
flood insurance markets  
Insurance markets can fail for a variety of reasons. One way of ordering 
them is to look at the two sides of markets, namely demand and supply. To 
put it rather crudely, if either demand or supply is insufficient, there is no 
market and no pricing of risk.  
On the supply side there may be problems with: the insurer’s having 
insufficient knowledge about a risk (Moss 2002); information asymmetries 
between insurer and insured leading to moral hazard (the insured knows 
more about his risk than the insurer) (Arrow 1963); and adverse selection 
(‘bad’ risks accumulate in insurer’s portfolio because inaccurate risk pricing 
encourages ‘good risks’ to leave the insurance pool) (Akerlof 1970), as well 
as risk correlation and cumulation due to the geographical concentration of 
flood damage (Gardette 1997).  
On the demand side, there are a number of reasons why individual 
householders and other asset owners do not purchase insurance. One set of 
reasons is related to misperceptions of flood risk. Kunreuther (2001) notes 
that house owners underestimate the probability of low frequency events, 
reflecting findings by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that highly unlikely 
events are either ignored or overweighed. Another argument brought 
forward to explain market failure is related to the role of government in 
disaster financing, the so-called ‘charity hazard’. 
In Germany, supply problems appear to be limited. Before the Elbe 
2002 floods, German insurers stated that flood insurance would be available 
for 90% of Germany’s territory (Hauner 2004). Schwarze and Wagner 
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(Schwarze and Wagner 2004) suggest that even though this proportion 
shrank after the 2002 event, insurers continued to offer flood insurance cover 
for most of the country (~80%). The increasing availability and development 
of risk instruments in the insurance industry rule out most of the 
informational problems while the problems of cumulation at present are of 
limited significance – mostly because of the still limited overall exposure to 
flood risk as a result of the limited uptake of flood insurance in Germany.     
This limited uptake, however, points to problems on the demand 
side. Research has shown that the lack of awareness of flood risk has been 
argued to be important for Germany’s insurance market. Thieken and 
colleagues (2007) analysed the data from 1,248 households in Saxony and 
Saxony-Anhalt between April and May 2003. Of the 82% of the insured 
households without prior flood experience, only 35% knew that they were 
living in an area at risk from flooding.
81
 Of the 88% of the uninsured 
households without prior flood experience, only 26% were aware of their 
living in a flood-risk area. Analysing the cases of the Rhine floods in 1993 
and 1995, Linneroth-Bayer and colleagues (2001) show that, among other 
factors such as low-income and Germany’s higher income households’ 
preference for self-insurance and precautionary measures, the lack of 
(historical risk) awareness (in particular among an increasingly mobile 
population moving into risk areas) is responsible for the relatively limited 
density of flood insurance in Germany.  
Moreover, scholars have also pointed to the issue of ‘charity hazard’ 
for Germany. Schwarze and Wagner suggest in their commentary on the 
financing of the 2002 Elbe flood that:  
“the near certainty of government emergency aid and private donations in 
the event of a natural disaster will continue to adversely affect the 
decision of homeowners to insure against natural risk” (2004:161). 
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 Thieken et al. (2006) use the concept of ‘flood-endangered zone’ without further 
specification 
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It is possible to disagree with the ‘near certainty’ of substantial aid such as 
the one for Saxony as the limited state involvement in the aftermath of the 
Rhine floods (1993 and 1995) shows. One indication however, that ‘charity 
hazard’ may contribute to the low demand in Germany, is that according to 
the survey by Thieken and her colleagues (2006) almost every three out of 
ten of households affected by the floods in 2002 still did not intend to 
purchase flood cover in spite of the better performance of the insurer in 
compensating losses. Moreover, while insurers report a spike in demand for 
insurance right after the Elbe flood event, they also observed that this spike 
was temporary and limited (ibid.). 
The demand-induced market failure in Germany’s flood insurance 
sheds light on a number of issues that are relevant for the discussion of risk- 
and market-based disaster financing. Due to the lack of demand, insurers 
only play a marginal role in improving financial resilience and reducing 
damage potential in Germany. Moreover the generation of risk instruments 
(led by the GDV) is an attempt to address the problem of insufficient risk 
information in a relatively novel market, which had initially impeded more 
proactive marketing of elemental damage products (GDVa 2008, interview). 
Given the novelty and size of Germany’s flood insurance market ZÜRS – a 
collectively-produced risk assessment instrument –becomes the risk 
assessment of choice as limited resources are dedicated to the relatively 
small and specialised market of optional elemental damage products.  
In contrast to Germany, England’s insurers operate in a flood 
insurance market with substantial demand. Demand is strong as a result of 
the requirement by mortgage and other lenders that homeowners need flood 
cover in order to obtain a loan and of the fact that flood cover had become 
part of the all-risk standard insurance packages for properties and home 
contents since the 1970s (Arnell, Clark and Gurnell 1984). This latter aspect 
directs attention to the supply side. England’s flood insurance market has 
been evolving over decades, even before sophisticated risk assessment 
instruments became available. This expansion of England’s flood cover was 
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initially driven by a gentlemen’s agreement from the early 1960s. It is 
therefore also based on political pressures and negotiations rather than 
predominantly on economic and market opportunities. While demand and 
supply are in place, England’s insurers fail to substantially differentiate their 
prices for coverage of properties with varying levels of risk or even to 
generally exclude high-risk properties from coverage, so that despite high 
levels of market penetration, insurance fails to incentivise behaviour change 
or reduce exposure to flood risk. 
The reasons for these constraints on insurance pricing reflect, in part, the 
particular nature of the resulting expansive, mature and competitive flood 
insurance market in England. The expansion of the market since the 1970s 
has been a profitable business for insurers. As an underwriter from Aviva 
notes: 
“it is a matter of a critical mass and the law of the large number (...). 
Historically we have been able as an industry to earn enough premium 
income across the full range of cover provided. (...) We have had enough 
premiums to make a profit for the majority of years and in a really bad 
year we can use some of the saved money to help pay for the bad year” 
(Aviva 2008a, interview). 
A (partial) withdrawal from the market in response to experienced and 
expected losses therefore restricts opportunities for profit and undermines 
the business model based on a ‘critical mass’ of clients. Moreover, a 
withdrawal from the market also potentially worsens the competitive 
position of individual insurers on the building and contents insurance market 
in general, because the exiting insurer would offer less attractive all-risk 
standard policies in the context of a property market in which flood 
insurance is required by mortgage and other lenders.  
Given their experience of and continued interest in commercially 
benefiting from flood insurance, insurers attempt to improve risk 
assessments to anticipate losses and gain a competitive advantage. This 
along with the fact that the ABI, in contrast to the GDV with its technical 
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capabilities and data access, is a pure interest representation organisation, 
explains individual flood mapping projects of England’s insurance 
companies.  
However, while this sheds light on the motivation of the insurers to 
remain in the market and improve risk assessments, it is less instructive for 
explaining why insurers do not use price differentiation to reduce loss 
potential and regulate risky behaviour. To make sense of this it is important 
to study the legacy of the original gentlemen’s agreement. Beyond 
underpinning insurance supply, the original gentlemen’s agreement also 
constrained price-setting by insurers. This in turn shaped public expectations 
with regard to available flood insurance as the next section will elaborate. 
Given market constraints and public expectations, insurers rather than using 
price differentiation focus on mobilising the government to reduce damage 
potential. This underlines the crucial role of state–market relations in 
England’s disaster financing domain that will be elaborated further in the 
following section. 
  The contrasts between Germany and England’s flood insurance 
markets are substantial. Germany’s disaster financing is a traditional case of 
disaster insurance market failure as a result of insufficient demand for 
insurance (Kunreuther 2002). As the state has thus borne a substantial share 
of the financial risk in recent disasters, disaster financing mechanisms 
mostly delivered on their social/financial function but failed in terms of 
regulation and made limited use of the concept and instruments of risk.  
England’s insurance market does not fail due to a lack of demand or 
supply. The flood insurance avoids this fate through a number of 
mechanisms (gentlemen’s agreement; agreement with mortgage lenders) as 
well the market’s historical entrenchment. This notwithstanding, the market 
fails to fulfil its regulatory function. The concept and instruments of risk, 
moreover, are not only not systematically used for pricing but define an 
industry-wide standard for insurability. In order to understand this 
interference with the market and the peculiar role of risk in England’s 
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disaster financing, it is important to scrutinise the state-market relation in 
England. 
7.4.2 State-market relations: Political opportunism, insurance pressure 
and path-dependency 
The previous discussion of market failures already highlighted the impact of 
state activities on the flood insurance market. In Germany, the phenomenon 
of the ‘charity hazard’ contributes to suppressing demand for private 
insurance products. This is interesting because it implies government action 
that undermines a disaster financing mechanism that potentially carries a 
limited financial risk for the state. In contrast – if there are no alternative 
collective financing mechanisms – public expectations are directed at the 
government for financial support (Moss 1999).    
One reason for this risky government strategy is the political benefits 
provided by public disaster financing (Schwarze and Wagner 2006). These 
benefits are particularly notable for the cases of ex-post ad-hoc governmental 
aid in the aftermath of floods at the Odra and the Elbe that had favourable 
political implications. For instance, the compensation efforts in the aftermath 
of the 2002 were partly driven by the imminent Federal election in 2002. In 
the words of an official of the Federal Ministry of Finance, the 2002 disaster 
financing:  
“carried a lot of political weight due to the imminent Federal elections. 
Hence, the public paid attention to how the two candidates and other 
campaigners acted” (BMF 2008, interview). 
Such public disaster financing in general seems to have reflected a public 
sentiment for solidarity, as the scale of private donations after the Elbe and 
Odra flooding also demonstrated
82
.   
Another reason seems to be a limited attention paid by politicians to the 
financial risks from flooding to the government. This is, on the one hand, a 
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 One water and flood specialist from the Federal Ministry of Agriculture argued that this 
special solidarity may have been caused by the fact that the victims were in both cases 
Eastern Germans (BMELV 2008, interview). 
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reflection of the relatively infrequent occurrences of major flood events such 
as the floods from 1997 and 2002, implying that financial risks are uncertain, 
infrequent and therefore not on the political agenda for long. This impression 
is shared by a representative of the insurance industry who describes the 
negotiations about a compulsory flood insurance scheme in the aftermath of 
the Elbe 2002 floods as follows: 
“Two years after the Elbe floods, the FMK [Interministerial Conference 
of Finance Ministers] did not see any need to act anymore. Our model is 
still on the table, unchallenged. But the ministers lost interest” (GDV 
2008, interview). 
On the other hand, as the absence of the regulatory core in Germany’s public 
disaster financing shows, there is no formal duty on the government’s part to 
provide financial aid and it is difficult for actors to predict which financial 
burden they would need to shoulder. In fact, one of the reasons why the post-
Elbe negotiations for a compulsory insurance scheme stalled and eventually 
failed was the inability of the ministers of the Länder and Federal level to 
find an acceptable formula for allocating the financial share of the state for 
the proposed financing scheme between the Länder and Federal levels.  
Germany’s disaster financing emerges as being rather poorly 
organised. While the prospect of public financial aid undermines the 
commercial insurance markets for flood damage, this prospect is rather 
uncertain as a result of the absence of clear duties and allocations of 
responsibility among different levels of government in Germany’s Federal 
state. It is therefore in the discretion of governments at Länder and Federal 
levels to assume the financial burden of floods. This suggests that political 
considerations, such as imminent elections, are determining how the adverse 
financial consequences of flooding are dealt with.    
England’s state-insurance industry relations do not undermine flood 
insurance markets as seen in Germany, but strongly shape the available 
strategic responses to increased flooding by the insurers. The constraints on 
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the range of options available shape and weaken the regulatory function of 
flood insurance markets.  
Current state–insurance relations are shaped by the gentlemen’s 
agreement between insurers and the government from 1961. As a 
consequence of the agreement in its original form, the insurance industry 
assumed almost all financial risks from flooding without being able to limit 
exposure through risk-adequate price rises (the ‘affordable’ standard rate), 
exclusions (‘regardless of risk’ commitment) or a reciprocal government 
commitment to prevent flooding (only a vaguely termed ‘sufficient’ 
investment promise). In addition to resulting in an expansive, mature market 
for flood cover this agreement constrained insurers in their price-setting and 
relieved the government from potential financial risks. As losses and loss 
expectations began to rise in the 1990s and 2000s, the industry tried to limit 
its exposure to financial risks.  
These industry efforts can be interpreted as ‘path-dependent’ 
(Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). The ABI renegotiated and renewed the 
agreement with the government, now publicised under the label of the 
‘Statement of Principles’ (SOP). The exposure limitation was to be achieved 
through various mechanisms that uphold the close co-ordination between the 
government and insurers.  
The first mechanism is the setting of the insurability threshold of 
HQ75 that replaced the ‘regardless of risk’ clause since the publication of 
the first SOP in 2002. A uniform, probabilistically-defined standard has two 
advantages. As the negotiating Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
represented the industry as a whole, such a standard would not favour any of 
the insurers in particular. Another advantage is that setting the HQ75 
standard publicly also exposes the government to public scrutiny and 
pressure. As an ABI officer notes: 
“what we actually want to achieve for high-risk areas is that individual 
house-owners assume control over the things. That they talk to their local 
authority. To the Environment Agency. Possibly also with their local 
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MP. That they make some pressure. That they say: “At the moment, I 
don’t get insurance. My excess is very high. But I know that my insurers 
is happy to change that if I can prove to them that something is going to 
be done over the next five years”. So we try to mobilise people” (ABI 
2008, interview).    
The second one concerns what the government is to provide in 
exchange for not having to face the financial risks from flooding. As the 
government has indeed stepped up funding for flood defences and reformed 
land-use regulations, Huber (2004) has argued that the insurers emerge as 
‘indirect regulators’ of government (and private individuals’) action. 
However, the underlying problem with the original gentlemen’s agreement, 
namely the government’s moral hazard, continues to be present. The 
argument made by Huber suggests that since the government has offloaded 
the financial risk to the insurance industry its incentives to engage in flood 
management are limited. The attempts of the insurers to ‘regulate’ the 
government (through their qualitatively-defined conditions concerning 
government action for the continuation of coverage) – thereby controlling 
the moral hazard – have been limited in their effectiveness, as the discussion 
in the ‘effecting’ section has suggested. It is important to be cautious about 
attributing this to pressure from insurers. The insurers themselves complain 
that:    
“the ABI's SOP does not provide the industry with a great deal of 
leverage over the government and its policies in relation to, and spending 
on, flood defences” (Lowe, Barnett, Black et al. 2008:55).  
There are two explanations for why the threat of withdrawal has not 
been providing the insurers with a ‘great deal of leverage’ in either limiting 
exposure to losses or spurring the desired government interventions. Both 
explanations can be linked to the legacy of the gentlemen’s agreement. The 
first explanation has been discussed in the previous section, namely the size, 
profitability and competition on the long-established flood insurance market 
that renders withdrawal from the market an unappealing option. The second 
are public expectations concerning the pricing and availability of flood 
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insurance. A study by Clark and colleagues (2002) argues that society views 
insurance as a ‘social’ rather than commercial process, and so the insurers 
are seen as assuming a social responsibility to provide a financial buffer 
from the consequences of floods. Price rises, say the authors, are therefore 
perceived as a ‘social affront’ and ‘abrogation of duty’ (ibid.:18). Huber 
points out that flood insurance in Britain was seen as a ‘social policy 
successfully externalised to the economy’ (2004:7). This ‘social’ character is 
also reflected in the view of an expert from Aviva on the reputational risk 
associated with charging risk-adequate premiums.  
“It is difficult to charge the ‘economic premium’. [For some properties,] 
these could become prohibitively high. (...) One of the main reasons why 
we cannot charge to full premium is that it would be a PR risk” (Aviva 
2009a, interview).   
This public perception of insurance as a social process can only be 
understood against the background of the legacy of the low prices charged 
for decades under the gentlemen’s agreement. England’s market-based 
disaster financing is underpinned by the non-market mechanism of 
agreements between the government and the insurance industry. This 
agreement results in a transfer of the financial risk from flooding to the 
insurance industry – while at the same time directly and indirectly 
constraining the industry’s ability to regulate private and the government’s 
flood management.  
Germany and England’s disaster financing therefore deviate from the 
expected endorsement of superior market-based mechanisms. But they 
deviate in different manners. In both cases however, the role of the concept 
and instruments of risk in disaster financing is limited – in particular in its 
use for regulating damage-increasing behaviour.    
7.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter begins with the debate of an assumed superiority of market-
based mechanisms for solving particular policy challenges. While markets 
have in general been deemed to be more efficient in providing particular 
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services to the population than the government, insurance markets and the 
private insurance industry in particular have recently been discovered as a 
vehicle through which – via the economic incentives that can be connected 
to price signals – individual behaviour can be shaped and financial resilience 
improved. Insurers are professional risk managers and are, at least in theory, 
not as sensitive to public pressure as an elected government. This allows 
them to control moral hazard and handle large numbers of compensation 
claims more effectively than the government. Given these benefits, it seems 
reasonable to expect that disaster financing in Germany and England should 
rely on the services of private insurers and the price mechanism of private 
insurance markets.   
The discussion of the cases of Germany and England do raise 
questions as to whether these arguments in favour of private solutions to 
disaster financing can be applied universally – and thus also as to whether 
the proliferation of risk instruments is indeed associated with the rise of 
private governance in disaster financing. Questions about the universal 
validity of these arguments arise because first, Germany’s disaster financing 
has for major flood events included government aid to the population for 
whose distribution risk assessments had no impact at all. Second, in 
England’s case, even though disaster financing is organised by the private 
insurance industry, risk assessment primarily matters to estimate overall 
exposure (and much less to determine variable price levels). In short, 
markets in both countries fail because in both cases, the price (of risk 
transfer) does not serve as the main allocation mechanism in disaster 
financing. In Germany, it is only applied to the insurance segment of disaster 
financing. In England, free price-setting by insurers is formally (Statement 
of Principles) and informally (public and political expectations) constrained.   
Which factors inhibit a market-based disaster financing in Germany 
and England? In Germany, the market fails because the demand for flood 
insurance products is limited. Two problems widely discussed in the 
insurance market failure literature seem to be important for explaining this 
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demand-side failure  – namely, a lack of flood awareness and the 
behavioural consequences of government interventions. It would be 
interesting to explore further whether the ‘safety commitment’ implicit in 
Germany’s flood regime (see chapters 5 and 6) explains the lack of public 
flood awareness (and political disinterest in organising disaster financing 
more systematically) in addition to factors such as the low frequency of 
events. Moreover, ‘free’ government disaster financing can also be blamed 
for undermining market demand for insurance cover that comes with a price 
tag.  
England’s case shows that demand does not have to be the central 
problem to insurance markets. The problem of a lack of awareness of flood 
risk is avoided through making flood cover a standard product (as required 
for mortgages and loans; as part of the All-Risk house and home content 
policies). The market fails because commercial insurers are constrained in 
their ability to charge a premium that reflects different levels of risk. This is 
largely a consequence of an informal agreement struck in the 1960s that 
continues to shape expectations vis-à-vis the role of insurance within disaster 
financing (a ‘social’ rather ‘regulatory’ role) held by policy-makers and the 
public, as well as the economics of flood insurance (a very large risk pool 
allows insurers to handle bigger losses).  
Organising disaster financing through commercial insurance markets 
is therefore not as easy as some advocates for market solutions may wish. 
Rather, scholars that have cautioned about market failures – in particular for 
disaster insurance – seem to offer interesting insights into the German case. 
The English case highlights how important it is to explore the unique 
institutional settings within countries, including those formed decades ago, 










CHAPTER 8: WHOLE FLOOD REGIMES, INTERNATIONAL 
CONVERGENCE AND NATIONAL GOVERNANCE STYLES 
Flooding is not exclusively managed through either of the governmental 
tools of ‘treasure’ or ‘regulation’. Nor do flood regimes solely consist of 
commercial insurance markets with their regulatory and compensatory 
capabilities. In actual flood management practice each of these governance 
mechanisms, along with others such as flood warning, contributes to 
reducing flood risk. This chapter therefore takes a holistic perspective on the 
regimes and the role of risk within them.  
Drawing on the empirical groundwork set out in the three preceding 
chapters, the analysis here focuses on describing and explaining diversity in 
flood management so as to challenges to arguments about convergence in 
flood risk management. Its theoretical perspectives differ from the partial 
analyses in the preceding chapters. Those chapters focused on arguments 
about convergence that were most relevant for a particular domain of the 
emerging complex flood regimes. This chapter’s analysis, in contrast, 
examines pressures for convergence that can be expected to affect each 
regime as a whole.   
Specifically three questions about flood regimes are examined from a 
comparative perspective. First, do flood regimes converge internationally 
around a particular use of the concept and instruments of risk? This question 
draws on the functionalist arguments and the neo-institutionalist discussion 
about various types of isomorphism that explain the convergence in policy 
responses (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The disaggregated empirical 
discussions of the preceding chapters have already highlighted the fact that 
the case studies of Germany’s and England’s flood regimes fundamentally 
differ in their use of risk in governance. The second question to be asked, 
therefore, is whether it is possible to identify particular national governance 
styles across the different domains of each country’s flood regime – and if so 
how such patterns can be explained. These questions lean on the notion of 
‘national styles of regulation’ (Vogel 1986) and associated arguments about 
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the macro-institutional determinants of such styles. Third, if such ‘national 
styles’ are assumed is the use of risk instruments internally consistent across 
regime functions and domains within regimes – and if not how can the 
inconsistencies be explained?  Each of these questions will be discussed 
below. 
8.1 FUNCTIONAL RATIONALITY AND INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM IN RISK-
BASED FLOOD MANAGEMENT   
Two types of arguments are discussed in this chapter, complementing 
previous discussions of ‘economic effectiveness’ and ‘accountability’ 
arguments in chapters 5-7. First, risk is functionally necessary – or at least 
carries substantial benefits for recently emerging approaches to flood 
management. Second, risk-based flood management converges as a result of 
the processes of ‘institutional isomorphism’ as introduced into organisational 
theory by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). 
The functional argument takes as its starting point the observation of 
a ‘seismic shift’ (Werrity 2006) in flood management towards more 
anticipation and adaptation that was already pointed to in chapter 2. This 
shift reflects three important insights in the disaster management scholarship 
(and practice). The first is the recognition that natural disasters such as 
flooding are beyond technical control, and that flood management should 
consequently be adapted to – and even take advantage of – the water 
retention capacity of nature. For instance, one important element of this 
ecological flood management is to preserve the natural functions of 
floodplains for water retention (Myers and Passerini 2000; Moss 2007). This 
ecological focus is an important part of a wider sustainable flood 
management approach, of which the maintenance and enhancement of 
environmental quality is a key component (Parker 2000b).  
The second insight is that socio-economic processes make very 
important contributions to the severity of flooding and the success of 
managing flooding. Scholars since White (White 1945; White, Hudson, 
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Calef et al. 1958; Mitchell 2003) have recognised that inappropriate socio-
economic processes, such as flood-vulnerable construction contribute, to the 
adverse consequences of flooding and that greater attention should be paid to 
these processes: through their regulation, through incentive-setting and 
through information that can ameliorate flood risks. This is reflected in the 
increasing emphasis on the ‘vulnerability’ of values and of the population in 
flood management and in discussions of adequate flood warnings and flood-
risk communication (Handmer 1987; Blaikie et al. 1994; Brown and Damery 
2002). 
The third insight is the recognition of the importance of anticipation 
for reducing the adverse consequences of future flooding. This implies the 
move from a reactive, remedial approach to disaster management to one that 
engages in proactive preventive action based on anticipation (Palm 1990; 
Bryant 1991; Munasinghe and Kreimer 1991). With technological and 
scientific progress, however, proactive and preventive measures have 
become increasingly possible and central. From rare humanitarian disasters 
flood events have become increasingly ‘normal’ and subject to governance 
interventions.  
There is therefore a functional argument for international 
convergence. The use of risk instruments may facilitate the threefold shift, 
since risk helps revealing the benefits of natural water retention, the 
importance of social processes and the possibility of foresight. In particular 
risk assessment instruments have facilitated the shift to anticipatory flood 
management because of our increased technical understanding and capacity 
to predict the frequency, nature and consequences of future flood events. 
Risk assessment instruments have also facilitated the ‘greening’ of flood 
management by providing systematic assessments of the probable damage 
avoided by flood defences, and of the effects of natural water retention 
capacities on flood risks. These assessments can help in limiting the need for 
engineered interventions to areas with a high value concentration and limited 
space for natural water retention. Finally, risk assessment instruments have 
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enabled the ‘socialising’ of flood management. This is because risk 
instruments offer ways of targeting regulations, incentives and information 
on particular processes and population groups thereby avoiding 
disproportionate interventions into socio-economic processes that would 
conflict with liberal democratic ideas of the state and society.      
In addition to such ‘functional’ arguments it is possible to argue in 
favour of convergence on the basis of neo-institutionalist arguments – or 
more precisely, the three different types of isomorphism (mimetic, 
normative and coercive) developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). In the 
case of risk-based flood management such convergence arguments can be 
underpinned in several ways.  The first is by pointing to the programmatic 
similarities in flood management strategies across different EU member 
states. Such parallel observations in a number of European countries – 
among them the Netherlands, England, Germany, and Switzerland – point to 
mimetic isomorphism  (that is the emulation of certain organisational forms 
on one country by actors in another) as an explanation. Becker (2009), for 
example argues that the high-profile international expert commission HSK 
(International Commission for Research on Floods of the Rhine River) 
established to study the Rhine flood management in 1968 first floated the 
idea of ‘making space for water’ and that other actors such as the LAWA 
and Dutch flood managers adopted and elaborated on these initial concepts 
in search of legitimacy after the two Rhine floods in 1993 and 1995 that cast 
doubts upon the suitability of an approach predominantly focussed on flood 
defences. 
Second, there are pressures for a normative isomorphism in the form 
of transnational professional networks and idea exchanges – from 
conferences of environment ministries in the aftermath of the Rhine floods 
in the early 1990s (see chapter 5) to expert working groups such as 
EXCIMAP (see chapter 2), from the transnational business activities of 
flood risk modellers and the biannual meetings of EU member state Water 
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Directors to transnational river catchment management bodies such as the 
ICPR.  
Third, there are also factors driving a coercive isomorphism in the 
form of supranational water policy initiatives including the Water 
Framework Directive from 2000 (EC 2000) and most notably the recent 
Flood Directive (EC 2007) with its explicit endorsement of a risk-based 
approach to flood management.   
In short shifts in flood management theory and practice offer strong 
arguments for convergence around particular forms of risk-based flood 
regimes across EU member states based on functionalist and institutional 
arguments about policy convergence. The proliferation of flood mapping and 
modelling – as well as the use of the concept and terms of risk in standard-
setting and to guide implementation – seem to vindicate such arguments. 
However as the following sections argue the cases of Germany and England 
show the limitations of such functional and institutional convergence 
arguments.  
8.2 EXAMINING CONVERGENCE IN THE FLOOD REGIMES OF GERMANY AND 
ENGLAND  
Convergence arguments can be challenged in two ways. First, the concept 
and instruments of risk can assume different degrees of centrality within the 
emerging flood regimes. Second, the role of risk in the flood regimes 
diverges because the policy instruments define and use the concept of risk in 
different ways.  
Clearly the role of the concept and instruments of risk within flood 
regimes in Germany and England gained in centrality, as reflected in the 
proliferation of risk assessment capacity and the emphasis of its benefits in 
anticipatory flood management. However a closer look reveals differences in 
the degree to which risk calculus is used. In Germany risk is marginalised 
where flood management interventions affect public finances. This marginal 
role is notable in the ‘effecting’ function of the flood defence and disaster 
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financing domains. In both these domains particular political dynamics 
interfere with a systematic risk-based allocation of public funding – as seen 
in the post-1997 and 2002 public disaster aid or the Königsberger Schlüssel 
whereas private disaster financing through Germany’s commercial insurers, 
by contrast, is strongly shaped by the risk zoning instrument ZÜRS. 
In England, there is also a public-private contrast, but it is the 
opposite to that in Germany. England’s public spending on flood defences is 
strongly shaped by the risk instruments NaFRA and the NaFRA-based 
Outcome Measures that direct central government spending to where flood 
defences maximise the reduction of probable damage from flooding. In 
England’s privately organised disaster financing, however, commercial 
insurers assume the individuals’ financial risks from flooding without fully 
taking into account in their premium-pricing the different risk levels and the 
risk-based insurability threshold from ABI’s Statement of Principles.  
What are the implications of the partially and varying ‘marginalised’ 
role of risk in public spending and disaster financing in the two countries? If 
risk is marginalised actors fail to address resource needs in a manner that 
reflects the varying risk levels. An example of how the politics of disaster  – 
that is the public pressure on governments to help victims in (financial) 
distress – leads to a different allocation of financial resources can be given. 
In Saxony for instance financial resources in the aftermath of 2002 were 
extraordinarily plentiful (the resource needs of Saxony’s flood managers are 
covered until 2013 (LTV 2008, interview)) so that ambitious and 
sophisticated flood management measures could be introduced (the flood 
protection concepts). These measures were the ‘envy’ of the other Länder 
who were not be able to achieve similar flood management standards within 
such a short time-span due to resource constraints (SMUL 2008, interview). 
An expert from NRW even pointed to ripple effects of the concentration of 
financial resources in Saxony –namely that it was difficult to recruit flood 
specialists after 2002 because Saxony had hired most of the qualified experts 
(LANUV 2009, interview). Moreover, disaster financing that disregards 
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different risk levels when compensating individuals fails to address the 
moral hazard that offloading the financial risk from flooding creates. This 
problem applies to both public disaster financing in Germany and private 
financing in England.  
Yet while risk may be partially marginalised in the ‘effecting’ of 
flood defence and disaster financing, risk is of central importance in other 
regime domains and functions. In these however, distinct patterns can be 
discerned in the way in which actors design and evaluate risk-based flood 
management measures and conceptualise risk within the flood regimes in 
Germany and England.   
The first conceptualisation of risk distinguishes whether the concept 
of risk is mostly concerned with the probability of occurrence (the hazard) or 
the probable damage (the risk) from harmful event
83
. In significant parts of 
Germany’s flood regime the standards and their implementation are shaped 
by a concept that concentrates on the hazard of flooding. In contrast 
England’s standards and their implementations are for large parts of the 
regime also informed by an account of the material consequences of 
flooding as much as probability.  
More concretely Germany’s statistical term of HQ100 (describing a 
water quantity with a statistical average return period of once in a 100 years) 
serves as key reference value in flood defence and land-use regulation. 
HQ100 normally constitutes the minimal safety standard for flood defences 
and the boundaries of ‘inundation areas’ in land-use regulation. The 
exception to this focus on hazard in Germany is insurers who consider 
claims and potential damage data, thus using a wider concept of risk than 
public flood managers. In England the probable damage from flooding is 
taken into account extensively by NaFRA and the Outcome Measures (OMs) 
in flood defence management (which measure avoided damage in the form 
of ‘properties at risk’ and in the context of benefit-cost target ratios). The 
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 See chapter 2 for a discussion of hazard and risk in flood management. 
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Sequential and Exception Tests in land-use regulation provide a tool to 
direct (relatively more vulnerable) developments away from higher risk 
zones. Finally, England’s insurers take into account the value of properties 
when underwriting flood insurance for properties (even though they fail to 
fully consider the probability of the damage). This contrast between 
Germany and England is interesting because actors in both countries have 
generated risk assessments that include broader assessments of the harmful 
consequences of flooding. In Germany actors in both regional case studies – 
ICPR and LTV – have undertaken damage potential assessments. Though 
not unheard of, such assessments of damage potential are much less 
influential in Germany than assessments of the probability of inundation. 
The second conceptualisation takes an interest in the degree to which 
uncertainty is reflected in the concept of risk. As discussed in chapter 3 the 
history of the concept of risk is one of imposing order and control over the 
uncertain future. While the ‘avalanche’ of data that had been collected in the 
19
th
 century boosted the ability of statisticians and social reformers to predict 
behaviour and to exercise control over previously unpredictable (mostly) 
economic and social processes, critics of statistics and risk calculation 
highlighted the uncertainty inherent in these processes. A similar 
juxtaposition can be found in the treatment of risk and uncertainty in the 
flood regimes of Germany and England. In Germany the concept of risk 
within the flood regime can be linked to enhanced safety and control. In 
England there is a much greater emphasis on the uncertainty of control and 
safety.   
More specifically Germany’s flood regime uses risk instruments as a 
means to define the extent of state-provided safety. Flood defence managers 
assess existing safety levels and determine desirable safety levels (HQ 
standards) – and financial resources are partly (where allocation is indeed 
risk-based and if money is available) allocated to accomplish these safety 
goals. Land-use planners along with water authorities determine, heavily 
regulate and strictly enforce regulations in unsafe ‘inundation areas’ (thus 
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making them safe by eliminating damage potential) but leave state-protected 
‘flood prone areas’ loosely regulated. In the domain of disaster financing 
however, the German state fails to provide any risk-based financial safety. 
Risk instruments are not used to define an event of a particular probability 
(e.g. a Jahrhundertflut, HQ100 event) where the state steps in to secure the 
financial safety of the population. Insurers provide financial safety 
depending on a range of factors including risk assessments, but also 
commercial needs and market pressures. As chapter 7 has argued however, 
the insurers’ role in Germany’s overall disaster financing is limited.  
In England the concept of uncertainty is more pervasive. Flood 
defence managers aim at reducing the number of properties at risk (Defra’s 
Outcome Measures) rather than defining specific safety levels – and 
accordingly allocate money to where the greatest risk reduction per pound of 
investment can be achieved. In planning actors (whenever they follow 
primarily the EA’s EFO map for decision-making) ignore the protection 
offered by defences when defining flood zones and steer developments to 
those flood zones where the probability of flooding is expected to be lowest. 
The domain of disaster financing in England offers an interesting contrast: 
risk is used to define the threshold HQ75 of financial safety.
84
 Existing 
properties that are safe in respect of HQ75 and higher-probability events 
have the possibility of acquiring financial safety through insurance cover. 
The two distinct conceptualisations of risk in governance point to 
significant contrasts between Germany and England. These differences are 
notable for both public and private actors. The following section focuses on 
explaining this cross-country variance.    
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 Financial safety is an exaggeration because insurance holders will have to pay the 
deductible by themselves and insurance policies may not be comprehensive enough to speak 
of financial safety. However there is a certainty for a particular payout if a property and its 
contents are insured. 
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8.3 EXPLORING NATIONAL STYLES OF RISK-BASED FLOOD MANAGEMENT 
These differences in the conceptualisation and use of risk in the flood 
regimes of Germany and England are suggestive of ‘national styles’ of risk-
based governance. As discussed more extensively in chapter 3, national style 
of regulation arguments highlight systematic patterns in the rules (e.g. 
product versus process-oriented restrictions) and procedures (e.g. rule-
making in a transparent manner and antagonistically vis-à-vis the regulatee 
versus secretive and co-ordinated with a regulated industry) for regulating 
risk issues (e.g. genetically modified organisms and chemicals in food 
production). The arguments then focus on the macro-institutional context in 
which regulating actors are embedded as potential drivers of these regulatory 
choices.  
Institutions shape the preferences and incentives of key actors. A 
focus on the macro-institutional variables as drivers of particular choices by 
actors therefore seems particularly relevant for comparative cross-country 
studies where cases with great institutional variance can be expected to 
result in different regimes in spite of common policy challenges and 
pressures. In fact the discussions in the chapters 5-7 already point to a 
number of macro-institutional factors influencing actor choices in each of 
the regime domains of the two regimes. These factors can be described as 
macro-institutional because they concern the fundamental organisation of the 
state and state-society relations within the two countries. The following 
sections revisit the discussions and findings of these three chapters to 
examine whether differences in risk-based flood management can be 
explained macro-institutionally.  
8.3.1 Structural characteristics of Germany’s and England’s state 
The first variable used to explain aspects of the variance between German 
and English flood regimes is their respective state structures. This section 
explores aspects of fragmentation and coherence in the relation between 
central government and lower levels of government and the organisation of 
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the executive and administration. Such structural factors have been widely 
used by institutionalist scholars to explain differences in public policy 
choices and issues, including discussions on environmental policy (for 
instance, Lees 2007; Knill and Lenschow 1998), public sector reform (for 
example Knill 1999), inflation rates (see Cukierman 1992), economic 
policies and welfare states (e.g. Ferrera and Rhodes 2000). 
In a nutshell Germany’s Federal polity is fragmented in terms of 
policy-making but coherent in implementing policies thanks to the 
organisation of the public administration and the dominant role of water 
authorities across the regime domains of the flood regime. Policy-making is 
fragmented because of the fragmented responsibilities for policy-making of 
governments at Federal and Länder level. Since their responsibilities are 
often also intertwined the resulting mutual dependence of policy-making at 
different government levels leads to a search for consensus and the need for 
negotiation (Lijphart 1984; Grimm 2003) to avoid policy blockage (Scharpf 
1988). Moreover as responsibilities are intertwined it is also difficult to 
clearly assign blame in the event of a policy failure. Schmidt (2005) has 
argued that actors situated in complex polities pay attention to making policy 
choices acceptable to other institutionalised actors within the polity. This 
sharply contrasts with actors in simple polities that seek public acceptance 
with the aim of gaining the central power position within the polity with few 
veto points.   
Once legislation and policies are agreed in Germany implementation 
is relatively coherent.
85
 There are two reasons for this. First, Germany’s 
public administration is organised hierarchically. As a result, local water 
authorities and planners, along with Landes authorities in charge of 
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 While the implementation may be coherent in the sense of a uniform standard pursued by 
the state actors that does not mean that it is always easy. There are a number of procedural 
barriers; for instance, the Planfeststellungsverfahren (evaluation of project plan with 
participation of the affected community) and the Raumordnungsverfahren (evaluation of 
project from a planning perspective). These offer the public opportunities to voice 
disapproval of flood management projects such as the construction of dykes and retention 
basins. 
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implementing Federal and Länder legislation, are subject to legality, if not 
substantive oversight by Länder authorities. Even the legality oversight 
already implies only significant constraints on local actors because of the 
high degree of codification in Germany’s water and environmental policies 
(Lees 2007). Second, policy-making and legislation (e.g. HWSG), inter-
governmental negotiations (e.g. the LAWA) and implementation across the 
flood regime are dominated by specialist environment and water authorities 
and ministries. This reflects Germany’s Ressortprinzip, the principle of 
departmental autonomy, and ensures that risk instruments are based on the 
shared professional outlook of water experts.  
These structural characteristics have a number of implications for the 
extent to which actors understand and use the concept and instruments of 
risk. First, the veto powers of the Länder mitigate against any Federal 
government-imposed risk-based re-allocation of public resources and costly 
flood management duties, because it may imply an unequal distribution of 
costs and resources. The asymmetric consequences of risk-based flood 
management are a result of the unequal distribution of flood risks across 
Germany (the Rhine rivers’ water volumes and damage potential are much 
greater than those of the Elbe). The importance of avoiding an asymmetric 
distribution of costs and benefits of flood management is reflected in the use 
of the Königsberger Schlüssel in flood defence spending – ignorant towards 
different levels of risk but proportional to the total population numbers in 
each Land. The choice of a relatively abstract and widely shared safety goal 
(HQ100) implies uniform duties of flood management (even though the 
costs for fulfilling these duties may vary significantly).  
Second, the administrative boundaries and distribution of 
responsibilities imply a mismatch between governance and the natural 
characteristics of water bodies that ignore these political boundaries. An 
abstract and uniform standard makes it less likely that varying standards for 
the same river catchment will be found, and defines a minimal safety 
standard that serves as a key reference value for the protection and 
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regulations provided by Länder governments. HQ100 therefore also serves 
as a co-ordination instrument within Germany’s fragmented Federal state, 
where responsibility for flood management is largely held in the capitals of 
its 16 Länder. Risk instruments are less important for co-ordinating between 
Landes and local levels since hierarchy, oversight mechanisms and law-
based public administration greatly reduces the scope for discretion by local 
actors. This is most conspicuous in the ‘cornered’ position of Germany’s 
local planning authorities – in spite of the local planners’ general planning 
competency (the so-called Planungshoheit).  
Third, the choice of HQ100 across flood defence management and 
land-use regulation also needs to be seen as a result of the dominance of the 
environment and water administrations within the flood regime reflecting the 
principle of departmental autonomy in government and the traditional 
fragmentation of environmental policy-making along natural media (water, 
soil, air) (Lees 2007). This dominance leads to a concentration on the 
probability of particular water quantities in conceptualising risk, because of 
a ‘shared professional outlook regardless of (…) administrative or political 
position’ (Lodge and Wegrich 2005:214) and the importance of the 
‘professional aspect of work within the policy domain’ (ibid:223) as 
important characteristics of Germany’s public administration. This shared 
professional outlook is underpinned by aspects of the recruitment for 
Germany’s public administrations more specifically an emphasis on 
specialist subject-knowledge, Fachwissen (along with legal skills) (Hood 
and Lodge 2004). Water authorities are mostly interested in water quantities 
and their management, rather than in the economic factors contributing to 
the development of flood plains and the increasing exposure to potential 
flooding. As noted in chapter 2’s discussion of hazard and risk it has been 
argued that specialised scientists such as hydrologists and water engineers 
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Fourth, the choice of HQ100 also reflects the context of the German 
state’s commitment to protect its population from harm, which will be 
discussed in the next section more extensively. Such a commitment can be 
made more easily where responsibilities are shared and accountability 
opaque. This implies that some actors have limited concerns about possible 
blame assignments (a LANUV expert suggested that ‘St Peter is responsible 
for too much rain’ and that such an explanation is accepted by the population 
(LANUV 2009, interview)); other actors engage in blame games, with the 
Länder complaining that the ‘Federal level ducks its responsibility’ 
(MUNLV 2008, interview) and the Federal level being concerned about 
making Länder ‘take their responsibilities seriously’ (BMU 2008, interview). 
In what ways does the macro-institutional context of flood risk 
management in England differ? And to what extent does this institutional 
variance explain risk-based flood management choices in England’s flood 
regime? And to what extent does this variance explain risk-based flood 
management choices in England’s flood regime? The macro-institutional 
context relevant to England’s flood regime is – contrary to description of 
England as a ‘simple polity’ (Schmidt 2005) – also fragmented. However the 
fragmented responsibilities among state actors are (in the absence of the 
mutual dependence seen in Germany’s ‘complex polity’) not organised in a 
manner that fosters the search for consensus or results in the diffusion of 
responsibility. To quickly recapitulate how fragmentation in England plays 
out the capability of the water specialist executive and administration is 
more limited in England as compared to Germany. The central government’s 
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 In a discussion with one administrator from NRW’s LANUV the author asked the 
LANUV expert to elaborate on the concept of risk in flood management and how it comes 
to shape flood management measures. In his response the expert pointed to the most cutting-
edge ‘risk assessment’ project as an example of how risk becomes increasingly important. 
Intriguingly the project in question was concerned with the probability of dike failure 
(LANUV 2008, interview) rather than how to develop damage-depth functions for different 
types of land use. The project has thus been concerned with the cause of harm rather than 
the wider consequences of the harmful event. 
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Defra might not have to co-ordinate with lower level government 
departments as Germany’s Federal Environment Ministry needs to with the 
Länder. But its control over operational and implementation aspects is just as 
limited due to the fact that the key operational authority (the EA) holds the 
status of a semi-autonomous, non-departmental public body. However, this 
can be useful in the aftermath of flood disasters when Defra can shift the 
blame to the operationally responsible EA. Less appealingly to Defra the 
department’s capacity to determine the course of flood management is also 
restricted by the strong role of the finance and economics ministry (HM 
Treasury) in Britain’s cabinet in controlling access to financial resources and 
setting the broad principles of public sector operations (Campbell and 
Wilson 1995; Chapman 1997; Lee and Woodward 2002). The EA in turn 
may have seen an increase in power within the flood regime since 1998. 
However this power can be argued to be effective only for the flood defence 
domain but still faces barriers when dealing with local planners and their 
rights to manage their local (planning) affairs. As a result EA and DEFRA –
while being formally the lead state actors in charge of flood management – 
need to find compelling arguments to convince actors without specialist 
subject-expertise of the need for more funding and tighter regulation to 
reduce flood risk.  
This peculiar form of fragmentation has a number of implications for 
the form taken by risk-based flood management in England and the role 
played by the concept and instruments of risk within England’s flood 
regime. First, England’s actors use the concept and instruments of risk in 
flood defence and land-use regulation so as to signal the uncertainty of 
safety through state interventions. The EA’s Flood Maps ignore the effects 
of flood defences; Defra’s Outcome Measures set out risk management 
goals, not minimal safety standards. This cautious position could be 
described as a defensive strategy against policy failures and the resulting 
blame game. The EA in particular is exposed to blame due to its prominent 
position within the flood regime and its relatively autonomous status.  
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Second, Defra and the EA use a broader concept of risk to compel 
local planners and HM Treasury to provide their particular resources, that is 
planning consent and financial resources respectively. Local planners – who 
are relatively autonomous and in pursuit of a range of objectives other than 
flood management in their planning policies – cannot be forced  (for 
example via hierarchy or legislation as seen in Germany) to follow the EA’s 
recommendations on the development of flood risk areas. The use of 
vulnerability classification and multiple flood zones offer local planners 
some flexibility and ‘objectivity’-based legitimacy when making decisions 
on local plans and individual development proposals. HM Treasury 
(traditionally in a powerful position in Britain’s executive) requires 
government departments to prove the relative value-for-money of their use 
of public money in order to claim a share of the budget. The use of the 
aggregate benefit-cost threshold and the quantitative NaFRA-based 
performance targets in Defra’s OM  often offers compelling arguments for 
spending on flood defences in particular. 
In short the macro-institutional variables associated with the state 
structure point to some major differences between Germany and England 
that can explain some of the contrasting choices regarding the use of risk in 
flood regimes. The type of state structure influences the need for co-
ordination between organisations with the same or different organisational 
and professional outlooks, as well as the opportunities for blame assignment 
and blame games. Risk can be conceptualised and used in varying ways that 
serve their different co-ordination and blame management needs. 
8.3.2 Raison d’etat and political culture of Germany and England 
The second variable used to explain variance between the two flood regimes 
concerns perceptions of statehood, its objectives and responsibilities – and 
thus the foundations of state legitimacy as they are held by key actors within 
the flood regimes. This is closely linked to debates about the political culture 
through which the relations between state and society are defined. Halffman 
(2005) broadly distinguishes between more interventionist states that define 
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concrete policy goals and undertake substantial interventions into society to 
achieve these goals on the one side and those states that act as a referee only 
to prevent societal excesses on the other. Scholars normally take a long-term 
view to discern the origins of a particular national political culture – such as 
Vogel’s reference (1986) to Victorian public administration reforms and the 
backlash to industrialisation in 19
th
 century England leading the business 
community to defer to Britain’s prestigious public service, or Braithwaite’s 
‘frontier state’ reference (1997) to explain the antagonistic relations between 
the business community and the Federal government in the U.S. (Braithwaite 
1987:564) to explain the antagonistic relations between the business 
community and the Federal government. While Vogel and Braithwaite are 
broadly concerned with regulatory interventions in corporate decisions flood 
regimes raise questions about the responsibility of state and society in risk 
management.  
Rather than going back to the early history of the German state the 
most important source of information on the relations between state and 
society in Germany is the Basic Law of 1949. The Basic Law embodies 
norms that are not only seen ‘as a general framework establishing a 
minimum consensus about certain principles’ but ‘as a political programme 
containing particular substantive goals’ (Dyson 1980:213). As noted in 
chapter 5 this ‘political programme’ ascribes a significant responsibility to 
the state for the well-being and protection of the population.  
In this context actors are sometimes constrained in their way of 
conceptualising risk, even as, in other contexts, they see the concept of risk 
as a suitable instrument for achieving objectives compatible with Germany’s 
notion of the state. First, a minimal standard of safety (mostly HQ100) 
implies that a particular level of protection is aspired to for almost
87
 all 
individuals. This is compatible with the basic constitutional norms that 
extend the protection of dignity, life and physical integrity to all individuals 
                                                 
87
 As Saxony’s flood defence management in chapter 5 shows, this does not apply for 
individuals choosing to live in isolated buildings and for many of those living in Dresden.  
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(Articles 1 and 2, Basic Law). Differentiating safety standards  –for example 
based on the amount of values kept safe – contradicts the idea of a state 
responsible for the safety of its population. It is for this reason that key 
actors within Germany’s flood regime view a conceptualisation of risk that 
includes probable damages, which may lead to an asymmetry in the 
protection of individuals as both politically and juridically problematic.  
Second, absolute protection for all is implausible. The Basic Law 
however does not explicitly define any limitations to the protective duties, 
i.e. how much risk would be acceptable. Germany’s water and environment 
administrations at state and Federal levels use HQ100 to delineate which 
adverse events are in the responsibility of the state and which are deemed to 
be an acceptable risk for the population. Through the HQ100 standard the 
German state essentially promises to protect individuals against all flood 
events that occur in their lifetimes (with the Germans’ average life 
expectancy being below 100 years).  
Such universal and ambitious safety provision implies great demands 
on public resources that raise the question of whether the state is actually 
able to deliver. As noted in chapter 5 flood managers were concerned about 
the availability of sufficient financial resources for flood defence 
maintenance, in particular for areas and in times in which no disastrous flood 
event increases the pressure on politicians to provide funding for flood 
management.  
Third, as HQ100 defines the boundaries to the responsibility of the 
state for managing flood risks it can be argued that individuals cannot – in a 
damage-causing event that surpasses HQ100 – expect with certainty to 
receive compensation. The absence of any regulatory core and specific risk 
assessment instruments in public disaster financing thus becomes more 
understandable. The incidences of disaster financing after the Odra and the 
Elbe floods are therefore puzzling. This ‘regime inconsistency’ will be 
discussed below in section 8.4. 
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Is there a comparable commitment to safety in England? In the 
absence of a written constitution England’s state objectives are much less 
recognisable and stable. In fact the absence of a constitution is one reason 
why the executive in England (once elected) faces much fewer veto points 
than Germany’s (Knill 1999). In England, the objectives of the state are 
therefore more subject to the political preferences and ideas of political 
parties and individual governments than in Germany.  
One influential account of the most recent orientation of Britain’s 
state has been provided by Moran (2003). According to this account the 
economic and political crises of the 1970s led to a fundamental change in 
state–society relations and state objectives. Since the 1980s Britain’s state 
has pursued the general goal of ‘raising [its] competitiveness against global 
competition’ (ibid:155). This pursuit of competitiveness has, among other 
issues, led to an emphasis on deregulation and liberalisation of markets and 
the privatisation of state-owned companies, in particular under the Thatcher 
government (see also Peck 2001), as well as to the introduction of new 
public management in the public sector (see also Hood 1991). Another 
aspect of Moran’s account of the regulatory state in Britain is an increasing 
emphasis on ‘standardisation, central control and synoptic legibility to the 
centre’ (Moran 2003:7) in response to the previously prevalent informal 
patterns of ‘club government’. This implied an increased emphasis on 
transparency and public scrutiny, more formalised, standardised rules and 
responsibilities and an extensive system of internal audits (Power 1997) and 
regulation inside government (Hood et al. 1999a). 
Risk has been conceptualised and used in a particular way by actors 
in England’s flood regime to facilitate the pursuit of the state objectives and 
deal with the consequences of greater transparency and scrutiny. First, in 
terms of the pursuit of economic competitiveness, calculating the potential 
damage (through NaFRA) and considering degrees of vulnerability of values 
(the vulnerability classification) allow England’s flood defence managers 
and planners to evaluate different options in terms of economic efficiency 
 293 
and advantages. Decision-makers are enabled to make more efficient and 
differentiating use of taxpayer money in flood defence management (the 
higher the probable damage the better the benefit-cost ratio and reduction of 
the number of properties at risk as stipulated by Defra’s OMs) and more 
targeted land-use restrictions (the less vulnerable a particular land use the 
fewer restrictions the developer faces for the economic utilisation of flood 
risk areas). The macro-institutionally shaped efficiency orientation fell onto 
fertile ground within the flood management regime since flood management 
(or as it used to be called land drainage) has been understood as an economic 
policy field where public investment is supposed to yield economic benefits. 
Moreover, the reliance on market solutions for disaster financing also seems 
(at least at first glance) to fit with this efficiency orientation. However the 
actual organisation of disaster financing – with its HQ75 insurability 
threshold and a premium-setting that does not fully reflect differences in risk 
levels – does not fit with economically efficient and liberalised insurance 
markets. This ‘mismatch’ with macro-institutional factors will be revisited in 
section 8.4.     
Second, risk instruments can be useful for actors embedded in a 
context of increased transparency and scrutiny. Flood managers use risk-
based Outcome Measures to prove their performance in managing risks to 
homes without promising safety. This strengthens the defensive position of 
flood managers if a flood occurs and causes damage, since no safety is being 
promised. The EA provides local planners with risk-based risk assessments, 
flood zones and vulnerability classifications. As a consequence the EA can 
claim to have informed and advised local planners on a flood issue if a flood 
occurs and damages properties in areas at flood risk. Moreover for local 
planners the risk instruments, with their scientific ‘objectiveness’, offer 
strong justification for their planning decisions vis-à-vis developers. Finally 
the insurance industry – by making the HQ75 threshold public since 2008 
even jointly with the government – seeks to encourage individuals to take a 
strong interest in finding out about their risk levels and (if at risk from 
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flooding even for events more frequent than HQ75) whether and what the 
government wants to do about it. In a context of greater scrutiny and 
transparency risk instruments can therefore fulfil defensive (blame 
management) and offensive (increased scrutiny) organisational goals. 
In short macro-institutional variables associated with the rationale of 
statehood and state–society relations sharply differ between Germany and 
England. The difference between Germany’s ‘safety-providing’ and 
England’s ‘competition and transparency’ state also influences whether 
actors use risk instruments to make (risk-)qualified safety promises as shown 
for Germany or to enable actors to maximise economic benefits and to 
manage increased accountability pressures on state action as seen in 
England.  
8.3.3 Styles of public administration in Germany and England   
The third factor concerns the style of public administration. This factor is 
basically about whether there is a rulebook upon which administrative action 
is to be based, how formalised and binding this rulebook is, and whether 
administrators can be held accountable for what is written down in the 
rulebook. The effects of such rules for state operations have been discussed 
for public sector reforms (Knill 1999) and environmental policy (Knill and 
Lenschow 1998; Lees 2007).  
Germany’s style of public administration can be described as 
‘juridified’ – that is, Germany’s rulebook consists mostly of binding public 
laws. This implies that any administrative intervention of state actors must 
be based on or connected to a formal law and is subject to judicial review 
through a specialised court system (Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit). It is 
therefore also not surprising that Germany’s public administrators not only 
require subject-expertise (Fachwissen) but also legal training (Hood and 
Lodge 2004). As the discussion in chapter 6 on land-use regulation in 
particular has shown, actors within Germany’s flood regime are sensitive to 
the possibility of the judicial review of their administrative decisions.  
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German actors need to reconcile their concepts and calculus of risk 
with the requirements of Germany’s law-based administration. The 
compatibility of risk-based approaches with the legalistic foundations of 
public administration is particularly problematic for any conceptualisation of 
risk that reflects the uncertainty in risk calculations and protection measures. 
This is because risk calculations serve as a basis for state interventions into 
property rights (land-use regulations) and for describing how the state 
ensures the well-being of the population (flood defences). Revealing 
uncertainty in these calculations may lead to judicial challenges because the 
state’s interventions in property rights may be disproportionately restrictive 
(e.g. if the protection provided by flood defences is not taken into account in 
the regulations) or fail to provide the legally sufficient levels of protection. 
Long-established and clear concepts such as HQ100 (used to distinguish 
between safety and danger) are acceptable to the legal specialists within 
public administration and the court system especially – as seen in the case of 
land-use regulation – when they are linked to existing physical protection 
through dykes (as noted in chapter 6, one part of the HWSG’s definition 
refers to in front of and behind flood defences). The importance of judicial 
review for Germany’s administrative interventions is not unique to the 
domain of flood management where (thanks to the relatively recent changes 
in legislation) courts have yet to be involved in the legal evaluation of flood 
management measures. Lodge (2001) for instance has detected concerns 
among state authorities about ‘defending legally’ specific interventions 
against ‘dangerous dogs’. Rothstein and colleagues (forthcoming) have in 
general argued that ‘courts have found it hard to base their decisions on 
probabilistic concepts of risk, or to even reach a view on what is meant by 
concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘acceptable risk’.  
England’s style of administration can best be described as 
‘managerial’. There is neither a formal constitution nor a specialised court 
system examining the legality and constitutionality of administrative 
operations. Public law – as Hancher and Moran suggest – is concerned with 
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the ‘pragmatic control of power’ and law is not perceived as the ‘great 
interpreter of politics’ (1989:156). Halffman notes that:  
“disagreement over specific regulatory decisions is generally 
expected to be solved in negotiation and, if all else fails, by a 
process of administrative law in which an appeal is made to a 
minister rather than a judge” (2005:60). 
In this context administrative procedures can be based on varying 
management approaches. Since the 1980s New Public Management (NPM) 
has become increasingly important to England’s public administration. NPM 
is normally associated with greater managerial scope and ‘performance 
accountability’ (Light 1993). 
England’s flood managers therefore do not face the same judicial 
constraints. One illustrative example is land-use regulation. The EA could be 
interpreted as a specialist overseer. However its supervisory powers are 
limited to being a ‘statutory consultee’ that reports about whether its advice 
has been accepted to Parliament. Planners are also subject to appeals 
processes that involve the generalist inspectors from the Planning 
Inspectorate (PINS). However these lay inspectors flexibly balance the 
arguments of the different involved parties in the appeals process (see 
chapter 6). Even where disagreements persist the case will be taken forward 
to the Secretary of the State from the DCLG. Only when all these 
administrative steps are exhausted may the High Courts of Justice get 
involved. Moreover the review of administrative action is – in a culture of 
NPM and target-setting – usually undertaken against quantitative 
performance targets and economic evaluation. As noted earlier 
conceptualisations of risk that include monetary and other quantitative 
measures of damage potential help meeting such review demands.  
In short a review of the styles of public administration contrasts 
Germany’s ‘juridified’ style with the ‘managerial’ style found in England. 
The ‘juridified’ style in general struggles with probabilistic concepts as a 
basis for intervening into property right and defining ‘acceptable risk’ levels. 
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If risk terms are to be accepted they need to be clear and well-established in 
theory and practice, as is the case within flood management for HQ100. In 
contrast a wide conceptualisation of risk facilitates the quantitative standard-
setting required in England’s ‘managerialism’ and is acceptable in the 
appeals and review processes predominantly set outside the court system.   
8.3.4 National styles of risk governance and macro-institutional context 
Macro-institutional characteristics of the state and state–society relations 
such as a particular state structure, different objectives of statehood and 
specific administration styles in Germany and England clearly limit and 
shape the choices of actors within the two countries’ flood regimes. The 
macro-institutional characteristics of Germany and England differ and actors 
in the two countries choose a particular use of the concept and instruments 
of risk that is compatible with these macro-institutional variables.  
In Germany the macro-institutional context provides incentives to 
state actors to make use of risk as a co-ordination and harmonisation device 
within the fragmented Federal state structure in a manner that is reconcilable 
with the legalistic requirements of Germany’s Rechtsstaat and enables the 
state to provide protection to an equal level to most of its population 
(protective state). As a result state operations within Germany’s flood 
regime are in general geared towards the scientific and in flood management 
long-established probabilistically defined minimal safety standard of 
HQ100. By using this standard as a default the state sets risk-based 
boundaries to its constitutional responsibility for providing safety to its 
population. Alternatively where the concept of HQ100 is not central – 
especially in ‘effecting’ that requires public financial resources – political 
negotiations between Germany’s multiple government levels are one 
determinant of the nature of flood management measures.  
In England by contrast the macro-institutional context encourages 
state actors to utilise risk instruments as a means to legitimise trade-offs 
between harm prevention and cost in ways that limit their own liabilities. In 
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other words risk is used as a way of defining acceptable adverse outcomes in 
the context of the state’s desire to perform state operations with economic 
effectiveness and increased accountability pressures. The risk instruments in 
use therefore take into account the damage potential (allowing for an 
economic evaluation of state operations and targeted interventions into 
socio-economic processes) while at the same time communicating the 
uncertainty of protection to the population and ensuring a defensible 
consistency of state interventions through centralised risk assessment.  
8.4 EXAMINING INTERNAL REGIME CONSISTENCY  
At first glance these macro-institutional accounts of risk-based flood regimes 
describe relatively consistent arrangements. In Germany there is the HQ100 
reference value that lends coherence to flood defence management and land-
use regulation across Länder boundaries. In England’s flood regime there is 
one single, central actor (the EA) which holds the expertise and is in charge 
of producing most of the risk instruments – along with technical guidance 
for other actors involved in England’s flood regime.  
The following two sections however will point to some 
contradictions within the two regimes. Some of these contradictions are 
connected to interdependencies between different regime domains that raise 
questions as to whether Germany’s protective state is really limited to 
HQ100 events and whether the English flood managers’ ability not to 
promise safety is not possible mostly due to the peculiar disaster financing 
arrangement. Other contradictions concern the regime functions that may 
also constitute challenges to the overall objectives of each of the two 
regimes. 
8.4.1 Contradictions across regime domains 
This section focuses on the organisation of particular regime domains that 
contradict the types of risk-based regimes that have been identified in the 
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discussions of the macro-institutional variables.
88
 There are two noteworthy 
contradictions, each of which is linked to the disaster financing domain.  
HQ100 is used to define the end of the German state’s involvement 
in flood management. Beyond that state actors encourage precautionary 
behaviour including the purchase of private insurance. The absence of any 
formal commitment by the state to financially support victims of floods with 
a lower probability than HQ100 is therefore not surprising from a macro-
institutional perspective. This also explains why the German state did not 
provide any significant funds to victims in the aftermath of the Rhine floods 
of 1993 and 1995. However this is not the whole story since the state has 
provided ad hoc disaster financing for the Elbe and Odra flood events. This 
seems to match more closely the German welfare state’s norm of solidarity. 
As these are inconsistent outcomes linked to different macro-institutional 
variables (the qualified protective state versus the welfare state) a simple 
focus on the macro-institutional context cannot explain why Germany’s state 
only provided significant disaster compensation after the Odra and the Elbe 
floods, but not after the Rhine floods of 1993 and 1995. Rather as shown in 
chapter 7 it is essential to take into account factors such as elections and the 
particular needs of the poorer Eastern German regions.  
Rather than being safety-oriented, England’s flood regime has been 
characterised as oriented towards efficient economic performance. The 
private insurance-based approach to disaster financing fits neatly with this 
orientation, especially given an assumed superiority of market mechanisms 
in delivering efficient outcomes. However the actual practices on the 
insurance market conflict with the idea of economically efficient outcomes. 
Insurers fail to price flood cover adequately in view of public and political 
                                                 
88
 There are further technical inconsistencies in the use of risk instruments between 
domains. For instance, the Environment Agency’s NaFRA uses HQ75 to delineate high-risk 
categories. When determining flood zones in its Flood Map the EA uses HQ100 as 
boundaries of high-risk zones. These are outcomes of different political and institutional 
dynamics: HQ75 is a compromise between insurers and government; HQ100 has been used 
in land-use regulation for almost 20 years and has therefore also served as the basis for the 
more recent mapping by the EA. 
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expectations and the regulation of supply through the Statement of 
Principles. Even though insurers have been trying to prevent growth in 
exposure at least the insurance market provides a de facto financial safety net 
to the population. This may be argued to allow the government to limit its 
involvement in flood management as arguments about the moral hazard of 
Britain’s government in flood management (Huber 2004) suggest. The 
current macro-institutional context is therefore insufficient to understand 
some influential aspects of England’s flood regime. Rather it is important to 
take a look at the historical evolution of flood insurance markets – in 
particular at the gentlemen’s agreement from 1961 that continues to shape 
current decision-making by the insurance industry and the government.   
8.4.2 Contradictions across regime functions 
This section focuses on contradictions between the regime functions of 
detecting, directing and effecting.  
HQ100 is the key risk category in the German state’s directing. 
HQ100 (as noted in section 7.2) is a probability-centric conceptualisation of 
risk that ignores the material consequences of flood hazards. This ‘smaller’ 
concept of risk in directing contradicts the more advanced efforts in 
detecting – such as Saxony’s ‘flood protection concepts’ or the ICPR’s 
‘Rhine-Atlas’ – that include the ‘bigger’ concept of risk with calculation of 
damage potential. While macro-institutional variables shed light on why 
actors use the ‘smaller’ concept in directing, the use of the ‘bigger’ risk in 
detecting can partly be explained by the interests and interactions within the 
expert community of flood managers and risk analysts. For instance the 
motivation of Saxony’s flood managers to develop very elaborate protection 
concepts cannot be understood without taking into account the presence of 
the Swiss experts’ resources and solutions. The expert working groups of the 
ICPR decided to produce a damage potential assessment for the ‘Rhine-
Atlas’ partly to communicate to policy-makers the huge risks of flooding 
along the Rhine, thus putting flooding onto the political (and budgetary) 
agenda.  
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In England this contradiction between the state’s directing and 
detecting is not present since directing also uses the ‘bigger’ concept of risk. 
This is different though for the activities of private insurers in disaster 
financing, in particular the probabilistic HQ75. As argued in chapter 7, that 
threshold needs to be seen as an exposure-reducing response in the context 
of the gentlemen’s agreement.  
A widely discussed contradiction between different regime functions 
is that between directing and effecting. This contradiction is present in both 
countries, though in different domains. German actors set ambitious safety 
goals defined in risk terms (HQ100). However to achieve the desired safety 
levels through public spending financial resources must be made available. 
The availability of such capital, however, is not driven solely by the 
particular risk-based safety goals but is also shaped by the occurrence of 
disasters and (as noted in chapter 7) political negotiations within Germany’s 
multi-level government. In England there are also gaps between directing 
and effecting – most notably in land-use regulation – as the discussion in 
chapter 5 has highlighted. The particular institutional fragmentation between 
EA and autonomous planners helps explain this implementation deficit. 
These contradictions within flood regimes between individual 
domains and functions cast doubts upon the rationalising forces of risk and 
the extent to which a particular macro-institutional context results in 
consistent risk-based flood management. Even when the macro-institutional 
context compels actors to use the concept and instruments of risk for a 
particular end the emerging risk-based regimes are prone to contradictory 
arrangements. Germany’s ‘protective state with HQ100-limited liability’ 
may fall short of protecting its population to the HQ100 since the funding 
required for the desired protection may (for political and institutional 
reasons) not be made available as needed. At the same time the government 
sometimes assumes financial liabilities in disaster financing for events 
beyond its HQ100 limit. This points to a certain ‘fuzziness’ of the HQ100 
boundaries of Germany’s flood regime. England’s ‘competitive and 
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transparent state’ is not as consistently oriented towards economic efficiency 
as a pure review of the state’s operations may suggest. This is because the 
disaster financing domain contains a privatised financial safety net provided 
by commercial insurers.  
8.5 CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter took on two sets of arguments. The first set proposed cross-
country convergence in risk-based management. In contrast to the partial 
analyses in chapters 5 to 7 this chapter takes a holistic view and challenges 
functionalist and institutionalist isomorphism arguments about international 
convergence. From a functionalist perspective there has been a shift towards 
more anticipatory (rather than remedial) as well as ‘green’ and social (rather 
than technical) approaches to flood management for which risk-based flood 
management can be expected to be instrumental. From a neo-institutionalist 
perspective there are transnational expert networks, widely adopted flood 
management templates and supranational policy initiatives that can be 
expected to result in the adoption of risk-based flood management.  
This set of arguments cannot explain the distinct conceptualisation of 
risk in the flood regimes of Germany and England as well as varying degrees 
to which risk informs the flood regimes in the two countries. This chapter 
argued that the emerging nationally distinctive patterns of risk-based flood 
management can be linked to three macro-institutional sets of factors, 
namely the structure and rationale of the state as well as the style of public 
administration. Leaning on the literature of ‘national styles of regulations’, 
the second set of arguments therefore examined how macro-institutional 
factors explain two different patterns in which the concept and instruments 
of risk are conceptualised and used in these flood regimes.  
The two types of risk-based flood regimes identified, namely 
Germany ‘providing safety’ regime and England’s ‘managing uncertainty’ 
one, seem to vindicate the macro-institutional approach to explaining the 
diversity of risk-based flood management. However there are contradictions 
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within each regime. These point to the role of politics following disasters, 
the importance of the legacy of former institutional arrangements and the 
conflicting outcomes from different macro-institutional determinants.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS. PUTTING RISK-BASED 
GOVERNANCE INTO INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
This study is about diversity in risk-based governance. Using a cross-country 
comparative perspective, it has pursued three aims: first, to challenge 
arguments about a convergence towards a particular form of risk-based 
governance; second, to describe and analyse diversity in risk-based 
governance; and, third, to identify and explain observed patterns of variance 
in the case studies by putting risk-based governance into its institutional 
context.  
These aims were pursued through the empirical examination of the 
flood management regimes in Germany and England. Studying flood 
management has been particularly relevant for the study of diversity in risk-
based governance because actors in both countries are traditionally familiar 
with, and have access to, advanced risk assessment instruments. The choice 
and design of risk instruments is therefore not limited by availability or 
actors’ ignorance of them. Germany and England are ideal candidates for a 
comparison because they are exposed to similar pressures for convergence 
towards risk-based governance while displaying significant variance in their 
institutional contexts. Using the meso-level risk regulation regime 
perspective has allowed for a nuanced analysis of the diversity of (and the 
varying drivers of) the emerging forms of risk-based flood management. 
Thanks to the disaggregation into regime domains and functions achieved 
here, internal contradictions within each of the regimes became visible, the 
varying ways in which institutions shape individual aspects of the regime 
could be discerned, and convergence arguments could be tested for domains 
in which they would be expected to be most applicable. 
The findings of this study, presented in the next section 9.1, have 
implications for arguments of convergence and those scholarly contributions 
that have emphasised diversity in the governance of risk. These implications 
will be discussed in sections 9.2 and 9.3. These are followed by a section on 
the limitations of this analysis and opportunities to expand on this research.  
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9.1 NATIONAL PATTERNS AND INSTITUTIONAL DRIVERS 
There are two key findings of this dissertation. First, there is no single form 
of risk-based flood management adopted in Germany and England. 
Secondly, the institutional context can – to a large extent – explain the 
national patterns found in the use of concepts and instruments of risk in the 
two countries’ flood regimes.  
The first finding directs our attention to the different forms of risk-
based flood management. In Germany, risk underpins an emphasis on the 
state-provided provision of safety to the population, for instance, through the 
setting of safety standards in flood defences and by distinguishing between 
safe and dangerous areas in planning. To this end, Germany’s public flood 
managers use ‘hazard’ assessments and ‘hazard’-based management 
instruments, for instance the HQ100 reference standard. These ‘hazard’ 
instruments, however, do not exclusively shape Germany flood 
management, especially where public spending for flood management is 
concerned. In contrast, England’s state actors use of risk instruments serves 
to highlight the uncertainty of the protection provided by state as reflected in 
the absence of any safety standards and flood mapping that discounts the 
protective effects of flood defences. They also typically take into account the 
‘risk’ of flooding in the broader sense of probability and consequences, for 
instance through NaFRA’s benefit-cost calculations and PPS25’s 
vulnerability classification. While public measures draw on available risk 
calculations, England’s private insurance industry does not make full use of 
the assessments in its underwriting.   
These distinctive patterns and underlying choices are strongly 
determined by the particular constraints and opportunities actors face, which 
are in turn shaped by the institutional context. As shown in chapter 3 
theoretically and chapters 5–7 empirically, the concept of institutions 
includes a wide range of variables – from structural to cultural, from 
normative to procedural. Specifically, the risk-based flood management in 
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Germany and England is shaped by the three macro-institutional factors: 
first, the fragmentation and coherence in government and public 
administration structures; second, the perceptions and norms that reflect and 
describe the state’s objectives and state-society relations; and, third, the 
prevalent styles of public administration.  
Germany’s emphasis on ‘providing safety’ reflects perceptions and 
norms that define the state’s responsibility and unique capacities to protect 
the population from mishaps. These perceptions and norms are found in 
Germany’s constitution and flood legislation; they reflect the state tradition 
and philosophy of the 19
th century that continues to shape Germany’s 
concept of statehood, and are endorsed among flood managers and experts as 
well as the judiciary. The choice of the specific HQ standards is, however, 
not only shaped by Germany’s ‘protective’ state but also by other particular 
constraints actors face in Germany’s complex polity. Most notably, 
Germany’s state is characterised as a Rechtsstaat (the legalistic and 
constitutionally-shaped nature of Germany’s state and its operations) and 
Bundesstaat (the Federal structure of Germany). The Rechtsstaat implies 
that risk-based interventions can be subject to judicial review. As a result, 
they have to rest on well-established, technical concepts, such as HQ100, 
and be proportionate (for instance, interventions in the name of safety must 
show that they are essential for the population’s well-being to justify any 
restrictions on the constitutionally guaranteed property rights). The 
Bundesstaat endows the Länder level with veto rights on Federal water 
legislation, restricting the Federal government’s ability to harmonise flood 
management beyond setting a standard widely used across the German 
Länder. Another factor that explains the choice of HQ standards is that flood 
management primarily based on hazard assessment fits well with the 
dominance of water specialist authorities across the domains of Germany’s 
flood regime (reflected, for instance, in the lead role of environment 
ministries and the veto rights of water authorities in flood-related planning 
legislation and decision-making). Traditionally, these specialist authorities 
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focus on calculating water quantities and their distribution over land rather 
than considering the potential damage that floods may cause.   
Macro-institutional variables not only shape the conceptualisation of 
risk in Germany’s flood regime. They can also – at least partially – explain 
why risk fails to make an impression on the area of public spending in the 
flood regime. For instance, political proportionality – as reflected in the 
population-based Königsberger Schlüssel used for the financing vehicle 
GAK – outweighs risk as an allocational principle as a result of the political 
negotiations between Länder and Federal level within Germany’s complex 
polity.  
How does England’s macro-institutional context differ when 
explaining its contrasting risk-based flood management approach? The 
particular form of England’s ‘managing uncertainty’ flood regime is 
connected to the particular exposure of its key actors to public scrutiny and 
blame. This is a result of the concentration of responsibility, and in particular 
the high public profile of the Environment Agency within England’s flood 
regime. This reflects, on the one hand, arguments about blame avoidance 
through ‘agency strategies’ (Hood 2002), specifically through delegating 
responsibility for flood management from Defra to the EA. On the other 
hand, scrutiny and blame are intensified because of the elevated role of 
public discourse and confrontation in centralised, ‘simple polities’ such as 
Britain’s with their ‘winner takes it all’ majoritarian election systems 
(Schmidt 2005). This contrasts with the aforementioned complex Federal 
state of Germany in which political conflicts are resolved through 
negotiations among different parts of the state and key stakeholders in a 
consensus-seeking political culture.  
A second major influence on England’s flood regime are the ideas 
and procedures that stress the performance and efficiency of state operations, 
including New Public Management (NPM) and a performance ‘target 
culture’ (Bevan and Hood 2006). These ideas can be linked to Thatcher’s 
adoption of ‘neoliberal’ ideas that rose as a result of the alleged economic 
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failures of the post-war Keynesian interventionist state in the 1970s. 
Moreover, these economic performance ideas are in turn underpinned by the 
central role of the economic and finance ministry in England’s executive. 
This central role goes beyond budget and macro-economic policies, and 
includes guidance for public sector management (such as the introduction of 
public sector agreements) that shapes the operations of specialist 
departments and agencies. Part of this Treasury-generated guidance has also 
included the endorsement of a risk-based approach to regulation (Hampton 
2005).   
This is not to say that macro-institutional factors determine all 
aspects of the emerging risk-based flood regimes of the two countries. As 
chapter 8 has argued, there are aspects in both regimes where additional 
factors have to be considered. One such set of factors are the historical, 
institutional legacies that are specific to the flood regime of each country. 
They can underpin some characteristics of the regime (for instance, a long 
tradition of benefit-cost calculations in the country’s flood defence domain 
creates a conducive environment for expanding on the use of risk-based 
economic instruments) and explain some of the contradictory arrangements 
in flood regimes (for example, the gentlemen’s agreement between 
England’s government and insurance industry explains the ‘social’ function 
that the insurance market assumes in disaster financing). Another group of 
factors are the political dynamics, most notably the imminent Federal 
election of 2002 that turned comprehensive disaster aid to victims into a 
politically appealing choice. However, the national patterns in risk-based 
flood management are very distinctive for Germany and England’s flood 
regimes, and various institutional constraints and opportunities have been 
shown to be of great important in shaping these particular national patterns. 
What are the implications of these national patterns of risk-based 
flood management for the arguments of convergence and the analysis of 
diversity in risk-based governance? 
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9.2 REVISITING CONVERGENCE ARGUMENTS 
The dissertation identified four arguments in support of an international 
convergence towards a particular form of risk-based governance. The first 
argument for convergence (discussed directly in chapter 5-7) is that a 
particular form of risk-based governance can improve the effectiveness of 
the state or help replace the state with more effective market-based 
governance mechanisms. This argument is inspired by neoliberal critiques of 
the state and advocacy of markets (Peck and Tickell 2002; Peck 2001; 
Castree 2008a; 2008b). Risk offers a solution because risk instruments can 
convert policy issues and responses into quantitative, comparable, ideally 
monetary numbers that make explicit probable damages from certain events 
and the effects of flood management interventions. This allows states to pick 
the most economically efficient interventions (maximising the ‘value-for-
public money’ in flood defence spending and ensuring more targeted ‘better 
regulation’ in land-use regulation) and the markets to price their governance 
‘services’ (adequately pricing the risk transfer from individual to insurer in 
the form of premiums).  
The ‘economic effectiveness’ driver has been found to be only 
partially valid in explaining the emerging risk-based flood management 
regimes in Germany and England. More specifically, ‘economic 
effectiveness’ is one important motivation for adopting risk-based 
governance in the particular institutional settings of England.  
In Germany, risk instruments are fragmented and focus on hazards, 
preventing national level comparisons of the economic effectiveness and 
consequences of interventions. This has been linked to particular structural 
factors, namely the Bundesstaat structure (that prevents the emergence of 
consistent, comparable risk assessments across Germany) and the dominance 
of water and environment authorities in Germany’s flood regime (whose 
shared professional outlook is focused on the hazard rather than the risk of 
flooding). In addition, there are more generic barriers to the 
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‘neoliberalisation’ of Germany’s flood regime that also affect the use of risk 
in governance. Most importantly, cultural and normative factors form 
significant barriers to this ‘economic effectiveness’ orientation. These 
factors stress the provision of safety to the population and the equal 
treatment of citizens. Moreover, the complex Federal state structure also 
highlights the need for negotiations and political proportionality that 
contradict a purely economic rationality. This suggests that under the 
particular German institutional context, a ‘neoliberalisation’ of risk 
governance faces substantial barriers of mostly cultural and normative (as 
well as structural) kinds.  
In contrast, many risk instruments in England take the forms desired 
by those stressing the need to improve the state’s economic effectiveness. 
Risk instruments such as NaFRA and the EFO flood map provided by 
central government organisations consider the probable damage of future 
flood events based on a nationally consistent and thus comparable 
assessment. Moreover, there are procedural (NPM and the target culture in 
the public administration), normative (the rise of neoliberal ideas) and 
structural (the strong role of HM Treasury) variables that promote an 
economic effectiveness orientation in flood management. However, even for 
England’s case, this argument only offers a partial explanation: flood 
insurers do not use risk instruments and the markets do not regulate 
behaviour as might expected by neoliberals. Moreover, the discussions show 
how key actors in England’s flood regime are strongly concerned about 
attracting blame for the failure to protect, and that this has also been driving 
the use of risk in flood management. 
This latter aspect redirects attention to the second convergence 
argument, interpreting risk-based governance as a response to heightened 
demands for transparency and accountability on state actors. These 
heightened demands reflect universal societal changes towards ‘late 
modernity’ (Giddens 1991) and an emerging international institutionalisation 
of an accountability and transparency culture (Rothstein et al. forthcoming). 
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Risk offers a solution to accommodate these demands for two reasons. First, 
risk instruments can make (quantitatively) transparent both what state actors 
deem an acceptable risk and how successfully the state manages 
unacceptable risk. Secondly, risk instruments, calculating and managing on 
the basis of probabilities (as opposed to certainties) can highlight the 
uncertainties associated with the state’s risk management (Rothstein et al. 
2006), as well as justify interventions on the basis of the scientific 
‘objectivity’ and of the proceduralisation of risk management (Porter 1995; 
Power 2004).  
England’s public flood managers use risk instruments to emphasise 
the uncertainty of protection and introducing ‘objective’, risk-based 
procedures into flood management with which to justify policy failures and 
controversial policy choices. This reflects the intensified accountability 
pressures on England’s flood managers that are in turn a result of the 
particular state structure.   
In Germany, however, ambitious safety goals mean that flood 
managers are not especially sensitive to a public backlash in the aftermath of 
flooding, reflecting the difficulties in attributing responsibility for flood 
management in Germany’s complex, multi-level system of governance. 
However, one traditional accountability mechanism has a significant impact 
on Germany’s flood managers, namely the mechanism of judicial review of 
administrative interventions and processes in Germany’s Rechtsstaat. 
Judicial review has a different impact on risk-based governance in Germany 
than in England. In Germany, the prospect of the judicial review (and 
potential annulment of administrative decisions) compels actors to use risk 
in a manner that reduces uncertainty as much as possible – for instance by 
choosing the well-established risk category of HQ100. Arguments that use 
accountability pressures as a cause for convergence in risk-based governance 
therefore need to be treated with caution, since accountability pressures can 
take distinct forms as shaped by the particular institutional context in which 
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actors are held to account, and this can lead to different forms of risk-based 
responses.    
The third argument explains convergence by pointing to the 
functional rationality of risk in emerging flood management approaches that 
increasingly anticipate and stress the adaptation of wider socio-economic 
processes to nature. This new emphasis implies that better risk information 
on future flooding is required not only to design flood defences but also to 
steer human behaviour.  
Even if actors choose not to act in a functionally rational manner, 
another argument that predicts convergence in risk-based flood management 
highlights the institutional mechanisms through which risk-based flood 
management can be expected to be widely diffused internationally. 
Following neo-institutionalist arguments about isomorphism, it can be 
expected that risk-based flood management is diffused internationally 
through various institutional mechanisms, from transnational expert 
networks to imitation of flood management programmes to supranational 
regulations. While the third and fourth arguments do not point to any 
specific form of risk-based flood management, they raise our expectations 
that risk-based flood management in different countries should be similar. 
However, as the discussion of the national patterns argument in the previous 
section showed, risk-based flood management in Germany and England is 
not similar.   
As compelling as the convergence arguments may have appeared, the 
cross-country comparison of Germany and England’s flood regimes has 
shown that risk-based governance can come in different forms in the issue 
area of flood management, and that pressures for convergence can be filtered 
and blocked by institutional factors.  
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9.3 ENRICHING THE DIVERSITY DEBATE 
The diversity of risk in governance has been recognised in scholarly 
discussions, as chapter 3 highlights. This study of diversity in risk-based 
flood management reinforces and expands on these accounts.  
First, some of the diversity literature concentrates on only one set of 
institutional variables. One prominent example is cultural theory (Douglas 
and Wildavsky 1982). According to this approach, choices of regulatory 
regimes and policy instruments can be linked to particular (dominant) 
understandings and perceptions of the nature of the world and cause–effect 
relations (Lodge et al. 2008). The discussion of flood management regimes 
suggests that some aspects of the emerging regimes can be associated with 
particular worldviews, but not all.  
Germany’s safety orientation, for instance, can be argued to reflect a 
hierarchist–egalitarian hybrid worldview, given the efforts to ensure control 
up to a particular level (hierarchy) and the dominance of water authorities 
(egalitarianism in the form of decision-making shaped by a professional 
community). However, it is equally important to consider those structural 
characteristics of Germany’s institutional context (that is, the fragmentation 
in the Federal state) that cannot be easily linked to the hierarchy-cum-
egalitarian worldview prevailing in Germany’s public administration but 
have significant impact on risk-based flood management. 
England’s case also offers some additional insights. In terms of 
worldviews, individualism seems to prevail within England’s regime. Choice 
as a means of control could be argued to be reflected in the individual 
responsibility for picking insurance cover in disaster financing, but also in 
the transparent communication of risk and uncertainty (through publishing 
Flood Maps on the Internet and providing risk advice to local planners). This 
allows actors to make choices about how much risk they are willing to 
accept. However, the individualist worldview normally associated with 
markets has to be revised for the particular flood insurance market in 
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England, where choice is restrained (flood cover is part of the package 
required for mortgage lending) and everyone participates in the 
responsibility for risk in a similar way (thanks to limited price differentiation 
and significant size of risk pool). This underpins arguments about the 
parallel (and competing) existence of worldviews in one regime (here, 
individualist and egalitarian), and points to the need for studying historical 
institutional legacies that may have been formed at a time when different 
worldviews prevailed. 
Second, some of the diversity literature focuses primarily on 
particular government tools and actors. One example is the national styles of 
regulation literature. Vogel (1986), for instance, focuses on environmental 
and consumer protection regulation by the governments in the United States 
and Europe. This dissertation not only looks into land-use regulation but also 
examines the macro-institutional determinants of public infrastructure 
spending (the government tool of ‘treasure’) and the government–insurance 
industry dynamics that shape disaster financing markets and practices (non-
state governance). As chapter 8 showed, the dynamics in a domain such as 
disaster financing are different from the ones in land-use regulation. For 
instance, England’s actors in other domains have been found to be 
attributing a special weight to the economics of flood management and the 
fear of blame attribution. In disaster financing, insurers assume a quasi-
social function (rather than one which stresses economic efficiency) and 
attempt to strengthen accountability pressures on government. Moreover, the 
marginalisation of risk in Germany’s risk-based flood management regimes 
where public spending is required (that is, for flood defences and post-
disaster aid) also points to dynamics specific to the government’s tool of 
treasure, shaped by the specific distributional conflicts within the Federal 
state. These dynamics within flood regimes would not be captured if the 
analysis had focused on regulation only. 
Third, some of the literature on risk regulation regimes has focused 
on diversity between different risk issues within a single country, most 
 315 
notably Hood and colleagues (2004). By undertaking a cross-country 
comparison of risk governance regimes, this dissertation sheds light on the 
impact of institutional variance on risk-based governance, complementing 
the traditional interest group and public opinion analysis used for the 
analysis of risk governance.       
9.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This section briefly discusses two reasons why cross-national diversity in 
risk-based flood management has important implications. The first reason is 
that it is likely to affect international policy integration – more specifically, 
the implementation of the EU Floods Directive. The implementation of the 
Directive is still at its early stages, with all member states having transposed 
the Directive into national law and named competent authorities.
89
 The next 
step is the generation of preliminary flood risk assessments due to be 
finalised by the end of 2011, followed by flood maps and flood risk 
management plans by the end of 2013 and 2015 respectively. To some 
extent, the Directive ensures that national autonomy in flood management is 
safeguarded. Paragraph 10 recognises that the objectives of flood 
management should be determined nationally. Paragraph 16 stresses that 
existing national assessment instruments can also fulfil the requirement for 
developing the various risk assessments instruments required by the Floods 
Directive. At the same time, however, member states are obliged to produce 
assessments and maps of flood hazards and risks (including number of 
inhabitants affected and the type of economic activity) for three probability 
categories (Article 6), as well as flood-risk management plans that include 
relevant information on the costs and benefits of management measures 
(Article 7(3)). As other research on the implementation record of the EU 
directive shows, the record and the actual form of implementation is often 
shaped by the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olson 2004). Knill and 
Lenschow (1998) compare the implementation of four EU directives in 
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Germany and Britain and argue that the EU-required administrative 
adaptation depends on the extent to which a change of the core of national 
administrative institutions was required. Cost-benefit considerations, as well 
as a greater focus on the material consequences of floods, for instance, can 
be argued to require a deeper adaptation from Germany’s actors than from 
England’s.  
While many of the practical deadlines for the implementation of the 
Flood Directive are still a few years away, the very recent revision of the 
WHG (that became effective as of August 2010) suggests that the risk-based 
flood management in Germany will not be amended substantially as a result 
of the transposition of the Flood Directive: While the risk assessment may 
become more systematic in particular by compelling Länder to undertake 
damage potential assessments (WHG §74.4), the practices of risk-based 
flood management remain unchanged in other respects. Most notably, the 
legal category of ‘flood-prone areas’ was abolished, leaving ‘inundation 
areas’ as exclusive regulatory category for local planners and water 
authorities within Germany’s flood regime (WHG §76). 
The second reason is that rivers can transcend national boundaries. 
Flooding is – potentially – a transboundary risk. Diversity in national risk 
assessment and management systems can impede the co-ordination of flood 
management along river catchments. While there are transnational river 
management bodies, methods for risk assessment vary across countries. For 
instance, the Dutch HQ1250 flood defence standard and NRW’s HQ500 
protection level at the Rhine’s Lobig gauge do not result in dykes of 
different height (MUNLV 2008, interview). This is because Germany’s 
dykes normally include a so-called Freibord (distance between top of the 
dyke and the design standard). Different methods of calculating HQ100 for 
the Odra in Poland and Germany have led to different actual protection 
levels (SMUL 2008, interview). An interesting, hypothetical question would 
be whether a transnational river catchment (such as the Rhine river’s) could 
be managed if an upstream nation would apply a benefit–cost ratio at a 
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national level. Investing into flood protection may just not make sense right 
in front of the national borders. One solution might be that the downstream 
country would pay for upstream management measures, as happened, for 
instance, by agreement between Germany and France in 1982 for the Upper 
Rhine (Germany paid for the construction of a retention basin in France).   
9.5 LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This section focuses on the limitations of this dissertation and suggests 
directions for future research thereof.  
One important question concerns the generalisibility of the argument 
about national approaches to risk-based governance and their macro-
institutional determinants. This thesis focused on exploring what diversity in 
risk-based governance may look like (hence, the focus on a traditional type 
of risk of flooding in which risk instruments have been well-established) and 
how institutions have shaped this diversity. But is the management of other 
types of risk in Germany and England organised along the same lines? The 
study of Hood and colleagues (2004) highlights the diversity of the 
governance of different risk regimes in Britain. This casts doubts upon the 
idea of consistent national styles of flood management and risk-based 
governance, and thus would restrict the validity of the national patterns 
argument in the particular case of flooding. However, the effects of the 
discussed institutional variables on the use of risk instruments can also be 
found for other risk types. One example is the recent food safety crisis 
around the EHEC bacterium in Germany that demonstrated the impact of the 
structure of Germany’s Federal state on risk assessment instruments. In 
particular, the often contradictory expert assessments by Landes health 
authorities (such as Hamburg’s), the Robert-Koch-Institute (the research 
institute associated with the Federal Ministry of Health) and the Federal 
Institute for Risk Assessment (the Federal agency associated with the 
Federal Ministry for Agriculture, food and consumer protection) were seen 
as characteristic of Germany’s risk governance. There are further examples 




) in Germany’s complex, multi-level governance 
arrangements. Another example is the threat of energy companies to sue the 
government at the Constitutional Court on the basis of an infringement of 
property rights for its decision to phase-out nuclear power by 2022 (that 
followed a reassessment of risks in the aftermath of Japan’s Fukushima 
nuclear accident in March 2011)
91
. Given the arguments about diversity 
within one country and the examples underlining the impact of the 
institutional variables even beyond flooding, it would be important to 
examine whether the identified national patterns also hold for other types of 
risk. 
Another question is whether the effects of institutional variables and 
the incidence of national patterns of risk-based governance can also be found 
in other countries. France, for instance, combines a number of features of 
both countries. On the one hand France’s state continues to be strongly 
centralised and features semi-autonomous agencies in the fields of food, 
pharmaceuticals, occupational safety, environment and disease control 
(Borraz 2008). On the other hand, there is the portrayal of the state as 
providing security, being in control and pursuing the general interest. 
Tentatively exploring the notion of particular ‘national personality’ types of 
the risk-managing state, Rothstein and colleagues (forthcoming) argue that 
France’s institutional features ultimately result in an approach to risk-based 
governance that stresses secrecy, reactive crisis management and the 
identification of individual public officials as culprits for policy failures. 
How can this notion of a personality be squared with the internal 
inconsistencies found for flood management regimes? Additional cross-
country comparative studies are needed to establish the extent to which 
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macro-institutional variables uniquely determine the emerging risk-based 
governance regimes and to what extent they produce ambivalent outcomes in 
terms of risk-based governance.  
Finally, there is a set of limitations related to choices of time period 
and subnational case studies. For instance, Saxony and NRW were chosen 
because of their pioneering role in Germany’s overall flood management 
regime, providing particularly conducive testing grounds for the use of 
advanced risk instruments. It would be interesting to investigate whether 
there is also systematic diversity between other Länder and what kind of 
barriers (beyond the absence of devastating flood events and resources) risk-
based flood management may have faced in other Länder. Moreover, the 
cut-off date of 2005 in Germany also excluded more recent, potentially 
relevant changes to Germany’s Federalist system. In September 2006, the 
Federalism Reform I (Föderalismusreform I) came into effect. In terms of 
environmental legislation, the framework competency of Federal legislation 
was replaced by permission for the Länder to deviate (in specified areas) 
from the Federal Law through the development of competing legislation. 
This may imply greater diversity in risk-based flood management within the 
German case study, potentially making it more difficult to identify a 
particular national pattern of risk-based governance. For England, the 
Conservative Big Society idea (with its associated decentralisation of 
governance) might reverse the centralising tendency in the flood 
management regime and change its accountability dynamics. How do these 
new pressures and changes affect the institutional context in which flood 
managers operate? 
9.6 SOME FINAL THOUGHTS   
Flood managers have moved a far way from perceiving floods as ‘Acts of 
God’. In part driven by the long absence of major floods in countries such as 
England and Germany, flood managers and the public assumed that 
technical control over natural processes had become possible. The 1990s and 
2000s, however, demolished this assumption. 
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The policy response has two sides. On the one hand, risk instruments 
are introduced because better anticipation of disasters is instrumental for 
adaptation and preparation, increasing a country’s resilience against flood 
disasters. On the other hand, risk instruments deal with retaining the state’s 
legitimacy. This legitimacy is at risk for two reasons. First, the state’s 
resources are finite – and this becomes particularly conspicuous in times of 
austerity. Second, the population in advanced European countries expects a 
high level of safety. This expectation is combined with increasing levels of 
public scrutiny of the state’s interventions.  
This raises the need for risk managers to communicate the limits of 
governance. Both German and English flood managers engage in this 
communication, but with different outcomes that result from different 
institutions. What are the implications of such a limited role for the state in 
its risk management on the society? Where are the boundaries between the 
state and society in the risk society? Who takes the place of the state? 
Insurers? The Big Society? The individual citizen?   
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APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 




1 GDV 2008a 28/4/08 Association of 
German Insurers 
ZÜRS team leader 










4 UBA 2009 30/4/08 Federal Environment 
Agency 
Department of 
Water and Soil; 
Flood management 
officer 






6 LFUG 2008 08/5/08 Environment Agency 
Saxony 
Flood Management 







Head of Flood 
Management 
Department 
8 BMF 2008 13/5/08 Federal Ministry of 
Finance 
Head of General 
Financial 
Administration    
9 SMUL 2008 15/5/08 State Ministry for the 
Environment in 
Saxony 
Head of Unit Flood 
Management 
10 ICPR 2008 16/5/08 International 
Commission for the 
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 All interviews with German experts were undertaken in German. I undertook the 
translation from German into English myself. 
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# Reference Date Organisation Position  
Germany (continued) 










Scientific Officer   
13 Deutsche 
Rück 2008 
23/5/08 Deutsche Rück NatCat Center/ 
Underwriting  
14 LAWA 2008a 26/5/08 Inter-Länder Working 
Group Water 





27/5/08 Ministry for the 


















18 BMVBS 2008 02/6/08 Federal Ministry for 
Spatial Order, Urban 






19 WWF 2008 12/6/08 World Wildlife Fund 
for Nature Germany 
NGO flood 
management expert 











# Reference Date Organisation Position  
Germany (continued) 












21/4/09 Regional Water 
Authority Düsseldorf 








21/4/09 Regional Planning 
Authority Düsseldorf 
Head of Planning 
Department 
25 LANUV 2009 22/4/09 Environment Agency 
of NR 




26 MWME 2009 23/4/09 Ministry of Economy, 
SMEs and Energy of 
NRW 

































# Reference Date Organisation Position  
England (continued) 
31 DEFRA 2008 27/11/08 Department for 
Environment, Food 





Relations to ABI 
32 ABI 2008 12/12/08 Association of British 
Insurers 
Policy advisor on 
climate chance and 
flooding 










Unit; Team leader 
flood mapping  







36 Aviva 2009 16/1/09 Aviva Insurance 
(formerly Norwich 
Union) 
Head of statistics 
and risk assessment 
37 Aviva 2009 16/1/09 Aviva Insurance 
(formerly Norwich 
Union) 
Project Team Flood 
Map; Geoscience 
expert 
38 IDB 2009 27/1/09 Internal Drainage 
Board Linsey Marsh  


















41 EA 2009d 20/3/09 Environment Agency 





# Reference Date Organisation Position  
England (continued) 




43 NFF 2009 30/6/09 National Flood 
Forum 
Chairman  





45 Local Planner 
South Holland 
2009 
20/10/09 South Holland 
District Council  
Head of Planning 
and Development 
46  DETR/DCLG 
2009a 
21/7/09 Department of the 
Environment, 






DCLG Head of 
Flooding, Coastal 




01/11/09 Department of the 
Environment, 













28/5/09 DG Environment Unit Protection of 
Water and Marine 
Environment   
 
